Expansive Discourses
Urban Sprawl in Calgary, 1945–1978
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Max Foran

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Preface

This narrative represents an attempt to explain urban sprawl in Calgary in terms of stakeholder relationships, with the prime emphasis being on the City of Calgary and the various land developers. The focus is purely on residential development, with only minor attention being paid to commercial or industrial growth. Both deserve further academic attention, particularly the role played by the big regional shopping centres on sector planning and development.

This case study concentrates on Calgary. It makes no attempt to assign either singularity or congruence as compared with other Canadian cities, although it seems likely that similar patterns were followed elsewhere. Again the absence of related studies would seem to confirm a need for further study of what to me was a fascinating foray into the dynamics involving profit-motivated private enterprise on the one hand and the multi-faceted municipal public sector on the other.

Given their popular reputation, developers (and City Hall for that matter) loom as easy targets for polemical treatment. However, I was not interested in identifying “good guys and bad guys,” mainly because, in my opinion, legitimate historical inquiry is not about according blame. To assign unscrupulousness and notoriety to all developers is as unfair and ludicrous as to ascribe inefficiency and corruption universally to the City officials with whom they had to deal. What the discussion tries to show is how shared philosophies about the roles of the private and public domains played themselves out against different constraints. To the developers, proper practice lay in meeting the demands of the market and optimizing profits by building houses as quickly and efficiently as possible, and by doing all in their power to sway civic policy makers to the same end. To the City, the demands of the same market needed to be set against wider considerations that dealt with planning conformity and constraints, and infrastructure costs and feasibility. The dialogue between the two sought to achieve a utilitarian balance with respect to the same desired end. This study tries to explain the complexity of their debates from a historical perspective; why each party acted as it did; where each can be criticized; and what might have been.
Finally, a note about sources. The bulk of the research was conducted in the City of Calgary Archives and its fine collection of papers from the various City departments. The reader will note that oral accounts figure very sparsely in this narrative. Except for a few developers whom I consulted mostly for their insights and for practical questions, and former mayor Rod Sykes, whose extensive papers are housed in the University of Calgary Archives, I avoided the oral route. The reason had nothing to do with credibility but more about the fallibility of memory and my reluctance to accord finality to unverifiable statements made about events and sensitive issues that occurred more than 30 years ago. Thus I have chosen to let the written record speak for itself.

Max Foran
Priddis
December 2007
Part One 1945–1962
Historically, Calgary’s economic growth has been closely tied to the beef cattle and fossil fuel industries. However, it was real estate that best chronicled the City’s boom-bust cycles. Competition for land produced the fledgling settlement’s first controversy in 1883–1884 as speculators squabbled over the site of the new town. Falling land prices in the early 1890s brought the first doubters but encouraged optimists who poured money into sandstone buildings and redefined the downtown district west along Atlantic and Stephen Avenues. Speculators made fortunes in the boom years before 1914 selling land and promises to eager buyers. A slack real estate market after 1915 reflected the city’s slow growth, and it took a war and rising disposable income to stir interest in buying and selling city land. The aftermath of the Leduc oil discovery of 1947 brought money and people to Calgary, and a new type of entrepreneur ready to capitalize on rising land prices and demand for housing. Part real estate entrepreneur, part speculator, and part builder, the land developer moved the concept of real estate from the sale of property to a process necessitating large-scale land assembly tailored to consumer wants and involving several stakeholders.¹ With their full acceptance of the goodness of the garden city, and a firm belief in the efficient deployment of resources to achieve it, the land developers and municipal authorities combined to create the template for residential urban sprawl.
The phenomenon of urban sprawl in Canada and the United States has elicited considerable academic attention and discourse. Most studies are generally condemnatory, and focus on housing, transportation, and land-use issues, and on their negative economic, social, and environmental implications. In the United States, urban sprawl has been defined as the dominant issue in planning. Alain Bertaud and Harry Richardson argue that it would cost hundreds of billions of dollars and a 3,400 mile rail system to bring Atlanta's share of public transit to the level of that of Barcelona. European cities, however, are not immune. According to a report from the European Environment Agency, urban sprawl is now a serious problem threatening natural and rural environments. However, not all see urban sprawl as a major problem. To Michael Bruegmann, the term is not an objective reality legitimized by “an entire body of ideas and assumptions,” but rather a cultural concept whose essence defies definition and whose study is distorted by outmoded evidence. In describing urban sprawl as “the latest chapter in a story as old as cities themselves,” Bruegmann argues that cities are a series of diverse landscapes, ever changing and reformulating themselves. Regardless of Bruegmann’s optimism, most observers, and this study, agree with the bleak definition offered by the Sierra Club in 2000 when it referred to urban sprawl as “scattered development that increases traffic, saps local resources and destroys open space.”

This case study focuses on Calgary, and in particular the two main architects whose shared beliefs, differences, and pragmatic interactions shaped the city's residential growth patterns. Though there were other
Participants, the suburbanization process was directed, monitored, and executed through the interplay between Calgary’s municipal authorities and the land developers. The period covered by the study begins in 1945 and extends to 1978, by which time strong housing demand and rising profits in the industry represented solid vindications of a well-established *modus operandi*.

In 1950, when Calgary’s 114,000 residents inhabited an area of 40 square miles, thousands of empty acres were available for settlement. Yet the pattern of indiscriminate land use did not change after 1950. By 1978 the city’s population had reached over 505,000, with the urban boundaries encompassing 189 square miles. It takes no arithmetical wizardry to conclude that the gross densities were virtually unchanged. But at least in 1950, one could point to a reason for a gross density of less than three persons per square mile. The speculative frenzy between 1911 and 1914 had led to large-scale purchases of raw land on the city’s fringes. For example, in 1912, a lot on a windswept field in north Calgary was eagerly snapped up for $500. For four subsequent decades, the owner paid taxes on the undisturbed property. In 1955, when the subdivision of Cambrian Heights was developed, the lot sold for $400. Most landowners, however, either sold at basement prices or, more often than not, defaulted. When the real estate bubble burst in 1914, significant tracts of empty land accrued to the city’s tax rolls as a bitter legacy of misplaced optimism.

Given the difference between the laissez-faire frenzy of the early 1900s and the more controlled civic and business environments of the

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**TABLE 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area (square miles)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>49.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>74.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>151.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>155.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>157.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>162.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>189.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: City of Calgary Municipal Handbook
Part One: 1945–1962

post–World War II era, it seems valid to ask what explained the continuing expansive spatial growth patterns in Calgary, particularly given the already low densities. Is it enough to attribute rampant suburbanization to simple consumer demand? Or did the profit-driven developers have their way with City Hall? Did civic policy making mirror developer demands or was it based on different priorities? How were decisions reached? Was the debate simply between the City and the developers or were there other inputs, and if so, from whom and how? In short, who were the agents who influenced outward residential growth, and how did they interact to produce a consistent pattern of profligate land use? The following study of Calgary attempts to deal with these issues, with an emphasis on the pragmatic dimension that often guides institutional and individual behaviour.

Given the accepted role of the land developers in influencing the suburbanization process in North America, it is surprising that little has been written about the specific relationships with their respective city governments. Ann Durkin Keating, in Building Chicago: Suburban Developers and the Creation of a Divided Metropolis (1987), does trace the interaction between local governments and real estate developers in creating suburban Chicago early in the twentieth century. William Fulton, in The Reluctant Metropolis: The Politics of Urban Growth in Los Angeles (2001), discusses the development industry as being one of the prime movers behind the growth machine that dominated the politics of Los Angeles after World War II. Similarly, Owen D. Gutfreund, in Twentieth Century Sprawl: Highways and the Reshaping of the American Landscape (2004), dwells on the role of developers in creating metropolitan districts around Denver. In Mega Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture After 1940 (1992), John M. Findley discusses housing proliferation, and assumes a lack of civic direction in cities that were out of control. Shoukry T. Roweis and Allen J. Scott argue that governments have been largely ineffective in regulating land developers. None of the above, however, deals with specific relations between the land developer and city governments. Other works, such as Thomas M. Stambach Jr.'s The New Suburbanization: The Challenge to the Central City (1991), Daniel J. Alazar's Building Cities in America (1987), and Nicholas Dagen Bloom's Suburban Alchemy: 1960 New Towns and the Suburbanization of the American Dream (2001), make little or no reference to the development industry, let alone its relationship with city governments.
In Canada, the situation is similar. While Lawrence Solomon deals with the issue of urban sprawl in Toronto in his recent publication, *Toronto Sprawls: A History* (2007), his brief and sweeping study does not place developers in any meaningful context with respect to City Hall. He does, however, associate Toronto’s rampant growth with long-standing civic and other government decisions. Developers receive specific mention in Gerald Hodge’s *Planning Canadian Communities: An Introduction to the Principles, Practice and Participants* (1986), especially with reference to their role in the subdivision process, but Hodge is mainly concerned with explaining the complexities inherent in the planning process and not the actual dialogue between the developers and municipal authorities. He does, however, credit the developers with being “the central actor in the process by which a piece of land is turned into … usable spaces.”

In discussing the significance of Canada’s first corporate suburb of Don Mills in Toronto, Richard Harris, in his recent publication *Creeping Conformity: How Canada Became Suburban 1900–1960* (2004), acknowledges the place of the land developers in influencing the rise of post-war suburban Canada. However, he does not try to integrate their activities with those of local governments. Some of the articles in John Miron et al., eds., *House Home and Community in Housing Canadians, 1945–1986* (1993), and particularly that by John Bossons, “Regulation and the Cost of Housing,” attempt to locate developers in the overall housing market.

In an important study in the early 1980s, Andrew Sanction and Warren Magnusson, in *City Politics in Canada* (1983), rightly argue in their Introduction that civic officials believed they could regulate the development process through creating appropriate conditions. They further acknowledge the reliance by municipal bodies on the initiative of developers, and generally seem to support the argument that city governments drew close liaisons with business interests. However, none of their chapters on several Canadian cities showed how the developers were specifically involved with these “supportive” governments. Barbara Wake Carroll shows how, by the 1960s, big real estate developers building by subdivisions in multiple markets transformed the housing industry. John Meligrana has documented the role of developers in initiating City land annexations, while Jack Masson, in *Alberta’s Local Governments and Their Politics* (1985), touches on developer influence at City Hall. Freelance writer Gabrielle Goliger refers to high land prices in the 1970s as being linked to land speculation by big development companies. John Wolforth and Roger Leigh, in *Urban Prospects* (1971), offer a similar
argument that developers bought raw land and waited for the price to rise before capitalizing. James and Robert Simmons give a more accurate opinion in *Urban Canada* (1969) when they infer that speculators should not be confused with developers.

Probably the best treatment of the land development industry in Canada is by Peter Spurr in *Land and Urban Development: A Preliminary Study* (1976). Using a wealth of tabular statistics and facts, Spurr discusses the emerging concept of land as a commodity, and demonstrates that monopolies by major land development companies were endemic in Canadian cities by the mid-1970s. With respect to local governments, however, Spurr is more interested in public land assembly programs than he is in their relationship with developers. Another good insight into developer operations in Canada is given by Susan Goldenburg in *Men of Property: The Canadian Developers Who Are Buying America* (1981). Unfortunately, although Goldenburg focuses on the growing international influence of large Canadian land development companies by the late 1970s, she offers nothing for the reader on relations with local governments. The only real attempts to discuss the two in any detail are by James Lorimer and other like-minded writers from the publication *City Magazine*. Three books comprise the corpus of what amounted to a scathing critique of developer dominance in the land assembly business and housing industry, a process enabled by collusive or hapless local governments. In *The Developers* by James Lorimer (1978) and the two city books both edited by James Lorimer and Evelyn Ross, *The City Book* (1976), and *The Second City Book: Studies of Urban and Suburban Canada* (1977), the arguments are the same. Undeniably, the sweeping generalities about developer land monopoly, though overstated and biased, do present a generally accurate picture of trends clearly observable in the industry by the mid-1970s. On the other hand, the arguments that denigrate local governments are far too sketchy. Comments that associate sympathetic municipal policies with the emergence of the corporate suburb require far more analysis than is supplied by Lorimer. Three treatments of isolated land scandals involving City Hall are scarcely indicative of general practice. It is doubtful whether any Canadian city has escaped similar individual taint. One has only to note the Calgary scandal in 1959, and the subsequent judicial inquiry which implicated a few City officials and developers in underhand practices. In an insightful critique of *The Developers*, John E. Engeland criticized Lorimer’s use of hindsight to explain an end result. He further noted that while it may be
argued that selected government policies did affect development industry concentration, “no motive or level of consciousness on the part of government at the time of policy selection can be inferred.”

With respect to Calgary, one finds virtually no serious discussion on the land developers and the City. This is somewhat surprising given the fact that of all cities, Calgary was reserved for the most scathing criticism in Lorimer’s *The Developers*. Donald Wetherell and Irene Kmet, in their excellent study of housing in Alberta, deal with several issues relative to land development as discussed in this narrative. Included are affordable housing, the lack of provincial interest in developing a coherent housing policy, and the importance of the Central (later Canada) Mortgage and Housing Corporation. However, they do not deal with land developers specifically, nor with their dialogue with city governments. Geographer Peter Smith has written extensively on planning in Alberta cities but has not integrated City-developer dialogue into his arguments. Nor is it an issue with Robert M. Stamp in his recent book, *Suburban Modern: Post War Dreams in Calgary* (2004). Perhaps the closest to an assessment of this relationship came from D.G. Harasym in his solid 1975 Master’s thesis, “Planning of New Residential Areas of Calgary, 1944–73.” Harasym documented Calgary’s post-war planning strategies and argued that developers were able to use them to advantage. Neither Beverly Sandalack, Brenton Barr, Richard Baine, Harry Sanders, Jack Peach, nor this author for that matter, all of whom have explored related topics, has dealt with this singularly important relationship.

To summarize, the role of the developer in city politics and development is widely recognized, but little understood and certainly not documented. In popular parlance at least, Lorimer et al. notwithstanding, the developer has emerged as a shadowy, often dominant force ready to exert persuasion, charm, will, and pressure as needed on city governments. In this dialogue, the latter is embodied primarily by City Council, a body viewed as largely unable and more importantly, unwilling to resist. In the context of this discussion, the process is not so one-dimensional.

Essentially there were five influencing factors in the suburbanization process. The main players, of course, were the City of Calgary and the land development companies. However, three other participants played important roles, and their presence introduced other complexities and variants to the two-way dialogue that underpins this discussion. Policies
pursued by the provincial government and the Central (later Canada) Mortgage and Housing Corporation (C.M.H.C.) helped shape the way the City approached urban land issues. And seemingly hidden in the whole debate about who was responsible for what in the suburbanization process was the home buyer with his or her hopes and ambitions, and most significant, his or her mortgage money.

THE HOME BUYER

The capacity of individuals to purchase homes brought the land developer, the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, and the City together. Before the 1950s, most people saw housing in terms of need or want. In the post-war period, available mortgage money, rising disposable incomes, high-profile marketing, and amenable policies created the concept of housing as a right. Equally significant was the association of housing with property ownership. This was best demonstrated in the single family residence, or as a City Planner observed in 1974: “Two facts of life that neither the planner nor the public likes to recognize are population growth and the preference for a single family home.”39 The policies followed during this period by endorsing, fostering, and protecting this preference made residential urban sprawl inevitable.

The developers equated the market with the high demand for single family residences. Given the fact that the home buyer paid taxes and voted, the City had no wish to tinker with the demands of this market. Thus, decisions affecting urban growth, whether they were made by the developers or the City, defaulted to buyer preference. Alternative forms of housing were viewed with suspicion by both participants, being tainted on the one hand by prospects of reduced profits and sales, and on the other by potential backlash from angry voters. From the late 1960s, homeowners collectively exerted significant pressure on city governments, particularly with respect to zoning and park areas, resulting in restrictive civic decisions that in turn encouraged expensive and inefficient expansion in all four quadrants.40 A further assumption linked undeveloped land inventories to the cost of housing. Annexations became necessary, since an ample land supply induced competition and led to lower house prices. This flawed scenario, accepted unequivocally by the developers, the City, and the public, became an article of faith and a persuasive rationale for ever-expanding growth.41
Chapter 1: Setting the Stage

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

The power of the provincial government over cities is total and final. With no constitutional protection at all, Canadian cities are virtually creatures of their respective provincial governments. With respect to land policies this control was wielded on several levels.

The first level of dependency was financial. Heavily reliant on the property tax for about 80 percent of their revenues in the mid-1950s, Calgary and local governments generally in Canada were falling behind their provincial and federal counterparts. In 1939, the municipal share of all government revenues was 30 percent. By 1951 the figure had shrunk to 12 percent. As with other Alberta cities, Calgary's borrowing powers were limited under the City Act, as was access to alternative revenue sources. A further source of concern was the $31 million dollars of assessable property and buildings that were exempt from taxation. According to the City in its presentation to the McNally Commission on Metropolitan Growth in 1954, it had suffered financially in the tax transfer agreements negotiated with the Province. The City's brief argued that the provincial replacement grant did not compensate adequately for the loss of the service tax, the power to tax corporations, and the power to levy automobile and licence taxes. In addition to health, education, and public welfare, which took up most of the 40 percent of City revenues supplied by the Province, the City received a Municipal Assistance Grant for general purposes. In 1953 this amounted to $7.546 per capita and translated into a total of $940,724. This amount was clearly inadequate. In January 1955 it was predicted that the City faced a deficit of $6.5 million if provincial grants remained static. To the Province these grants were non-negotiable. An excellent case in point concerned financing for a proposed public land assembly program in late 1952. In declining to assist, the Province advised the City to simply take the money from its Municipal Assistance Grant.

The City was constrained by stipulations in the Planning Act which established guidelines and provision for regulations respecting subdivision requirements, zoning, appeals, and the preparation of general plans. The Provincial Planning Board, and later the Local Authorities Board, could override local decisions on appeal. Later still, the Cabinet had the final say. Annexations to the city had to be approved by the Board of Public Utilities and later the Local Authorities Board. Although not a forceful organization, the Regional Planning Commission was a vehicle for orchestrating planning on a regional basis and had to be consulted on matters.
affecting expansion. Here, annexations and transportation corridors stand as two excellent cases in point. The fact that the provincial government also contributed towards the construction of bridges and main roads affected the City’s ability to plan expansion, a situation exacerbated when final decisions were slow in forthcoming. Further holdups were due to procedures necessary for waivers or special circumstances. For example, provincial approval was necessary for every relaxation of lot frontage requirements in 1969–70 to facilitate special housing projects.

The above notwithstanding, it could be argued that up to the 1970s the Province interfered very little in local affairs. However, while it was not particularly interested in the City’s relations with the land developers, the Province did view suburban sprawl with misgivings, and in the early 1970s was particularly concerned with population concentrations in the two major cities. As such it viewed annexations with some suspicion, especially if they were comprehensive. Nevertheless it could be argued that any direct intervention to circumvent sprawl was tantamount to a holding pattern only. Direct intervention by the Province in City affairs, though an annoyance, was not a major factor in advancing or restricting urban sprawl.

**THE CENTRAL MORTGAGE AND HOUSING CORPORATION**

The role of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (C.M.H.C.) in creating the Canadian post-war suburb cannot be understated, and went far beyond its lending policies, its “watchdog” role, or in its advisory capacity. Its influence was manifest on a variety of levels. Operating well out of the public eye, the C.M.H.C. exercised its considerable powers with a forcefulness that broached no redress. Thus while Calgary’s growth patterns bore the stamp of developer and civic negotiations, it must be remembered that they had already been sanctioned and sometimes moulded by the C.M.H.C. That the overall agendas of all three were similar provides more food for thought to those who would lay the blame for urban sprawl solely on developer greed and civic incompetence or collusion.

First, and most significant, were the C.M.H.C.’s lending policies. The fact that they became increasingly generous with respect to amortization periods, down payments, and insurance disguises the inescapable fact that they were geared towards higher income brackets. Two results were immediately observable. The lack of affordable housing was an issue by the late 1950s, a situation compounded by a civic unwillingness to vary established zoning policies, or to respond to developer pleas for concessions
to allow lower incomes to qualify for a mortgage. Second, these policies fuelled an insatiable appetite for single family dwellings, or to quote one C.M.H.C. official in 1952, “a cottage with a picket fence.” One has only to note the C.M.H.C. encouragement of Neighbourhood Plans in the 1950s, when it allowed longer amortization periods for the single family homes demanded by the concept. The success of the single family subdivision of Thorncliffe, developed in 1954 under the City's first private contract, was due to revised CM.H.C. lending policies. Also, by denying mortgage money on houses without utility extensions, the C.M.H.C. influenced civic decisions to forestall potential fringe communities by expanding the city's boundaries.

The C.M.H.C. also insinuated itself into the development process. By arbitrating lending values, the Corporation established precedents that heavily influenced permanent residential socio-economic differentiation patterns throughout the city. Developers had to approach the C.M.H.C. with respect to the availability of lending money. Approval was not always forthcoming. For example, the subdivision of Lynwood was held up in 1957 because the C.M.H.C. refused to lend money on any residential property that was within three-quarters of a mile of the Imperial Oil refinery. Developers in Collingwood were similarly affected in 1958 when the C.M.H.C. would not release lending money due to dissatisfaction with the construction of eleven intersections. Kelwood could not get the go-ahead for the Southwood extension in 1959 until details were rectified according to C.M.H.C. standards. Since lending value was associated with the cost of services, developers needed to be careful in adjusting their lot prices, and had to consult with the C.M.H.C. respecting any variations. A case in point was the City itself, which prevaricated over selling its own lots on a prepaid basis because of C.M.H.C. lending limits.

The C.M.H.C. monitored the City by keeping a close eye on building dimensions, set backs, side yards, buffer strips, etc. By providing low-interest loans to the City for utilities construction, the C.M.H.C. was able to monitor standards and quality. With respect to zoning the C.M.H.C. was particularly watchful. For example, approval of the subdivision of Wildwood was delayed until zoning adjustments met C.M.H.C. requirements.

The C.M.H.C. was part of the subdivision approval process. It received copies of all outline plans and its input was included in any resubmission process. In fact, in 1968 Carma Developers complained that delays were due to the C.M.H.C.’s refusal to review subdivision plans until approved by the Planning Advisory Commission. In 1967 the Calgary Planning Commission had to table an application from Carma to develop Huntington
Hills Phase 2 because the C.M.H.C. was not prepared to accept the road alignment patterns or the dedication of land to schools.\textsuperscript{56}

While it is true that the C.M.H.C. was not directly involved in every home mortgage, the fact remains that it was the dominant force in influencing housing development generally. Its ubiquitous presence at the planning stages meant that negotiations affecting housing were not exclusive to the City and the developers. Though the C.M.H.C. was interested in alternative housing, there can be no doubt that its lending policies provided the foundation upon which urban sprawl took shape not only in Calgary but throughout the country. Its role cannot be separated from that of the developers and indeed the City itself. In that sense, the C.M.H.C has largely “flown under the public radar” when perpetrators of urban sprawl are singled out for censure.

\textbf{THE CITY OF CALGARY}

Though the focus of the ensuing discussion is on explaining the City of Calgary’s actions in influencing suburban residential growth, it is useful to touch on four points, all of which are crucial to a better understanding of how, and possibly why, the City dealt with the developers as it did.

First and foremost the City and the developers were on the same philosophical page when it came to land development for suburban housing. They believed not only that the private sector was best suited to meet consumer demand for housing but that the demands of the market should decide on both type and location. The role of the public sector was to provide an amenable climate for development, and to guard the general interest through close monitoring and ongoing dialogue. The need to work together to secure these desired ends led to close and intense interactions or to quote one commentator, a “symbiotic interrelationship.”\textsuperscript{57}

The second concerns the uni-city idea. Put simply, Calgary did not want to become like Edmonton, where jurisdictional issues dogged the City of Edmonton’s aspirations to grow. It mattered not to Calgary policy makers that surrounding jurisdictions like St. Albert, Strathcona, Fort Saskatchewan, and Leduc had given the northern city a true metropolitan profile. Calgary was to pursue no such route. The solution lay in swallowing up incipient urban nodes, or in short, embracing the uni-city concept. This belief was long-standing and unequivocal in both Council and Administration. Fringe communities were to be discouraged at all costs, since they represented potential blight and a parasitical threat. Moreover, it was also argued that the uni-city was less expensive to operate than a metropolitan structure, a belief endorsed by one researcher as late
as 1998.\textsuperscript{58} An example in point was the official horror expressed when speculators wanted to develop a satellite town in the present suburb of Haysboro in 1954.\textsuperscript{59} This fixation with the uni-city had tremendous implications for outward growth. It helped explain the City's positive attitude towards large-scale annexations as the best way to avoid fringe communities. A corollary argument suggests that the City's policy of encouraging contiguous outward development was designed to prevent developers from moving just beyond the city boundaries and establishing potential fringe communities.

A third point refers to City decision making as residing solely with Council. Critics like James Lorimer assume that Council's theoretical autonomy is wielded equally at the implementation level. This is a misconception. Jack Masson has suggested in his book on Alberta local governments that city councils routinely endorse 75 percent of the recommendations that come to them. In Calgary's case this figure is probably too low.\textsuperscript{60} According to a University of Calgary political scientist in 1974, commissioners in Calgary were allowed to run the city as if it were a closed corporation.\textsuperscript{61} In referring to the absence of elected officials "at the Development Agreement stage," Alderman Pat Donnelly noted in 1975 that "by the time Council gets involved we are looking at a \textit{fait accompli}—a quasi agreement as one senior planner was recently quoted as saying."\textsuperscript{62} Certainly there were instances when Council rejected advice or when Administration was censured. The controversy over the 1973 secret study on land monopoly stands as a typical case in point.\textsuperscript{63} But these were few. In the vast majority of cases, Council "rubber stamped" Administration's recommendations on subdivisions, rezoning or utilities extensions. The notion too that Councils were irresponsibly pro-developer requires qualification. There were enough "reformers" on Council willing to press their views in meetings that were always open to the public and press.

But the main point concerns City Administration, not Council. The former is a multi-layered structure of committees, commissions, and departments, each with its own mandate and "turf," and some with their own budgets. The Chief Engineer was preoccupied with the feasibility and costs of utilities. Planners stressed rational growth. School Board representatives were suspicious of developer motives when it came to school locations. The Technical Planning Board and its successor the Calgary Planning Commission, whose recommendations went straight to Council via the City Commissioners, saw issues in very practical terms. They were not averse to rejecting plans that did not adhere strictly to
technical criteria, and they did so often. At least a dozen individuals perused every application for subdivision. Sometimes the number of required modifications left a bewildered developer wondering what to do next. Then there were the citizen appeal boards. The Development Appeal Board, for example, was definitely not stacked with developer interests, though in all fairness it did not always see issues in the same light as the Technical Planning Board or the Planning Commission. In summary, there were simply too many inputs from different departments, too much reasoned professional advice, too many budgets to guard, and too many separate decision-making bodies for developers to hold consistent, undue sway over the decision-making process.

The fourth consideration was the City’s need to guard the interests of property. In practice this meant using zoning provisions to protect land values. Given the immense latitude it had with respect to zoning, especially in new areas, the City was overly cautious. This predisposition towards traditional zoning practices represented a lost opportunity to work with developers in achieving a more innovative subdivision design.

**THE DEVELOPERS**

As with the City, the developers’ role is primary to this narrative. The intention here is to outline a profile that generally fits the collective that operated in Calgary from 1954 to 1978. Three points require elaboration. Who were they? How did they interact with the City to secure their ends, and what were the conditions they required for success?

Developers in Calgary over this entire period fell into two categories, defined chiefly by time, although with some overlapping. Up to the 1970s, Calgary developers were not developers in the later accepted sense of the word. The development companies that formed in the 1950s and continued into the next decade were primarily extensions of the Calgary construction industry. Their limited capital was offset by access to relatively easy money in the form of generous mortgage financing, and by the willingness of banks to lend money against the value of undeveloped land. Only in the 1970s, in response to rising land prices and higher anticipated profits, did the “traditional” developer enter the scene.

Builder-developers thus dominated in Calgary until the 1970s. They were several in number. For example, in 1968, nineteen developers operated under agreements with the City. Of the half-dozen or so major operators, the two largest were Carma and Kelwood. Both were owned and based in Calgary, as opposed to Quality Construction (Qualico) and BACM (Winnipeg), or Melton Real Estate later Melcor (Edmonton). All,
however, were tightly integrated into the Calgary construction industry. Carma was a co-operative that drew its initial energy from the Calgary House Builders Association. Kelwood was a consortium identifiable mainly through Keith Construction but which also counted several major Calgary builders and associated construction enterprises as members. For Carma, Kelwood, and the other larger operators, the land development component was simply a practical necessity to facilitate efficiency in the Calgary construction industry. In the main, they were a very fluid group that drew on temporary alliances and brokered informal deals. They knew each other well and formed social associations that transcended their business alliances. That is not to say, however, that tensions did not exist. They did. The fact that these bigger operators drew on a pool of selected local builders to construct their homes led to the exclusion of others. These small builders felt alienated, and it was they who welcomed the arrival of the true land developer like Daon in the 1970s.

Beginning in the early 1970s the pure developer entered the scene. Unlike the builder-developer, these large corporations were interested in assembling and developing very large tracts of land. They operated in several cities in both Canada and the United States. They were not Calgary-based or Calgary-oriented, and were often horizontally integrated. Who did the actual building was irrelevant. The day of the builder-developer was over in Calgary by the mid-1970s, by which time Kelwood and BACM had been swallowed up by Genstar, and Vancouver-based Daon had assembled large landholdings in the city. This left only Carma. However, one could argue that when Carma went public in 1972, it became more oriented towards gross profits than serving the needs of its builder-members, some of whom had difficulty in securing financing for their allocated lots.

The developers' role was facilitated by another group. While they owned the subdivisions and were ultimately responsible for negotiating agreements with the City, the developers looked to private consulting engineering companies to prepare feasibility studies, to make the various presentations to the appropriate civic authorities, and often to design and supervise the construction of utilities. In this period the two major consulting firms were Haddin, Davis and Brown, and later Strong, Lamb and Nelson. Both were locally based. These two were foremost in preparing the studies that informed their developer clients of the viability of a proposed subdivision in terms of cost of development, primarily with respect to utilities, as well as of the chances of approval by the City. Both were excellent intermediaries in that they had developed close ties
with the City and the developers by contracting with both. Because the engineering consulting companies functioned as an effective buffer between the developer and the City, their role in influencing urban growth is both understated and worthy of more intensive study than is given here.

In the main the developers were very proactive in their dealings with the City. They made their intentions quite clear through consistent and insistent correspondence and representations. Some formed personal relationships with senior City officials. For its part, the City recognized their importance and placed them on ad hoc committees like the one that examined the impact of the innovative housing program in 1976. They gave input into the preparation of general plans, sector plans and design briefs, and were invitees to meetings that foreshadowed policy changes. More significantly, however, the developers had their own institutional voice in the Calgary Chapter of the Urban Development Institute (U.D.I.). A North American body based in Chicago, the U.D.I. was formed as an official voice of the land development industry. It was incorporated in Alberta in December 1958 with a specific mandate calling for the economic development of well-planned communities through ethical and harmonious relationships with other stakeholders. The U.D.I. enjoyed a high profile and was generally chaired by a prominent member of the development industry. It negotiated the various developer agreements that defined the rules, operations, and responsibilities of both the City and the developers on both a general and specific subdivision basis. The protracted and often heated negotiations that preceded these agreements generally resulted in the grudging compromises characteristic of wider labour industry agreements.

The developers desired two things from the City. First, they wanted a speedy subdivision approval process. Their singular and regressive lack of success induced a persistent lament about how bureaucratic inefficiency prejudiced the homeowner more than them. The second need was likely the most significant factor in precipitating expansion. The developers argued that they could not operate efficiently without a minimum ongoing three-cycle land supply. They felt that they needed to have a two year supply of lots approved and being built upon, and an inventory of two more years in the outline or approval stage with a further two year supply in the raw state. The result was a persistent clamour that confronted civic administrations on a daily basis from several voices in all four quadrants of the city, all appealing to economies of scale, all with pressing urgency and all with persuasive reasons in the interests of the
homebuyer. Not surprisingly, City responses were largely exercises in reasoned pragmatics.

In broad terms, housing in this period began with assured financing and ended with a built product. At one end of the construction spectrum was the C.M.H.C with its readily available but income-targeted mortgage money. At the other was a proud couple taking possession of a single family detached residence. In the middle were the provincial government, the City of Calgary, and the land developers. Philosophically, they were on the same page. Housing was a private sector matter governed primarily by demand and personal choice and limited by ability to pay. Government’s proper role was to set the rules and then monitor their execution by the developers. The trouble was that the combination of similar philosophies, urgency on the part of the developers, heavy work loads, poorly conceived planning, and fractured decision making at City Hall led to what W. Lucy and D. Phillips in *Confronting Suburban Decline: Strategic Planning for Urban Renewal* (2000) have termed “the tyranny of easy decisions.” 65 Urban sprawl was the unhappy but predictable outcome.

Three themes are explored in the following narrative. All flow from a City decision in 1954 to hand over the development and construction of residential subdivisions to private enterprise, a decision predicated on the issue of utilities installation.

The first theme focuses on the relationship between the City and the developers as demonstrated through the various agreements that bound them. These agreements were the result of intensive bargaining and compromise by the City on one hand and the Urban Development Institute on the other. It will be contended that the City sought effective control by increasing its financial demands and by submitting developers’ proposals to closer scrutiny and accountability. However, it is also argued that this process essentially meant that the developers more than the City were the primary agents for directing urban growth. Two secondary themes that focus on low cost housing and green space will be explored to highlight deficiencies in the City’s understanding and appreciation of this relationship.

The second theme deals with annexations. The overall argument will contend that they were initiated by developers but carried through and supported by the City. The developers promoted annexation because it increased their land banks and enabled lower land acquisition costs. It also allowed greater buyer choice, and could mean cheaper utilities
installations. The City favoured them as a way of ensuring long-range planning, averting the growth of fringe communities, while contributing to lower housing prices. It was also believed, perhaps naively, that developers could be better contained by having them operate within the city rather than just outside the municipal boundaries. In short, urban sprawl was fostered by a process amenable to both the developers and the City. Critical comments that infer collusion between the two over annexation must be measured against the fact that their motivations were very different.

The third theme focuses on the zoning paradox. During this period Calgary operated under either a Development Control Bylaw or a Zoning Bylaw. While Development Control allowed more flexibility in that it involved a virtual but temporary suspension of zoning constraints, both gave the City the power to control and change land use. The following argument will suggest that the City took the path of least resistance by not employing its options under Zoning and especially Development Control more forcibly to secure a greater mix of residential land use in developing subdivisions. Second, for both philosophical and political reasons, City Council and civic administrators were very hesitant about changing the zoning bylaws in the interests of higher density development. When the City failed to capitalize on the flexibility it enjoyed through zoning powers, it allowed a continuation of processes established in the early 1950s.

**Utilities**

On a final note, an overarching theme in this discussion emphasizes the primary role of underground utilities in determining physical growth patterns. It is understandable that most observers would probably relate city growth to transportation factors with respect to cost, location, and priority of construction. Many would not recognize the significance of the labyrinth of underground pipes and ducts that deliver water and which remove sewage and wastewater from every dwelling in the city. Underground utilities were central in determining the direction, timing, and nature of physical growth in post-war Calgary. They were more important than other infrastructure, since the release of mortgage moneys was contingent upon their availability. Perhaps nowhere were there stronger statements made about their importance than those expressed by the City in its Brief to the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Growth in 1954.
The availability of utilities was directly related to topographical and cost factors. In fact, comparisons between cities in terms of spatial development patterns are often difficult given the variables dictated by utilities issues. In that sense, every analysis of a city’s physical growth can be no more than a case study.

The City of Calgary sits where prairie meets foothills. Its terrain is rolling and punctuated by two major rivers and two creeks. The Bow River approaches the city from the west and swings south at the eastern limits. The smaller Elbow River snakes in from the southwest and merges with the Bow at Fort Calgary, a few blocks east of City Hall. Fish Creek runs west-east and joins the Bow in the city’s southeast environs, while Nose Creek runs north-south and empties into the Bow east of the zoo. The result is a series of hills, ravines, escarpments, and valleys that have dictated the transportation routes, green urban space, and most of all utilities easements and rights of way. For example, the height of land and accompanying water pressure problems necessitated reservoir construction, and compromised development in the north above the 3,700-foot contour. Extensive expansion beyond this altitude had to wait until the 1970s when a gravity water supply from the Bearspaw Dam to the west became available. A natural drainage basin to the east precluded residential development there. The fact that the city slopes towards the southeast foreordained the direction and location of the sanitary sewer trunk lines. This impacted in part on westward residential expansion. It was too expensive, for instance, to bring utilities to the Strathcona area in the 1950s and 1960s. The role of utilities is seen elsewhere. The annexation of Forest Lawn, Montgomery, and Bowness was delayed because of the cost of utilities installations. The City’s first plan to encourage residential development on the north hill in 1953 was restricted to the area tributary to the trunk sanitary sewer.67

Utilities extensions were also expensive to install and over the entire period averaged about 15 percent of the cost of a house. Subdivisions thus developed in response not only to feasibility but to costs that may or may not be associated with topographic factors. For instance the length of necessary trunks, and their proximity to treatment plants, pumping facilities, and drainage basins, often determined priority of subdivision construction. Here the role of the City Engineer was pivotal. Not only did he chair the powerful Technical Planning Board in the formative 1950s, but he also scrutinized all subdivision applications in terms of utilities expense and feasibility and frequently recommended against them. For example, he disallowed expansion in Ogden in 1953 because
of sanitary sewer problems, and delayed development in north Glamorgan because utilities capacity was inadequate. The first application to develop Canyon Meadows was refused on the Engineer’s advice because of water supply problems. Generally cautious and protective of his budget, the City Engineer assessed developer initiatives against commensurate civic expenditures. As Commissioner George Cornish once remarked: “Specific financial commitments by the city council to construct capital facilities … was far more definitive in determining the city’s direction of growth than policy decisions which can be changed from day to day and from Council to Council.”

Finally, underground utilities were the most significant arbiters of change. With respect to residential growth, it is contended that the most important decision ever made by the City was to transfer the responsibility for utilities installations from its own departments to the developers. When the City was developing subdivisions it did so in relation to its own capacity to install utilities and construct trunks. However, when the developers secured the right to provide and largely pay for water connections, and sanitary and storm sewers services to residential subdivisions, the City in effect lost the real power to direct growth. The crucial role of the land developers in directing outward residential physical growth virtually fell to them by default.
The decade following the end of World War II saw the City of Calgary face the future with a rare confidence. In fact the City had been dealing with exceptional circumstances since 1929, the last good year before the onslaught of the Great Depression. Until the early 1950s, the City was able to satisfy housing needs through its own departments. By 1953, this task had become sufficiently formidable to require drastic measures. The decision to allow the private sector to finance and construct suburban Calgary heralded the age of the developer. Though alternatives probably existed, the reasons behind this decision were rooted in philosophical considerations and a host of practicalities.

The Calgary of 1944 was hardly a metropolis despite its large area of approximately 40 square miles. Its annual budget was a little over $4 million with a bonded debt of around $9.5 million. Most of the population of around 100,000 lived in the valley of the Bow and Elbow Rivers that converged from the west and southwest at the site of Fort Calgary. Street car routes which followed the valleys defined the level of settlement mainly to the west along Kensington Road, north in the Crescent Heights area, south around Stanley Park, and in the Altadore area to the southwest. The Canadian Pacific Railway maintenance facilities had produced the isolated suburb of Ogden in the far southeast. All areas were served or readily serviceable by utilities. Fringe settlements outside the
Part One: 1945–1962

In 1945 Calgary was unprepared for any large-scale population increase, let alone that which engulfed the city after the Leduc oil discovery in 1947. Between 1946 and 1955, city population increased by 80 percent, a phenomenal number and well above the annual 3 percent increase beyond which existing infrastructure was compromised. Between 1949 and 1953 the value of building permits doubled, reaching over $42 million. More significantly, the City’s bonded debt went from $9.53 million in 1944 to $41.5 million in 1954. These statistics were telling indicators of what became increasingly pressure-filled years for civic administrators. Compounding their problems was the fact that, beyond a pre-war zoning bylaw and a land sale policy that seemed to change by the year, there was no long-range land use policy to guide them.

This lack of direction was manifest between 1941 and 1945 when the City depleted its land bank and subsequently compromised its ability to control the sudden and dramatic growth after 1947. In an effort to counter a severe housing shortage due to wartime constraints, the City had instituted a policy whereby City-owned land was sold well below assessed values. Land on the periphery of the City was virtually given away providing it reverted to acreage. The bargains were tremendous. Twenty lots in the Windsor Park area went for $450. Thirty-four lots in Ogden sold for $250. Thirty-one lots on Edmonton Trail at Ninth Avenue went for $1,400. Farther north on 33rd Avenue west of Edmonton Trail, a whole block sold for $575. Three acres in the Mount Pleasant district went for

<table>
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$40 an acre. Land in the Belfast area was offered at $35 an acre, and some eventually sold at $25 per acre. As of September 30, 1945, the City had disposed of 7,205 lots and 3,505 land parcels for $890,000. In the summer of 1946 alone, 5,390 lots and 434 land parcels with an assessment value of $324,760 were sold for $141,066.

Three results showed the long-term folly of this policy. All had implications for the City's ability to direct development within its boundaries. First, the City later found it very expensive when, mainly for re-plotting reasons, it became necessary to repurchase some of these parcels. One acre on 17th Street S.W. that was sold by the City in 1942 for $1,700 was bought back in 1955 for $14,700. Ten acres were sold to a market gardener in 1947 for $1,500. When the City needed the property in 1955, the owner asked $65,000 and settled for $54,000. Another ten acres in the Richmond area that were snapped up for $1,700 in 1940 were sold to the City in 1955 for $24,000. Given the amount of land the City needed to buy in order to assemble its own housing subdivisions, this extra expense was an unwanted burden.

Second, not only had the City reduced its land bank, but much of it had fallen into the hands of speculators who capitalized especially if their holdings were in areas currently being developed by the City. One speculator who bought over 40 lots at $150 apiece in Altadore in 1946, sold them three years later for over $600 each. The later Turcotte Inquiry documented cases where City officials profited handsomely on real estate transactions in the late 1940s and 1950s. In September 1952 the City tried to control speculation in its Manchester subdivision by placing strong restrictions on land disposal. By 1950 the practice had become rampant enough for the secretary of the Calgary Trades and Labour Council to note that “the person who wishes to build for himself finds he cannot purchase a lot unless he is prepared to go to a speculator and pay at least double the price the City received, a price that is likely to be 3 or 4 times the assessed value of the property.”

Third, the building commitments under this policy resulted in scattered settlement on large parcels of land. Once sold for subdivision purposes they needed to be re-plotted. This was a time-consuming and often expensive process, particularly when residents were holdouts. Others, not pressured by re-plotting, petitioned for utilities. In 1953 the City Engineer commented that such requests were tantamount to “the straw that breaks the camel's back.”

It was standard practice for the City to develop residential subdivisions according to need by surveying and grading the land and then selling
lots to individuals and builders on a bid, or set rate. Utilities were pro-
vided by the City upon petition and partially charged to the homeowner
on a local improvement basis. City policy was to borrow for these and
then clear the debt as quickly as possible.14 It saw no reason to change
this policy after 1945. Between 1945 and 1950 the City developed enough
land for around 700–800 houses per year. In 1950 this figure had
increased to 1,200 lots in eight City subdivisions. In established subdivi-
sions development proceeded a block at a time, with half the lots reserved
for individual buyers and the other half for builders. With new subdivi-
sions, lots were advertised for sale to individuals for ten days, after which
time the building contractors could bid. Competition for lots was fierce.
Builders secured more than their quotas by using stand-ins to buy for
them. When their own turn came they bought as many as they could,
almost always building a single home on two 25-foot lots. By 1952, the
larger builders were developing subdivisions in Briar Hill, St. Andrews
Heights, Parkdale, and Altadore.15 In 1950, Bill Jager paid $3,400 for
40 25-foot lots in order to build 20 homes in the Knob Hill area and
Ellis Keith laid out $8,300 for 63 lots for 30 homes in Banff Trail.
Engineered Buildings bought 125 lots for 63 homes in Parkdale for
$19,200.16 This movement towards the 50-foot building lot, which
became official policy in December 1954, was probably the private sector's
first contribution to the process of urban sprawl.17

As the demand for lots began escalating in 1950, the City tried to keep
up. In 1952, for example, 22 miles of sanitary sewers and 13 miles of storm
sewers were installed. In a 100 percent increase over the previous year,
40 miles of paved and gravelled roads were constructed in addition to
another 70 miles in sidewalks, curbs, and gutter.18 In 1952, over 2,250 homes
were built. Land absorption for residential use jumped almost 60 percent
over 1950–51.19 In 1953 the City opened two new subdivisions in Spruce
Cliff and Britannia as well as additions to established subdivisions in half
a dozen areas. But to the building contractors, it was simply not enough
to meet continuing demand. In a very explicit but tactfully worded pre-
sentation to City Council on October 15, 1951, the Calgary House Builders
Association painted a dim picture of subdivision development. Impassable
roads discouraged prospective buyers. The Association called for several
remedial measures that included double shifts by the City Public Works
Department during the summer months and a more sustained attempt
to integrate utilities installations into the overall construction process.
In one telling statement the Association noted that one of its members
“has, at his own expense graded roads in the property he is developing
and we are certain that this will pay him dividends in a quicker and easier
sale and in being able to complete his house sooner.20 A few months
later a Building and Planning Department report, in offering solutions
to increase the percentage of annual development in City-owned lands,
suggested that one viable option was to allow private contractors to buy
and develop the land.21

It was against this background of concern that the events unfolded in
1953–54 which resulted in the significant policy changes that were to
determine the future of residential development in Calgary. Three forces
were at work. The exigencies associated with the first two lent plausibility
to the City's actions. The third imposed an inevitability that left the City
with no option.

The first was the rising doubt over the City's financial ability to con-
tinue its present policies. After 1950, as the demand for utilities increased,
greater strain was placed on local improvements and the debt charges
necessary to retire them. Between 1944 and 1953 local improvement
expenditures increased over twelve-fold. For example, the cost of install-
ing utilities in an area of Spruce Cliff amounted to over half a million
dollars.22 By 1954 the utilities portion of the debenture debt was
$11.5 million, or double what it had been in 1950. The amount charged to
local improvements had risen from $2.8 million in 1952 to $7.8 million
in 1954. Overall debt charges were rising rapidly. On a per capita basis
they had increased from $56.79 in 1944 to $141.46 in 1954. They were esti-

tated to be one-fifth of City expenditures in 1955, and fears were being
raised that the debt was approaching an unacceptable 64 percent of per-
missible borrowing.23 Most disquieting, however, were reports by the
Chief Engineer on projected utilities and road costs to 1957. Com-
missioners were appalled to learn that utilities expenditures would amount
to $13.9 million, with another $10 million for streets and bridges.24

Faced with these disturbing prospects, the City first sought the alter-
native of exploring the Edmonton example, where lots were sold on a
prepaid basis, that is, with the cost of utilities and other services built
into the price of the lot.25 After consulting with the C.M.H.C., which
expressed concern over the loan implications of higher land prices, the
Commissioners prevaricated. It took another year before Administration
reluctantly concluded that prepaid utilities constituted an effective
method of controlling rising local improvement costs. Noting that the
price of lots would more than double, Administration recommended
the new policy with qualifications on January 19, 1954, and it was adopted
by Council on May 25. It was to be applied only in new subdivisions, and
restricted to sewer and water in lower income areas. The policy was not popular. The City had to revert to selling under local improvement when lots in the City subdivision of Lynwood went unsold. Though the policy of selling City-owned lots on a prepaid basis was to continue for several years, it was never given a serious chance to justify its worth given the City's early abrogation of the field to the developers.

The policy of prepaid utilities compounded the second issue that pointed to the new direction. The City's inability to meet demands for housing and to provide roads and utilities had led to buyer unhappiness. In 1953, people stood in line for three days hoping to buy one of the 118 lots being sold in the new subdivision of Spruce Cliff. Utilities installations lagged, and were often not in place when house construction was completed. Spruce Cliff was described in June 1955 as a "glorified mud hole," and a month later the Spruce Cliff Improvement Association complained to the City of impassable roads that defied emergency vehicles. The City Engineer pleaded with his superiors to install utilities more quickly in subdivisions involving public and private development, noting that the City "should rough grade their land first just like the private developers who improved their land much faster than the city." Other problems involved land assembly, where holdouts made it very difficult to assemble land on time for the construction season.

There can be little doubt that by 1953, the City was feeling the pressure of utilities provision in new subdivisions and the mounting debts being charged to local improvements. Clearly new measures were warranted, and the official mindset had not settled on prepaid utilities. The alternative of moving the financial burden from the public to the private sector was foreordained by 1953. However, it had less to do with financial circumstances than one might imagine. There was an inevitability that transcended civic policies, an inevitability that was linked to developer initiative and to cries of land shortage. These two factors, visible in the second half of 1953, were to reappear repeatedly over the ensuing 25 years as the twin drivers of outward residential development.

As late as 1953, the City was not anticipating any expansion of its boundaries. Indeed, if anything, the situation seemed the opposite, as evidenced by a Building and Planning Department report in 1952. The Report concluded that the most disturbing feature of physical expansion between 1946 and 1952 was the release by the City of considerably more land than was needed to accommodate increased population. The Report claimed that land serviced between 1946 and 1952 had been only 60 percent built up at an unacceptable density level of 7.3 persons per
Chapter 2: Going It Alone, 1945–1954

It further argued that the projected population increase of 25,000 between 1953 and 1957 could be almost entirely contained within land already serviced. These contentions were later supported in July 1953 by a more detailed report by the Calgary District Planning Commission and the City of Calgary Planning Department. Essentially the City’s first long-range plan, the Report stressed the crucial need to integrate the economics of utilities installations into population growth projections. In predicting growth to 1980, the Report argued that only 1,769 acres would be required outside the city limits at 10–12 persons per acre to house the anticipated population. Warning of the danger inherent in liberal land-use policies, the Report noted prophetically that “it will be most difficult to enforce any conditions requiring the construction of buildings within a certain time if more land is released than is actually required to satisfy the calculated public demand as opposed to the demand of the contractors.”

The latter report significantly underestimated population growth and clearly demonstrated the rudimentary nature of planning projections in the early 1950s. In predicting that the oil boom would be temporary, the report anticipated a slowdown in population. The city’s population increase was expected to fall from its present 8,000 a year to 3,000 by 1960, and to 2,000 after 1967. It is small wonder that the 1980 projection of 230,000 was off by about 330,000. The point is not that the projections were wrong but rather that they reflected current thought within segments of the civic administration. In 1958, after admitting that the City had underestimated the rate of expansion, the City Planning Department still stood by the report and noted that the basic principles of the plan were still valid.

A month later, in a follow-up to the July 1953 report which had recommended residential development north of the Bow River, the City announced a major plan for housing construction there. The plan was feasible, since most of the land was City-owned and easily served with utilities. Development was proposed west of Mount Pleasant through Rosemount and Cambrian Heights, Capitol Hill and Collingwood through to Brentwood and Charleswood, all within the city limits. On August 31, 1953, Council authorized the acquisition of a 300-foot right of way for trunk sewers to serve “a vast area” of residential land in northwest Calgary to be opened for development in 1954. It was a well-reasoned and attractive plan that envisaged modestly priced residences. The plan also called for the development area to be constrained by a
continuous band of open spaces in the form of parks, golf courses, and where topography dictated, natural green space areas.

Thus, in terms of future growth, the City had recommendations and a plan in place in the fall of 1953 that might have restrained expansion or at least held it off until alternative polices were thought through and executed. This was not to happen for a very simple reason. The presence of two developers operating on the city fringes influenced civic administrators by pleading land shortages. The inevitable results were annexations and a transfer of development initiative to the private sector.

The first change agents were the engineering consulting firm Haddin, Davis and Brown, and building contractor Ellis Keith. In 1952 a feasibility study conducted by the former revealed the cost-effective potential of developing certain lands outside the city limits. In the fall of 1953 Ed Davis, President of Haddin, Davis and Brown, approached Chief Commissioner Ivor Strong respecting a particularly appealing area just west of the city limits at 37th Street S.W. At the same time, building contractor Ellis Keith was seeking land to satisfy the growing demand for housing. In fact Keith was interested in the same piece of land and had actually approached the City about the feasibility of utilities connections there. Davis and Keith linked up. The results were fourfold. The first was a “gentleman’s agreement” with Ivor Strong to bring the subdivision into the City through annexation upon completion. The second was an understanding that utilities installation costs were to be borne by the developer. The third was the formation of Kelwood Corporation in October 1953 with Ed Davis as president. The last was the purchase of a quarter section of land at $400 an acre and the construction of the subdivision of Glendale, primarily by Ellis Keith, Bill Jager, and other Kelwood builders. A few months later, after the formation of Kelwood, Art Sullivan, a Kelwood founding member, commenced the subdivision of Corlet, later Meadowlark, just outside the city’s southern limits.

The formation of Kelwood reflected the dovetailing of specialized interests that characterized Calgary’s early land development industry. It was born out of mutual need rather than a conscious attempt to dominate the market. Kelwood was a vertically integrated company but resembled a consortium through its individual participants. The five founding members who contributed the sizable sum of $120,000 to launch the company were engineers Haddin, Davis and Brown; utilities specialist Borger Construction; and builders Keith Construction, Bill Jager, and Art Sullivan. The latter soon left the organization and his place was taken by Burns and Dutton, a large construction company whose principal
work was in streets, sidewalks, and paving. When Haddin, Davis and Brown terminated its association in 1961, it was replaced by Delray Engineering, headed by Les Cosman. Later, Sun Gold Investments joined the corporation. Kelwood's rapid growth reflected the rising demand for housing. Within three years, the company was constructing around 40 percent of new homes in the city. The need to counter Kelwood's monopoly was a pivotal factor influencing the formation in 1958 of the second of Calgary's home-grown major land development companies, Carma Developments.

The pioneering role of Ellis Keith in the Calgary construction industry also deserves mention. A missionary's son from Raymond, Alberta, Keith, like most other builders of the day, started out with virtually nothing, operating from a two-by-four shack near the Louise Bridge, and after founding Keith Construction in 1950 began building homes in Parkdale. Ever practical, Keith followed the market and concentrated almost entirely on building single family residences on large tracts in the city's southwest. His vision manifested itself in three national awards for design, and in his innovative lake communities. Over the years Keith tightened his hold on Kelwood until its ultimate disposition to the Genstar group in the early 1970s. In the interim, Keith and fellow Kelwood executives like Ed Davis and Norm Trouth were tough negotiators, and it was they who comprised the first developer team to deal with the City on a large-scale, long-term, consistent basis.

The second initiative came from the Calgary House Builders Association and the Spyhill Development and Holding Company. Spyhill was incorporated in May 1953 and headed by a group that included plasterer-builder Frank Howie, and teacher-turned-farmer-turned-builder John C. McLeod. Howie and McLeod, both members of the Calgary House Builders Association, had heeded a general importunity to the membership from the Association executive to acquire building tracts for development. They persuaded local landowners and business acquaintances to participate in the purchase of around 400 acres of ranchlands north of the city limits for $52,000, and then approached the City. In a brilliant strategy, B.L. (Tiny) Gienow, Chair of the Calgary House Builders Association Show Homes Committee and the man responsible for Calgary's first parade of show homes in 1952, suggested that the 1954 Parade of Homes be located in the new subdivision. The result was remarkable. The 1954 Parade of Homes opened in Thorncliffe Heights on August 21, 1954 and consisted of 23 show homes built by members of the Alberta House Builders Association. In effect what might have been just another development
proposal became a joint effort involving a sizable percentage of the Calgary construction industry. It was a phalanx not easily ignored, a fact evidenced by the co-operation extended to the developers by the City.46

As 1954 unfolded, Thorncliffe Heights took definite form. Construction of the show homes was under way, and in May John McLeod, through a written agreement with the City, bound Spyhill to install utilities and services in Thorncliffe Heights at its expense.47 In addition to paying for utilities installations within the subdivision, the company had to pay the City $9,305 for sewer leads from the Nose Creek trunk and $62,000 for the water extensions.48 Details as to why utilities in show homes outside the city limits were connected to the city system are unclear. According to McLeod, the installation was possible because Spyhill obtained an adjacent piece of land that projected south into the city.49 In any case, the show homes were ready for opening on August 21. For the next two weeks, Calgarians braved the mud and rode buses hired by the company to visit the impressive display of homes on Thornton Road. Over half a million dollars were spent on these houses, which boasted innovations like double sliding closet doors, “ceiling” windows, all metal kitchens,
and living rooms designed to include a television set. In addition, two large halls featured over 20 exhibits by local companies and included appliances, paints, wallboards, carpeting, and draperies. Builder-participants in the 23 show homes read like a Who’s Who of the Calgary construction and development industry present and future. They included Keith Construction, Quality Construction, Nu-West Homes, Engineered Buildings, Art Sullivan and Co., and Jager Construction. Special note was made that all homes were eligible for financing under the recently amended National Housing Act. Blessed with C.M.H.C. approval, Thorncliffe Heights, with its contoured streets and the conveniences of shopping, schools, and churches, was a grand display of the Calgary of the future, and a prototype for the “Neighbourhood” concept of subdivision development recently adopted by the City. Not surprisingly, the Parade was an unqualified success. With projections for over 600 houses modelled on the show homes, the City had been presented with an irresistible lure. Annexation, already assumed by both the City and Spyhill, had now become inevitable. A month later, the District Planning Commission asked the City Engineer and Planner to furnish details respecting utilities
costs in the area to be annexed and further to consider annexation in terms of wider plans for urban growth.\textsuperscript{53}

The Thorncliffe Heights subdivision was crucial in that it was the first to be covered by a written understanding that transferred the costs of street and sidewalk construction and utilities installations from the City to the developer. Though brief, it outlined a division of responsibilities and financial commitments. The subsequent standard developer agreement which evolved between 1955 and 1958 defined a way of doing business that was to change little over time. Though Spyhill continued in the development business, it never rose to the position of dominance occupied by either Kelwood or Carma. It can, however, lay claim to precipitating the change that shifted the onus for suburban residential development from the public to the private sector.

In January 1954, Spyhill and Kelwood began a dialogue with the City that integrated annexation with their provision of services. On January 12, Spyhill made formal application to the City for annexation, arguing that its 775 lots “will go a long way towards assisting the City of Calgary in meeting the demand for lots in private homes in the year 1954.” It also stressed the fact that several builders wanted assurances that annexation would take place before proceeding with confidence.\textsuperscript{54} Kelwood argued it would be cheaper and easier for the City to maintain essential services like police and fire protection and garbage disposal in Glendale if the area was in the city.\textsuperscript{55} Predictably, the annexations went through without trouble. Six and a half sections running east-west and including Thorncliffe Heights were added to the city northern boundaries by a Board of Public Utilities Order on September 9, 1954.\textsuperscript{56} Spyhill’s favoured position through its written understanding with the City was evidenced by the fact that the effective annexation date, first set for December 30, 1954, was later changed to December 30, 1953. In the absence of a written agreement, Kelwood was not so fortunate. Though Glendale was included in an annexation order on February 28, 1955 for a half-mile strip to the west between 37th and 45th Streets and from the Bow River to 50th Avenue South, it was made effective December 30, 1954.\textsuperscript{57} In urging this annexation, Kelwood had wanted it predated to December 30, 1953 so that it might recoup maintenance expenses from the City. The Board of Public Utilities, however, agreed with the City and the Municipality of Springbank, both of which preferred a December 30, 1954 date. In early 1955, land adjacent to Art Sullivan’s small acreage in Meadowlark was annexed.\textsuperscript{58}

As annexation became a reality, the developers were determined that there would be no going back. Soon after the north annexation in
September 1954, a developer in Thorncliffe Heights sent a strong letter to the City noting that the only holdups being experienced were due to the City's failure to meet its obligations. It further warned that any return to "the old system" was unthinkable. Kelwood later provided the new philosophy towards land use when it informed the City of its intention to buy 130 acres for a new subdivision in the proposed annexation area. In calling for the City to allow it to integrate development with public demand, Kelwood noted that "It is not either in the city's interest nor Kelwood's interests to service a great deal of land which will lie idle and undeveloped."

By the end of 1954, an era had ended. The way was open for residential development to pass to the developers through the right to construct and pay for utilities installations and roads within their subdivisions. Though abetted somewhat by the City's financial constraints, the change was largely brought about by two companies. One took the informal route, and by assuming the total costs of construction secured a verbal agreement with the City for annexation upon completion of its Glendale subdivision. The other guaranteed annexation by involving local builders in a Parade of Homes in Thorncliffe and by assuming the financial responsibility for utilities installation through a written agreement with the City. In this sense the transfer of utilities installations to the private sector and the beginnings of gross expansion were complementary.

Discussion

Two central points of discussion emerge from the events that transpired up to the end of 1955 respecting the developers' future role in subdivision development. The first concerns need, and the validity of the City's actions in transferring the cost of utilities installations to the developers. A corollary questions the wisdom of delegating this new responsibility to developers operating outside the city limits.

Arguably the City did not have to transfer the cost of utilities to the developers. It could have maintained the current policy and continued to fund the installations through local improvement taxes. The true costs of a house were more hidden when the developer was able to integrate them into the mortgage. Furthermore, given the City's general belief that it faced a drastic population slowdown after 1960, it was surprising that no one at City Hall opted for continuing what was, after all, accepted policy. The prepaid services option was not given enough chance in spite of the fact that it was practice in other Canadian cities. An initial negative
reaction was predictable, and doubtless would have abated through time. After all, homebuyers had to buy their lots prepaid from the developers. Even after the developers assumed the utilities costs, the City continued to sell and develop subdivisions on a prepaid basis, but half-heartedly and with the avowed intention of withdrawing altogether as soon as practicable. A general utilities tax was another alternative.

Over 20 years after the decision to hand over servicing costs to the developer, the City offered its opinion on the financial impact on the homeowner. In a submission to the provincial government on developer agreements in 1977, the City argued that the homeowner would not have benefited financially had services been installed by the City and charged to local improvement as was the practice before 1954. It was an interesting conclusion and one based on cost analyses and available figures, and not on the rationalization one might have expected in the mid-1950s.61

It appears that three factors guided civic administrators in their decision to shift this significant responsibility to the private sector. First, senior civic administrators during this period, and especially in these early years, were very conscious of their fiscal responsibilities. Unaccustomed to rapid growth and its financial costs, the City Commissioners shrank before the daunting implications of long-range capital expenditures and the tax increases necessary to sustain them. As one of the Commissioners on the McNally Commission on the Metropolitan Growth of Calgary and Edmonton noted in 1955, "City Councils are as reluctant as any other elective assembly to identify themselves with increases in taxation."62 Furthermore, individual departments guarded their budgets zealously, particularly the Chief Engineer, whose caution was manifest and on whose advice the Commissioners relied so heavily. Equally worrying was the problem of ensuring that the City had the manpower on its payroll to keep pace with development. It was also believed that the City was a laggard when it came to utilities installations. The year 1953 had convinced the Commissioners of this deficiency. Finally there were the administrative and public relations headaches associated with implementing and maintaining a rapidly expanding public service. With complaints from the public about delays, unfulfilled commitments, and vague predictions about when and where utilities would be available, a harassed and understaffed administration sought the best practical alternative, one that stood waiting in the wings and very able and more than willing. Simply put, the developer route was easier to go. It was believed to be cheaper and was certainly faster. It also promised fewer headaches. One
is reminded of a later comment by Mayor Rod Sykes respecting this decision: “We abandoned the pay as you go system a number of years ago. We did it for municipal convenience, for administrative comfort and not for the good of the community.”

Here the City's experience in developing the subdivision of Britannia is illuminative. Situated on scenic land above the Elbow River, Britannia was conceived in 1953 as a high-priced subdivision. Admittedly it was a risky gamble. Some of the land was in private hands, which necessitated some financial arrangements prior to the obligatory re-plotting process. Heavy expenditures were needed to convert the rolling ground into 240 lots, a figure that ultimately exceeded $4 million, of which more than half was to be assumed by the property owners in local improvement taxes. Furthermore, there were uncertainties regarding the public response to lots that cost as much as $7,650 without utilities, many on wide 80-foot frontages and all with building restrictions. Nevertheless, after rejecting a generous purchase offer from the Toronto General Trusts Corporation, the City lined up seven building contractors, launched a strong advertising campaign, and went ahead.

The extent of the gamble was soon obvious. Even before lots were sold the City was being criticized for turning one of Calgary's scenic areas into “an unpleasant sore on the face of Calgary.” Lots sold slowly even on a local improvement basis. When sales opened, there were only eight buyers for lots at the upset price of $6,000 per lot. The City was forced to drop its price for the most expensive view lots to $5,000 and to $3,000 and under for the inside lots. By the end of 1954 only half the subdivision had sold. Though the Superintendent of Land and Rentals was later to remark with some justification that “we consider Britannia the best residential area developed in Calgary to date,” one wonders about its sobering effect on civic officials. Were such harrowing experiences worth the effort?

The City also believed that privately developed subdivisions were more cost-effective and efficient. In August 1953, an engineering consulting firm advised the City that development costs per lot favoured the private developer over the city by $251.74. When the City sold its Belfast subdivision it debated whether to install utilities and services itself or contract the work out. Its estimate of $670,000 was easily undercut by Poole Construction's bid of $601,000. According to Ed Davis, Kelwood could build a house at a cost savings of over 20 percent as compared with the
The Kelwood engineers organized all the paving utilities and earth moving contractors, and house builders to achieve the lowest total costs. All services, domestic sewer and water, storm sewers, streets, curbs and sidewalks, electric power and natural gas lines were constructed in advance of the houses to facilitate their year round construction on a dry site. Arrangements were made [for] the gas company to co-operate with Kelwood and lay gas on predetermined grades. Using portable heaters, concrete pouring, plastering and painting walls could be done in otherwise cold, idle months. The engineers developed the rolled curb and continuous sidewalk which was cheaper to build and also allowed the placement of a front driveway to accommodate any choice of house plan.71

Davis also felt that Kelwood’s policy of buying large land parcels in easy-to-service areas resulted in lower lot prices, citing as examples the purchase of Harry Hays’ dairy farm for Haysboro; the Earl of Egmont estate for Willow Park and Lake Bonavista, and the Burns ranch lands for Fairview, Acadia, Parkland, and Midnapore.

The second issue, as to why developer-installed utilities initially occurred outside the city limits, is more speculative. One would think that a shift of this magnitude would occur within the city where the need was greatest. According to the two reports discussed above, the City had enough land within its boundaries to support significant development. Certainly one developer thought so. In June 1953, E.L. Wade, Manager of the Glencoe Engineering and Development Co. Ltd., brought the matter to Commissioner Ivor Strong’s attention. In his letter, Wade identified his group as a syndicate formed by members of the Calgary House Builders Association, and suggested that private developers should be responsible for preparing and servicing subdivisions on City-owned land. Specifically, Wade offered to buy City-owned land for $1,000 an acre and service it with sewer and water, sidewalks, curb and gutter, and gravel roads to the City’s specifications. His rationale was cost-efficiency:

It is our contention that in this way property can be serviced much more readily at a smaller cost in actual per lot service charge and the City would not be asked in any way to bear any of the local improvements such as there are today in the subdivisions where improvements of side streets and the like deduct a considerable amount from the actual sale price of each lot sold by the city.72
It seemed like a reasonable suggestion. Both City- and privately owned land within the corporate boundaries would be developed by private developers. The significant difference was that the City would no longer be responsible for utilities installation and roads. Moreover, it was argued that development costs would be less and therefore beneficial to the homeowner. The City, however, did not follow up.73

The decision to allow development in Thorncliffe Heights (or even Glendale for that matter) raises some questions about the planning process and policy making. The fact that the Thorncliffe subdivision was not contiguous to any existing built-up area ran contrary to City policy. Second, it violated the North Hill Plan of 1953 in that it was located beyond the anticipated green belt. Third, the subdivision was developed outside the city limits on terms that the City was not legally able to offer. When the matter of annexing Thorncliffe finally came to Council for approval, several aldermen were unaware that the subdivision was outside city limits.74 Certainly, the City had the Municipal District of Conrich’s approval on the assumption of pending annexation, and any question of legality was later removed when the annexation order was back dated to take effect on December 30, 1953. Nevertheless, the fact remained that the City had sanctioned residential development outside its boundaries.

However, it seemed that there were compelling reasons for allowing residential development to take place beyond the corporate limits. First and most significant was the ready availability of utilities. In Thorncliffe, sewer trunks along Nose Creek were accessible, and they posed no problem at all in Glendale. Second, the merits of physical expansion had already caught hold regardless of any study that confirmed a good supply of available land within the city limits. Even before any approval was given to either Kelwood or Spyhill, the two most senior City administrators had decided that the present corporate boundaries were too limiting. Planning Director A.G. Martin told the Calgary District Planning Commission as early as 1952 that the city would need to expand physically in the near future.75 By early 1954 he was convinced that there would be no slowdown.76 He also associated residential containment within the city with higher land prices.77 Martin was supported by Chief Commissioner Ivor Strong, who told the Board of Public Utilities that it was cheaper to provide services on land in annexed areas than in the city.78

The City also saw annexation as a vehicle to acquire additional developable land at little or no cost.79 The annexations in 1954 concerned more than just the subdivisions of Thorncliffe Heights and Glendale. In January of that year, the City approached the municipal district of Conrich,
City newspaper advertisement for tenders in its subdivision in Britannia, 1953.
where Thorncliffe Heights was located, seeking co-operation in a submission that would involve several sections beyond the subdivision to the east and west. Furthermore, no opposition was expected. The municipal districts of Springbank and Conrich allowed Kelwood and Spyhill to develop urban subdivisions on their periphery, knowing that annexation was a virtual certainty. As such they did not oppose the annexation applications. Similarly, the District Planning Commission, of which Calgary was a member, had no real power to force Davis, Keith, and the others to refrain from developing. Moreover, annexation was welcomed by fringe areas. Most people in the proposed areas to be annexed did not want to become part of the large municipality recommended by the Provincial Co-Terminus Boundary Commission, and therefore were not only amenable to annexation but actually anticipated it. Other landholders welcomed annexation because it brought an increase in property values.

Purely practical factors were at work. Ed Davis and the City were well aware that the Glendale subdivision was easily accessible to utilities connections. Indeed this was the crucial factor that underpinned the “gentleman’s agreement” between them in October 1953. Another reason related to the developer’s increased responsibilities if the subdivision was outside the city. Kelwood, for example, had to install everything in Glendale, including storm sewers and flankage, with some hope that the company would be reimbursed upon annexation. This did not occur. As for Thorncliffe, one can only assume that its promotion and support by the Calgary House Builders Association in a time of high housing demand were simply too much for beleaguered civic officials to ignore. After all, they had been told in late 1953 that lot demand exceeded existing supply by 1,000.

A further reason could be linked to what became a familiar refrain, well-orchestrated by vested interests and repeated over and over again through the years until it became an accepted theme song. Developers consistently maintained that there was insufficient land within the city to meet demand, a claim often supported by civic officiandom. The Calgary House Builders Association, Kelwood, and Spyhill were simply the first in a long succession. Though refined over the years to include a relation to housing costs and assured inventories, arguments about a land shortage were central to the urban expansion debate throughout the period under discussion and beyond. In this instance the differences in predictions about lot availability doubtless helped the expansion cause. Loud claims by the Calgary House Builders Association in early 1955 that demand exceeded supply by 1,000 lots in the coming construction season
more than counterbalanced a City statement made a few months earlier that the lot situation was tight but not desperately so.82

In all probability the “shortage” was related to other factors. For example, the 1952 and 1953 reports that documented large-scale land under use in the city were not accompanied by any details on location, suitability, or cost. Indicating adverse topographical factors and the distance from sewer trunks, developers contended that available land inside the city was scarcely “available” if development costs were significantly higher than on land beyond the corporate limits. The desire of the developers to pursue higher profit margins and the disinclination of the City to restrain them via regulation or incentive had thus emerged very early.

Finally, the City was not about to discourage private enterprise and interfere with market demand. To civic policy makers, the initiative of two developers simply reflected both principles in action. This attitude was clearly apparent when the City declined to take advantage of a generous offer by the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation in support of a land assembly program. In November 1952, the C.M.H.C. offered to provide 75 percent of the cost of acquiring 5,000 acres of land outside the city limits in the southwest. When the Province refused to put up the other 25 percent, the City declined to become involved. 83 This shortsighted rationale showed the City’s reluctance to interfere in the market by influencing residential housing development. One wonders what might have happened if the City had had the foresight to take advantage of this remarkable offer.

Two underlying beliefs about the proper role of government underpinned the complementary decisions to hand the responsibility for subdivision development over to the developers in 1954, and to expand the city’s area. First was an unswerving faith in the merits of private enterprise. In this new order, the City’s best role was as director and monitor. Second, expansion was seen as an easy way of stabilizing land prices while allowing the City added jurisdictional control. As for the developers, albeit only two, they had established the notion that outward growth was cheaper and therefore better than operating within the existing boundaries. As 1954 closed, the road ahead seemed clear. Free from the financial shackles and headaches associated with prescribing urban growth, the City approached the McNally Commission in December 1954 with dreams of further expansion. That it may have opened a “Pandora’s Box” was not considered at the time. Furthermore, any suggestion that it had would likely have been met with disdain.
These years were crucial to Calgary's spatial development. First, the attitudes towards outward growth were entrenched. In spite of the implications, the City, with developer support, endorsed the merits of gross physical expansion. Second, the City and developers established their formal relationship, one that was not to change for the next 20 years and beyond. This relationship was one of tightening expectations, and although it showed the City in its most dominant mode, there were missed opportunities. Policies respecting green space and low cost housing revealed a reluctance to broach new ground. Finally, the official attitude towards zoning demonstrates the City's adherence to tradition and its unwillingness to exercise available options. This helped more than hurt the developers.

The period began on an auspicious note. In July 1954 the provincial government struck a Royal Commission to investigate the problems associated with metropolitan growth in Calgary and Edmonton. It was a long and exhausting experience for the five commissioners.\(^1\) Headed by Dr. George Frederick McNally, a retired Deputy Minister of Education, the Commission held 34 formal sittings over 112 days, involving 89 witnesses and 286 briefs. The 21-volume Report was released to the public in early 1956. For the City, the findings and recommendations of the McNally Commission were largely vindications of paths already chosen.
They also emerged through time to legitimize both private enterprise and gross physical expansion.

The McNally Commission

The City's brief was presented to the McNally Commission in December 1954 after having been postponed from October in order to allow for additional preparation. It was a reasoned document based on “the orderly and progressive development of the City as an economic unit.” According to the brief, controlled planning strategies were necessary to achieve stable land values, equitable economic development, and the integration and provision of transportation, welfare, and health services. The brief also stressed the City's inequitable financial burdens and called for remedial measures, either in the form of additional provincial monies or access to alternative revenue sources.

Central to the City's argument was a request for annexation. In asking for extensive additions, the City justified its arguments primarily in terms of utilities issues. According to the City, annexation was one way of dealing with what it called the “staggering cost of utilities facilities due to backlog of demand.” The City's solution under annexation was a system of graded utilities services via differentiated taxation. It also called for the annexation of the fringe communities of Forest Lawn, Montgomery, and Bowness. The appeal for annexation was supported in briefs by the Calgary Real Estate Board and by developers anxious to develop subdivisions on the edges of the city.

The City's interests were well served when the Commission released its recommendations in February 1956. Amalgamation with Forest Lawn, Montgomery, and Bowness was recommended, as were annexations to increase the city's area from 40 to 104.77 square miles. In its recommendations, the Commission mirrored the City's brief. Concluding that the city's needs for the next 15 years would be met in the south and southeast, the Commission noted: “It is here that boundaries should be extended to accommodate a population of 300,000.” The commissioners evinced less enthusiasm over expansion to the north, west, and east, citing cost and topography as formidable barriers to growth.

Both the City and the developers were pleased with two other recommendations. The Commission liked the prepayment option for local improvements, and further urged an increase in the proportion borne by the property owner. The Report endorsed the growing trend towards shifting the financial burden for utilities installations to the private
developer, and agreed that the economics of development favoured larger-scale operations.\(^4\) The Commission further recommended that the Province pay half the costs incurred in amalgamating with the three fringe communities.

Through time, the McNally Commission was seen by City officials in groundbreaking terms, and was frequently referenced as a precedent. For example, City officials up to the present day have referred to the McNally Report as the genesis of the uni-city idea, and by implication the later policies of gross expansion.\(^5\) It was not. The uni-city concept predated the Commission. The McNally Commission simply reaffirmed it, and by so doing lent legitimacy to the policies that supported it.

Calgary’s success in achieving a uni-city status stands in sharp contrast to other Canadian cities where a metropolitan profile is more evident. Part of the reason lies in geography. For years the area around the city was ranching country. Peripheral urban development did not occur at the same rate as say, Edmonton, where more intensive farming was prevalent. The main reason, however, was linked to historical precedent and the expansive euphoria associated with the pre–World War I expansion boom. The settlements of Bowness and Montgomery on the city’s western limits were linked by street railway to the city, while the village of Forest Lawn also developed close commuter links.\(^6\) Following the collapse of the boom they attracted residents who commuted to their city jobs. An abhorrence of the parasitical fringe community was soon evident in civic thought. By the time the McNally Commission convened, and in the face of dramatic population increases in these three communities, the City was firmly convinced that the Bowness, Montgomery, and Forest Lawn experience should never reoccur.

In recommending substantial annexation, the McNally Commission wanted to avoid potential jurisdictional issues while providing for sufficient land to allow a comprehensive approach to long-range planning. It also wanted to do away with “piecemeal” annexations that created instability in surrounding municipalities. A City Planning Department Report released a few months later gave indication of how annexation could be integrated into long-range planning. In reference to sewer trunk placements, the document acknowledged the haphazard practices that had led to uneven development within the city. According to the report the result had been “a most undesirable position” in which over 38 percent of the city’s area was undeveloped.\(^7\) The Report concluded that “the present area of Calgary is too great to be utilized by the existing population,” and recommended that land in any future annexations be loosely
zoned with respect to time of development. The 1958 Zoning Bylaw took the intent of these recommendations but widened them to allow maximum discretion.\(^8\) Outlying land was zoned agricultural, taxed as such, and restricted to a minimum of 20 acres. Provision was made for priority areas for residential subdivision. The result was mutually beneficial to both the City and the developers. The Zoning Bylaw, with its provision for Agriculture (Future Residential), ensured planning flexibility. The retention of large agricultural holdings and low attendant taxes enabled owners to stay on their land, and encouraged developers to secure options to purchase.

Annexations

Between 1956 and 1961 a series of annexations swelled Calgary’s size from 40 to 151 square miles. All were consistent with the recommendations of the McNally Commission and all were strongly influenced by the interests of property. The 1956 and 1957 annexations clearly showed the City and the developers hand in glove. Though the developers’ role in the 1961 annexation was not as direct, the interests of property were present.

Difficulties with annexation arose following the release of the McNally Report mainly because the Commission had no powers of implementation.\(^9\) In fact the Province was quick to step in, appointing an Interim Development Board “to monitor development that would in the opinion of the Board materially affect or prejudice the carrying out of the recommendations of the Commission.”\(^10\) One early manifestation was the refusal by the Province to assume half the costs, estimated conservatively at $8.09 million, of amalgamating the City with Forest Lawn, Montgomery, and Bowness.\(^11\) The City declined to bear the entire expense, indicating debt repayments of over a million dollars a year for 20 years and an annual loss of $10,000 for the Transit Department. Amalgamation was thus allowed to lapse for another five years when property issues imposed a new imperative.

The City lobbied for annexation by appealing to urgency.\(^12\) In early 1956, Commissioner Ivor Strong wrote to McNally Commission member Ivan Robison. In referring to the half a dozen requests for land outside the city limits, Strong argued that in order to satisfy the needs of these developers, land to the south needed to be annexed by 1957.\(^13\) Strong went much further a month later. In a long letter to A.W. Morrison, Deputy Minister of Municipal Affairs, Strong pushed hard for annexation by stressing two factors, both concerning utilities. The first was the cost
advantage in installing utilities outside the city as opposed to those underdeveloped areas within the corporate limits. The second referred to the ongoing extension of utilities trunks to the areas of greatest demand in the south and west.\textsuperscript{14} In May it was noted that 900 building sites in Kingsland, Wildwood, Glendale, and Glamorgan were all approved contingent on annexation to the city.\textsuperscript{15} Then in August, the City asked the Chair of the Metropolitan Interim Development Board to grant a special order allowing Kelwood and Art Sullivan, already in possession of 200 mortgages, to go ahead with development in Glendale Meadows.\textsuperscript{16}

Faced with this pressure, the Province granted two annexations, both on application by the City in 1956 and 1957. Each was consistent with the McNally Commission recommendations. In 1956 a half-mile-wide strip to the west was added between 45th and 53rd Streets and from the Bow River to 26th Avenue South.\textsuperscript{17} In June 1957 the long-awaited south annexation was finally achieved. Comprising approximately 25 square miles and extending south to Anderson Road from the Glamorgan-Lakeview area to Willow Park, the addition increased the city’s area to
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74.4 square miles. A denial of a strip to the east was not pivotal to developer interests but did anticipate the pending battle with the Town of Forest Lawn. Following these annexations, development advanced southwards on three fronts. In the west it continued from Glendale to Richmond and Glamorgan. Another thrust progressed from Meadowlark Park to Bel Aire, Mayfair, Kingsland, Chinook Park, Haysboro and Southwood. Farther east, Kelwood negotiated the purchase of the Earl of Egmont Estate plus an option on 18 sections of land from Burns Ranch at $1,600 an acre, and soon began another southward thrust that would take development from Fairview to Acadia and Willow Park.

Private sector influence was a major factor in securing these annexations. First the influential Calgary House Builders Association, wanting to protect the interests of the small builders, argued that all development should occur only within the city limits. Kelwood pushed hard for both annexations particularly in the south. The Glendale experience had convinced the corporation of the danger of building beyond the city boundaries. It was just too risky to go ahead unilaterally with construction...
and utilities installations and hope that annexation and eligible recompense from the City would follow. Also, while Kelwood was willing to install and bear the expense of utilities in its subdivisions, it needed the City's co-operation in providing the necessary sewer trunks and the main water lines. In other words, development had to occur not only within the city but in areas where utilities installations were feasible and cost-effective. Kelwood knew it had reached its limit in the west. It had ventured farther west into Glendale Meadows and Westgate, but aside from the Wildwood subdivision to the north, this was as far as utilities feasibility allowed. This left the south, and it was here that Kelwood chose to stake its future. In pressing for annexation in February 1957 Kelwood told the City that development should follow lines of economic efficiency, and argued that its subdivisions of Kingsland and Mayfair were superior to those located anywhere else. It is interesting that the Board of Public Utilities' tacit approval for annexation came only six days after Kelwood's strong letter.

The next major annexation occurred in 1961, when over 70 square miles were added to the city, virtually doubling its size. Unlike earlier annexations, this one did not go through without intense controversy. Opposition arose in the south and the east, marking for the first time a concerted effort to thwart the City's expansion ambitions. Developers played a lesser role in this annexation because their needs had been adequately met in 1957. However, though less clamorous than in the earlier annexations, they were still more than bystanders.

The pressure for further expansion came from several directions. One was related to population projections, an accepted basis for annexation applications. By the late 1950s, these projections were becoming more accurate. In a 1959 commissioned study, University of Alberta Geographer Peter Smith employed a wide variety of indicators to project a population of 516,962 by 1976 (470,043 actual). Civic administrators, always mindful of the impact of rapid growth, viewed these figures with some disquiet and as a rationale for physical expansion, especially in light of the fact that southward residential development was approaching the city boundary at Anderson Road.

A second reason was likely related to advice offered by the C.M.H.C. In early March, 1958, the City made inquiries to the Corporation respecting land values in various parts of the city. In a carefully worded reply, the C.M.H.C. offered several opinions, two of which were crucial not only for annexation but for subsequent development. In referring specifically to the subdivision of Belfast and surrounding areas in the northeast, the
C.M.H.C. noted that they were suitable for “residential construction of a certain type,” but that they did not offer amenities likely to attract the wealthier classes, who “depend to a large extent on social significance.” The Corporation went on to stress that “the North Eastern section of the City is naturally limited to low to medium cost developments,” and that the City would find it “equitable to fulfill the needs at these levels and for our part we could possibly reflect such end values in our mortgage appraisals.” The message was clear. Mortgage monies in the north and northeast were to be based on lower rental values than in the south and southwest, which the C.M.H.C. referred to as areas of “higher class or exclusive construction.” Thus, in a single correspondence, the C.M.H.C. laid out Calgary’s differentiated socio-economic residential patterns, a preference that had profound implications for subsequent development. The impact was not lost on the City. Annexation to the north assumed a new significance. By 1959 the City had begun assembling land in the Forest Lawn area.27 By the early 1960s development in the north was approximating that in the south, and by the summer of 1962 actually exceeded it.28

Another pressure involved emotion and politics. Though it was related to the McNally recommendations on amalgamation, it specifically concerned the ambitious little town of Forest Lawn directly east of the city limits. As discussed earlier, Forest Lawn was a historic community of 4,000 with close commuter links to Calgary. However, it had also demonstrated its ambitions for independence through two successful annexation applications in 1950 and 1952 when it acquired parcels of land to the southwest close to Calgary’s eastern boundary. That the Town was prepared to fight for its survival was without question. Anticipating the McNally Commission recommendations, the town’s mayoralty election for 1956 was fought on the amalgamation issue, with the anti-annexation candidate receiving 81 percent of the popular vote.29 The Town had also successfully opposed the City’s annexation bid in 1957 with reference to a strip of land running north/south along the eastern boundary.

The central issue was not whether or not Calgary would annex the Town of Forest Lawn. The City had little if any interest in the town itself. In fact, it was estimated that amalgamation with Forest Lawn would add $2.39 million to the debenture debt and cost another $3.78 million in School Board and capital expenditures.30 Rather, it was the land between them. Traversed by railways and main highways, the land was highly prized by both parties for industrial purposes. The City made its move in early 1958 when it applied to the Public Utilities Board to annex the land in question. The Town countered by announcing a $1.93 million
development plan “for the continued sound and rapid development of the town as a vigorous independent community that may some day grow into Calgary’s proud and valued twin sister.” Supported by several developer interests, the Town proceeded with an annexation bid of its own. On January 20, 1960 the City responded by indicating the support of the Municipal Districts of Foothills and Rocky View. Six months later, it made formal application for annexation of the contested eastern strip plus land south of Fish Creek, several sections to the north, and a block of land in the northwest corridor. Much later it added a bid for 270 acres in the municipality of Montgomery.

As the battle with Forest Lawn moved towards its climax in 1961, developer and land interests made their voices heard. The Forest Lawn bid was supported by three developer-based organizations that had either acquired land or had options to buy in the annexed areas. They were outnumbered, however, by those who saw more merit in the City’s case. Anticipating higher prices, this group comprised the vast majority of landowners in an area covering 50 whole and partial sections. City developers also expressed interest in developing residential subdivisions to serve the potential industrial areas.

In marked contrast to the earlier annexation, developers were not crucial in the bid to extend the city farther south, although it was contended that several large landholders in the annexed area stood to reap heavy profits when their land was needed. Fish Creek just beyond the present boundary of Anderson Road was a natural barrier. The City gave two reasons for its bid for moving its boundaries south beyond the creek. One focused on Midnapore, a small community whose origins predated Calgary’s. Planners were worried that it could develop into a fringe community. A second reason concerned the new sewage treatment plant at Fish Creek. It was outside the city limits and needed to be brought in. Also in order to offset the cost of its construction plus the $2 million necessary to build a four-mile trunk, a greater population density in the south was necessary. In part, the need for a taxation base to pay for high cost facilities always furnished a rationale for outward growth. In this case, possible alternatives did not seem to matter. According to Kent Lyle, a leading business figure in real estate, the costs of the Fish Creek plant could be met by encouraging higher densities north of Anderson Road. The only opposition to annexation to the south came from residents in the present Canyon Meadows area who feared potential tax increases. City officials easily deflected their concerns by pointing out that Midnapore residents were in favour of annexation.
The bid to secure several sections in the north and northwest was due to developer influence. According to a 1958 report, previously recommended capital expenditures were revised following a meeting with developers who offered to contribute to a reservoir that would enable water to be brought to areas above the 3,750-foot contour, including another 1,550 acres outside the city limits. The report further mentioned the distinct possibility of annexation. The subsequent annexation bid for land north of Thorncliffe Heights comprising most of Nose Hill and eastward was also a response to pressure from the North Hill Businessmen’s Association. The Association maintained that the north was being neglected and asked for development of seven sections to raise the area’s population by 54,000. A petition signed by 54 business proprietors and presented to the City in April 1959 called for the annexation of four sections presently beyond the corporate limits. The City obliged. The annexation bid included the aforementioned sections plus two and a half to the immediate east.

The City’s interest in annexing 270 acres of land in the municipality of the Town of Montgomery was ostensibly linked with a desire to expand the subdivision of University Heights and to make land available to the university. It had already bought 60 acres for $180,000 and wanted the other 210 to consolidate the annexation bid. This land in question was owned by Standard Gravel and Surfacing of Canada Ltd. with an option to purchase given to Moraine Investment Corporation Ltd. Predictably, both supported the annexation bid. The towns of Montgomery and Bowness opposed it.

The Board of Public Utilities heard the annexation application on September 8, 1961. In addition to the towns and municipalities involved, two development companies and a representative of landowners in the Forest Lawn area were present. The annexation of part of Montgomery was rejected. In recognizing the strenuous efforts the town had made to improve conditions, the Board sided with the principles of local autonomy. The Town of Forest Lawn was not so fortunate. The Board recognized the essence of the issue: “The essential question … is not as to whether or not Calgary should be allowed to annex Forest Lawn but rather which municipality should be allowed to annex and develop the territory common to both applications.” Observing that Calgary was better suited to this end, the Board recommended annexation of the disputed land, and added the town of Forest Lawn as well on the grounds that it had no future otherwise. The other annexations to the north, south and northwest were accepted without opposition.
The City ultimately annexed the Town of Montgomery in August 1963. In approving the application initiated by the Town through resolution and petition, and supported by the City, the Local Authorities Board described the community of 5,200 as a logical extension of Calgary’s residential area. In the years following the McNally Commission the Town had installed its own utilities that had been connected to the City before the annexation was processed. The City had done well. In October 1963, The Town of Bowness voted 1003 to 397 for annexation to the City. Though not overly happy with the financial implications, the City did not oppose the bid. The application was approved in July 1964 and became effective the following month. With the annexation of Bowness and its population of 10,000, the City had expanded its area to 154 square miles.

The way was now cleared for a sustained period of suburban growth within a large urban area. As the developers would later argue, the land supply was sufficient to promote healthy competition, and all benefited. It is misleading to suggest that the developers had achieved a mighty victory. The City had gotten what it wanted as well.

Developer Dialogue

The main feature of this period was the formalization of the City-Developer Agreements which defined and specified subdivision development. The rules and procedures that were established during this period provided a template that remained largely unchanged in substance. Within this context, the pragmatics of “give and take” ensured a balance that ultimately favoured neither. However, issues associated with green space and low cost housing revealed some limitations in “the politics of pragmatics.”

The Developer Agreements

The terms of the 1955 contract with developers obliged them to supply sanitary, sewer, and water services to all properties within the subdivision. Sidewalks, curbs, and gutter were built on frontages at developer expense as well as roads 32 feet in width and gravelled to a depth of 12 inches. The maintenance period was set at twelve months. The City remained responsible for storm sewers and for laying the water mains, valves, hydrants, and fittings, including leads to the boundary of the development. The City further contracted itself to pay for oversize, and to assume a 50 percent share of utilities installations on boundaries or where only one side of the street served the subdivision.
The development agreements were subject to an eight-step process beginning with a Statement of Intent submitted to the Technical Planning Board and continuing through the submission, circulation, modification, and final approval of Tentative Plans. The signing of the agreement was followed by its registration with the provincial government and the ultimate go-ahead by the City. The tentative plans contained information related to lot, road, and school placements together with details on utilities rights of way and easements if necessary. They focussed on specific subdivisions and were not integrated with future developments over a wide area.

Over the next five years, the contracts became more binding on the developers. The maintenance period in some instances was increased to two years. Road construction obligations were widened. The time frame and procedures for plan submission and approval were specified. A $300 per lot performance bond was necessary, as was a payment of $80 per lot for inspection purposes. However, contractual obligations in three other areas showed more graphically the City’s intention to distance itself further from the costs of residential development.

The first concerned flankage costs. Local improvement levies had previously been on frontages only. Curb and gutter and sidewalk construction on side streets between blocks were the responsibility of the City. The City was loath to put these flankage costs under local improvement, believing it would add substantially to the cost of a lot and present difficulties in determining exactly who would be levied. By 1955, the City was feeling the financial strain. Side streets in many older areas of the city were without curb and gutter and sidewalks. By early 1956, the City had only constructed 35 percent of flankage requirements in Thorncliffe Heights at a cost of over $42,000. The move to have developers assume flankage costs was probably inspired by Kelwood’s precedent when it expended $22,000 in Glendale even though the City had no money to repay the company. By 1957 the matter was settled in the City’s favour. The developers’ contract in that year stated that the developer was responsible for constructing “sidewalks, curbs and gutters on all streets and roads.”

The second significant change occurred in the fall of 1957 and involved financing the installation and extensions of storm sewers and water mains. Hitherto they had been the City’s responsibility, chargeable to general revenues. They also involved heavy expense. For example, rather than install storm sewers at a cost of $292,000, the City paid Art Sullivan $135,200 for his 52 acres of undeveloped land in the Glendale Meadows.
On October 28, 1957, Commissioner Dudley Batchelor recommended to Council that developers assume these costs, which had amounted to $1.5 million in 1956. Batchelor admitted that the price of a lot would increase by $150 and thus affect mortgage payments, but added that the C.M.H.C.’s lending policies would be accommodating. The C.M.H.C., he later argued, was prepared to advance 70 percent of the extra cost, a figure that would translate into a modest increase of $3 per month in mortgage payments. On Batchelor’s recommendation Council adopted the new policy but applied it to undeveloped areas only.

The new policy had significant implications. First, the large developers had no problem with absorbing the total costs of utilities. In fact, in order to speed up development, some developers like Kelwood had been installing storm sewers on a voluntary basis and simply charging the cost to homeowners anyway. A greater level of control meant that bigger developments could be planned to a higher level of efficiency with respect to cost and time. The same was not true for the smaller developers. In a special meeting between the developers and the City Commissioners on November 28, 1957, the Calgary House Builders Association argued that the extra up-front costs would force the smaller developer out of business. Echoing the feelings of several present, John McLeod of Spyhill pointed out that the average homeowner would be greatly prejudiced. To McLeod, anyone earning Calgary’s average income of $3,815 per annum was “practically eliminated from the picture.” The Commissioners, however, paid little heed to this opposition. In giving their reasons for supporting the new policy, they neatly encapsulated a philosophy that would reign supreme for the next 20 years. To them, the present policy was unacceptable since it restricted growth to the extent of the City’s ability to provide services. On the other hand, the new policy, by allowing developers free rein, allowed large-scale development to “go ahead unhindered.”

The final change effected by the City related to acreage assessments. Essentially they were one-time levies against the civic costs of constructing such water and sewer facilities as filtrations systems, pumping stations, and waste treatment plants as well as trunks and water mains. For storm and sanitary sewers, the fringe areas of the city were divided into drainage zones, and for water into pressure zones. Using current market values, the cost of developing and servicing the entire area contained by these various zones was established. The total acreage was divided into this figure to arrive at a per acre assessment which was then applied to the area until it was fully developed. Acreage assessment for sanitary sewers presented more inequity than for storm sewers since it included
Part One: 1945–1962

Source: City of Calgary Archives, Cartographer: Robin Poitras
major trunks that serviced both developed and undeveloped areas plus the cost of individual facilities like treatment plans which served a particular region of the city. Thus acreage assessments varied from area to area and over time from year to year.53

The idea of acreage assessments was first mooted in late 1957 to developers in the south part of the city and was associated with the costs of the pending Fish Creek Waste Treatment Plant, and the main sewer trunk serving it.54 Doubtless realizing the inevitable, the developers were not indisposed to the suggestion. At a meeting held in July 1958, the details were hammered out and an acreage assessment of $175 per acre was established.55 In 1959 a further acreage assessment was applied towards the $1.5 million cost of upgrading the Glenmore Reservoir filtration system. In 1960 an acreage assessment was applied to the north. While the acreage assessment principle had become civic policy in 1958, it did not become part of the development agreement until 1961.

The Urban Development Institute (U.D.I.) strongly resisted acreage assessments and in 1959 and 1960 fought for their removal. First, it questioned the City's legal power to levy the assessment. The Institute also maintained that the developers who had originally accepted the levy were not under the Institute's auspices; that the 1958 agreement was not supposed to set a precedent, and that subsequent dialogue with the City in 1959 had been unsatisfactory. In an oft-repeated argument, the U.D.I. contended that acreage assessments were a form of double tax on homeowners in new areas. It claimed that the installations they affected were a benefit to the entire city and not just the area being developed. Arguing that the City's policy of "either pay now or wait until we are ready to install" was tantamount to "blackmail," the U.D.I. urged resistance.56 Carma announced in the fall of 1960 that it not going to pay any acreage assessment.57 Then in December 1960, U.D.I. Secretary C.J. Combe informed the City that the members of the Institute had unanimously agreed not to sign any agreement in which acreage assessments were required.58

The issue was likely settled in February 1961 when the City Solicitor notified the U.D.I. of the City's legal right to levy acreage assessments.59 His confidence was puzzling since existing legislation was not definitive on the City's right to impose off-site levies.60 Even when a new Planning Act was passed in 1963 it made no provision for acreage assessments, nor did the wording of any section appear to give Council the enabling power. Yet the U.D.I., which had always questioned the levy's legality, chose not to challenge it. Its reasons are conjectural. It may have had something
to do with the dreaded delays occasioned by legal action, or the implications of any ensuing strained relations with the City. Also the fact that levies were differentiated and affected some developers far more than others probably precluded U.D.I. unanimity on the wisdom of a court challenge. In any case, the U.D.I. took the pragmatic route, backed down and sought a compromise solution. An arrangement was reached between the City and the Institute in April whereby acreage assessments were to be included in the 1961 Developer Agreement. There were eight in all, two each for waterworks and sanitary sewers north and south of the Bow River, and four for storm sewers, three in the north and one in the south. In return for U.D.I. co-operation, the City agreed to a $750 per acre maximum and to make no changes in levies for five years. It also promised to negotiate consistently with developers on an individual basis.61

In a short period of time, the City of Calgary and the developers had achieved an enduring formal relationship. Any subsequent changes were in form rather than substance. Though the official recognition of the new arrangements was embodied in the 1959 standard Developer Agreement...
Agreement, all the components were in place by 1958. In July of that year, the Chief Commissioner informed City Council “that new subdivisions are being developed as a result of the overall assignment going to the developer and the City of Calgary is playing no part in the picture.”

Since the development of utilities averaged over $2,000 an acre, the City had reason to be satisfied with the immediate cost savings. In 1958, Kelwood paid $1.2 million for storm and sanitary sewers and water mains in Haysboro and another $700,000 in Fairview. An added form of revenue had been discovered in the acreage assessment. In referring to the projected $7.6 million expenditure on nine sewer trunks Chief Planner, A.G. Martin expected that acreage assessments would ease the financial burden. Finally, the City felt that the new arrangement had not weakened its control over the developers. As Assistant City Engineer, C.D. Howarth pointed out in 1959, “The system of private subdivision development … has reached a point where the City has excellent control over both design and materials and the execution of the work.” By 1961 there were fourteen developers under contract with the City for subdivision development.

Yet, as significant as these developments were, they were replicating a pattern being followed in other Canadian cities. Indeed, before beginning the negotiations that led to the developers taking over storm sewers and water mains, the City had contacted several other Canadian cities respecting their policies. Knowing that municipalities like Hamilton, Scarborough, North York, and Etobicoke had all largely withdrawn from residential development, the City doubtless felt more confident in its own deliberations. However, the speed at which these dramatic changes had taken place is noteworthy, especially given Calgary's modest size. Certainly Edmonton had not gone as far.

While the template for developer agreements was standard, the agreements themselves differed from developer to developer and contained special agreements and modifications with respect to division of responsibility, cost sharing and maintenance conditions. Most were minor and usually predicated on special circumstances and difficulties. Sometimes they led to inconsistencies. One bizarre example concerned two developers in Glamorgan. Both were paving the same road but contractual obligations had committed one to a width of 36 feet and the other to 18 feet.

The establishment of the agreements with the developers was not an immediate signal for the City to withdraw from residential subdivision development. In 1956 the City still controlled 45 percent of residential
For several years, the City continued to develop subdivisions in Britannia, Cambrian Heights, Spruce Cliff, University Heights, Belfast, Capitol Hill, Mountview, Lynwood, Stanley Park, and Rosemount. The problems with City subdivisions had little to do with quality. However, limited by policy constraints and other factors, the City simply could not meet demand and thus lost interest and desire. For example, much to the chagrin of the Chief Engineer, the City was reluctant to install any utilities in its subdivisions until the lots were sold. For a while it was at a disadvantage with the developers because of a failure to secure the requisite C.M.H.C. approval with respect to paving requirements. Difficult terrain and land assembly problems, resident complaints, and resistance to local improvements were other factors influencing the City to withdraw from subdivision development. The Rosscarrock Community Association berated the City in 1956 over sanitary conditions, stating that “absolutely no attempt has been made to improve the district since annexation in 1955.” In 1957, a contractor complained that land he had purchased from the City in Cambrian Heights and on which he prepaid utilities costs had not been serviced. He added that private developers in the same subdivision were installing everything on time and were thus inducing contractors to buy from them and not the City. In 1958, the City sold 549 lots. In 1950, the figure had been 4,722. By 1960, there were about 4,700 lots under development. The City’s share was less than 20 percent. However, it was the option not to go ahead with the subdivision of University Heights in 1962 that effectively ended the City’s role as a major developer. Following a recommendation that servicing costs of $1.2 million were too excessive, and that too much pressure was being placed on the Planning and Engineering Departments, the City sold 182 acres to private interests, and in so doing signalled the end of an era. Finally, the City’s problems in developing one subdivision led to the arrival of what was to become Calgary’s largest developer. In 1958 the City of Calgary sold the subdivision of Rosemount to the recently formed Carma Developments Ltd. for $309,868.

The brainchild of veteran builder Albert Bennett, and his younger colleagues, Roy Wilson and Howard Ross, Carma Developers was incorporated in February 1958. The new syndicate comprised 43 members of the Calgary House Builders Association who contributed $250,000 to launch the company, and was partly a response to the monopoly wielded by Kelwood. In referring to Kelwood, Carma president Albert Bennett told the Land Department that “this monopoly … is becoming more complete with every passing month.” Carma was a unique organization
based on the co-operative principle. Its sole aim was to acquire tracts of land and distribute the lots to its members on a proportionate shareholder basis. Another unique feature was the fact that other prominent builder-developers in the city were shareholders, including Quality Construction and the major shareholder, Nu-West Homes. Financed by debentures bought by members, Carma employed bold but simple strategies. First it followed its developments in Rosemount by concentrating on City-owned properties in the north and northwest. Second, Carma used its co-operative membership as a lever to secure preferential treatment from the City, a strategy which was reflected in its standard offer of $2,500 an acre for prime building land. Third, it dealt with the City more forcibly than its competitors. Long-time General Manager Joe Combe was widely recognized for his ability to make his presence felt. The reputation, apparently, of “Old Stone Face” at City Hall was legend. Finally, Carma’s success in Rosemount helped consolidate its reputation with the City. In spite of the topographic difficulties, Carma successfully built over 300 homes in Rosemount at a total cost of over $5 million. Indeed, some builder-shareholders, including Ralph Scurfield of Nu-West, lived there.

The City and Developer Relations

The City’s relations with the developers were characterized by a general commitment to co-operation on the grounds that it was necessary for the achievement of common goals. Differences existed, however, and it was here that one sees the “give and take” consistent with longstanding relations.

The City was not loath to exert its authority over the developers. Suburban Developments Ltd. argued unsuccessfully in 1961 for a change of rules with respect to its share of road costs on 14th Street. Subdivision approval was not automatic. When Carma revised the City plan in Rosemount north to accommodate more lots at a savings of $29,000, it was rejected on the grounds that “It would be a pity to accept an inferior plan merely for the sake of a little extra cost.” A plan for Thorncliffe Heights was also rejected in 1960. A developer’s contract in Glamorgan was terminated in 1960 because of lack of progress. Another in Greenview lost an oversize dispute. The Technical Planning Board wanted work in a Southwood subdivision halted until the developer had settled outstanding payments on an earlier development. In many cases modifications were necessary with respect to set backs, lot depths, road widths, minimum
distances between houses, etc. It was rare for a plan to be totally accepted following its circulation to the various departments. Many mirrored a 1959 Brentwood plan that required extensive revisions.\textsuperscript{92} A variety of other pleas were rejected. Some were daring in their presuppositions. One developer who had over-bought in Glendale Meadows wanted the City to buy portions of the land from him and then sell it back at the same price when it was needed.\textsuperscript{93} Another who had bought land from the City in Collingwood at $3,000 an acre wanted $1,000 remitted for every acre that was not developable.\textsuperscript{94} In 1961 Norman S. Trouth, the current Chair of the Urban Development Institute and Manager of Kelwood, wanted to save money by using open ditches for storm water runoff rather than underground pipes.\textsuperscript{95}

An excellent example of entrepreneurial initiative occurred in 1956 and involved Art Sullivan, a builder-developer recognized for his aggressiveness. In August 1955, Burns Ranches granted an option to Sullivan to buy 540 acres at $2,000 an acre in the present Fairview area on condition that the land was rezoned for residential and commercial purposes in time for the 1956 construction season.\textsuperscript{96} Sullivan envisaged a $35 million project containing 2,000 homes, 60 acres of park and recreational space, bounded to the east and west by industrial and commercial zones. Noting that “gainfull [sic] employment is a necessity for continued prosperity,” Sullivan projected employment for 1,000 men, including 350 unemployed during the winter months.\textsuperscript{97} Sullivan further argued that this subdivision (Meadowbrook) was superior to Kingsland farther west.\textsuperscript{98} Sullivan “sweetened the pot” by giving the City the option to buy him out or otherwise let him go ahead on his own.\textsuperscript{99} It was a marvellous pitch and one to which the City gave serious attention, more so because utilities were not a pivotal issue. Yet, as Public School Board and Transportation officials pointed out, Meadowbrook’s isolation from existing development made it a much more expensive proposition than Kingsland. Faced with these financial considerations, the City declined to take up either of Sullivan’s options and decided to press ahead as planned with Kingsland.\textsuperscript{100}

On the other hand, co-operation was also evident. In return for increasing its performance bond, Kelwood was allowed to borrow $20,000 worth of pipe from the City for water in Glendale. Even though the subdivision was outside the city limits, Kelwood was also allowed to take water from the City system in off-peak hours. It was stored in tanks capable of holding 250,000 gallons, and used as a temporary water supply for 2,100 residents.\textsuperscript{101} The City also secured agreements with developers respecting land it wanted to buy. In order to consolidate its holdings in
1957, the City arranged for a developer to release his option to acquire 13 acres in University Heights. In return the company was given the right to buy 50 lots in another subdivision at an equivalent price. In 1959, the City took advantage of a Department of National Revenue concession that exempted municipalities from the sales tax on sewage and drainage materials. Following purchase at the discounted levels, the City sold pipes, fittings, etc. to the developers at full price. The savings difference was placed in a special fund to be accessed by developers for subdivision enhancement. The construction of several community centres, including those in Glenmore Park and Brentwood, was partly financed under this arrangement.

An excellent example of dialogue between the developer and the City concerned the subdivision of Highwood south of Thorncliffe. One of those areas that had been provided with utilities in the pre-1914 boom, Highwood had reverted to the City in lieu of unpaid taxes. Wanting to realize some gain from a long dormant investment, City engineers approached Kelwood and offered to sell the land for residential development. Kelwood was interested but resisted the City’s asking price by citing cost factors occasioned by large sandstone formations near the surface in several areas. According to Kelwood, development costs were between $4,000 and 5,000 an acre. The City subsequently accepted Kelwood’s counter-offer for 220 acres, and the suburb of Highwood took shape after 1955. There can be no doubt that Highwood was a difficult subdivision to develop, as witness the lack of any previous interest by either the City or builders especially given the presence of utilities installation. Yet the price paid by Kelwood elicited one of the earliest comments about undue developer influence. In 1957, an alderman censured the City for acceding to “ridiculously low prices.”

The developers profited in other areas. First it was argued that the City sold its land too cheaply. Of all developers, Carma pushed hardest for the best deals by referring to its central place in the Calgary construction industry. For example, in a request to buy City land in Charleswood, the company mentioned its 45 builder-shareholders and argued that it deserved special consideration since it was offering gainful employment to over 3,000 Calgary citizens. Since it tended to bid low, Carma was essentially asking the City to do away with its tendering system for land purchases and sell at a cheaper price. A year later, Carma admitted that its bid for 170 acres in north Cambrian Heights was not the lowest. Then, after alluding to the low bidder’s capabilities, grandly informed the City that there was no other choice but “to accept Carma’s offer.”
successful, apparently. Two months later, Carma thanked Commissioner Dudley Batchelor for the consideration we received when we presented our proposals.\textsuperscript{107}

Advantages were secured in other areas. Many involved street extensions. For example, Kelwood succeeded in having a cul de sac in Fairview extended to 82nd Avenue.\textsuperscript{108} The original policy on storm sewers obliged the developer to construct them with the capacity to drain both his subdivision and any adjacent raw land, after which the City would pay for oversize. After an intense debate with the Urban Development Institute, the obligation to drain adjacent raw land was removed.\textsuperscript{109} The City backed off a recommendation by the Subdivision Co-ordinator to charge half a percent a month interest on outstanding accounts.\textsuperscript{110} In 1957, Art Sullivan won his argument that he should be governed by his 1956 contract and not held responsible for storm sewers and water mains.\textsuperscript{111} In 1960 the City lost the argument over the construction of some major roads through subdivisions. In arguing that these roads offered limited access and were a result of City transportation policies, the developers succeeded in having the City bear the costs.\textsuperscript{112}

In this early period, the developers encountered the sorts of criticisms that later tainted them with accusations of rapacious behaviour and indifference to the public. In a letter to the \textit{Herald}, a City alderman ranted somewhat misleadingly that “We allow the contractor to buy cheap land outside the city. We ask for annexation then pay the cost of parks, storm sewers, water and lighting.”\textsuperscript{113} In Glendale, Kelwood was heavily censured by concerned citizens for its indifference and misleading sales pitches.\textsuperscript{114} As early as 1961, a member of the Planning Advisory Commission commented on the indifference of developers to the merits of variety in their subdivisions. In criticizing the unimaginative house designs, the critic noted: “The dreary and unimaginative approach to much of the present day building design and construction in the city left little doubt that the average private developer neither cared nor was concerned with providing first class development that would enhance the appearance of the city.”\textsuperscript{115}

**Green Space**

Neither the City nor the developers exhibited vision with respect to the potential of green space within subdivisions. Lacking an overall plan, the City merely responded to developer initiative by relying on provincial legislation and an occasional touch of common sense. The developers exacerbated this by pressing their interests as much as possible.
The provision for reserves during this period was laid out in the Subdivision Regulations of 1953 and the Subdivision and Transfer Regulations of 1960, which specified the setting aside of no less than 10 percent of the gross area of registered subdivision plans for reserve purposes. Both allowed discretion. In the 1953 Regulations, the location or topographic nature of reserves was not specified, though the intent was clearly to provide for schools and adjacent public spaces. The 1960 Regulations were more specific. Land unsuitable for building purposes within a subdivision could be designated as park or reserve but had to be additional to the 10 percent requirement. However, the Regulations also specified that if the total area of streets, lanes, and reserves exceeded 40 percent of the entire subdivision then the reserve requirement might be reduced. Both sets of regulations revealed the narrow concept of public green spaces in that they were seen in terms of developable land. In 1953, reserves were associated primarily with public facilities like schools and adjacent recreational areas. In 1960, true “green space” was equated to undevelopable land. Both the City and the developers bore the onus of blame for a lack of interest in incorporating more green space within subdivisions. For example, as early as 1956 the Technical Planning Board faced pressure to reduce the 10 percent if the needs of arterial roads demanded it.

Reserves were essentially pawns in the give and take between the City and the Developers. In later years the developers saw them as a way to increase density and raise land prices. In this early period, they used them in two ways. First, reserve allocations were differentiated over large tracts to maximize lot numbers in more exclusive subdivisions. Second, the definition of reserves was widened to defeat the intent of the Regulations. In both cases the City offered little leadership.

The most obvious way developers used the reserve issue was as an incentive for subdivision approval. Art Sullivan provided for 4½ acres more than necessary in Glendale Meadows. Kelwood over-dedicated 26 acres in Wildwood. The concessions, however, were deceiving. Sometimes the over-dedication consisted of land that could not be developed. In other instances, the excess was retrieved by under-dedication of reserves in subsequent adjacent subdivisions. The policy of incremental subdivision development by the same developer over time prejudiced reserve allocations. For example, Kelwood developed both Mayfair and Kingsland. When the Corporation submitted its plan for Mayfair, it reduced the requisite reserve acreage and made more high-priced lots available. In referring to lot areas of 12,000 square feet, Kelwood argued...
that public land “was not necessary in high class residential areas,” and that it should be allowed to transfer the reserve requirements to Kingsland. In allowing the request, the Technical Planning Board warned that it “should not be regarded as a precedent for future cases.” Kelwood was later censured by the Technical Planning Board for trying to reduce the size of its Mayfair lots. The same thing happened in 1959 in the exclusive subdivision of Eagle Ridge, where almost all the community reserve was transferred from the Chinook Park subdivision to an area later used by the City as a tree farm. Reserve allocations also suffered when individual developers operated in small subdivisions. When Kingsland was being completed in 1962, the developer could not provide his 10 percent and was forced to compensate by remitting $5,430 to the City. The City received money. Residents lost entitlement.

The use of buffer zones provides a good insight as to how green space was perceived by both the City and the developers. As the term implies, buffers served to separate specific zoning areas. They could be green strips or transitional-zone buildings like apartments. For example, the
agreement that allowed the Stampede to expand north into Victoria Park in the late 1960s specified a grass buffer on the south side of 14th Avenue. The question as to whether buffers could or should be included in the 10 percent reserve allocation resulted in inconsistency. Developers argued that if the buffers represented potentially developable land then they should be included in the 10 percent. In Haysboro, Kelwood included buffer zones and future road requirements in reserve quotas. On the other hand, the City claimed that by serving as a buffer the land in question was essentially undevelopable. Yet the City did not push the issue. For example, developers were allowed to pay cash in lieu of reserves in industrial areas when the original intent of the regulations was to deploy the 10 percent reserve requirements in green space buffers between industrial and adjacent residential zones. Moreover, the City sometimes permitted buffers to be included in reserves on a two to one basis. Under this arrangement, two acres of buffer or marginal land could be credited as one acre of reserve. Reserve allocations in Brentwood were modified under the two to one policy. In industrial Fairview, Kelwood wanted part of its 10 percent residential reserve to be a buffer protecting it from the industrial area to the north. The City allowed this on a two to one basis. One implication was the under-dedication of green space in Fairview, a situation exacerbated by the fact that six additional acres of reserve were removed for road interchange purposes. Carma was allowed a 100-foot storm sewer right of way in Greenview as reserve. Kelwood requested the same concession in Acadia with respect to a 500-foot buffer zone for storm sewers. In 1960 a developer in Thorncliffe wanted a drainage ditch included as community reserve.

Developers tried to convince the City to accept undevelopable land as reserves. Carma, for instance, said it was only logical to place its reserve in north Cambrian Heights on the “worst rock formations.” Sam Hashman included cliffs and riverbanks in his reserve allocation in Bel Aire. When Spyhill Development and Holding Company agreed to 15 percent in public reserve including some hillside and coulee, the Technical Planning Board reduced its developable allocation. The City allowed a developer in Wildwood to include 20 acres of hillside to compensate for his 4-acre reserve deficiency on the condition that 4 acres was added to another subdivision. The fact that reserve requirements were subject to negotiation and even manipulation shows that City and the developers were interested in honouring the letter of the regulations more than the intent.

Calgary’s topography, with its rivers, creeks, moraines, bluffs, hills, and coulees, was an important factor in determining the city’s physical
development. While these features presented problems with respect to utilities installations and residential development, they were prime candidates for natural open space dedication. In fact, many fine recreational areas in the City have more to do with topographic unsuitability for development than with civic policy. The bluffs and draws in Edgemont stand as a prime example. However, these locations also had high scenic potential and were therefore tempting to developers who pursued a simple but risky strategy. They bought sizable chunks of scenic land and then prepared plans to develop the gentler slopes. In presenting these plans to City officials, they offered to help financially with capital expenditures, and to contribute the steep slopes to reserves in addition to the requisite 10 percent. The first area in Calgary to receive such attention was Nose Hill in the city's north.

Nose Hill, with its strong historic links to aboriginal usage, its ecological sensitivity, and its varied grassland environment, comprises well over 4,000 acres and rises over 3,700 feet above sea level. It offers panoramic views of Calgary and the Rocky Mountains. It is also a natural “treasure.” Despite steep slopes, the summit is fairly flat and therefore an irresistible lure to developers. Evidence suggests that the City would have allowed development on Nose Hill before 1960, long before the later bitter controversy of the early 1970s. The fact that it was forestalled had little to do with any civic policy regarding green space preservation. External forces prevailed.

In 1954 Spyhill Development and Holding Company bought about 190 acres on the upper east slope of Nose Hill. In December 1956, with the support of a financial backer, the Company approached the City respecting a residential development. The City offered no objection but requested more information. Doubtless encouraged, Spyhill came back a month later with a more formal application that promised 1,000–1,200 homes over a four year period below the 3,700-foot contour. The developer further offered to construct the necessary reservoir or assist with its construction if it was to serve a greater area. The Technical Planning Board, in noting that it constituted orderly development, approved the development pending the construction of the reservoir.

There was little doubt that the development would have gone ahead but for two factors. The first was the fact that the upper 70 acres obstructed the clear flight path from the municipal airport to the immediate east. In a series of meetings with the City, airport officials and members of the federal Aviation Commission stressed the potential hazards posed by any development on upper Nose Hill. They also emphasized the distinct
possibility that potential jet plane traffic would be discouraged from coming to the city. Faced with these sobering prospects, the City agreed with airport officials that the flight path should be widened from 1,500 to 2,000 feet and that it be extended farther west into Nose Hill. Spyhill was not dissuaded, and in July 1957 responded with another application. Admitting that the plan still intruded into the widened flight path, the company suggested that the encroachment be used as reserve. The strategy did not work. While it had no trouble with the southern portion of the development, the Technical Planning Board sought safe refuge and passed the matter on to the City Commissioners, who found a better solution. Spyhill was persuaded to accept a land swap on a 3.5 to 1 basis. In November, 1957 the company gave up its 190 acres valued at $1,000 an acre in Nose Hill for 53 acres valued at $3,500 an acre in the emerging subdivision of Collingwood to the south. The City sweetened the deal by agreeing to construct the necessary utilities in Collingwood. Three subsequent applications from different parties to develop the top of Nose Hill were turned down, and for a while at least, Nose Hill was allowed to remain in its natural state.

One thing is certain in the Nose Hill issue. Its temporary reprieve had nothing to do with any emerging concept of the area as a prime asset in its natural state. Since the legality of the airport’s discretion over the entire area covered by the proposed development was tenuous, it is useful to consider a second point of influence. In addition to those dictated by utilities issues, and School Board and Transportation Department concerns, the City was profoundly influenced by the pending ring road to the immediate north. Any decision to allow a subdivision to go ahead would prejudice the City’s chances of securing a free right of way from the Province. Clearly it was a risk not worth taking.

This period also marked two City efforts to improve marginal lands and preserve green space through golf course construction. Both were in the north and both were associated with the green belt envisaged in the North Hill Plan of 1953. The low-lying areas in Highwood were considered for golf course purposes in 1958 as a way of extending the green belt. Similarly, the area north of Capitol Hill had been set aside for a golf course for the same reason. The initiative stalled when a golf expert informed the City that the terrain was unsuitable. For a short time the area was considered for sanitary fill purposes, until reason prevailed. A plan to develop the area for residential purposes was turned down in 1960, thus clearing the way for the subsequent development of Confederation Park Golf Course. The potential for golf courses in raising land values
in residential subdivisions was not lost on either Kelwood or Carma, both of whom were to enter the field in the ensuing decade.

By any account the provision of green spaces in Calgary subdivisions during this period was not successful. The interpretation of the word “reserve” translated into man-made structures in the form of schools, playgrounds, and recreational facilities. Even the haphazard placement of tot lots in every subdivision reflected the need to reach the 10 percent more than it did a concerted attempt to integrate meaningful green space into new communities. In this context the intent of the “neighbourhood plan” was not reflected in the uneven dispersal of reserves. Finally there is the matter of the 10 percent. Provincial regulations specified it as a minimum. That it emerged as an absolute maximum speaks volumes about official thinking and the place of the “public green” within residential areas.

Land Use

The foundations for urban sprawl were laid during this period. Trends led to patterns which repeated themselves over two subsequent decades in ever-widening concentric circles to produce a low density residential environment. While the extensive annexations might have foreordained this process, it was enabled by specific policies. Certainly it could be argued that these policies simply reflected general attitudes that made the end result inevitable. However, options did exist for both the City and the developers. They were not exercised for a variety of reasons. By the early 1960s, on the eve of the release of Calgary’s first General Plan, the blueprint for growth had already been established and there would be no turning back.

Urgency imposed its own agenda. There can be little doubt that rapid population growth in this period placed an inordinate strain on City resources. While financial burdens were lessened, the delegation of responsibility to developers for subdivision construction imposed new pressures. City administrators, beset with dozens of development applications in several areas, found their role increasingly difficult. The feasibility of utilities was not the only problem. Approval of a new subdivision usually meant an elementary school. The placement of junior and senior high schools was a compounding issue. Roads had to be extended to provide for new bus routes, and to integrate the subdivisions into the city’s transportation network. Provision for commercial areas also had to be factored
in. The problems of coping with these insistent issues tended to blur their long-range implications. A reliance on present and past practice was safer and easier than “tinkering with the mechanism.”

Despite sporadic attempts that dated to 1913, Calgary had done little in the way of formal planning up to 1950. The most significant advancement was a Zoning Bylaw in 1934. The passage of the Town and Rural Planning Act in 1950 brought about significant changes. It allowed the appointment of a Technical Planning Board to oversee the preparation of a General Plan. Comprised of senior administrators and generally chaired by the Chief Engineer, the Technical Planning Board was given the added power in 1953 to approve subdivisions under the Subdivision Regulations. The planning process was further refined by the creation of a separate Planning Department under A.G. Martin and the establishment of an appeals process in the form of a Planning Advisory Commission comprised of three aldermen and six citizens.

The motion providing for a General Plan “for the whole area lying within the limits of the city” was passed by Council on September 4, 1951. The General Plan was to provide for “a rational and harmonious relationship between land use and transportation, an economic extension of utilities and a proper provision of public amenities.” It was supposed to be a blueprint for future growth. It was not. At no point was the General Plan seen as an instrument for change. While transportation and engineering studies formed part of the process, the General Plan, if City officials are to be believed, was based on two early documents. The first was the “Outline Report on Land Requirements for Housing the Metropolitan Population, Calgary 1953–1980.” The second was the brief to the McNally Commission in 1954. Neither was specific on future visions for the City and both saw Planning in terms of reasonable responses. When the General Plan was adopted in 1963, it affirmed current trends, and used them as a basis for future planning.

During this period the City failed to exercise its option to influence residential building patterns. In 1952 the more flexible system of Development Control replaced the existing Zoning Bylaw. Development Control operated through the issuance of permits which, unlike zoning, were applied to development on an individual basis. Ostensibly guided by the General Plan, Development Control allowed planners to specify the subdivision patterns before permanent zoning was applied. Yet traditional practices endured, and developers were not compelled to modify their outline plans in the interests of design or higher densities. These
cautious attitudes, entrenched during this period, were to later manifest themselves in a disinclination to use Development Control to redevelop built-up areas.

Zoning practices reinforced low density principles. Under the 1934 Zoning Bylaw, virtually all of north and northwest Calgary was zoned for R2, or two family residences. Even as late as 1953, the North Hill Plan envisaged R2 zoning west from Centre Street to Brentwood and Charleswood. The major problem with this R2 designation, however, was that it also allowed for R1, or single family dwellings. The failure of the Technical Planning Board to narrow the definition of R2 to either exclude or modify the presence of single family dwellings or to encourage duplexes had predictable results. In fact the Board noted the redundancy of R2 zoning in 1957 but declined to redefine it to encourage medium densities.

Encouraged by developers who showed a marked preference for R1 zoning, single family residences became the norm. The advantage of the R1 over the R2 designation had to do with a better location within the subdivision and a higher level of exclusivity. Keith Construction, for example, catered almost entirely to single family homes. Whole areas in Haysboro and Glenbrook were rezoned R1 from R2. So popular were R1 lots that it was generally assumed that all buyers wanted them. In Westgate several buyers bought lots and only learned of their R1 designation when they tried to build duplexes. When Spyhill developed Thorncliffe Heights it secured a caveat that the entire area would be zoned R1 for 15 years. An application for an apartment in an R2 area in Parkdale was turned down since it was “out of keeping with the single family residences there.” By the early 1960s the bias towards single family residences had made its mark. In the working-class suburb of Ogden, which had been zoned almost entirely R2, over 80 percent of the homes were single family. In Highwood and Capitol Hill, both zoned entirely R2, the percentage of single family homes was over 90 and 80 percent respectively. Other suburbs showed a similar profile. Only 15 percent of the R2 lots in Westgate, South Richmond, and Kingsland were used for two family dwellings. By the time newer areas like Meadowlark Park, Haysboro, Lakeview, Fairview, and Acadia were developed, zoning for R2 lots had shown significant decline. By 1960, a trend had been set, supported, approved, and acknowledged. In February 1961, the City Planner prefaced a discussion on the forthcoming General Plan and the City’s future land needs by noting that “the predominance of the single family home would continue … for some time to come.”
The Technical Planning Board's reasons for supporting this trend were not entirely linked to an aversion to change for its own sake. Zoning adhered to rigid covenants and personal rights. According to one contemporary source, “private landownership is so sacrosanct in public opinion and law, that it can question the propriety of planning proposals and defeat legitimate community objectives.” This traditional viewpoint of zoning as a legal tool for the protection of property values continued to hold major sway in civic thinking. Thus any amendment had to be based on its impact on surrounding property values (and angry residents), and not on merit or long-range implications. For instance, residents in Highwood had to be convinced through lengthy negotiations to give their conditional approval for apartments on land unsuitable for houses.

When a new Zoning Bylaw was adopted in 1958 following a successful legal challenge to Interim Control, not only did the existing R2 classification remain unchanged, but a new and more exclusive category was introduced. Restricted Single Family or RR1 zoning allowed for greater lot size and therefore an even lower density ratio. Moreover, the introduction of the Conditional Use category was used in a restrictive capacity more than as a tool for flexibility.

The Neighbourhood Plan concept adopted by Council in 1953 as a base design for new subdivisions reinforced traditional attitudes towards zoning. The Neighbourhood Unit Model which was first utilized by Charles Perry in New York in 1929 attempted to consolidate community identity by separating neighbourhoods by arterial thoroughfares or natural features. A dendritic design of curvilinear streets, cul de sacs, and walkways in place of the old grid system emphasized the private realm. Access was limited to a few collector roads. Schools and recreational facilities were centrally located while commercial facilities were provided on the edges either on or adjacent to the main intersections.

The Neighbourhood Plan gave the City a specific rationale for its zoning priorities. A typical neighbourhood was subject to layered zoning which became more restricted with distance from the periphery. Single family residences were predominant. R2 zoning occurred sometimes along main roads and but always in the vicinity of commercial facilities. Apartment placement was on a buffer basis, usually between R2 zoning and commercial areas. Since the R2 designation was also used increasingly as a buffer and primarily for single family residences, there was little place for multi-family dwellings. Rezoning proposals for apartments were routinely refused. For example, in resisting an attempt to rezone parts of the inner city suburb of Bankview to higher densities, the Technical Planning
Boards referred to the presence of single and two family dwellings “of good standard.” When the City accepted the row housing principle in 1960, it stipulated that no project could face R1 housing. A limited dividend row housing project in Acadia in 1960 was turned down on these grounds. The definition of an ideal neighbourhood was implied in the reasons given by the Technical Planning Board for refusing applications for rezoning. Phrases like “property devaluation,” “breaches of faith” and “regressive district character” were clear indicators of the type of dwelling that was not needed in suburban neighbourhoods.

In their haste to meet demand, the developers further undermined the planned neighbourhood concept. Large subdivisions negated the idea of neighbourhood. They were developed incrementally and were thus intersected by major thoroughfares. Several developers sometimes operated in the same subdivision over long periods of time. Southwood and Acadia are two cases in point. The latter, for example, was begun during this period but not completed until the late 1960s. Given the tight zoning designations of the single neighbourhood, zoning conflicts occurred on boundary roads where commercial areas faced across the street from single family zoning. This problem in coordinating streets that became thoroughfares with zoning patterns was most visible in the adjacent subdivisions like Brentwood, Collingwood, and Charleswood, or in Fairview, Acadia, and Willow Park. The Technical Planning Board thought that one of Kelwood’s plans for Acadia in 1959 resulted in the undesirable proximity of commercial areas to low density residences. The breakdown of the neighbourhood concept was closely related to incremental subdivision development in the same area.

If walk-up apartments were frowned on in new neighbourhoods, low cost housing was held in lower repute. Hitherto, the City had not embraced low cost housing, as evidenced by the opposition from residents who protested veterans’ housing in their communities in the late 1940s. The Chamber of Commerce went on record in 1950 as opposing any subsidized housing. Calgary’s first low cost housing projects were built in 1951 and 1954, when the City backed out of the C.M.H.C.’s assisted program and opted instead for limited dividend projects built by private enterprise on cheap land provided by the City. Like the veterans’ projects, they were not overly popular in the two communities that housed them. Rather than become involved, the City opted to promote co-operative efforts. In 1950 the Mayor tried unsuccessfully to float an informal house building scheme whereby potential homeowners got together and built homes for each other on a co-operative basis. Another fruitless
proposal called for individual contributions of $1,000 to build 400 homes co-operatively.\textsuperscript{168}

The subject of low cost housing emerged again in the late 1950s amid a brief slowdown in Calgary's economy. The City was not prepared to enter the field unilaterally, since under the current 75–25 percent sharing arrangement for low cost housing between the federal government and the provinces, Alberta had simply passed its 25 percent responsibility onto the municipalities. It was the developers who broached the matter. They were willing to build low cost housing but wanted concessions from the City in the form of cheap or even free land, and some relaxation with respect to lot sizes as well as in construction and servicing standards. The City's reaction was mixed. While it was willing to secure provincial government approval for relaxation to subdivision regulations, any application was to be confined to “appropriate” areas. As for supplying cheap land, the City was less sanguine. If possible, and on an individual basis as with earlier projects, some arrangement might be made. However, an official policy administered through a municipal land banking program, though occasionally discussed, was never a real priority. Lacking any overall housing policy, the City's approach to low cost housing thus tended to be spontaneous, and very much dependent on outside governmental financing and developer initiative.

Though this pattern had already been established, it was more in evidence in the period between 1957 and 1961. First, since no direct financing was available from higher levels of government, the initiative for low cost housing had to come from the private sector. In 1958 the Technical Planning Board and the Commissioners met with developers and discussed the subject of substandard houses in new subdivisions. The developers argued that by reducing lot widths from 60 to 50 feet or less, lengthening blocks, providing narrower or no sidewalks, and relaxing standards for utilities, the price of a lot could be cut by $342.\textsuperscript{169} The City agreed but stressed the need to severely limit the extent to which these relaxations were applied. Quality Construction, for instance, was allowed to reduce costs in Belfast through deep faced sidewalks and curbs on the grounds that there “was no understanding that it would become a general city specification.”\textsuperscript{170} Design innovations were not welcomed. Row housing units, for example, were discouraged, and efforts by both Kelwood and Quality Construction to put them in Acadia were abandoned due to zoning issues and resident opposition.\textsuperscript{171} Not surprisingly, the city's first row housing project in Greenview in 1961 was enabled solely because of its proximity to industrial zoning.\textsuperscript{172} Following sustained
negotiations, Kelwood was allowed to build 27 low cost houses on lots with smaller frontages in Haysboro. The City’s rationale for acceptance was the fact that the lots were close enough to the railway tracks to classify them as warranting the concession.\(^{173}\)

The City also reaffirmed its position on concessions on City-owned land. In one case, it did make land available for a low cost housing project, but only because the developer had already spent $160,000 in assembling property in a suitable area in Vista Heights adjacent to industrial zoning. In 1960 Buena Vista Developments paid the not-so-low price of $2,000 an acre for 42 acres of City-owned land in order to complete its requirements for a 198-unit $2 million limited dividend project.\(^{174}\) Yet when the Calgary House Builders Association proposed a homegrown workable solution to the affordable housing problem, the City was less than enthusiastic. In late 1958 the Association notified the City that it intended to design and build a no-frills house “to prove to the City and the public that a home could be built at a price the working man … could afford.”\(^{175}\) By 1960 the house was constructed in Belfast at a cost of $7,436, which included the builder’s 6 percent profit. However, land and utilities added over $2,000 to the cost.\(^{176}\) Given the high buyer interest in the home and the fact that it was inexpensive enough to secure a mortgage on an annual income of $3,600, the House Builders Association urged the City to follow the example in Saskatoon, where developers obtained City-owned land for low cost housing at $10 a frontage foot and then built single family residences for $8,000.\(^{177}\) In requesting that the City to set aside cheap land for that purpose, the Association noted that affordable housing for low income families was otherwise impossible.\(^{178}\) The City’s response, however, was desultory. After some preliminary thought as to where suitable land might be available, the idea was allowed to lapse. Unlike the case with land acquisition for industrial purposes, no residential land assembly program was entertained, even one as modest as that suggested by the Calgary House Builders Association.

Since higher land prices were associated with commercial activity, the “Neighbourhood” concept provided developers with opportunities they could not resist. In short, they over-provided for commercial activity. Service stations were especially popular. In reference to six of them within a few hundred yards on Northmount Drive, the Technical Planning Board stressed that that had not been the intention when providing commercial zoning in the area.\(^{179}\) At the end of 1956, there were nine appeals pending to the Provincial Planning Board regarding service stations.\(^{180}\) While service stations were usually turned down on “spot zoning” principles,
they were insinuated into Neighbourhood units on the grounds that they belonged with the commercial strip.\(^{181}\) An interesting case concerned Kelwood in 1956 when it applied for a service station and adjacent commercial facilities in the Highwood area on lots zoned originally as residential. Kelwood argued that it had always been its intention to use the lots for this purpose and that the proposed facilities constituted “a necessary local service.” The application was refused following strenuous objections from residents. Kelwood appealed the decision to the Planning Advisory Commission, furnishing evidence that the original advertisement for the subdivision advised potential homeowners that shopping facilities would be provided. The weak argument was enough to convince the Planning Commission, which allowed the commercial facilities only.\(^{182}\)

During this period, commercial zoning was reduced in Thorncliffe, Greenview, Brentwood, and Glendale. Carma tried unsuccessfully to put three commercial locations in the small subdivision of Rosemount.\(^{183}\) Residents in Westgate fought to rezone several lots which they argued had been zoned commercial for speculative purposes.\(^{184}\) Mayfair residents thought that the commercial area south of 66th Avenue would continue to gobble up adjacent land and thus lower the value of residential property values. The Technical Planning Board agreed and refused to rezone. The result was the present suburb of Kelvin Grove.\(^{185}\) Affected residents lost the battle regarding the location of the North Hill Shopping Centre on the grounds that it was not a community issue.\(^{186}\) In 1957, Kelwood considered a major commercial development in Haysboro. The layout envisaged 2,000 homes, several small shopping venues, and a 42-acre regional shopping centre anchored by a Woodward’s department store.\(^{187}\) Though the project secured City approval, Kelwood declined to go ahead in light of a commissioned study which doubted the capacity of the projected area population to support a regional shopping centre. Instead, Calgary’s first regional shopping centre in the south opened farther north in Chinook. Ironically, it was just across MacLeod Trail from where Art Sullivan had tried to float his own similar dream a couple of years earlier. In reference to zoning practices in this period, planners in 1963 admitted that too much commercial zoning had produced an undesirable mix of residential and commercial land usage.\(^{188}\)

Two other trends, both of which had implications for urban sprawl, were observable during this period. The need for providing for parking was becoming a factor in the approval of high density dwellings. Apartment construction, for example, was restricted because of the strict interpretation of the zoning bylaw respecting off-street parking requirements.
Commercial facilities faced similar zoning strictures which required one off-street parking space for every 500 square feet of commercial area. Construction of a mosque on Centre Street North was turned down ostensibly because, unlike the case with a church which required seating, off-street parking criteria could not be applied. The second point refers to citizen involvement. The Zoning Bylaw specified that potential lot buyers had to be apprised of the zoning pattern in the area where the lots were being purchased. The apartment complex in the exclusive suburb of Eagle Ridge only survived because it had been posted as such at the time of lot sales. Any subsequent deviations from that pattern required resident permission and were subject to appeal. This happened several times from Bel Aire to Rosemount. Residents did not win every time. A gravel operation in the Riverbend area was approved over objections from the Ogden Community Association.

Discussion

In a few short years, the foundations were laid and attitudes entrenched that defined the relations between the City of Calgary and the land developers. The subsequent 20 years were in many ways an amplification of policies and practices forged in the 1950s.

The developer-agreement process was formalized during this period to the satisfaction of the City. While admitting to protracted negotiations on occasion, City officials on the whole were pleased with the evolution of “a formidable document” that specified the details and processes for developers to follow. The developers accepted the City’s demands, though grudgingly at times. Though the Urban Development Institute objected to acreage assessments on principle, most developers accepted it as part of the cost of doing business. Two other issues in evidence by 1960 concerned them far more. The first had to do with the time it took to approve subdivisions. Citing the number of reviews and examinations, developers argued that their subdivision plans were being unnecessarily delayed on subjective rather than on deficiency grounds. This led to added expense without materially improving the subdivisions. They also blamed the City for adding to the cost of housing by insisting on overly high specifications. They questioned the wisdom of increased concrete strengths and higher paving standards, wider roads, and underground utilities designed to “peak load” specifications. They pointed out that alternatives did exist but were not being considered. For example, it was suggested that provision for house storage tanks could allow for peak
use such as fire protection and lawn watering and thus reduce the high costs of mains. To the developers' chagrin, the time-consuming subdivision approval process and the “blue chip” specifications were to continue. The validity of their arguments and the fact that they were never addressed allowed developers their own refuge from which to counter rising costs in their industry.

The solution to growth problems through annexation was accepted in this period. The developers influenced but did not ordain this process. While developer demand was a factor, a belief that expansion enabled effective planning and an inordinate fear of fringe communities were equally pivotal. The annexations promised a larger supply of competitively priced land and resulted in a profligate density pattern of 12 persons per acre. The developers facilitated this process through lower lot prices on the city’s periphery, and by stressing buyer choice in terms of location, house design, and cost. It appeared a workable formula, one that was compatible with the market. It seemed simple, too: The farther one went out, the cheaper the house. A precept well learned in this period was to become a blueprint for the future. When in doubt, annex.

By surrendering initiative to the developers, the City placed itself in a reactive and arguably inferior position. City officials believed that the combination of developer dialogue and constraints were effective growth controls. For example, developers bought their land only in areas generally approved for expansion, and had to plan their subdivisions within the City’s annual development program. However, the City’s policy of demanding compliance before subdivision approval obscures the fact that the specific initiative belonged to the developers. Whether under interim control or a zoning bylaw, undeveloped areas were zoned agricultural until ready to be subdivided for development. The specifics of rezoning fell to the developers, not the City. It was their subdivision design and size, their zoning proposals, their notions about interior road design, green spaces, school placement, and commercial locations against which this compliance was gauged. The experience with green spaces stands as an example of interpretive licence. So while the City had the power to demand compliance, it was balanced by other factors. Given the number of subdivision applications faced by a harried and understaffed administration, it is more than probable that compliance often submitted to initiative, in this or any subsequent period, for that matter.

Practices followed in this period also failed to anticipate future trends. The reluctance of the City to capitalize on the Calgary House Builders Association’s no-frills proposal in the late 1950s stands as an excellent
case in point. A creative use of the R2 zoning designation to initiate new low density built forms had to wait over a decade. Zoning priorities accorded multi-family densities a marginal place in new subdivisions. This militated strongly against both apartments and row housing, which had to compete for restricted space or settle for lesser-status concessions. Developers focused considerable attention on small commercial nodes in new subdivisions. The argument that they overbuilt is probably valid, and was later manifest in the inability of the strip malls to prosper in the coming age of the regional shopping centre. Despite Calgary’s first regional shopping centre on the north hill, or the failed initiative of Kelwood in Haysboro, the potential of the regional shopping centre for developer interests had to wait until the next decade.

The developers’ strong interest in maximizing commercial zoning gives an indication that profit margins in residential development might not have been as great as expected. Nu-West President Ralph Scurfield attested to the wide difference between profit margins in commercial as opposed to residential development. The Spyhill Development and Holding Company barely scraped up the money to buy the land for the Thorncliffe subdivision, and later had to pay its subcontractors on an incremental basis. John McLeod told this author that he netted a paltry $2,900 in his first year of operation. According to Ivan Robinson, a private appraiser and member of the McNally Commission, Kelwood expected to make “little or no money” by selling residential land in Fairview at $500 per lot but expected to more than compensate on its

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<td>1951-1952</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952-1953</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953-1954</td>
<td>405</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954-1955</td>
<td>740</td>
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<td>1959-1960</td>
<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6,442</td>
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</table>

Source: City of Calgary Plan, 1961
adjacent industrial and commercial properties. Most early builders were prepared to accept a profit margin of between 6 and 10 percent. The subject of profit margins for residential development in these early years is one that warrants further scholarly attention.

By any standards, Calgary's growth statistics for the 1950s were impressive. Population had increased by over 100 percent. The value of building permits was up by 166 percent and City assessments by 312 percent. As the decade ended, residential construction was firmly in the hands of two major and a dozen or more other private developers. In terms of the future, three statistics are informative. While the city's gross area had grown from 40 to 150 square miles, only 10 square miles had actually been used for residential growth. Third, and equally revealing, was how this expanded area was being used. Of the estimated 43,000 dwelling units completed between 1945 and 1961, 36,596 were single family houses. In subsequent years, this disturbing trend became the accepted pattern for residential urban growth.
Part Two 1963–1978
Chapter 4 ENTERING A NEW ERA

This period began and ended with both a City Plan and a Planning Act. The intervening years were characterized by steady and accelerating growth. Everything, it appeared, got bigger and grander. People earned more; drove bigger cars on wider roads, and lived in more expensive houses. Calgary’s subdivisions rolled like a wave towards the snow-capped Rockies in the northwest. They threatened to encircle Nose Hill in the north, and by the mid-1970s had thrust north of Forest Lawn across the Trans-Canada Highway to the flats east of the airport. To the south they advanced on a three-mile front and by the end of the period were south of Glenmore reservoir and beyond Fish Creek. If there was a downside, it was the fast-rising prices, especially after 1973. Land prices more than doubled between 1961 and 1971. Housing was particularly affected. A modest bungalow in an average suburb that cost $12,000 in 1960 was worth over $20,000 a decade later and around $70,000 by 1978.¹ The complex and sometimes contradictory relationship between the City of Calgary and the land developers is probably best explained when set against this background of escalating costs.

For the City the most significant trend lay in the formalization of its growth policies. This was manifest in three areas. First the General Plans of 1963, 1970, 1973, and 1978 set out the principles on which the City based its decisions respecting future growth. The intent of these general
plans was articulated through sector plans and design briefs. All three were designed to give the City control over the growth process. Their effectiveness, though, was prejudiced by several factors, including current philosophy, developer influence, and deficiencies in the way the plans were interpreted.

The Provincial Planning Act, which received royal assent on March 29, 1963, increased the City’s power to control residential development. The Act provided for the preparation of regional plans by regional planning commissions. The Act also provided for the establishment of Municipal Planning Commissions comprised of senior administrators to advise Council on planning matters, approve subdivisions, and implement zoning or development control bylaws. City officials received more leeway in interpreting reserve requirements. Civic powers were also increased with respect to zoning caveats and development control. Decisions from the Calgary Planning Commission could be appealed to a Development Appeal Board comprised of one alderman and citizens at large. Any subsequent appeal went to Council for ultimate disposition. Stipulations respecting the subdivision of land were loose. Civic approval bodies retained wide discretion with regard to the land’s suitability for the purposes intended and its conformity to existing or proposed general plans.

The City continued its policy of shifting financial burdens to the developer. Here the greatest success came through acreage assessments. Development agreements became more complex and differentiated. High housing prices in the 1970s brought the City and the developers together in the City’s first concerted attempt to deal with the issue of affordable housing. Attitudes towards green space in subdivisions remained

### TABLE 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1963</th>
<th>1973</th>
<th>% Increase</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Price of average bungalow 1100-1200 sq ft.</td>
<td>$15,099</td>
<td>$29,281</td>
<td>97.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Costs per square foot</td>
<td>$10.69</td>
<td>$18.11</td>
<td>79.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Serviced</td>
<td>$2,882</td>
<td>$7,584</td>
<td>163.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly Payments</td>
<td>$110</td>
<td>$227</td>
<td>106.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Downpayment</td>
<td>$2,634</td>
<td>$4,579</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Income per month</td>
<td>$354</td>
<td>$597</td>
<td>68.5%</td>
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</table>

Source: Planning and Building Department
unchanged. Finally, density transfer emerged as a vehicle to enhance higher densities.

The rapidly increasing land values after 1970 brought more money to the development industry and widened the developer's role to include large-scale land assembly. One result was a renewed interest in annexation. Indeed, nowhere was developer influence more visible and sustained than in the annexation debates in the period 1972–1978. Though the City seemed to buy into the developers' arguments, their different rationales mirrored those of the earlier period.

The popularity of single family residences remained. In 1972 it was contended that a short-lived shift to higher density preferences had run its course and that the market was returning to its familiar land-hungry mode. Certainly, tighter mortgage moneys and the availability of urban renewal funding in the 1966–70 period had their impact on single family dwellings. In 1971, only 3,000 of the 8,000 units added to the city's housing stock were single family dwellings, and between 1967 and 1970, they had counted for 40 percent of all additions to the housing supply. The new General Plan of 1973 reflected this trend when it recommended higher and mixed densities in residential areas. However, even as the Plan was released, the tide seemed to be turning. In 1972 single family dwellings had climbed back to over half of all residential construction. The number constructed between 1971 and 1974 was over 70 percent more than in the previous three years. Vacancy rates reflected the change. In 1973, the vacancy rate for single family dwellings was 1.9 percent as compared with 6.8 percent for duplexes, 9.1 percent for apartments, and 14.4 percent for townhouses. In early 1976, Lyle Frodsham of Keith Homes said that there was a waiting list of ten persons for every single family residence that the company would build that year. The market demand for condominiums was so small that they were not included in the city's building statistics up to 1975. Between 1965 and 1975, except for a brief period in the late 1960s, the vacancy rates for apartments in Calgary were well above the national average. In 1973, for instance, Calgary had the second highest apartment vacancy rate in the top 25 cities in Canada and was over three times the national average. In 1974 the Housing and Urban Development Association of Calgary (H.U.D.A.C.) observed that the single family residence was "necessary for the preservation of Calgary's accepted lifestyle." While skyrocketing housing prices after 1975 dampened this trend, single family residences continued to be the ideal.

Attitudes towards zoning remained inflexible. Property values were to be protected as much as possible. Opportunities to diversify the residential
profile of existing districts through the judicious use of development control were lost. For example, a Planning Department report in 1966 was adamant that high density zoning must be confined to either peripheral areas of downtown, commercial complexes, or shopping centres. On the other hand, recognition of the implications of continued low-density development resulted in modest experiments and changes that addressed but did not counter urban sprawl.

The heated debates over Nose Hill and Fish Creek Parks demonstrated the emerging role of the public in influencing decision making, a voice not welcomed by either the developers or the City. The developers saw citizen participation as another delaying factor. In 1972, Canadian Building editorialized that “there is no question that anti-development forces (which are organized minorities of ratepayers mostly seeking their own selfish ends without regard for the welfare of the community) are getting more of a hearing now from municipal governments than they ever have had.” A.E. LePage president Gordon Gray maintained that an anti-developer attitude in the form of organized citizen groups pervaded most Canadian cities. City officials were no less critical. Planner M.V. Facey wryly noted in 1974 that “the very actions that a home owner takes to preserve the quality of life in his neighbourhood under the guise of public participation drives up the price of houses and causes him to complain.” The motives of citizen groups was held suspect. In 1976 a scandal erupted over accusations that certain community groups were demanding cash gifts of up to $100,000 in exchange for supporting developers’ projects at public hearings. Rod Sykes summed up the dilemma precipitated by public input into civic decision making when in reference to a controversial high-rise condominium in an older neighbourhood, he observed: “On one hand people were fighting against responsible densities and on the other they were opposed to urban sprawl.”

The period witnessed a significant change in the city’s development industry. The role of the developer as an extension of the Calgary construction industry gave way in part to the large operator who assembled significant tracts of land on the city’s environs in anticipation of development. By the end of the period there were three major players in Calgary. The first was the Carma–Nu-West group. Carma Developments had been a very strong presence in the city since its incorporation in 1958 and had grown significantly in the 1960s. In 1971 Carma recorded pre-tax profits of $1.6 million on gross sales of $8.2 million, and in the following year when it went public the company upped its sales to $17 million and its profits to $4.8 million. After it became a public company in 1969,
Nu-West Development Corporation Ltd. recorded an average annual growth rate of 27 percent and in 1973 reported sales of $67.8 million. By 1975, Nu-West was grossing over $100 million on sales. Both Carma and Nu-West concentrated on development in the north part of the city.

The second dominant force was represented by Genstar Ltd., a powerful conglomerate with international connections.17 Nationally it was a force. With gross sales of $360 million in 1972, Genstar was among the top 32 firms in the country. Genstar’s presence in Calgary was mainly through a major subsidiary. British American Construction and Materials Ltd. was incorporated in 1961. The Winnipeg-based company, by merging the interests of several companies active in land development and construction, soon became a heavyweight in the industry in its own right. Its first involvement in Calgary came in 1966 when it purchased the prominent Calgary land developer and builder, Engineered Homes. After changing its name to BACM Industries in 1967, the company became a Calgary developer under its own name a year later. BACM’s success was noted by Genstar, which wanted a presence in the western Canadian real estate and construction market. In 1968 Genstar acquired a majority of BACM shares, and two years later completed the acquisition at a cost of $40 million. Through BACM, Genstar went on a $30-million buying spree. Calgary acquisitions included Consolidated Concrete (1968) and Borger Construction Co. Ltd. (1971). In 1971 Genstar paid $5.6 million for Kelwood Corporation Ltd. Later in the decade another major player in north Calgary, the Abbey Glen Corporation, entered the fold. Genstar wisely allowed its acquisitions to continue to operate under their own names. Many homeowners in the south for example continued to identify the house building industry with Kelwood and Keith Construction.

Another major developer to arrive in Calgary was the Vancouver-based Daon Developments Corporation. Its entry into Calgary was solicited by Mayor Rod Sykes, who felt that the added competition would be beneficial to the industry.18 While Daon preferred condominiums, office buildings, and shopping centres to the residential housing market, it also saw the merit in capitalizing on Alberta’s hot economy to acquire large land blocks in anticipation of extensive housing development. In 1969, the corporation acquired a sizable land bank of 1,450 acres in northeast Calgary. Known as the Properties, this land now contains the suburbs of Rundle, Whitehorn, and Pineridge. Later Daon obtained control over another large tract totalling 4,250 acres in southeast Calgary outside the city’s limits. Unlike Genstar, Daon had no interest in building houses. Its policy of contracting out the entire house-building component to local builders
made it popular with smaller operators, who openly supported the corporation’s efforts. For example, Daon contracted land in the Properties to 27 builders and developers. By the end of this period Toronto-based Markborough Properties had bought land in southwest Calgary preparatory to developing the subdivision of Woodbine, for which it paid a reputed $30 million. With assets of $141 million of which over $62 million were in undeveloped lands, Markborough was the last major developer interested in building houses to operate in Calgary during this period.

The rising price of housing was the dominant issue of the 1970s, and more so after 1974. The price of a new house rose more than threefold between 1968 and 1977. Prices escalated rapidly after 1974. A house that cost $33,200 in 1974 went for $62,709 in 1976.¹⁹ The reasons were hotly debated. Developers blamed the increases on rising land prices attributable to a chronic shortage of developable land. Some City officials believed that it was linked to rising costs in the industry generally.²⁰ Another view held that prices were being driven up by speculators moving from stocks into land and housing as a hedge against inflation. This opinion was reinforced by Carma, which argued that speculative land prices in most areas of the city were too high to allow development. Critics of developers thought otherwise. They attributed the rapid rise in the cost of a house to excessive profit taking by developers, who had also succeeded in achieving a strong monopoly presence in the city. The unfavourable image of the land developer was born during this period.

James Lorimer claimed that the price increase on suburban house lots was due to “astonishing increases in the profits made by developers on those lots.”²¹ Quoting the fruits of his own research in Calgary, Lorimer wrote: “My research that summer (1976) indicated that Calgary’s land developers were making a profit of about $20,000 on every house lot they sold over and above normal profits earned in the construction of the house itself, and in servicing the land.”²² Using a specific house in Marlborough as an example, Lorimer quoted figures to show that the profit on the lot was $12,642.²³ Lorimer’s point is buttressed by two examples which suggest that land prices were related to what the market would bear. Carma secured a good deal from the City in West Thorncliffe in the land swap for park purposes in Nose Hill. According to Mayor Rod Sykes, Carma acquired the land at an equivalent price of $50 per frontage foot. Yet Carma sold the lots at $345 a frontage foot, a gesture which Sykes described as “clear evidence of a very irresponsible attitude towards land development.”²⁴ In 1974 Daon sold 19 lots in Whitehorn Phase III, to Engineered Homes at $170 per frontage foot. A few months later Engineered Homes
resold the land for $238 per frontage foot. Like Sykes, Daon executives were not pleased. R.A. Nunn described the deal as “reprehensive in view of the status and image that Daon is attempting to maintain in the properties.” Arguably, given the fact that both income and profits were on a spiral in this period, the rise in house prices could be directly attributed to market demand based on increasing disposable income.

On the other hand, evidence suggests a more confusing picture in relation to profits. Carma’s profits in the high-rolling mid-1970s were easily eclipsed by national companies operating in other business sectors. Nu-West claimed 3 percent profit on operating costs in 1972, while Carma declared only 2.5 percent profit on assets worth $200 million in the first half of 1976. In breaking down the cost components of a building lot in 1976, City Planner Len Fox assumed a not-so-exorbitant 6 percent profit for building contractors and 15 percent for developers. According to a 1978 study by Basil Kalymon, a professor in the Faculty of Management Studies at the University of Toronto, profits from real estate during this period did not deviate significantly from those in other industries. Kalymon noted the high ratio of fixed to total assets in the real estate industry as compared to those in the non-financial sector, and concluded that real estate income as a percentage of capital employed was much less. In a remarkable claim, Kalymon pointed out that in 1976 Nu-West’s operating profit as a percentage of sales was only 0.1 percent after assessing the effects of taxation on pre-adjusted inflation profits. Kalymon attributed rising land prices to general inflation and indicated a significant level of government control in real estate, higher than in any other sector save possibly the oil and gas industry. Maurice Chornoboy, a manager and later vice-president with Qualico, agreed that 6 percent was a normative profit but that in some years, builders had to settle for 3 percent. He recalled a situation where he had no buyers for 140 houses in Queensland Downs, built and ready for occupancy. Up to 1975, developers profited from claiming the carrying costs of land as a tax deduction. The loss of this privilege hurt them significantly. According to the Herald in 1976, Abbey Glen and Daon had been deferring a very high percentage of their taxes in carrying costs. The dollar figure given for Carma was $7.9 million. Finally, there is the degree to which the developers themselves were responsible for the excessive profit taking that critics argued were pushing house prices up. As noted above, it is quite likely that the contractors to whom the developers sold the lots were equally culpable. According to a City Planner, some building contractors were reaping over 30 percent profits on lots bought from developers.
The question of monopoly in the industry was very real. On several occasions the City expressed concern over the fact that a few developers were dominating the market. Over the five year period 1973–1978, 80 percent of residential building permits were issued to six developers. Of the 19,490 lots at the outline stage in January 1976, Carma, Daon, and the Genstar group controlled 13,860. This dominance was even more pronounced since the above “big three” tended to concentrate in specific areas of the city. Moreover, formal ties existed between the major developers. Nu-West was Carma’s major shareholder (35.4%) and for a time during this period the two were considering a merger. In 1974, Ralph Scurfield, Nu-West President, was also Chairman of the Board at Carma. BACM was also a 7 percent shareholder in Carma through its ownership of Engineered Homes.

While it is inviting to speculate on the financial and other implications of this monopoly presence, and indeed to find some resonance with James Lorimer, some qualification is warranted. First, no hard evidence points to price collusion. In the highly controversial BACM-Genstar inquiry in 1974, only the implications of monopoly were shown. According to a 1977 research report prepared for the Ontario Economic Council by a team of economists from the University of Western Ontario, the monopolistic pressure exerted by developers was one of the least significant factors behind skyrocketing housing costs in Canada. Instead the report blamed unanticipated increases in demand, a shortage of utility trunk-serving capacity, and the tendency of municipalities to hold back land for development. In referring to the nation’s strongest monopoly presence in Ottawa and Calgary, the report noted that “even in these cities it (monopoly presence) it is not great enough to have a big impact on prices.”

When discussing monopolies, the difference between owning and controlling land should also be considered. It is true that some developers bought land well in advance of development. This was possible only if the land was relatively cheap, and the developer’s all-important cash flow remained unaffected. Faced with rising interest rates, developers did not wish to hold undeveloped land for extended periods, a fact compounded by uncertainty over civic decisions as to when and where expansion would take place. According to Carma, the annual carrying costs of undeveloped land were over 13 percent. Referring to the hard-line policies of Canadian banks, one developer noted, “it’s not when the tide comes in that you worry. It’s when it goes out.” Thus it was not surprising to find that “options to purchase” was a common practice, especially in the early period. Deposits were advanced and agreed-upon prices negotiated often
on an annual basis, with the land changing hands at the time of pending development. For example, in 1971 Nu-West controlled land worth over $3 million with less than $300,000 in option deposits. A year later, Carma deposited $64,000 in order to control land tracts worth over $1.5 million.\(^38\) Given City uncertainty over when and where land would be released for development, holding land on option placed constraints on developers with respect to priority and market readiness.

A City survey on landownership taken in 1978 qualifies some of the popular assumptions about monopoly control. The survey was taken on land just within and adjacent to the corporate boundaries in six directions: north, northeast, northwest, south, southeast, and west. The results were revealing.\(^39\) Over 150 landowners were listed in the 27,000 acres surveyed. Of this amount, speculative interests held only about 4,500 acres, of which about half was under option to purchase. Approximately 11,000 acres, or around 47 percent, were under the control of the eight largest developers, with the Genstar group and Carma accounting in equal part for about 64 percent of that total. Daon and Melcor each held about 1,000 acres; Qualico, 900; Markborough, 660; Nu-West, 500, and Jager, 400. Of the eight, only Genstar retained direct ownership over all its holdings. Jager, Melcor, Nu-West, and Daon held the majority of their lands on options to purchase. Carma owned 2,200 acres of the 3,600 under its control. While it is true that this developer concentration was in the growth corridors, it was more diffuse than believed. Moreover, abundant land remained under private ownership and, officially at least, was beyond developer interest or control. Interestingly, in the same 1976 report that documented 70 percent control of lots in the outline or processing stage by Carma, Daon, and the Genstar group, the same three controlled less than 50 percent of lots in the tentative or formulation plan stage.\(^40\)

Builders also competed with each other. Carma still had to distribute lots to its builder-members, who vied for business. Nu-West, Kelwood, BACM, and Engineered Homes guarded the integrity of their names and marketed themselves as independents to attract buyers. Keith Construction, for example, stressed its individuality. The company had its own tree farm so it could live up to its reputation as “the builder with the trees.” Finally, it should also be remembered that a certain degree of industry dominance had always existed. In the mid-1950s Kelwood’s builders were constructing around 40 percent of Calgary’s houses. In 1961 Carma and Kelwood controlled over 60 percent of the local housing market. Yet, there was no public clamour about house prices during this period.
Accusations about excessive profit taking and monopoly aside, the fact remains that the potential homeowners were being penalized the most by rising land values. It is true that inflationary influences had driven up housing prices generally. The costs of construction more than doubled between 1968 and 1977. Servicing costs were up by 380 percent during the same period. These figures, however, paled before the cost of land. The price of a lot in 1977 had increased over 600 percent since 1968. Implications associated with this indisputable fact pushed the developers into the public light for the first time.

The absence of consensus over the cause of escalating land values, and the presence of a scapegoat, made certain conclusions inevitable. Public fears about monopoly control and excessive profit taking in the development industry were evidenced by the increasing level of citizen participation. A general mistrust of land developers was one enduring result. Yet, while they were sometimes misinformed and often too emotional in their battles with City Hall and the developers, the various citizen groups in the 1970s were responding to an emerging reality. For despite the inflationary trends that characterized the decade, and the rising land values in cities generally, the arrival in Calgary of the corporate big-name land developer during these years was proof positive that the “real money” was here for a very good reason.
Chapter 5

THE ANNEXATION DEBATES, 1972–1978

Calgary’s first post-war annexations, which began in 1954, ended a decade later when the town of Bowness was brought into the City. With a gross area of 154 square miles, Calgary had plenty of room to contain projected growth. Seemingly, annexation was for the distant future. Yet less than eight years later, the issue was back with a vengeance. The series of events that continued into the spring of 1978 showed the crucial role of the land developers in influencing gross expansion. The City abetted the process with reference to planning control and to uni-city ideals. However, there was more vacillation and uncertainty than decisiveness. It was not the City’s finest hour.

The General Plan of 1963 did not anticipate annexation until the 1980s.1 In fact the Plan had over-projected Calgary’s 1976 population by around 69,000. It had anticipated that the increased population of 261,000 would be accommodated within the existing corporate boundaries on 22,104 acres, or about 34.5 square miles. The figures were consistent with the current policy of 12 persons per acre in new subdivisions. Even at this low density, the Plan foresaw no shortage of land, noting that by 1980 an additional area of 2,500 acres might be required. The renewed interest in annexation seemed doubly mystifying given the fact that Calgary’s population growth rate was below that predicted by the Plan, and that a density of 22 persons per acre was adopted for new

...
subdivisions in 1970. Even in the General Plan of 1973, annexation was seen as an option rather than a necessity. An accompanying map showed where the expected increase of population could be located within the current city limits.²

The renewed interest in annexation in the early 1970s was related to rising housing costs. The developers attributed them to a shortage of land, arguing that thousands of lots in the city were off the market due to policy reviews, environmental constraints, and transportation, zoning, and utilities problems. According to Daon president Jack Poole, constraints advocated in the interests of orderly growth induced artificial shortages and speculation.³ Carma maintained that the freeze on land around the airport affected the development of half of the city's residential growth.⁴ The corporation also complained that the uncertainty over Nose Hill had reduced its lot inventory by a further 4,400.⁵ In pressing for annexation the developers harped on the familiar argument that more land meant lower lot costs and therefore cheaper houses. In 1972 Commissioner Denis Cole noted that the City was being influenced to make large areas serviceable in the belief that the only way to keep the price of serviced lots down was to increase the supply of land.⁶ Even Mayor Rod Sykes, the sometime caustic critic of developers, felt that an enhanced land supply would reduce the rate of increase in house prices.⁷ As public disquiet over housing costs grew, the developers were accused of undue greed and indifference and of withholding land from the market.⁸ The genesis of public antipathy towards the land developers in Calgary was the alleged land shortage of the early 1970s.

The developers’ argument about a shortage of land and its impact on the house-building industry warrants some qualification. Peter Spurr, in his detailed study of land and urban development in Canadian cities,
disputes their contentions. Referring to the early 1970s, Spurr wrote: "The shortage has not been documented, its relevance to the increasing market value of houses has not been demonstrated and there are good indications that the shortage does not exist." The situation in Calgary appeared to support Spurr. A monthly lot and land inventory prepared by the City in 1972 did not seem to reflect a great deal of urgency over any shortage. In March 1972 the City Subdivision Officer reported that there were almost 5,000 vacant lots in the city under development agreements, including 1,446 scheduled for low cost housing.

Others felt that the shortage was contrived. The Housing and Urban Development Association of Calgary (H.U.D.A.C.) attributed the shortage to time-consuming City policies. City Commissioner Denis Cole thought that the problem lay in lot distribution. Supply lagged behind demand not because of a real shortage of land but because the numerous small builders and even developers had no lots. Cole argued that the major developers could afford the speculative land prices which then became the benchmark. These major players contracted the construction of houses to their own small coterie of builders. The smaller operators were thus squeezed out and production lagged. As an example, Cole pointed out that Makoi Homes, a respected builder capable of building 100 to 150 homes a year, had great difficulty in securing building lots from any major developer. In reference to Carma, Cole further noted that the company’s policy of supplying its shareholder members with serviced lots as cheaply as possible had changed. Since it had gone public Carma had become profit-oriented. This, Cole felt, was impacting negatively on its shareholders, who were finding it difficult to pay for the lots to which they were entitled. Cole was right. In 1976, for example, a group of Calgary builders upset at being the last in line for building lots banded together and formed their own development company.

In December 1973 the President of the Urban Development Institute and the regional manager of BACM in Edmonton said that serviced lot prices in Calgary were among the lowest in the country. This was backed up later in a national study for H.U.D.A.C. by Andrzej Derkowski, a Toronto Planning Consultant, who wrote: “Calgary stands out as the only metropolitan area which has maintained moderate lot and new house prices in spite of having rapid population growth, high income levels, and a highly comprehensive system of land development controls.” Finally, the price of land relative to the cost of a house was still low. Lumber prices, which constituted a far greater percentage of the cost of building a house, were also rising dramatically. As for a shortage
of land, Commissioner Denis Cole felt that “we must seriously counter the statements that there is a shortage of residential land and that a shortage is the major factor in escalating land prices.” However, in the larger scheme of things, a shortage, perceived or otherwise, was still a shortage. Since the quickest and simplest way of redressing a shortage was to increase supply, annexation resurfaced as the City’s logical and easiest solution.

The Annexation Debate Phase One, 1972–1975

The annexation issue which emerged in 1972 was precipitated by two related events. Both involved Carma and its desire to develop Nose Hill for residential purposes. In November 1971, Carma succeeded in securing the annexation of around 400 acres north of its holdings on Nose Hill. The intent of the annexation, effective January 1, 1972 and unopposed by the City, was ostensibly to provide land for low and medium priced houses. However, it was more likely due to Carma’s desire to consolidate its holdings in the Nose Hill area, and to a growing uncertainty over the future of the hill itself. Perturbed by the suddenness of the annexation, the Regional Planning Commission declined to approve the enabling amendment to the Preliminary General Regional Plan to allow development. Carma responded by pressuring the City in the form of an outline plan for residential development and, through a strong letter, urging the City to appeal the decision by the Regional Planning Commission. The City declined and the projected new suburb of MacEwan Glens remained in limbo.

The City’s reasons for not opposing annexation in the first place are puzzling. There was no immediate need for development in the area. The City’s argument that annexation was acceptable as long as it did not involve a commitment to provide services seems irrelevant given the intent of the General Plan. Furthermore, civic officials were certainly aware that the annexation was out of step with the regional plan.

The second factor precipitating the annexation debate resulted from City Council’s decision in July 1972 to freeze all development on Nose Hill pending a study on its possible future as a park. Faced with the potential loss of extensive tracts of land, Carma saw compensation by way of annexation. The City concurred and began preparing an application to annex an area to the west roughly the size of the Nose Hill lands in the area now occupied by West Edgemont and Hawkwood.

At this point, the City had not committed itself to any policy of annexation. The proposed northwest annexation was justified by the need
to offset the potential loss of land on Nose Hill. It is also possible that the City approved the MacEwan Glens annexation for the same reason. Yet unaccountably and “out of the blue,” the City adopted an Interim Annexation Policy in July 1972. The Policy called for the preparation of a comprehensive annexation policy. This ill-conceived and hasty action was unwarranted, and went against the tenets of higher density then being discussed for inclusion in the upcoming General Plan in 1973.

The adoption of the Interim Annexation Policy was a clear signal to the developers that the issue was back on the City’s agenda. They were quick to press their cause. In a familiar vein, they articulated their rationale for annexation in a series of seminars organized by the Planning Department. The developers opposed limited annexation since it created corridors and drove up land prices. They wanted a three to five year supply of lots to facilitate planning and to accommodate the lengthy approval process. More significantly, the developers pleaded their case for a 15 year supply of land to increase their options and to counter speculation. Extensive annexation was the only answer.

Throughout 1973, the developers continued their assault. In April 1973 Western Realty Projects Ltd. (later Abbey Glen–Genstar) opened a lengthy dialogue with the City on the merits of annexing land under its control north of the city limits. The proposal by Western Realty was a classic example of the insistent modus operandi pursued by the larger developers during the 1970s. The first rule of thumb was persistence. Western Realty pursued its ambitions in dozens of meetings and through frequent correspondence. The company set the pattern for the future by assembling a large land base of eleven contiguous sections. Like its successors, Western Realty’s pitch emphasized low priced lots and speedy development. According to vice-president Walter Badun, the resulting quick volume sales would ease the housing shortage and enable early debt retirement for the company. This win-win situation was reinforced by outside consultants’ reports that stressed feasibility and, more importantly, design principles which focused on community identity. Forceful persuasion was another option. In warning the City not to go ahead with its northwest annexation proposal until it had finalized its overall annexation plans, the Company hinted that otherwise it just might have to go public with its proposal.

Carma was also proactive. In pleading disadvantage in the light of lost inventories in MacEwan Glens and Nose Hill, Carma pressed the City to expedite the annexation of 2,500 acres in the northwest. In the south, Kelwood referred to significant lot loss as a result of the Alberta
government’s recent designation of Fish Creek as a provincial park. Kelwood lamented a lot inventory of less than five years, and delays of more than three years “due to the various appeals processes.”27 Developers made so many applications for annexations that they forced the Local Authorities Board to order the completion of the City’s annexation policy by the spring of 1974.

At the same time, the City seemed rudderless. Its negotiations with Western Realty were vague and if anything tacitly supportive, even though its own engineers had considerable problems with the company’s commissioned studies. The City also rejected a report which maintained that three times the present population could be contained within the city by increasing densities. According to Commissioner Denis Cole, there was plenty of land within the city limits to meet the needs of developers for several years.28 In a contradiction of its own policy the City did not oppose two subsequent small annexations east of MacEwan Glens initiated by developers in 1973.29

At first glance, the re-emergence of the municipal land banking question gave an indication of a possible deeper and nobler reason for the City’s renewed interest in annexation. Ever since the early 1950s when the City rejected an offer of assistance from the C.M.H.C., the idea of a civic land banking policy, though debated periodically, had never been seriously entertained. Thus senior administrators paid no attention to long-range planner G. Heald when he recommended in 1969 that “the City of Calgary should follow the example of Red Deer and become a major land developer.”30 Three years later, amid the rising land price controversy, the subject of land banking was broached again. In May 1972 an exploratory report on land inventories showed that City holdings of developable lands amounted to only 65 acres of the 5,854 acres under policy review. However, the report also noted the importance of public participation and the need for additional study on market prices for different kinds of housing. The report closed on a cautionary note about the merits of competing with the private sector.31 Following further study by the Planning Department, George Steber told Commissioner Denis Cole in December that the price of City-developed lots did not differ significantly from those in adjacent privately developed areas. According to Steber, if the City “was to use land banking to provide for an economic group not able to participate in private housing market, in all likelihood it would involve directly or indirectly subsidizing the developed land purchase price.”32

HISTORICAL ANNEXATION TO 1995

- 1884-1900
- 1901-1910
- 1911-1920
- 1921-1960
- 1961-1970
- 1971-1980
- 1981-1990
- 1891-1995

1. Annexed 1910, Withdrawn 1923
   Re-annexed 1954
2. Annexed 1956, Withdrawn 1993
   Lands returned to the Tsuu T'ina Nation

Source: City of Calgary Archives, Cartographer: Robin Poitras
The above sobering comment did little to aid the cause of land banking as a solution to higher house prices or as a counter to developer monopoly. Cole was clearly in a quandary regarding any firm recommendation to Council. In January 1973, a newspaper article quoted him as saying that land developers were not making excessive profits on the land they bought for development, and that both he and Steber felt that a land banking scheme was premature and required an urban evaluation study to identify alternative growth patterns. However, less than a month later, Cole's ambivalence showed when he expressed the opinion that the City should get into the land banking business by buying land for between $9,000 and $10,000 an acre and then passing it on to small builders in order to “put them in a highly competitive position with the big boys who are working together.”

Any incentive to pursue a City land banking policy was dampened by discouraging reports from Edmonton, where a land-banking scheme was being used to create the suburb of Mill Woods. An *Edmonton Journal* article in June 1973 commented on the slow rate of lot release and argued that it was not enough to influence overall land prices. Then in August 1973 a University of Alberta Sociology professor told Mayor Rod Sykes that lots in land-banked areas did not lower prices elsewhere in the city and might actually raise them. He also debunked the notion that housing prices were directly linked to the number of serviced lots available. It was enough to convince a dubious administration to go no further. In spite of subsequent Council inquiries, a highly successful industrial land-banking program, incomplete information on Edmonton, and the positive experience of other cities like Red Deer, City officials were loath to abandon their adherence to the principles of private enterprise, or to relinquish fuzzy beliefs about land banking, subsidization, and concomitant evils. Over two years later, nothing had changed. In October 1975, the City's Housing Committee concluded that the “Canadian experience with land banking has not been notably successful in keeping house costs down nor in achieving short term results.” Any chance the City might have had to deploy annexation to effect long-range control over land prices was lost.

The days of the Interim Annexation Policy were numbered by the beginning of 1974. What transpired in March was surprising. First, the Planning Department presented City Commissioners with a report entitled “Alternate Annexation Policies for the City of Calgary.” Despite the fact that the report offered no specific recommendations, and instead generalized on how a comprehensive annexation plan might provide
competition between developers and result in lower land prices, its impact was dramatic. A few days later, the City Commissioners recommended a Comprehensive Annexation Plan involving extensive additions to the city on the north, northwest, south and southeast. Following subsequent additions by the Calgary Planning Commission, the area to be annexed totalled more than 125 square miles.

The reasons for the phenomenally large area were based on assumptions about efficiency of planning, rational utilities extensions, unified transportation systems, and, of course, a way to avoid the inevitable evil of fringe communities. It was argued that land use in the annexed area would be subject to several options and that urban development might not even occur in some areas. Front and centre in the report’s preamble was a referral to the McNally Commission and to the “substantial benefits implicit in a unitary form of government.” The Commissioners also recommended speedy approval and that “a formal application for annexation of these lands will be prepared and submitted as quickly as possible.”

This inexplicable and unprecedented turnaround in civic policy making took City Council by surprise. Following a lengthy debate, Council approved the proposal in May but decided to put the matter to the citizens in a plebiscite in conjunction with the fall civic elections.

The decision was music to the developers’ ears. Only weeks later, Carma submitted a proposal for “a balanced and innovative series of eight village communities linked by a high wandering street” on 3,000 acres outside the city limits. By July, City Planner George Steber was complaining about developers preparing their own design briefs ahead of annexation. H.U.D.A.C. conducted an expensive campaign to convince voters of the benefits of annexation by appealing to the central place of the construction industry in Calgary’s economy. In fact it argued that the area to be annexed was inadequate and should encompass more scope and uniformity in all four directions.

Not surprisingly, given its magnitude, the obvious haste with which the proposal had been prepared, and the attitude of the provincial government, the annexation proposal was doomed from the outset. No information seminars were offered to the public to acquaint it with the intricacies of the issue. Costs were not considered. The Chief Engineer, for example, cringed before the potential bill of over $100 million to service the sparsely populated annexed areas with utilities. Most aldermen were against the proposal and said so during their campaign for re-election. Mayor Rod Sykes referred to the plebiscite as “an insult to the voter,” a sentiment echoed by one journalist who called it “a huge joke.” Not all
the City Administration was supportive. Parks and Recreation Director Harry Boothman thought that the proposal was a misplaced panacea to growth as a natural good, and noted that it ran counter to current trends in sprawling American cities. In addition to the press, several community associations voiced their disapproval. More significantly, the Calgary Regional Planning Commission was opposed. According to Director Rhys Smith, “the commission does not agree with sense of the urgency sounded for the annexation of this massive area.” In a veiled attack on developers and their arguments about land supply, Smith continued, “we believe annexation is not going to check the rise in land prices nor is such a move going to put large areas of land onto the housing market with readily available serviced lots.”

Moreover, the non-binding plebiscite was futile given prevailing provincial policies. Regardless of its outcome, there was no way the Province would have approved it. In fact any annexation application, let alone one involving huge areas, subverted provincial policies aimed at curbing urban growth through decentralization. As an example in point, the Local Authorities Board refused the four-square-mile northwest annexation application only a month after the plebiscite. The “Twenty Red Deers” policy, as one provincial initiative was facetiously labelled, called for a more equitable distribution of urban population by encouraging institutional and industrial development in smaller centres. The provincial government’s sensitivity towards emerging land use issues and urban growth had also been reflected in March 1973 when it established a Land Use Forum to collect public opinion on the changing urban-rural demographic. These included a strong focus on the proper place of agriculture, the role of land use in influencing population distribution, and, most significantly, “land use in and adjacent to urban areas as it affects the cost of housing.”

None of the above mattered, since the plebiscite was soundly defeated on October 16 by a three-to-one ratio. When asked for his comments, James Henderson of Qualico Developments called for “a lot of research, and more head scratching,” and predicted that annexation questions would provoke “interesting political confrontations in the near future.” City Planner George Steber summed it up more succinctly when he said, “It’s something Council will have to decide.” He was right. Nothing had been achieved and it was back to the drawing board. Commissioner George Cornish later contended that the defeat of the plebiscite created uncertainties over future land supplies and reduced opportunities for developers to choose the best and most cost-effective parcels.
The initiatives taken by Carma, and the City’s political response to the rising cost of housing, had led to hasty action. The City resurrected annexation as an official issue of concern and then prepared a plan that had no chance of success. It would have been far better, in light of what appeared to be an adequate land inventory for the City, to have prepared a policy consistent with the 1973 General Plan. But the City had done more than waste its time with respect to annexation. It had also embroiled itself in a messy controversy involving a major developer in the city. The BACM-Genstar inquiry provides an excellent insight into the annexation debate and City/developer issues, as well as the often self-defeating machinations of local government.

Project Apollo: The BACM-Genstar Issue, 1973–1975

In January 1973, Chief Commissioner George Hamilton made a highly irregular decision. Without consulting City Council he commissioned a private study by two reputable Calgary firms. Burnet, Duckworth, Palmer, Tomblin & O’Donohue were lawyers; Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath and Horwath were accountants and management consultants. Their task was to investigate the activities of Genstar Limited in Calgary and peripheral areas in order to determine if

the scope of such operations is such that Genstar Limited has attained or could attain a position where its activities could be deemed capable of unduly preventing or lessening competition or adversely affecting prices in one or more of the said industries to the detriment of the residents of the City of Calgary.54

The secret investigation was given the code name “Apollo.” Progress reports were to go to Hamilton only, with the investigation being conducted by as few people as possible. In accepting the commission, both companies stipulated that since the report was for confidential purposes only, it should not be released without their written consent. They further underscored the type of research they would be conducting with the cautionary comment that “we will not be in a position to guarantee our findings.”55

Hamilton’s actions were doubtless prompted by the ongoing debate over the shortage of building lots and by allegations that developers were wielding excessive control over their distribution. Denis Cole had noted as much in a July 1973 report in which he had indicated that the competitive aspect of the developers’ market bore watching.56 Should
the report warrant, Hamilton intended to submit it to the federal Combines Investigation Commission. Hamilton kept his own counsel on the matter until June 1973, when he confided in fellow Commissioner Denis Cole. A month later, the investigators informed Hamilton that the cost of the report would be significantly higher than the $10,000–25,000 originally projected. Worried that payment might be an issue, the investigators suggested that the mayor be advised. Hamilton refused. Though now clearly concerned about the clandestine nature of Apollo and its possible implications, the investigators went ahead and completed their investigation in the fall of 1973. A draft of the report was delivered to Hamilton on December 11 with a covering letter which stressed its subjective nature and the fact that it “has been prepared solely for your information and guidance and may not be used or quoted in whole or in part…” In early January 1975, Hamilton gave copies to the other appointed Commissioners and the City Solicitor. At this point, the Mayor and City Council had not been advised of either the investigation or the report.

Details in the often rambling and repetitive report were as potentially explosive as the investigators feared. It opened with its two main conclusions. According to the report, Genstar had secured market dominance in a wide range of construction-related industries to the degree that its activities could be deemed capable of “unduly preventing or lessening competition or adversely affecting prices.” The report recommended further investigation to substantiate its findings but felt that a prima facie case existed for the presentation of the report to the Director appointed under the federal Combines Investigation Act.

The report focused primarily on Genstar subsidiary BACM Industries. In documenting its “dominant role in heavy construction, building materials, land development and housing activities,” the report discussed BACM’s extensive horizontal and vertical involvement in virtually every component of the house-building industry, from land development to quarries and concrete manufacturing plants, and from house sales to gypsum wallboard and kitchen cupboards. In addition to BACM, the report cited Nu-West and Qualico Developments, and concluded that an “oligopolistic situation exists in this City with the evidence of an increasing market dominance by the three major builders.”

While the above conclusions had possible legal ramifications, the fact remains that most of the information was derived from the public realm. Certainly the City was well aware of who was building where in the city and how much. The real significance of the Report was contained in the section titled “Assumptions,” which discussed land assembly on the city’s

COMPREHENSIVE ANNEXATION 1974
(125 square miles)

- Existing City Limit
- Proposed Annexation

Source: City of Calgary Archives, Cartographer: Robin Poitras
periphery. Admitting subjectivity and incomplete information despite due diligence, the report offered the opinion that BACM and possibly Qualico Construction had acquired extensive tracts of undeveloped prime land in the city's southeast corridor. The report made similar observations about land assembly by Carma in the northwest and northeast and Nu-West in the northwest. "Should their anticipation prove correct," the report observed, "the companies face the prospect of windfall profits and control of developable land and serviced lot supply."

With the report and its strong indictments now in their hands, the Commissioners faced the decision of how to act upon it. After receiving the investigators' bill of $78,000, the newly appointed Chief Commissioner, Denis Cole, apprised Mayor Rod Sykes of the situation. In a "strictly confidential" letter to Sykes on February 28, 1974, Cole absolved himself, and indeed the report as well, by referring to its public nature. However, he was not dismissive. Though he felt that the problem was still only incipient, Cole thought that Genstar posed a threat and "that it would therefore seem that some action must be taken to break [its] power and control." His solution lay not in trying to achieve more competitiveness in the industry or in a public land-banking scheme, but in pressuring the Province to intervene. After suggesting alternatives, including revised Combines legislation, Cole concluded with the comment, "it is the unanimous view of the authors of this report, the Commissioners and our City Solicitor that it would not be in the public interest to reveal the contents of this report to Council or the public until we together have had an opportunity to thoroughly review its implications and the steps to be taken to safeguard the interests of citizens of Calgary."

Sykes, though very upset over Hamilton's actions, agreed with Cole. Council was not notified. On April 30, 1974, the Board of Commissioners discussed the matter at length. It was agreed that the best course of action was for Sykes to present the report personally to the appropriate federal authorities, but not before a second opinion was received, and after BACM had seen it. In the interim the report was to remain confidential. A land policy review was also urged. The report was then sent to A.W. Howard of Howard, Dixon, Mackie and Forsythe for a legal opinion. It was also decided not to allow BACM to see the report until after Howard's response. Howard offered his first opinion on July 24. Though he could not comment on the factual data, Howard supported the report's opinions and conclusions but recommended against giving it to BACM, since the "publicity that might result therefrom may in fact bring the matter to public attention ... and hamper the investigative efforts of
the Combines Investigation Branch." When Howard wrote to Cole again on September 9, he recommended sending the report to the Combines and Investigation Director on a confidential basis with a covering letter stating that there had been no communication with Genstar. In advocating utmost secrecy, Howard stressed that "the report itself should be and remain exactly what it is – a confidential report." Eleven days later, citing concerns in "current trends in the land development, construction and housing industries which could, if they have not already, lessen the competition or adversely affect prices," the Mayor and Commissioners decided on a delegation to Ottawa to present this "confidential information" to the Department of Consumer Affairs.

On September 26, four days before Chief Commissioner Denis Cole and City Solicitor Brian Scott discussed the Genstar report with Robert Bertrand, the Director of Investigations and Research, Mayor Rod Sykes wrote a puzzling letter to Bertrand. While not mentioning the report, Sykes referred to increasing monopoly control of land and construction materials and stated his belief "that too few firms now control too much land and their price setting mechanism is such as to raise residential land prices unduly." Sykes then went on to support Cole and Scott and requested an inquiry pursuant to a formal investigation. However he also qualified his remarks by warning that any inquiry "will undoubtedly show that the Council of the City of Calgary may itself have contributed to this concentration of land holdings by selling areas that were municipally owned to the landowners about whom we are concerned and by proceeding with annexation to assist them to bring their lands within the development market." After acknowledging his own efforts to prevent such malfeasance, Sykes added that "it seems rather unusual for me to draw this matter to your attention when in fact or City Council may be one of the offenders in that it contributes to the problem it complains about."

The reasons behind this strange correspondence are conjectural. The most logical suggests that Sykes was genuinely concerned about removing himself from an inquiry that he felt might indict City Hall. However, it is also distinctly possible that it was a guarded reference to the entire validity of the Genstar Report, as attested by his later remarks on its political nature. Its effect on the Combines Investigation officials is not as conjectural, as Sykes' comments could hardly have prejudiced them in the City's favour. The reply received by Sykes on October 4 from Bertrand was not helpful. Bertrand did not refer to Sykes' fears. He did, however, acknowledge receiving the report and its usefulness in helping him determine whether a violation had occurred under Section 27 of the
Combines Investigation Act. Bertrand then closed the matter by saying that any subsequent investigation would be privately conducted and in effect the City would be hearing no more about it.68

The mayor and commissioners, however, had prevaricated too long. It is not known whether she was the first to secure information about the report, but on September 23, during the regular City Council meeting, Alderman Barbara Scott requested a list of reports prepared by commissioners which had been kept from aldermen. Scott noted that she had reason to believe that such reports existed and likely thought that they had to do with the big annexation issue. Cole was evasive in his answer. Without mentioning any secret report, he told Scott that she would receive a copy but it would be up to her whether or not to release it to the public.69 Doubtless with this latter comment, members of the press in attendance pricked up their ears.

With the press baying about secrecy, intrigue, and the upcoming plebiscite, project Apollo had become a political football. Cole tried to defuse the situation. In a letter on September 30 to the mayor and Council with copies to the press, Cole exonerated the mayor and justified the secrecy surrounding the report on the basis of its sensitive and subjective nature. He also felt that the aim of the report had been achieved through its submission to the federal authorities and hinted that more would be lost than gained by releasing it to the public.70 It was not enough. Council demanded to see the report in a special meeting on the morning of October 3. In a closed session later in the day, and following a heated three-hour debate, it voted nine to four to release the report to the public. Council’s decision was made in the face of strong contrary advice by Commissioners, the City Solicitor, and Mayor Sykes, all of whom had raised the potential for legal action.71 According to Sykes, the City would “be blown out of the water by a massive lawsuit.”72 Alderman Eric Musgrave assessed the majority mood when he said “the important thing is that we have one politician, four commissioners and a few lawyers who are telling us that they are the important people and that they know better than we do how the people are to be governed.”73

The reaction was swift and predictable. In a special release on October 7, Nu-West distanced itself from the accused by stating that “it had no connection whatsoever with the Genstar group of companies.”74 Carma seemed unperturbed saying that “it had nothing to hide.” BACM noted its amazement that the City “could pay so much for information already available in the public domain.”75 Even before the report was released, BACM and Carma disclosed details to the press respecting their land

Source: City of Calgary Archives, Cartographer: Robin Poitras
holdings both within the city and in the proposed annexations area. BACM claimed ownership of 1,640 acres within the city and 3.5 square miles in the annexation area, of which 2.5 square miles was under an option to purchase. Carma controlled 7,000 acres, mostly outside the city, of which 1,200 were in the proposed northwest annexation area. Matters became more serious after Calgary MP Eldon Woolliams brought the subject up in the House of Commons. On October 9, BACM Vice-President Tom Denton announced that the company’s reputation was “irreparably harmed,” by the report’s “inaccuracies, distortions and unsubstantiated allegations,” and that Genstar was made to appear “mysterious and conspiratorial and that nothing could be further from the truth.” By the middle of October and the day after the defeat of the annexation plebiscite, the City was in damage-control mode. On the 17th, Denis Cole contacted Ralph Scurfield of Nu-West, informing him that the City was well served by the land developers but that the need to protect the public warranted “close watchfulness.”

On February 2, 1975, Genstar Counsel, James Unsworth, wrote to the City, accompanying his comments with an eight-page, point-by-point documentation of errors and inaccuracies in the report. According to Unsworth, the report was highly discriminatory and disturbing given its errors, deceptive slant, and inflammatory tenor. In his opinion the business activities of Genstar and its subsidiaries “have been and will continue to be adversely affected.” Unsworth further indicated that the company was owed a public apology. Three weeks later Denis Cole announced that Genstar was going to proceed with legal action against the City. Faced with the prospects of a seven-figure lawsuit that it very well might lose, the City opted to save money if not face. After several meetings, Genstar’s lawyers agreed to drop the suit in favour of a public apology. On June 23, 1975, in a joint press release, the City admitted that “the report contained inaccuracies and could contain innuendos that could reflect unfairly on Genstar and its subsidiaries for which the City sincerely apologizes.” According to Rod Sykes in a private correspondence to Robert Bertrand a year later, the report was also “politically inspired.” As agreed by the two parties, the matter was declared closed and no further comment was made by either.

The federal government, however, did follow up. A preliminary investigation which included detailed interviews with several City administrators was carried out by the Investigation and Research Branch of the Department of Consumer Affairs. In a press release on June 15, 1976,
Director Robert Bertrand announced that the matter was not such as to warrant inquiry under the Combines Investigations Act. In concluding that no violations had occurred or were about to occur, Bertrand disdained the report by saying that “a good deal of time and public money has been wasted on a political witch hunt.” Yet was all lost? The publicity generated by the report did elicit some remedial action by the Genstar group. In December 1975, BACM piously announced that it had sold its 8 percent interest in Carma “to allay public concern no matter how ill-conceived.”

Also, one wonders whether the implications of the Genstar Report had any bearing on a subsequent amendment to the Combines Investigation Act which extended monopoly restrictions to the service sector.

The Genstar Report became a political issue not so much for what it implied but rather in that it was seen as a way of undermining the credibility of an able but controversial mayor. Rod Sykes’ reputation for antagonizing certain aldermen and administration officials was well advertised, and two mayoralty hopefuls saw the Genstar report as a way of ending his tenure. They felt that he was using the issue to paint himself as a champion of justice and a martyr to boot. Ed Dooley claimed that Sykes had known about the inquiry all along and may have actually initiated the study. Peter Petrasuk said that it was he (Petrasuk) who had actually suggested the report to Commissioner Hamilton as necessary to combat undue developer influence. Sykes was re-elected, albeit with a reduced majority. The way in which the Genstar Report was handled showed how parochial interests triumphed over good judgment. Any benefit the report might have had in terms of frank dialogue with developers was lost amid political infighting.

In terms of the information delivered by the report, BACM was right. It certainly was not worth $78,000. The statistics on land assembly were neither accurate nor comprehensive enough. Moreover, since land monopoly was currently excluded under existing federal legislation, it did not matter anyway. Furthermore, any common sense observation would have deduced that land ownership in growth corridors was likely to occur in advance of development and that those with “the deepest pockets” would be the most involved. On the other hand, the Genstar Report proved this assumption. In that context, the report’s major impact was the force it lent to the Commissioners’ sudden decision in early 1974 to seek the huge annexation area. Finally, there is the matter of its political inspiration referred to by both Sykes and Bertrand. Here, the absence of evidence precludes elaboration or conclusion.
The Annexation Debate Phase Two, 1975–1978

Though the defeat of the plebiscite in October 1974 left the City with no annexation policy, it was obvious that the issue was not going away. The City’s commitment to annexation was reflected in its brief to the Alberta Land Use Forum in February 1975. The submission saw outward growth as irreversible and noted that Calgary could house a million people without any loss of quality of life. It was also contended that the aspirations of young families for a bigger house in the suburbs had led to a concentration of population increase in the fringe areas. While Calgary’s total population grew by 8,600 in 1973, the fringe areas just outside the city had increased by 15,000. The submission hotly criticized the Province’s decentralization policy; its prevarication over roads in new areas, and its negative attitude towards annexation. Support was lent to the developers’ argument that rising house prices were linked to a shortage of land, and to the uni-city concept as a guiding element and a brake on speculation. It was also obvious that the City was not concerned about the negative implications of low density outward development. Chief Commissioner Denis Cole equated urban sprawl with “leap frogging” or non-contiguous development, phenomena contrary to development patterns in Calgary. This of course led to the inescapable conclusion that any association of Calgary’s growth with the “true meaning” of urban sprawl was, to quote Cole, “totally inappropriate.”

Annexation issues continued to dominate civic politics from 1975 into 1978. As has been discussed, the City viewed annexation as a positive step to avoid the emergence of fringe communities and for control and planning purposes. On the other hand its timing had to be set against need, and this was difficult to justify when large areas of undeveloped land existed within the city. The developers wanted large-scale annexation for their own purposes. When they began agitating for annexation, couching their arguments in terms of inadequate inventories and promising lower house costs, they furnished a rationale for the City to do what it wanted to do anyway. The role of the developers in influencing annexation must be assessed in the above light. Of more significance is the degree to which the developers persuaded the City to adopt their ideas about the scope and direction of annexation. It was here that their persuasiveness was most evident. The annexation application that was approved by the Local Authorities Board in February 1978 was a clear vindication that they had won their battle.
By the mid-1970s, not a great deal had changed in the annexation debate. If anything there was less need for annexation. The Planning Department observed in 1976 that the City had a seven to eight year supply of available land. A survey taken in September 1976 showed that land within the present city limits could house over 242,000 people. The emerging Strathcona area alone promised housing for 50,000 people. Fifteen hundred acres had been removed from the original Nose Hill Park area and made available for residential development in east Edgemont.

On appeal in 1975 the Local Authorities Board had reversed its original decision to refuse the annexation of 2,500 acres in the northwest. It was further argued that the type of housing being built on an annual basis actually exceeded population needs by over 200 percent and that at 7.5 persons per gross acre, Calgary had one of the lowest densities in North America. In May 1976, the Planning Department offered the alternative of increasing densities in areas within the city through town house projects on land under development control, and suggested as an example three possible projects that could house 46,480 people on 516 acres.

Despite the above, the developers stressed minimal lot inventories within the city and, after 1974, spiralling house prices as warranting annexation. Both Nu-West and Kelwood referred to the “proven need for additional land for residential purposes,” while the U.D.I. made much of the “current shortage situation.” To counter contrary viewpoints, the developers indicated the amount of developable land within the city that had been taken off the market. This included 2,500 acres for Nose Hill Park, 3,000 acres south of Fish Creek, 1,100 acres in the northeast, while along Barlow Trail, a sizable chunk of potential residential development had been given over to industrial use. The developers were overstating the shortage. Though their assertions about Nose Hill and Barlow Trail were correct, the other 4,100 acres were in a delaying mode. The lands south of Fish Creek waited on a transportation study, while those in the northeast were temporarily frozen pending the solution to a sour gas problem. The developers also supported their contentions about high house prices by arguing that land values within the city encouraged only the upper ends of the market when the most pressing need was for lower priced homes. Without exception they accompanied their applications with promises to deliver lower-cost housing. Interestingly, a Planning Department document released in 1976 was of the opinion that lower priced housing in annexed areas would still be impossible to achieve due to spiralling construction and land costs.
The annexation process that unfolded between 1975 and the spring of 1978 was incorporated in three main policy decisions. Following on the heels of the defeated plebiscite, City Council adopted another Interim Annexation Policy in March 1975 which called for the preparation of a comprehensive growth policy as part of the review of the Calgary Plan.96 A year later the City unveiled its overall philosophy for the General Plan in what was termed the Balanced Growth Policy. In support of the latter, Council approved the Balanced Annexation Policy a few months later. All showed strong developer influence.

The Interim Annexation Policy’s contradictory nature rendered it ripe for exploitation. It was supposed to forestall annexation while allowing it. Applications for annexation were considered within seven criteria.97 These included need, size of annexation, servicing, relationship to existing development within the city, effect on adjacent uses, and existing land use and alternative uses. Vague and open to wide interpretation, these criteria encouraged the developers, who were anxious for both short and long term land. “Need,” for example, was linked to “ensuring a satisfactory overall development pattern in the long term” – whatever that meant – and to whether or not the land was needed to complete a development within the city limits that might not have even been begun. Furthermore, while the annexation of large areas was to be avoided, they was to be enough to create immediate communities. No guidelines were provided. Not surprisingly, the Urban Development Institute went on record as supporting the policy.98

The developers made a mockery of the Interim Annexation Policy by assembling land on the city’s periphery and applying to the City for annexation, easily justifying their claims under one or more of the seven criteria. By October 1975 the City was entertaining six applications involving 23,778 acres (37 square miles) with provision for a population of 371,500. Abbey Glen (formerly Western Realty Projects) held over 7,000 acres in the north. Carma had 3,680 acres north of the city near Simons Valley Road. Nu-West controlled 2,500 acres in the Scenic Acres area in the northwest. Kelwood and Richfield Properties owned about 2,600 acres in the Midnapore-Sundance area in the south. Daon and BACM controlled over 8,000 acres in the city’s southeast corner. However, instead of dismissing all applications as premature pending the completion of the General Plan, the City ultimately approved them all for annexation before the end of 1976. It did not matter, apparently, that the size of the applications violated the intent of the Interim Annexation Policy or that the aggregate land acreage involved grossly overstated the City’s
requirements, or that some had been met with strenuous disapproval from surrounding communities. The official mind was made up. The question is, why?

The fact that every application promised lower cost housing led the City to embrace the various annexation proposals, sometimes over strenuous public objections. Abbey Glen’s proposal is a good case in point. It called for housing for 50,000 people over 25 years. Inducements included moderately priced lots, a man-made lake, a very large dedication for reserves and an initial allocation of at least 100 acres for public housing. Yet when Abbey Glen presented its proposal at a public meeting of north Calgary communities in February 1976, the reaction was one of anger and disgust. According to the vice-president of the North Bow Community Association, Abbey Glen accompanied a “cooked agenda” with “manipulated statistics” and a “slick presentation” that focused on how development should proceed rather than on the question of annexation. It was also pointed out that citizen participation was becoming a developers’ tool to secure support through “very carefully structured meetings, incomplete and misleading answers, attempts to control the meeting and deliberate attempts to confuse the citizens.”

Civic officials were fascinated by Daon’s “Project 16” proposal to annex 8,250 acres in the southeast. Daon envisaged a centrally planned community with single and multi-family residence within a network of services and amenities that would meet moderate income housing needs for next 20 years. The area was easily serviceable and offered opportunities for employment estimated at 6,400 jobs in the first phase. The application was accompanied by a sophisticated brief that drew on five independent consultants’ reports on utilities service planning, conceptual planning and market analysis, landscape resources, transportation, and environmental impact assessments. In late 1975, without notifying the City, Carma asked the Province to expedite annexation of its lands in the north so it could construct low cost housing. Carma’s irregular and unsuccessful initiative showed the intensity with which the developers used low cost housing as a lever for annexation preference.

In March 1977, the City introduced its Balanced Growth Policy. It too bore the clear stamp of developer influence. The Balanced Growth Policy was to be incorporated into the General Plan as a guide to long-range population growth and subsequent annexations. Based on a valid population projection of 778,000 in 1996 (768,082 actual), the Balanced Growth Policy provided for the 127,000 extra people not covered by existing design briefs within the present city limits. It grew out of the eight
Alternate Growth Strategies prepared throughout 1976 and made available for discussion in October. Each strategy had a policy and a spatial component, the latter specifying precisely where the projected 127,000 would be housed by 1996. All involved some annexation.

Three of the strategies proposed increased densities in existing built-up areas. In Strategy A, “The Compact City,” annexation was discouraged in favour of increased densities. Under this strategy, 80,000 people would live well within the existing city limits. Another 24,000 would be housed in the far northwest and 23,000 in the south. Annexation would be required to house about half this number. The use of the car was discouraged: Under this more compact city, there would be a major shift towards public transit. Strategy E, “Conservation and Rehabilitation,” emphasized the improvement of existing housing stock in the inner city areas and the use of non-agricultural land for residential expansion. This was reflected in a population node of 10,000 in the inner city area, with the remaining 117,000 being located mainly on annexed marginally productive lands in the north and northwest. The other strategy to embrace increasing densities in central built-up areas was Strategy D, “Maximum Efficiency of Investment and Resources.” This strategy opted to increase densities in areas of existing infrastructure, especially along transportation routes. Six spatial nodes were envisaged, five on the periphery in the north, northwest, east, south and southwest, and one housing 55,000 in existing central built-up areas.

The other strategies made no provision for increased densities in existing built-up areas. Strategy B, “Modified Trend,” encouraged outward growth by placing the entire 127,000 increase in four population nodes on the city periphery. Annexation would be required in all four in the northwest, north, southeast and south to house more than half. In this strategy, “the car would remain the principal means of movement. Strategies C, “Decentralized Employment,” and F, “Price of Housing,” also called for outward population growth and advocated even larger annexations. In Strategy C the intent was to move employment away from the downtown. A major population node was chosen in the north and two others in the south and southeast. In Strategy F the rationale was to minimize the rate of increase in housing prices. Three variations were submitted. The first F(i), had five population nodes similar to Strategy B. In F(ii) the entire 127,000 were located in the north, and in the south in F(iii). Of all strategies, F advocated the largest annexations.

During the subsequent intense discussion and evaluation by City administrators, it was clear that Strategies A and D were the most
preferred. A financial appraisal that examined the operating and capital costs favoured them for their efficiency. Eight of the eleven City departments ranked them first or second. A sophisticated analysis that measured all strategies against the 69 objectives in the proposed General Plan placed Strategy A first and Strategy D second, both far above the others. Yet in February 1977, Council was offered a hybrid alternative called “The Balanced Growth Strategy.” It was not, however, as might be expected, a choice of or combination of A and D. So what happened? Evidence suggests that the City may have bowed to developer pressure.

As soon as the Alternative Strategies were made known in October, the developers went on the offensive. In voicing its concern to the Mayor and Council on November 12, H.U.D.A.C. felt that they should be amalgamated into a single preferred strategy. The City's reply gave the first hint that the official mind had not settled on any specific strategy. According to Commissioner George Cornish, H.U.D.A.C. had little cause for concern since the amalgamation it sought would evolve naturally anyway. Of far more significance was a correspondence on November 18 to the City Planning Department from David A. Levins, Chair of the Calgary Plan Review Committee for the Urban Development Institute. In a lengthy plea, Levins argued that the City's spatial strategies, by allocating specific populations to individual areas, would serve to increase rather than reduce the cost of housing. He then went on to suggest an additional strategy. Levins' Strategy G, “Flexible Development Control,” dismissed specific population projections in various areas, and essentially called for the market to regulate house prices, through innovative design, the abandonment of the 22 per acre density pattern in certain areas, and consistent and ongoing annexation. His “Policies” section jibed nicely with that of Strategy D by stressing redevelopment where possible and in aligning increased densities with transportation infrastructure.

In assessing the advantages of the new strategy against the 69 objectives in the pending General Plan, and offering to work with the City, the U.D.I. showed itself at its persuasive best. But if the U.D.I.'s feelings on the matter had been made quite clear, the City's response eleven days later was equally revealing. In a carefully worded reply, City Planner George Steber was only mildly critical, noting that population projections were a requirement under the General Plan and that control in growth corridors was an economic necessity. He then went on to suggest that the population projections did not matter anyway since “the extension of infrastructure in any direction approved as part of the growth strategies would be greatly influenced by market pressures for development.
in that direction..." Steber concluded by emphasizing that “most of the issues raised by you can and will be dealt with in the final strategy adopted by Council,” and noted specifically that the U.D.I.’s alternative strategy was a blend of Strategies B (Modified Trend) and F.

The Urban Development Institute made its final appeal in late February 1977. First it referred to earlier comments made by Commissioner George Cornish with respect to the population projections. Cornish had apparently agreed with Steber and had made it clear, according to the U.D.I., that the projections represented existing utilities and transportation thresholds and were not allocations to limit growth to the preclusion of others. In rejecting the higher central residential densities suggested by Strategies A and D, U.D.I. President Larry Butler observed: “We’ve all seen in these council chambers how often the public reacts to increased density in their neighbourhoods.”

On March 7, 1977, City Council accepted the Board of Commissioners’ recommendations and adopted the Balanced Growth Strategy, which called for annexation in four areas to accommodate the distribution of over 120,000 people on the city's periphery. It was not, however, one of the eight alternatives but a combination of Strategies F(i) and D. The choice of the former was surprising, since it had been ranked very low by the City departments and second to bottom in terms of the General Plan objectives. In their presentation to Council, the Commissioners justified their recommendations as a necessary compromise. They felt that by incorporating elements of Strategy F(i), the price of housing would be positively affected through increased competition in several parts of the city. Strategy D assured added efficiency by placing the peripheral population nodes in the growth corridors. Yet the provision for the higher central densities advocated in Strategy D was significantly reduced on the grounds that its adoption would engender too much community opposition. Significantly, this made it similar to Strategy B and more in line with developer preference. In other words, the more compact urban form that had been so firmly advocated in the favoured two strategies had been sacrificed for a continuation of the status quo through widespread outward development. In fact the five population nodes in both Strategies D and F(i) were increased to seven. The developers had got what they wanted.

The Balanced Growth Strategy was an astounding turnaround given the work that went into preparing the various strategies and what seemed to be a consensual choice between two options. The argument that no single strategy was acceptable begged the intent of the entire exercise.

The reasons for rejecting increased densities were weak, especially in light of their validity and overwhelming endorsement. Certainly, it was the responsibility of City Council, not the Administration, to determine whether or not the political will existed to implement either Strategy A or D. It was in many ways a historic policy decision, and was likely the City’s last opportunity to curtail a 25 year trend. It was also a marked victory for the land developers.

In adopting the Balanced Growth Strategy, City Council charged the Commissioners “to bring forward an annexation proposal that would permit the Balanced Growth Strategy as approved to be implemented....” Clearly it was not a difficult task given the fact that the official mind was already made up. In June 1977 the Balanced Annexation Policy was ready for presentation to Council. The influence of the developers was clearly evident. The potential annexations reflected much of Strategy F(i) but without the population projections. Even the accompanying annexation map labelled the areas to be annexed by the name of the developer operating there. In justifying their recommendations for the annexation of 36.7 square miles to the north, northwest, east, south and southeast, the Commissioners stressed the fact that they were providing for effective development control, and for varied if unspecified land use for the next 20 years. In echoing the developers’ argument presented to them so persuasively a few months earlier, the Commissioners also noted that the new policy would “provide large areas of land with a potential for residential development and therefore should assist in keeping down the price of housing.”

It was still not enough for some developers. In early June Nu-West and Carma registered their strong disapproval that all their lands in the northwest and north had not been included in the Commissioners’ recommendations. Smaller operators like Sterling Homes and Hill Developers Ltd. argued that they “catered to the complete spectrum of the housing market,” and therefore inclusion of their lands would “increase that level of competition that the City is so anxious to ensure.” Thus when the Balanced Annexation Plan was presented on June 27, City Council included five more areas totalling ten square miles to the proposed annexation boundaries. Commissioner Denis Cole justified the sudden alteration to a supposed definite proposal in a puzzling allusion to “control purposes,” and to the fact that they (the additions) were within the original 1974 annexation plan. In effect, City Council had amended the Balanced Annexation Policy to include all the land it had previously supported as private applications. Three months later, upon petition from a
number of landowners, another section in the south was added, bringing the total annexation proposal to 48 square miles. In the original annexation proposal, Commissioners had described this latter section as not offering “any potential for urban development for at least 20 years.” It appears that it was not only the developers who had got what they wanted. Speculative interests also stood to profit.

Over the ensuing six months the developers pushed for the City to expedite annexation. They countered protests by community associations and the Municipal District of Rocky View, as well as misgivings by the Calgary Regional Planning Commission by emphasizing the dire shortage of developable lots within the city, and hinting at the implications of what a very limited supply of developable land might mean for housing prices.

Chief Commissioner Denis Cole presented the City’s case for annexation to the Local Authorities Board at a hearing on January 12, 1978. In a well-prepared, articulate brief, Cole justified the need for comprehensive annexation in familiar arguments about the efficacy of long-term control. However, it is also easy to discern why Genstar executive M.H. Rogers described it three days later as “the best presentation I have ever witnessed before the LAB.” Probably Rogers himself could not have stated the developers’ case better. Cole sanctioned the input of developers by referring to two “of national standing” (Genstar via Abbey Glen, and Daon) who “were in consultation with the City regarding the extension of utilities and services and the position of the City regarding incorporation so as to permit immediate development.” He equated the high price of housing to “the uncertainty of the major developers as to where, in the long term, they could replace their land inventory as it was consumed by development.” Cole also echoed the U.D.I. argument that since the market determined housing type and location, “sufficient lands must be incorporated to permit rates of development to vary in different directions at different times and in different circumstances….” Cole’s overall sentiments were echoed more succinctly by the lawyer for the City who noted that an annexation refusal “would virtually eliminate certain reputable and active development companies who have traditionally supplied a large share of Calgary’s market in houses.”

In addition to Cole, the Local Authorities Board heard three other briefs from the City’s Director of Transportation, the Chief Engineer, and the Manager of Long Range Planning and Research. In addition, six developers gave presentations supporting the City’s bid. Interestingly, two former City officials represented the developers. Former Mayor Rod Sykes
spoke in favour of Daon and former City Solicitor Brian Scott represented Carma. Opposition to the City’s bid was provided by Rhys Smith, Director of the Calgary Regional Planning Commission, who felt that the original proposal of 36 square miles was sufficient, and that annexation would not resolve the problem of high housing prices. The Municipal District of Rocky View indicated that the annexations if approved would mean reduced tax revenues and a loss of 2.4 percent of its total area, much of which was prime agricultural land. The arguments, however, were not enough to convince the Local Authorities Board. On February 20, 1978 it approved the annexations on the grounds that “the City of Calgary has satisfied the Board that additional land is required for the future residential and industrial areas of the city.” Final approval now rested with the Provincial Cabinet.

Unfortunately for the City, the Provincial Cabinet did not see the L.A.B. ruling in the same light. Its foreboding delay in reaching a decision sent ripples of alarm through the developers, who were suggesting by early May that further prevarication threatened not only their livelihood but the industry itself. A few days later on May 11, Municipal Affairs Minister Dick Johnston dropped his bombshell. The annexed area was reduced from 48 to 25 square miles. Johnston justified Cabinet’s decision by arguing that the annexation would meet the City’s needs for 17 years, and that prime agricultural land had to be protected from the impact of urban growth. He also chided the City by stressing the “existing stock of thousands of developable acres within the city limits,” as well as the need for a policy to increase overall residential densities. Johnston’s allusions to future annexations sent an oblique message of official disapproval of the City’s annexation policies to date. In specifying the government’s official preference for future expansion to the north and northwest, Johnston added that “the Province anticipated consultation with the City of Calgary and perhaps the Local Authorities Board aimed at the desirability of providing additional lands for future growth in this direction.” The City’s knuckles were being rapped.

Reaction to the Cabinet’s decision was mixed. The Calgary Regional Planning Commission pronounced its satisfaction. At least one alderman was pleased. Alderman Greg Husband noted that “the province was sending the city a message that the developers and not it are in control of development in the city.” Phil Elder, leader of Calgary Urban Party, felt the Cabinet had not gone far enough. He called for revocation of the entire annexation proposal, arguing that the City already had enough land within its limits to last a generation. In reference to a developer
victory, however diminished, Elder evinced his frustration: “No matter what you do with these guys you can’t win.” The developers did not see it that way. Nu-West was very upset over losing some of its lands in the proposed Scenic Acres subdivision, as was Daon, which was the biggest loser in the south and southeast. The City agreed with the developers. In expressing his extreme disappointment, Long Range Planning Manager Ted Brown maintained that the allowed annexation has “serious implications on the number of developers who are going to be active in the market.” According to Brown, those developers who were not granted new land stock would have their “inventories severely reduced” and competition would be cut.

The Cabinet’s decision was not unexpected. It was well understood in civic circles that the forthcoming Planning Act indicated even stronger provincial control over urban growth. Furthermore, the power of amendment had been added to Cabinet’s discretion respecting Local Authorities Board decisions. Rather than either upholding or rejecting, Cabinet could now refashion annexation proposals to suit its policies. In the end it was the staying actions of the Province, not the City, that thwarted the developers, if only to a degree and temporarily.

Discussion

Clearly, the impetus behind the various annexation measures taken between 1972 and 1978 resided far more with the developers than with the City. By pleading reduced inventories, by equating house prices with lot availability, and by dangling the lure of lower-cost housing, they were successful in convincing the City that annexation was the only viable solution. And when the City did move towards this desired end, the developers worked to ensure that the desired end was also their end. Perceived in this light the City emerges as either a victim or a dupe of developer aggressiveness. Yet despite its contradictory and sometimes inexplicable behaviour, it could be argued that City officials followed a predictable pattern, one that suited the pragmatics of the times.

The requirement to modify general plans every five years meant that civic administrations had to plan for the future even as they tried to grapple with the implications of the current Plan. In the meantime the several studies on density, urban renewal and low cost housing, sector plans, and design briefs tended to fracture decision making. Arguably, the City’s attitudes and actions towards annexation were a manifestation
of the inordinate pressures associated with the preparation of general plans that were supposed to guide future development.

An examination of the tenor of the Commissioners’ reports during these years showed the ongoing fixation with the uni-city concept. This was evidenced by its inclusion in virtually every report on annexation. On January 15, 1976, Chief Commissioner Denis Cole, in recognizing anti-annexation sentiment within the city, offered the following frank opinion to Daon Vice President R.A. Nunn:

In the long run I do not believe that either the province or the citizens will significantly shape the pattern of development. Economics will determine its shape and form. The key issue is whether the suburbs will be in the same jurisdiction as the central city. If the unique position of Calgary is destroyed by the citizens or the province, then a great opportunity will be lost.134

The City’s presentation to the Local Authorities Board on January 12, 1978 mirrored these sentiments.135 The brief opened with a tribute to the significance of the McNally Commission, which, Cole argued, had “guided the development of Calgary to the present day.” In a lengthy argument Cole integrated recommendations made by the McNally Commission to maintain that “without doubt the most important concept and objective of the City Council, which has been consistently supported over the years is the principle of one local government to manage the metropolitan community of Calgary.” He buttressed this contention by reference to a 1968 study for the City of Edmonton by noted academic E.J. Hanson. Cole concluded that Hanson’s recommendations mirrored what Calgary already possessed under a unitary government. While there can be no doubt that Cole’s presentation that day echoed the sentiments of the developers, it was also consistent with a long-held belief about the intrinsic merits of a unitary government over a large area.

Seen in the above light, it becomes clear why the abortive Comprehensive Annexation Policy of 1974, while poorly explained to the voters and soundly rejected at the polls, did not lose its appeal to City administrators. Instead it emerged in official thinking as the “preferred annexation zone,” and as a convenient decision-making guide. One has only to note the large private annexation applications approved by the City in 1976. The fact that they were justified on the grounds that they were consistent with a “rejected” policy indicated an ideal that was far from rejected in the eyes of the City Commissioners. Had the Cabinet approved the
Part Two: 1963–1978

Source: City of Calgary Archives, Cartographer: Robin Poitras
annexation package in May 1978 it would simply have moved the city's boundaries one step closer to this ideal.

It is also possible that the City might have wanted to test the provincial government’s resolve respecting its recent designation of a Restricted Development Area (R.D.A.) around the City. In August 1976, ostensibly to provide a utilities and transportation corridor, the Province ended a lengthy and acrimonious public debate, and established a five-mile belt around the city. Development was restricted in the R.D.A., which included a half-mile-wide strip called the Transportation and Utilities Corridor that would actually contain the roads and utilities. Although the Province maintained that the R.D.A. was not designed to curtail expansion, City officials disagreed. To Mayor Rod Sykes it represented “the imposition of the dictatorial powers of direct rule over a large area.” Given the presence of the R.D.A., the scope of the proposed annexations posed a direct challenge. In the annexation proposal that went to the Local Authorities Board in January 1978, four areas totalling almost 10,000 acres in the north, northwest, and southeast penetrated the R.D.A. The rest of the proposed annexations simply moved the City boundaries right up to the R.D.A. Seen in this light, the Cabinet decision gave the City its answer. The R.D.A. was not to be violated, and no annexation was allowed beyond the Restricted Development Area.

Possibly the promise of cheaper housing figured in official thinking. There can be little doubt that skyrocketing house prices from the mid-1970s had introduced a sense of real urgency in City administrators for the first time. The City may have sincerely believed that the annexations offered opportunities for lower-cost housing. If the annexations were approved, Commissioner George Cornish wanted the Cabinet to insert a provision that allowed the City to buy between 25 and 30 percent of the land at cost plus carrying charges. According to Cornish, “it would not be the intention of the city to service such lands but rather release them to new developers, to small developers and to developers in other parts of the city.” Then, in expressing his disappointment following the Cabinet decision of May 11, Cornish lamented the lost opportunity for developers to follow through on their plans to participate in provincial housing programs aimed at low income residents. City officials were also seriously considering measures to acquire some of the annexed lands from the developers for a municipal land banking scheme. In June 1976, Alderman Pat Donnelly asked the Minister of Municipal Affairs whether it was possible for the City to expropriate some of the lands to be annexed in the interests of land banking. Two weeks later Council passed a
motion that directed Administration to explore the possibility of securing land from Daon and Abbey Glen. The matter was later raised in the Legislative Assembly with respect to a significant land banking program on the city’s periphery. One wonders at what might have happened had the annexations gone ahead as planned. As it was, Cabinet’s drastic reductions had the effect of releasing at least three developers from their stated commitments respecting low cost housing. Whether or not Carma, Abbey Glen, and Daon would have delivered on their promises will never be known. In that sense, at least, the decision of the Cabinet was frustratingly conjectural.

Finally, it is likely that the City believed that the addition of annexation would ensure greater competition and result in reduced housing costs. Commissioner George Cornish made that point clear in a letter to Alderman Pat Donnelly in November 1975.

This further emphasizes Commissioner Cole’s and my contention of the importance of maintaining an adequate supply of land in a number of areas of the city, and not under the control of a very few developers.... We cannot prevent the major companies from acquiring new lands as they are approved for development but by ensuring a continual supply we can eventually saturate the demand. There is a point where the major developers will hold enough land for their anticipated requirements and will not be ready to invest further. At this point the smaller developers will find it more profitable to develop themselves rather than sell out to the larger corporations.

Though wistful, Cornish’s comments provide an insight into how annexation was perceived not only in terms of planning control but also as an antidote to the rising cost of housing. Certainly smaller Calgary builders saw it that way. As the annexation issue picked up momentum in 1976, 20 builders calling themselves Calgary Community Builders threw their support behind the only pure developer. Realizing the advantages presented by Daon, as opposed to the other developers who only used their favoured contractors, the group employed billboards and newspaper and letter-writing campaigns to further the corporation’s annexation bid in the southeast.

A battle may have been lost but the war was not. Dick Johnston’s 17 year land supply projection was forgotten in a spate of annexations in the 1980s. By 1982, five more areas had been added. Certainly the Province’s influence could be seen in that three of the five areas and the bulk of the land involved were in the northwest. However, it was soon
back to “business as usual.” Between 1983 and 1985, five more annexations occurred in all four quadrants of the city. Then in 1989 the city limits were further extended to incorporate several very large tracts in the north, northeast, northwest, southeast and southwest. By the 1990s, slowly and inexorably, the City of Calgary’s boundaries were moving closer to the configuration peremptorily advocated and rejected in 1974 but which apparently had endured as a guiding principle.
Following the precedents set through Standard Agreements in the late 1950s, the City continued to place increased demands on the developers throughout the ensuing two decades. Here the major debate was over acreage assessments, although other areas of dispute arose. Elsewhere, the give-and-take dialogue of the founding period continued with no clear loser except the homeowner, who ultimately bore any increased financial burden. The City was responsive to some developer initiatives towards neighbourhood design and innovation. Others it ignored. The most contentious issues concerned Fish Creek and Nose Hill. Both illustrated the prevarication of City leaders, the concerted weight of citizen pressure, and the ambitions of the developers. The creation of two of the finest urban parks in the world had little to do with the developers and the City, but was due more to the efforts of the citizens of Calgary and the provincial government. Especially with Nose Hill, a lack of decisiveness on the part of the City was apparent.

**Developer Agreements**

The standard agreements between the City and the developers became lengthier and more complex. They were also, at times, contentious. Areas of dispute fell into two broad categories. The first was the division of
financial responsibility over “grey areas.” The second concerned acreage assessments. In dealing with these two contentious areas the City seemed determined to come out the winner.

Developers often complained about the approval process. Even recognizing inherent complexities, their frustration is understandable. From the submission of the preliminary sketch plan to the Planning Department, to the more than forty copies of the outline plan for departmental circulation, to the subsequent amendments demanded by them, through to the final legal plan for registration, the developers and their consultants contended with a bureaucratic nightmare. According to the Development Policy Manual prepared in 1973, developers, in addition to submitting subdivision outline plans with detailed engineering drawings for utilities and surface improvements, might also have to include documentation for provincial approval should the proposed subdivision impact on water courses or provincial park land. Since standard development agreements often included special clauses with respect to utilities, roads, boundary conditions, etc., a six-step process involving several City departments was necessary. Further multi-step procedures were required before the agreement was finalized, before permission could be granted to commence stripping and rough grading, before construction of utilities could commence, or before the linens or plans were properly registered. The circularization process was also time-consuming. It was supposed to be completed in three weeks, yet it often took much longer.

Developers were also frustrated over what they thought were unnecessary minor amendments that affected their short construction season. On occasion they claimed they were hassled by City departments. Moving a subdivision from outline plan to construction frequently took over two years. For example, a preliminary schematic plan for a subdivision in Palliser was submitted on June 26, 1962. Two more submissions were required. A tentative plan was circulated on April 13, 1964 but had to be withdrawn and resubmitted twice more. It still had not been finalized by 1966. The dialogue between Carma and the City over the subdivision of MacEwan Glens between 1974 and 1977 was a series of misunderstandings and delays that held up the approval process into 1978. Kelwood’s Bob Kimoff said that his company could build out the entire subdivision of Midnapore in the same time as it took to secure approval. Developers insisted that delays in approvals jeopardized their ability to meet consumer demands and added to housing costs. Carma, for example, complained to the City about last-minute approvals and having to rush construction through the winter months when costs were excessive.
The City claimed that the developers were equally responsible for delays, indicating faulty and incomplete submissions and non-compliance with regulations. In an obvious reference to developer criticism, the following comment reflects the City's version of who was responsible for delaying the subdivision approval process. In noting that a submission from Daon for a development in Whitehorn had been processed by 21 City agencies in two months, Commissioner George Cornish observed that it was "an excellent example of what could be achieved when the developer understood the city's procedures and requirements."10

A major change to the standard development agreement occurred in 1966 following the expiry of the five year arrangement between the City and the Urban Development Institute. After sustained negotiations, the developers agreed to assume added responsibilities regarding maintenance of subdivisions following completion, the responsibility for access roads to subdivisions across undeveloped lands, upgraded specifications, landscaping requirements, and the compulsory installation of weeping tile on storm sewer sites.11 The City, however, was unsuccessful in relinquishing its responsibilities for utilities and services on the boundaries of subdivisions adjoining vacant land. Under the current arrangement, the City remunerated developers half the cost of supplying utilities and services on these boundaries if the adjacent land in question was developable. When subsequent development took place, the City was reimbursed by the developer involved. However, delay and uncertainty as to when development might occur left the City carrying the expense, often for extended periods. Outside of acreage assessments, the debate over boundary cost sharing was likely the most contentious issue between the City and the developers. Here the City's practice of allowing variants in individual developer agreements created confusion, anger, and a lawsuit by Carma. Eventually the City relieved itself of some of the responsibility for boundary payments through its “Endeavour to Assist” Policy. Under this policy, the developer had to pay the full costs of boundary installations if the development date of the adjacent land was deemed to be indeterminable. In such cases the City would endeavour to assist the original developer to recoup half the costs from whoever developed the land. In this context one wonders about both the developers’ and the City's due diligence when it came to recompensing each other. In 1977 the City was horrified to learn that it owed developers $5,680,000 in oversize payments for the decade 1967–1977. In trying to figure out the best way to handle a very delicate situation, one official noted that “we must avoid taking any action that we could subsequently be criticized for or taken
to court for.” No information was available on the ultimate resolution of this “embarrassment.”

The debate over boundary cost sharing, the delay in approvals, and the City’s aggressiveness in transferring more responsibilities to developers created tensions. In reference to unnecessary delays and changing rules, Carma complained in November 1965 that “it is most unreasonable to ask the developer to accept newer and more stringent specifications than in the ones involved in the development agreement.” Ten days later, U.D.I. Chair V.S.G. Lewis noted bitterly that “there has been a subtle change over the years and one can now get the impression that the private developer should consider himself fortunate if he is allowed to develop.” Other issues of concern included the City’s practice of lowering the unit prices for work done by the developers on its behalf until they were below cost, the delay in completing sector plans, additional inspections, extra drawings, and the autonomous attitude of the City’s Development Committee. Most contentious of all was the City’s gilt-edged standards. For example, overly stringent maintenance standards might require a developer to tear up and replace a whole section of sidewalk for a hairline crack. The City also insisted on rigid specifications for weeping tile installations in high ground water development areas. According to one developer the City’s standards were inconsistent with his intensive testing program on changes in seasonal groundwater levels. In its brief to the Federal Task Force on Housing and Development in 1968, the U.D.I. reaffirmed these concerns:

There is a growing tendency on the part of the Municipalities to extract ever increasing requirements and more stringent servicing specifications. This is in order for them to attempt to reduce future demands upon their general revenue by requiring Developers to provide services that are even more extensive or of a higher quality than those required in the past. Quite often these requirements are completely out of proportion to the anticipated future savings which will accrue to the Municipality.

The City did not see it that way. In a brief to the provincial government on housing in 1977, the City contended that in most areas, standards had changed little since 1959, and indicated lanes and thoroughfares as outstanding examples. The City argued that any upgraded specifications were due to a need to minimize maintenance costs. Examples included the change from cast iron to ductile pipe in 1969 and to yellow jacket coating in 1976; weeping tile in high ground water subdivisions, and O-ring seals in valves and compression-type fittings. The City indicated its
several concessions with respect to standards, including low rolled curbs, dished pavements, utilities corridors outside street rights of way, elimination of sidewalks on small cul de sacs, and twin servicing Y connections for utilities.\textsuperscript{17} It was also pointed out that the developers were reluctant to apply these lower standards in medium and high end subdivisions.

The above notwithstanding, developers argued that their relations with the City were generally positive. The U.D.I. took comfort in the knowledge that no major change would be considered to developer agreements without consultation, while the City was aware that the U.D.I. was generally ready to negotiate. Thus most of their negotiations respecting changes to the standard agreements resulted in some sort of compromise, albeit at times with an accompanying degree of resentment. Here the debate on the responsibility for limited and controlled access roads in the early 1970s was a good case in point.\textsuperscript{18} However, their most contentious issue related to acreage assessments. This bitter debate involving philosophy, fairness of scope, and legality maintained itself throughout this entire period and beyond.

**Acreage Assessments**

Acreage assessments emerged in the late 1950s as a flexible tool to recover the costs of capital infrastructure from which individual subdivisions derived or would derive benefit. They were negotiable and, being based on the nature of the capital expenditures, were applied inconsistently throughout the city. For example, the expenses associated with the construction of the Fish Creek sanitary sewer treatment plant were applied only to those drainage areas affected by it. Acreage assessments were also difficult to compute accurately and posed equitability problems across different drainage areas and pressure zones.

It will be remembered that the principle of acreage assessments had not been accepted by the developers when it was imposed on them in the late 1950s. This attitude was not to change. In 1968 the Chief Engineer, perplexed that every communication from the U.D.I. contained a preamble attesting to its disagreement with acreage assessments, assumed that a dark and devious strategy was at work, noting archly that “we can only assume it is being done with some intention in mind.”\textsuperscript{19} The U.D.I. believed that developers should be financially responsible only for expenses applicable to their subdivisions, and that any further levies against wider infrastructure represented a double tax on the new homeowner. The developers originally went along with acreage assessments, believing that
they were not necessarily permanent and would not change through time. They were wrong on both counts.

To its credit the City acknowledged that acreage assessments were inequitable and placed an undue burden on homeowners in new subdivisions. Following a strange logic, however, City officials contended that these new homeowners were also enjoying other capital services but had made no contribution to the costs of their installation. They also argued that the money saved through acreage assessments could be deployed in under-funded social programs throughout the city. Fortified by this strained rationalization, City officials embraced acreage assessments as a sure way of compensating for heavy capital expenditures.

The agreed-upon acreage assessment levies in April 1961 varied greatly. A developer in the Highwood-Thorncliffe area paid $287 per acre, whereas one operating in the Haysboro area paid $705. The City's efforts to increase them in 1966 led to a compromise with the U.D.I. While increases were allowed, a maximum levy on any developer was set at $750. This clearly advantaged some developers whose individual levies for the three assessments totalled well over $1,000. This figure was raised to $850 in 1969. By then, however, two factors were converging that put the developers and the City on a collision course.

The chief reason was that acreage assessments were not meeting the needs for which they were designed. They were based on estimated costs at the commencement of development and projected over the several years it took to build out the particular drainage area or pressure zone. There was no provision for financing expenses. When construction costs began rising in the later 1960s, the acreage assessment levies proved woefully inadequate. In 1968 only $609,760 had been collected against $9.037 million in City expenditures on storm sewers. With sanitary sewers the corresponding figures were $747,911 against $2.992 million dollars, and for water $309,177 against $2.263 million. In 1974, even after acreage assessments had been revised upward, the shortfall for storm sewers alone was over $4.5 million.

The second reason was associated with the change in subdivision density requirements. Since 1966 the City had been working informally on an overall density of 22 persons per acre in new subdivisions, and by 1969, this became official policy through the 1970 General Plan. Since subdivisions hitherto had been designed for lower densities, the implications of the new policy for utilities installations in multi-residential areas meant upgrading at greater expense. Developers fought hard to have acreage assessments based on what was tantamount to single family densities.
By late 1968, the City officials were alarmed. In November the Chief Commissioner noted the critical shortage of capital funds for utilities trunks to serve land development.22 A couple of weeks later Chief Engineer, C.D. Howarth, in lamenting the low maximum acreage assessment levy, offered the opinion that there was “absolutely no way” that the full costs of utilities and facilities could ever be recovered.23 Two months later he complained that the increased number of special assessments for sanitary and storm sewer leads were forcing the five year capital budget beyond the City's financial limits.24 Then, in September 1969, Howarth proposed that the limit on acreage assessments be abolished and new levies set to reflect present costs, especially given the revised density requirements in new subdivisions.25

The U.D.I. was appalled by what was obviously the beginning of a shift in civic thinking. Stalling for time, it noted that “any change in the present principle of acreage assessment could be affected by the general plan and will require a significant amount of study.” Any major change, the U.D.I. further argued, would affect “the entire philosophy of land servicing costs.”26 The City chose to back down in the face of this subtle forewarning. The 1970 Agreement was a typical compromise. The U.D.I. settled for a 10 percent increase in the acreage assessment maximum, bringing it to $935. In return the City secured an agreement to review the whole matter of acreage assessments in 1970. It was the lull before the storm.

Both sides went on the offensive in 1970. The air was cleared in a meeting between the City and U.D.I. in March. The City paved the way for its new strategy by suggesting three alternatives, two of which were more impossible than improbable. The idea of abandoning acreage assessments altogether or having the developer assume all capital costs was music to one and anathema to the other.27 The third option called for a change in the way acreage assessments were levied. Following considerable discussion, the City came out with its three-pronged solution in January 1971. In response to the newly adopted 22 persons per acre density policy, the City’s proposal sought to change the levy from an acreage to a per-dwelling unit basis plus financing costs. A formula to compute the new assessments was also submitted with the aim of recouping the total costs of capital infrastructure over 20 years.28 The new assessment included a uniform levy to replace the City's share of oversize payments. Under the existing arrangement, if the City deemed that larger pipes were needed than those required for an individual subdivision, it paid the developer for the difference in diameter and recouped it from
subsequent developers in the area. It was a costly and often frustrating arrangement and delinquencies were too common. The City's decision to shift this cost to the developer represented a major step.

However, another proposal accompanied this radical suggestion. Given the work that had gone into the preparation of an alternative to the way acreage assessments were computed, a second suggestion seemed self-defeating. Under this alternative, the status quo was maintained. Acreage assessments would be based on present construction costs for each area, doubled to cover financing with an oversize charge of $200 per acre. Possibly the City was not totally convinced that unit assessments furnished the best solution. More likely, however, was a realization that the U.D.I. would recognize the complexities involved in establishing per-unit assessments in areas slated for high density redevelopment. What was obvious, however, was that both alternatives sent a clear message. The developers were going to pay more. Much more.

The U.D.I. had been working on another strategy. Believing that it could cut its costs by challenging the need for acreage assessments on water, the U.D.I. commissioned a study by Economic Consultants, Hu Harries and Associates. Its completion in the fall of 1970 gave the U.D.I. what it wanted. The report echoed the U.D.I.'s central argument that new homeowners were being unfairly penalized. It also argued that the City's revenues from water services far exceeded expenditures. According to the report, the waterworks' total operating income of $34.339 million in the 1960s was well over double its capital expenditures. A similar situation existed for storm sewers. Harries concluded that acreage assessments on water penalized new homeowners over $400 on their lot purchases. A vindicated U.D.I. noted in December 1970 that the report substantiated “the Institute's contention that new development operating under the terms of the present agreement does in fact carry more than its fair share of utilities costs and has actually enhanced the City's financial position.”

The City Commissioners gave short shrift to the Harries Report primarily on the grounds that profits from waterworks went into general revenue and were therefore tantamount to a mill rate subsidy. They also questioned the report's figures on the City's share of oversize payments and doubted whether the costs of tapping into the Bearspaw Dam had even been considered. More significantly, they reaffirmed their desire to replace differing acreage assessments on water based on pressure zones with a uniform rate applicable to all new areas in the City. Bowing to the inevitable, the U.D.I. pressed for a figure of $100 per acre. The City was not impressed.
Instead it adopted a magnanimous stance and indicated that the new uniform levy was designed to recoup only 25 percent of expenditures. This figure, they stressed, was $240 an acre. Reflecting rising costs, it was raised to $275 per acre in 1974, and to $387 in 1975.

It is conjectural who benefited the most in the debate over acreage assessments on water. The U.D.I. believed that of all assessments this was the most unfair. Yet following the uniform assessments, revenues probably dropped. Certainly they did in the first year of operation. Moreover, the fact that the levy was uniform and adjustable on a yearly basis without any upward limit made it fairer for both the City and the developers operating both north and south of the Bow River.

On January 22, 1971, the City presented its two proposals to the U.D.I. for consideration. Both were rejected, as was the provision for an acreage assessment to recover oversize payments. The U.D.I countered with its own proposal that called for no change in oversize arrangements or in the way basic acreage assessments were calculated. To compensate for the new 22 persons per acre density, the U.D.I. wanted a differentiated assessment when development exceeded R2 densities. It also accepted the inclusion of financing charges but offered its own computing formula. At first the City rejected the total U.D.I. package proposal and referred to a uniform acreage assessment of $1,700 per acre that included $200 per acre for oversize and which allowed 50 percent for financing charges. The U.D.I. was appalled at the prospect of paying $1,700 an acre. More significantly, so were others at City Hall who thought that the levy would increase lot prices by $285 and prejudice mortgage monies.

A typical compromise was hammered out and presented to City Council. The U.D.I. won two victories. The $1,700 per acre uniform levy across the city was dropped in favour of continuing the present arrangements that imposed differentiated assessments according to area. The City also accepted the U.D.I.’s formula for computing finance charges but secured concessions elsewhere. Upward limits on acreage assessments were removed and a $200 uniform but adjustable levy for oversize was included. Areas where acreage assessments were clearly out of line with present costs would be recalculated, and in instances where development costs were unusually high, special levies would be considered. Moreover, the assessments would be based on the new 22 persons per acre densities. It was a good arrangement for the City. After the first year, revenues from acreage assessments were up 12 percent excluding finance charges.

The City was not done with acreage assessments. In spite of a verbal agreement with the U.D.I that no new development costs would be
imposed in 1972, the City levied a $200 per acre acreage assessment for expressways and freeways. The assessment was intended to recover about two thirds of the cost of a collector standard road normally assumed by the developer in those locations where expressways and freeways served the same function as a major thoroughfare. However, the fact that the levy did not take into account the substantial land acquisition costs meant that the assessment fell far short of its intent. A year later the City imposed a levy of $175 an acre to provide for recreational facilities in new subdivisions. Though the City Parks and Recreational Department was in agreement, the Commissioners heeded the advice of the Chief Engineer, who felt that in the long run better results would be gained through persuading rather than forcing developers in this direction. The levy was included in the 1973 Developer Agreement but made optional. Some developers paid the acreage assessment. Others preferred to donate the community centres. Over the ensuing years, developer contributions to community centres included Daon/Carma in Pineridge, Daon in Rundle and Temple, Daon/Qualico in Whitehorn, Genstar in Marlborough Park and Abbeydale, Carma in Braeside, and Kelwood in Parkland and Lake Bonavista. In addition, Carma contributed an outdoor pool in Silver Springs. By 1978, despite these contributions, the City was again pressuring the U.D.I. to accept a compulsory acreage assessment against community facilities.

Between 1973 and 1978, the developers faced ongoing efforts by the City to force them to assume added costs. An examination of the Standard Developer Agreement for 1977–78 shows that a developer operating in a new subdivision could expect to pay anywhere up to $1,310 an acre in sanitary sewer acreage assessment, up to $2,983 for storm sewers and a flat $500 per acre for water. In addition he had to remit a flat payment of $384 per acre for oversize recoveries and $410 per acre for expressways and freeways, and $310 an acre for inspection fees. He had to post a performance bond of $400 per lot and pay 1.5 percent a month on overdue accounts. The City's success in shifting financial responsibility to the developers via acreage assessments and other levies represented its greatest triumph over the developers, albeit at the expense of the new homeowner.

There can be little doubt that the City saw itself as the winner in the acreage assessments debate. As has been noted, the U.D.I. declined to challenge their legality in the early 1960s when there was a good chance of success. It took until 1973 for acreage assessments to achieve legal status through an amendment to the Municipal Government Act. Under this amendment, the City was authorized to pass a bylaw requiring
developers to pay a maximum of $2,000 per acre in acreage assessments, or offsite levies as they were called. However, the City decided not to pass the enabling bylaw and continued the levy in its traditional form. Even when $2,000 per acre was exceeded in some cases, the U.D.I. declined court action. The reason was possibly linked to alternative assessment options defined in the Act, or more likely to the probability that the maximum would then be applied unilaterally instead of being differentiated according to location.

Despite the City’s successes in the acreage assessment debate, the question as to whether the developers bore their fair share of infrastructure costs remains for the most part unanswered. It is unlikely that the City recouped anywhere near the costs of overall infrastructure from the developers through acreage assessments. A compounding factor was the lack of an efficient management information system to oversee what was a difficult and complex process. Acreage assessments were overly subject to negotiations, and were not updated systematically. They were derived from unsophisticated assessment criteria and for a long time were not tied to debt costs. In this context one wonders to what degree the battle over acreage assessments represented a victory for the City.

These mounting levies were part of the debate over rising house prices and who was responsible. As evidenced in a City Council motion and in the words of Rod Sykes, these increasing levies “put the responsibilities for increasing costs on the shoulders of the developers and not the community at large.” Yet, according to U.D.I. Chair, Norman Trouth, the increases simply shifted the financial burden to the new homeowner and represented a trend that “must be terminated.” Although he endorsed Trouth’s argument, the City Engineer justified the City’s position in a blunt but practical assessment. In referring to the growing financial burden on new homeowners, C.D. Howarth observed: “What if this policy is discriminatory against new homeowners? They were aware of the costs at the time they purchased their new home.” So while a winner in the acreage assessment debate might be open to question, there is no doubt as to who was the loser.

Aspects of City-Developer Dialogue

Most of the dialogue between the developers and the City was routine in nature. Differences usually arose at the Outline Plan stage. Post-circularization discussions also put individual developers in a compliance situation. On the other hand, in the case of wider issues involving more
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than one developer, the City was often prepared to give ground. The developers evinced an interest in experimentation and change while the City was more passive. Some innovative proposals were accepted and incorporated into practice. Others were rejected or failed to proceed. Given the planning powers of the City and the ongoing participation of developers in joint discussions on development matters, it is surprising that the City seemed generally prepared to abrogate leadership to them in areas of subdivision design and improvement.

On the whole it is difficult to argue convincingly that developers exerted undue sway over City Hall. The developers submitted their Outline Plans for subdivision to the Calgary Planning Commission (C.P.C.), the approval authority under the Subdivision and Transfer Regulations. Comprised of senior City officials including the Chief Engineer, the Director of Planning, the Commissioner of Public Works and Utilities, and various other department heads, the C.P.C. was not an easy body to impress or influence. It had no trouble whatsoever rejecting plans. Referring to substandard street widths, unsuitable commercial locations, and deficient reserve allocations, the C.P.C dismissed what it termed was a very shoddy application for a subdivision in Greenview in 1964.49 A plan for Albert Park was turned down because of non-conformity to the area sector plan.50 In spite of its accompanying master plan, Carma’s original application for Huntington Hills was rejected in 1967 on the grounds that it did not provide sufficient community reserve, and that the proposed grades were too steep for utilities.51 When Kelwood went ahead on its Lake Bonavista project in 1968 before final approval had been secured, a stop work order was issued against the corporation.52 A year later the C.P.C. refused Kelwood the “go ahead” in Lake Bonavista Phase III because its plan showed a deficient street layout that was “chopped up in an unimaginative fashion.”53 In 1972, BACM’s plan for a 40-acre subdivision in Cedarbrae was rejected because of inadequate reserve provisions.54

There were other examples. One concerned underground electric installations in the early 1960s. Both the City and the developers wanted them primarily for aesthetic reasons. Previously the City had been responsible for providing electric power to subdivisions, with the developer playing no part beyond connecting the various houses to the City supply. Because of additional insulation requirements, costs for underground installations were about double those of the conventional overhead lines. Wanting to maintain their current position, the developers believed that the City should carry out all installations and recoup the costs through the standard rate structure. The City refused and made the developers
pay two thirds of the total cost of installation on a frontage foot basis.\textsuperscript{55} In 1971, in response to delinquencies of more than $100,000, the City clamped down on developers by making them pay interest on payments overdue after 30 days.\textsuperscript{56} Then in 1975, despite professional support in the form of a commissioned brief, BACM was unsuccessful in pressuring the City to allow development west of Macleod Trail in the Midnapore area.\textsuperscript{57}

Finally, the most persuasive evidence that developers collectively were hardly exerting excessive influence over the City is contained in the U.D.I.’s submission to the provincial government in 1977 regarding developer agreements. The brief argued that municipalities had gone beyond the limits of existing legislation, and called for remedial legislation imposing minimal standards in standard development agreements. The U.D.I. referred specifically to increasing servicing standards and costs, the results of which had led to a 100 percent increase in the price of lots since 1973. The U.D.I. was also highly critical of City policies which forced them to sell land needed for expressways, freeways, interchanges, and parks at prices fixed at the time the outline plan was submitted rather than market price at the time of sale. The same criticism was levelled at policies which obliged the City to recompense developers for over-dedication of roads and reserves again at the lower prices prevailing at the time the outline plan was submitted.\textsuperscript{58}

The City clashed with developers over other more minor issues. Most concerned those that angered communities and which disregarded instructions from the C.P.C. These included non-compliance with maintenance commitments, the failure to remove loam from newly constructed residential areas, stripping areas prior to approval, and building houses without any commitment respecting sidewalks. The infractions were frequent enough in 1968 for the Chief Engineer to note that the City was “losing control” and for the City Solicitor to consider legal proceedings.\textsuperscript{59} Apparently Carma was the main culprit. According to an official in the Subdivision Development Office, nine out of the ten complaints that crossed his desk concerned Carma.\textsuperscript{60}

Yet despite its vigilance over subdivision submissions, the City was prepared to give the developers their due in other areas. The City reluctantly accepted the developers’ argument that the requisite 60-foot-wide green strip at the top of escarpments constituted developable land and therefore should be included in the 10 percent community reserve.\textsuperscript{61} The developers’ case that their payments to the City in lieu of community reserves should be based on market values at the time of subdivision was also accepted. Over the Chief Engineer’s objections in 1971 Carma and
Jager were allowed to build to capacity in Huntington Hills despite the fact that water capability from the Bearspaw Dam would not be available until 1973–74.62 The City was generous to Kelwood in Midnapore. First it helped the company secure provincial approval which allowed storm water discharge into Fish Creek in spite of contrary advice from the Parks and Recreation Department and the Fish Creek Park Management Committee.63 Then Kelwood was permitted to build beyond agreed-upon capacity of 4,500 even though the requisite upgrading to Macleod Trail had not been done.64 Informal dialogue was common. In 1974 the City and Kelwood discussed the feasibility of the corporation bearing the up-front costs of utilities installations to serve the Midnapore subdivision.65 The City gave Melcor a break respecting its responsibilities for John Laurie Boulevard during the construction of a subdivision in Ranchlands.66

City Responses to Developer Initiative

This period saw the developers offer several initiatives. While they were designed to increase sales, they also promised to either reduce costs or provide some amenity for subdivision improvement. Typical was Nu-West–Devon Estates Limited in Lynwood. In referring to “extensive market and consumer research to determine the level of homeowner satisfaction with the environment created in a range of subdivisions,” the developers went on to indicate their innovative street layout as well as “lots of atypical proportions.”67

The most outstanding visually belonged to Kelwood, or to be more accurate, Ellis Keith, who in 1967 was inspired to enhance the value of his lots in Bonavista through the creation of two artificial lakes. The first, Lake Bonavista, cost $1.8 million, and required the removal of 250,000 cubic yards of earth from 50 acres to create what was essentially a large neighbourhood private lake.68 The water was pumped from Fish Creek at a rate of 110–150 gallons a minute under a provincial water licence with any overflow being returned to the creek. With its mirrored surface and 65-foot hill with waterfall, Lake Bonavista was a prototype not only for Calgary but the rest of the country. The smaller and private Lake Bonaventure followed to the south, and in the late 1970s Kelwood continued its tradition by building lakes in Midnapore and Sundance south of Fish Creek. Ellis Keith’s success in enhancing suburban life through a different outdoor experience defined by the artificial lake was continued in Calgary by developers in other parts of the city, a process
enabled by later arrangements whereby the water was taken from the City's water supply.

The neighbourhood lakes were mutually beneficial. The City profited from higher property tax revenues, especially from the owners of the impressive houses that backed onto the lakes. According to the Planning Department in 1976, the lakes contributed to a sense of community while providing an amenity that was scarce in Calgary. It was also argued that the lakes contributed to energy savings since they kept residents from driving their cars to other recreational facilities.\textsuperscript{69} In referring to its plans for lower-priced homes in Midnapore, Kelwood contended that provision for a lake “is very necessary of marketing in light of the new housing types to be provided under the 22 persons per acre development density requirement.”\textsuperscript{70} Stipulations in the agreement with the City bound the company with respect to water quality and quantity, seepage, easements, and indemnification. In return for their annual levies, residents in the subdivision enjoyed year-round recreational benefits and ultimately assumed ownership of the lake. Furthermore, Lakes Bonavista and Bonaventure defined a band of recreational space that stretched almost from Anderson Road in the north to Fish Creek in the south. Kelwood enjoyed increased profits from lot sales. It also reached favourable agreements with the City respecting acreage assessments and community reserve requirements. In Lake Bonavista, for example, acreage assessments were deferred while reserve requirements were calculated over the gross area of the entire subdivision with credits being applied to the top of the Fish Creek escarpment.\textsuperscript{71}

The lakes development also demonstrated the often difficult and sensitive three-way dialogue between the City, the developers, and the public. As Lakes Bonavista and Bonaventure took form, four issues arose. The first two involved public use of the two lakes. The third was the conditions of transfer of Lake Bonavista to the community. The fourth concerned the provision of a community centre.\textsuperscript{72} The way in which the City administration chose to handle all four is illuminative and provides a good example of civic attitudes towards the public and private domain. In the first, the City brokered a mutually accepted deal between Kelwood and the Bonavista community which linked usage of Lake Bonavista to specific physical boundaries. The second issue concerned whether Lake Bonaventure should be a private lake as envisaged by Kelwood and the 150 property owners that bordered it. Here the City backed private enterprise and the rights of property. The Planning Commission averred that
“the exclusive use of the lake by those that pay for its construction and operation is not a principle to which the City should object.” On the question of conditions of transfer of the lake to the community, the City also tried to remove itself. The Commissioners noted that “it is our view that this is a matter between the home vendor (Keith) and the home purchaser.” The only gesture towards settling the issue lay in offering to act as mediator, but only if both parties requested it in writing. The fourth issue was different again. Here the community and Kelwood differed over the site for a community centre. Kelwood had offered a site near Macleod Trail at “a reasonable price.” The community wanted one closer to the lake. Again the City tried to broker a deal by suggesting to Kelwood that if it acceded to the community’s wishes, there would be no levy on homeowners until Kelwood had sold all its lots, and that no construction would take place until written permission had been secured from surrounding homeowners. The offer was flatly rejected by Kelwood. In a strong letter to the City, manager Bob Kimoff pointed out that Kelwood had more than fulfilled its obligations respecting reserve requirements and that the facility in the desired location ran counter to sound planning principles. Kimoff went on to castigate the City for its unwarranted interference: “Council should not attempt to force requirements which are obviously judgmental decisions affecting the normal course of managing a company’s business particularly where such decisions can very seriously affect successful merchandising of a company’s product.”

The perceived limits of public responsibility are discernible in the above examples. Deals were brokered on accepted notions about community demarcation through the roles of major thoroughfares, and the belief that community and recreational facilities should be centralized. On the other hand, the right of private enterprise to profit by improving subdivisions was equally accepted. Though many might wonder why a private lake was sanctioned in the first place, the decision to support the rights of property in Lake Bonaventure was prudent legally. The City’s stance on the transfer is more difficult to understand. The City’s preference for a “hands off” policy was based on the fact that the issue essentially involved a private contract. Interestingly, the extent to which it was a public issue, in that it involved precedent and service provisions, was not recognized at the time.

Provision for golf courses was a second major amenity pursued by the developers and approved by the City. The golf courses in Willow Park, Maple Ridge, and Varsity Acres owed their existence to Kelwood and Carma. All three, however, represented positive contributions to
community life, although the developers bargained for concessions in two of them.

Maple Ridge was the simplest. Here Kelwood simply donated 80 acres to the City for a 9-hole golf course. Under an agreement signed in January 1966 the City transferred 80 acres to the City on the condition that construction begin by June 1967 and be completed by the fall of 1968. Furthermore, the course was not to be considered part of the Maple Ridge subdivision for acreage assessment purposes. Again, this was a good deal for both the developer and the City. The latter received free land for a municipal golf course (currently a very respectable 18-hole public course), while Kelwood easily recouped the value of its donated land in the prices of lots that backed onto the course.

In Willow Park the situation was different. In response to lagging lot sales in his Willow Park subdivision, Ellis Keith applied to the City in 1964 to build a private golf course on 136 acres. Between 1964 and 1968, after an expenditure of $608,000, the result was a fine golf course within an upscale neighbourhood. It was also a good investment in that it stimulated lot sales and ultimately returned its cost and more to the developer. However, the feasibility of operating and maintaining the course was not appealing to Kelwood, who sold it in 1972 to a group of private investors for $653,000. Controversy erupted. Local members felt they should have had first right of purchase. They brought the City into the dispute by claiming that they could and would thwart the Planning Department’s timetable by holding up the North Bonavista Design Brief. Fortunately for the City, an Alberta Securities Commission ruling invalidated the original purchase on the grounds that the buyers anticipated a profit in what was essentially a non-profit domain. The end result was the purchase of the course by the members for $800,000, of which Keith donated $100,000. The controversy over the Willow Park golf course showed the dangers of developer involvement in amenity provision.

As with the lakes, Kelwood pressed for consideration for both community reserve requirements and acreage assessments in the Willow Park golf course. The developer secured concessions in both areas. Noting that the corporation had over-dedicated for reserves in neighbouring Acadia, the City waived its right to take 10 percent out of the golf course in community reserve. The acreage assessment negotiations were more difficult. According to the City, Kelwood was obliged to pay an acreage assessment of $65,475 for sanitary and storm sewers on the golf course. Kelwood protested both, arguing that an acreage assessment on storm sewers was completely unnecessary and that it needed to be drastically
reduced for sanitary sewers. The City countered by pointing out that in effect the golf course was an after-thought by Keith and that the original acreage assessments had been established based on the entire drainage area, which also included the land occupied by the golf course. Following sustained discussions, during which the developer stressed the financial advantages of the golf course to civic revenues, the City agreed to negotiate the possibility of allowing open storm sewers through the golf course and reduce the acreage assessment from $36,000 to $22,000.

In 1972 the City adopted an important modification into house placement on lot frontages. Under Bylaw 8600, the Zero Lot Line concept was incorporated into Calgary’s new Zoning Bylaw. The Zero Lot Line promoted a more efficient and compact use of space. Under Zero Lot Line application, houses were built right up to their boundaries on one side and the former side yard space transferred to the other side. The resulting intrusions onto the neighbouring properties were facilitated through successive easements. One advantage was a wider side yard on one side. Another was vehicular access to the back of properties in laneless subdivisions. While the acceptance of this new concept reflected the current trend towards a more efficient use of space, its implementation had nothing to do with City planning priorities but rather was due to a developer initiative two years previously. In September 1970, Bob Kimoff of Kelwood submitted the concept to the Calgary Planning Commission. In requesting permission to go ahead with a Zero Lot Line experiment on five lots in Lake Bonavista, Kimoff referred to its marked popularity in California, its advantages to the homeowner, and its applicability in areas with no back lanes. The C.P.C. was impressed and after securing a favourable legal opinion approved the Zero Lot Line on an experimental basis over a two year period. During this time both Kelwood and Nu-West built Zero Lot Line houses in the new subdivision of Dover Meadows. The incorporation of the Zero Lot Line option in R1 and R2 districts in 1972 led to its continued application. It also demonstrated a too-infrequent willingness on the part of the City to experiment with new ideas.

Carma’s experimental proposal for its subdivision in Varsity Acres south was an example of lost opportunity. In early 1967, after paying $7,000 an acre for the subdivision, Carma submitted a plan based on the Town Centre concept, one that called for a variegated system of walkways that allowed unobstructed pedestrian access to a central shopping centre. The pathway system was designed to be the integral component. For example, the houses were planned to face the pathways rather than the open street. The plan called for a population of 7,000 and was based on mixed densities.
Single family residences would accommodate 2,500 people while the rest would be housed in town houses and a high rise apartment on the south side abutting a major thoroughfare. The City, it seemed, tried to find ways to scuttle the idea. It worried about traffic circulation and access to the shopping centre. It was feared, for example, that people would drive rather than walk to the shopping centre because their purchases would be too heavy to carry. By May it was obvious that the plan was not going to move ahead. The Town Centre concept was not welcomed. From the City’s viewpoint there were too many mitigating factors, including maintenance issues, narrow rights of way, and the problems of road interchanges. Carma reacted pragmatically, and began agitating for a regional shopping centre instead. The eventual presence of Market Mall was the more successful outcome of that labour. As for Varsity Acres south, it was developed in a more traditional manner, although the presence of sidewalks on only one side of some streets and tree-covered walkways instead of back lanes give an indication of what might have been.

On other occasions the City’s response to developer initiative seemed inexplicable. A good example concerned Quality Construction (Qualico) in Queensland Downs. In March 1972, the company offered to build a recreational complex there. The four year project when completed would feature a swimming pool, indoor skating rink, tennis, badminton and squash courts, and craft room. Quality offered to fund two thirds of the cost if the City would contribute one third and maintain the facility. The offer of the facility, however, was rejected by the City Commissioners on the grounds that its location and timing conflicted with long-range plans for recreation complexes. The case was closed when Commissioner Denis Cole suggested that the company fund the entire cost and apply for a refund when the facility was warranted. Certainly there might well have been other avenues open to discussion that would have beneficially addressed the intent of Quality’s offer.

The most sensitive negotiations between the City and the developers concerned the futures of the Fish Creek area and Nose Hill. However, the resolutions of both issues had more to do with other agents. In the Fish Creek issue the City for various reasons was unable to translate its preference into policy. Essentially the City wanted to preserve the area from the start but could not seem to find the resolve to do so. With Nose Hill, the developer interest was more widespread and intensive. Unlike the case with Fish Creek, the City had no preconceived notion of the area’s best future. The result was prevarication, disagreement, and very little leadership.
Fish Creek

Fish Creek is Calgary’s third main watercourse. It meanders east-west for six miles on the city’s southern reaches before emptying into the Bow River a little south of the present-day suburb of Deer Run. Its passage through an expansive glacial-melt valley at times a half-mile wide is defined by steep escarpments, ravines and terraces of varying width, and towards the east by stretches of relatively flat or slightly undulating land. With its rich diversity of habitats, including grasslands, wetlands, spruce forests, and riparian woodlands, the area is home to many species of birds and animals and aquatic life as well as an abundant variety of wildflowers and plant life.

People had always been attracted to this beautiful valley, as the presence of eighty archaeological sites attests. The modern era changed nothing. By 1960 the entire area around Fish Creek was in private hands. Thirty-nine different parcels were owned by farmers and ranchers whose properties backed on to the creek, and by city dwellers who had acquired land for recreational purposes. As the 1960s progressed, the area inevitably attracted the developers. To the east of Macleod Trail, Kelwood had options on the Burns ranch lands. Wesco Property Developments Ltd. secured parcels as well. The most visible, however, was Art Sullivan, who acquired extensive tracts to the west of Macleod Trail on both sides of the creek.

The main obstacle to development in Fish Creek was its propensity to flood. Though infrequent, these spring floods were sufficient to dissuade settlement in the valley, and to cause the City to identify it with park usage. The City obliquely recognized this in the General Plan of 1963 when it referred to potential for a natural regional park. The first attempt to gather information for policy-making purposes came a year later through a Planning Department study. “The Fish Creek Flood Plain Report” gave some definition to the flood plain through reference to flood incidences over a 45 year time period, but made no clear recommendation. It did, however, accord some priority for future policy by suggesting that the area might be best designated as park, and that development should be restricted in the flood plain. Thus when the developers became interested in subdividing the valley for development purposes in the mid-1960s, the City had a good idea of what it wanted to do but no long-range policy to support it.

In 1964, Art Sullivan began developing the subdivision of Canyon Meadows as a country residential district, though well up on the terrace overlooking the creek. Then in May 1966 he applied to develop the area
closer to the creek, with the southernmost limits extending well onto the flood plain. The Calgary Planning Commission turned him down, arguing that there should be “no development of any kind below the forty-five year flood line for the time being.” With Sullivan testing the waters and showing no signs of going away, the City requested the Planning Department to undertake a study “to establish the principle of reservation of the Fish Creek Valley land for the needs of Calgary’s future generations” and “to initiate the necessary steps to provide the proper conditions for its timely purchase or philanthropic donation.” The report presented to the Commissioners in October 1966 recognized the area’s unlimited potential for recreational development. In noting that “private developers are anxious to develop this valley for private use” and that any encouragement would mean the loss of the park, the report recommended that top priority be given to a land acquisition program. The authors of the report, inadvertently perhaps, weakened its impact. While recommending the immediate purchase of land for between $1,300 and $7,900 an acre, the report noted that the park’s development was a decade or more away. The report concluded with an unusually definitive statement. “The essential question is not whether we can afford Fish Creek but whether we can afford not to have it.”
In that outright purchase had become an option, the City now faced a dilemma. Certainly there were many like the Local Council of Women and the Federation of Calgary Communities who believed that a park should be secured at the City’s expense.97 Other groups were not so sure. The Anderson Road District Association, whose membership owned land adjacent to Fish Creek, protested, arguing that the idea of a park transcended need and would lead to property devaluation.98 This group was supported by another local body, the Canyon Meadows Residential Association.99 Not surprisingly, Council prevaricated. On February 13, 1967, it tabled the proposal to create a regional recreational park but agreed to initiate a discussion with landowners respecting purchase.100 On June 16, Council received very sobering news from the Superintendent of the Land Department. After noting that Sullivan was on a buying spree in Fish Creek, R.O. Leitch affirmed that it was going to be “a very costly process for the City to acquire the flood plain area for park purposes.”101

Ironically, Sullivan’s next action helped the City’s cause. Instead of continuing to concentrate on the upper reaches, he pressed for development closer to the creek and within the flood plain. In January 1967, he announced a five year program for the development of 775 acres in Fish Creek.102 In February he applied to develop 122.6 acres near the creek, with houses interspersed by green spaces which the City should buy beyond the 10 percent reserve dedication.103 Five months later Sullivan approached the City with a proposal to develop 450 acres in country residential lots some backing onto the creek on both sides.104 Arguing that he had title to the creek bed, Sullivan offered the City the alternative at buying him out at $2,500 an acre. The City disdained the purchase, tabled the proposal, and successfully challenged Sullivan’s claim to creek bed ownership.105 By concentrating his attention on an area clearly in the flood plain, Sullivan had inadvertently guaranteed rejection while buying the City some time.

In the second half of 1967, the City considered its options. There can be little doubt that official thinking favoured a park. The issue was how to secure it and restrain development at the same time. Three options were available. The first and most effective was outright purchase. It was also the first rejected. The cost had both practical and political implications. Also, a tentative request to the Province for financial assistance had borne no fruit. The second option was to refuse all development applications under Section 16a of the Planning Act, which stipulated that applications for subdivision could be refused if the projected land use
was deemed unsuitable. However, it was felt that appeals under this clause had a good chance of success with the Provincial Planning Board. The third and most favoured option was to invoke Sections 15 and 24(3) of the Subdivision and Transfer Regulations. These regulations prohibited subdivisions on land susceptible to flooding, or in those areas where topographic and drainage factors were such that the land would be better utilized as community reserve or for park purposes. This meant financial compensation in the long run, but if the land was considered undevelopable, the costs to the City would be less.

Between 1968 and 1969 the City rejected a series of applications from Sullivan by using Sections 15 and 24(3) of the Subdivision and Transfer Regulation. It was just a matter of time, however, before the developers began questioning the application of these regulations to the entire valley. By 1969 they were arguing that most of the valley was not in a 1 in 45 year flood zone and that development should be allowed on higher land. They had a point. Earlier assessments had suggested that possibly a quarter of the valley might be subject to floods once every 45 to 100 years. It was this area that became the focus of attention. Pro-development proponents argued that land in Fish Creek could be developed to good densities in the 45-100 year zone by using density transfer. Under density transfer, land in the 1 in 45 year zone would be left untouched and density transferred to the higher 45-100 year zone at 22 persons an acre. This higher density on smaller and scattered subdivisions throughout the valley would justify utilities services, provide an upscale living environment, and preserve the lower flood plain for park. The problem was that this perceived developable flood zone had never been professionally assessed.

It was to this measure that City Council turned its attention in early 1970. On January 26, Council determined that the Once-in-45-year flood plain should be clearly defined in which there would be no construction, but that a 45-to-100-year flood plain should also be established where development might proceed conditional to buyer knowledge of the potential risks. Commissioners were also asked to report on the feasibility of using density transfer. The pro-park Administration hedged for a year, possibly because the issue was moot as long as there was no clear delineation of the flood plain. During this time the City received its commissioned Master Plan for recreational areas prepared by University of Calgary Geography professor Louis Hamill. In the comprehensive 600-page report Hamill noted how developers were pushing for areas within the
city for country living and cited Fish Creek as an example. He also advocated the expenditure of $18 million to buy a further 2,000 acres for parks, including 800 in Fish Creek by 1975.

The impetus for the requisite flood plain study picked up in early 1971 after a developer tested the waters with a bold plan. In February 1971 Wesco Property Developments Limited submitted a proposal to develop flood plain lands under its control east of Macleod Trail. Arguing that virtually the entire valley was in the 1 in 45 year flood zone, the company dismissed density transfer as a viable option. Instead it offered a solution to deepen and widen the creek and use the overburden to raise the surrounding area. According to Wesco President, Norman Trouth:

Specifically this would be done by way of deepening and widening the creek and by providing a sloped grass terrace in which overflow water could and would drain as and when necessary. The effect of this design would be to provide a reasonable size creek bed with a park strip on both sides which strip would flood only occasionally. Our consultants, your engineers and the Provincial authorities all appear to agree that the adoption of our approach would permit the development of substantially the whole of the valley to the east of Macleod Trail and at the same time honour your policy to keep development out of the 1 to 45 year flood plain.¹⁰⁹

The Planning Department was horrified. City Planner Mike Rogers observed with clear disdain that the proposal meant the loss of mature tree growth as well as the defacement of the creek in one of its most scenic locations. In obvious reference to mounting citizen concern, Rogers was adamant that a full public hearing be held pending any final decision.¹¹⁰ Not surprisingly, the Wesco proposal advanced no further.¹¹¹

However, it is likely that the implications of the 1971 Wesco initiative spurred the City into action, since what was being proposed essentially redefined the issue of land use in the entire Fish Creek valley. On March 22, 1971 City Council adopted a recommendation from the Operations and Development Committee to secure professional advice on the feasibility of permitting development in the valley outside the flood plain.¹¹² To this end, Commissioners were asked to pursue measures by which Fish Creek could be included in the ongoing flood study of the Bow River by Montreal Engineering Limited, being funded on a 50/50 cost-sharing arrangement between the City and the Province. The study began in the fall of 1971 with the Province picking up half the cost of over $300,000. Both the pro-park and pro-development forces waited on the study with some apprehension.
The City had noted its concern and its preference in July 1971 when it asked the Province to buy Fish Creek for park purposes. Its request for a provincial park in Fish Creek and for one in Edmonton was predicated on need based on urban population densities and lack of access to regional recreational facilities. Its hopes, however, were dashed by the reply from Donovan Ross, Minister of Lands and Forests. Ross felt that Calgarians had ready access to several provincial recreation facilities within easy driving distance. His closing statement that he would require a detailed submission before he could even comment was tantamount to a flat dismissal.

The City received the results of the Fish Creek Flood study from Montreal Engineering in June 1972. The authors were impressed with the area and clearly thought that development was inadvisable. The study, however, was based on feasibility from an engineering standpoint. In this respect the news was disconcerting. The study found that 395 acres, or 26 percent of the valley floor, were outside the flood zone and capable of risk-free development. More significantly, the report also concluded that another 579 acres could be developed pending precautions and some restrictions in building design.
The report did not sit well with Administration. Though Chief Commissioner Denis Cole was not convinced that “the maximum amount of development in flood risk areas was the proper position for government to take in areas where there is no development at all,” he was well aware of its implications. So was Commissioner George Cornish when he referred a month later to the pressure being applied by developers to see the report. Mindful of other emerging activity beyond the confines of City Hall, the Commissioners decided not to tell developers that possibly 65 percent of the valley floor was eligible for development. Instead they waited.

The emerging activity was twofold. The first was a significant change in the provincial government’s park policy. The appointment of Allan Warrack as Minister of Lands and Forests in Peter Lougheed’s first Cabinet on September 10, 1971 signalled a major shift in direction. Warrack’s belief that the present park system was inadequate, that more funding was needed, and that Albertans in metropolitan centres, especially seniors and the disadvantaged, lacked opportunities to visit provincial parks were some of the factors that led to a new Provincial Park Act in 1974. From the outset Warrack was sympathetic to the idea of a provincial park in Calgary at Fish Creek. An official in the City of Calgary Planning Department noted in the summer of 1972 that Warrack had acted early in gathering information on land acquisition costs in Fish Creek. In fact, by the time the Province was ready to announce its decision to reserve the area for provincial park purposes in early 1973 it had quietly acquired 1,250 acres. In August 1972 Calgary MLA and ex-alderman Roy Farran was confident enough to tell City Commissioners that there was a better than a 50/50 chance that the Province would buy Fish Creek. Farran’s crucial support had resulted in legislature approval in the spring for a policy to establish provincial parks in urban areas. City officials were further encouraged in a meeting with the Province in September where they were told that the acquisition of the Fish Creek valley was now under active consideration. A week later Denis Cole expressed his confidence that the Province was ready to move on land acquisition in Fish Creek.

Significant pressure to preserve Fish Creek came from another direction when Calgary citizens mobilized to oppose any policy of development in the area. The coalescence of a well-organized and committed grassroots movement in the summer of 1972 presented an emerging dimension to local politics in Calgary. In June 1972, a small band of disgusted citizens led by Southwood resident Rosa Gorrill formed the Fish Creek
Centennial Park Committee to marshal and then coordinate the efforts of local and other groups in a campaign to preserve Fish Creek. Ultimately consisting of 14 south Calgary community associations and other organizations, including the Local Council of Women, the Calgary Field Naturalists Society, the Calgary Equestrian Society, and representatives from the National and Provincial Parks Association of Canada and the University of Calgary Faculty of Environmental Design, the Fish Creek Centennial Association embarked on a multi-pronged strategy that included a persistent barrage of pointed questions to the City, a strong lobby at the local and provincial levels, favourable press coverage, and intensive research geared towards the preparation of a brief to the provincial government. The association’s momentum picked up in the fall of 1972, gaining the unanimous support of the Federation of Calgary Communities and the personal support of at least three aldermen and two MLAs. The association’s comprehensive brief, “Fish Creek Valley, A Natural Park,” was endorsed by City Council and forwarded to Edmonton in the New Year. There can be no doubt that the public pressure to preserve the area for park purposes weighed heavily on a City Council that needed some solid gesture of support and a little push to do the right thing. It also dovetailed nicely with the incipient provincial move in the same direction.

The developers did not help their cause. Already under critical public scrutiny in the wake of rising land prices, they inadvertently positioned themselves as the enemies of environmental sensitivity in Fish Creek. In August 1971, prominent city resident and former judge Harold Riley claimed that Fish Creek was suffering because of water diversion by Kelwood to its subdivision in Lake Bonavista. Referring to the creek as “once a beauty spot [but now] just a gravel pit,” Riley questioned the merits of trying to make Fish Creek a park “in its present degraded condition.” Greater public opprobrium resulted a year later when Wesco Property Developments Limited, without authorization or a development permit, dumped overburden from its grading operations on the escarpment onto the valley slopes and floor. According to Parks Superintendent Harry Boothman, “the actions of the developer resulted in these slopes being covered in sub-soils in depths ranging from three to four feet…. It is my opinion that very little of the original ground cover can be salvaged.” The Planning Department felt that the damage would “have a lasting effect on the ecology of the valley.” Arguably, perhaps since Wesco was made to remove the dumped dirt and restore the slopes, the political damage might have outweighed the ecological in the long run.
Part Two: 1963–1978

While the City was still considering its options in the light of the Fish Creek Flood Study, the Province stepped in. On February 19, 1973, Premier Peter Lougheed announced the creation of a 2,800-acre provincial park in Fish Creek at an estimated cost of around $15 million. The entire valley was designated as the Fish Creek Restricted Development Area by a subsequent Order in Council which prohibited all operations that disturbed the surface area. Two and a half years later, on June 19, 1975, following further land purchase and consolidation, the first stage of Fish Creek Provincial Park was opened.

The developers’ response to the provincial acquisition was mixed. Kelwood took the pragmatic approach. “In a spirit of co-operation and as a good corporate citizen,” it sold its 440 acres in the valley to the Province at cost plus interest. However, it is also possible that the corporation secured a verbal assurance from the Province that should annexation ever become necessary, its holdings farther south just beyond the city limits would receive some consideration. Wesco, it appeared, tried to compensate for its dumping infraction by donating land to the City in return for density transfer at the top of the hill. It proved to be a good
deal for the City, since when it later needed an equivalent amount of provincial land for interchange purposes elsewhere, it simply gave the Province the donated land. As for Art Sullivan, he held out for the best possible price for his land and was still in not-so-amicable negotiations with the Province when the Park was officially opened in 1975.

It is illuminative to conjecture what might have happened in Fish Creek had it not been for public pressure and the actions of the provincial government. The public participation dimension is interesting not just for the fact that it was so concentrated and organized but that it focused on the preservation of open urban space rather than on other negative aspects being challenged by the urban renewal movement. In this sense it complemented the ongoing public dialogue to preserve Nose Hill and Calgary's riverbanks. Yet for all their efforts, one wonders how much these dedicated citizens would have achieved had not the Conservatives replaced the Social Credit government on August 31, 1971. The impact of changing provincial policy is hard to overestimate, especially given Donovan Ross's bleak attitude only weeks before Allan Warrack replaced him as Minister of Lands and Forests.

The City's stance on Fish Creek Park raises some questions. Evidence suggests hesitancy and uncertainty based on two primary reasons. The most logical approach was to buy the land outright for park purposes. Indeed, the General Plan of 1970 suggested that the City might acquire 793 acres of flood plain for park purposes. Expense was definitely a factor. In fact one opinion held that if the City accepted Art Sullivan's asking price of $2,500 an acre in 1967, it might constitute a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of City Council. But the argument given for not pursuing this route on a long-range, more gradual basis is revealing, especially in the light of subsequent developments on Nose Hill. According to Commissioner Ivor Strong in 1967, the City's lack of ability to conclude the land purchases quickly would unfairly penalize developers. Another reason given by one alderman made more political sense at least. In a letter to a concerned activist, Alderman Adrian Berry expressed his agreement with the need for a park in Fish Creek but stressed financial limitations in the light of overall City priorities. The point is, the idea of buying the entire Fish Creek area was never a consideration.

The second course of action was to freeze the whole area entirely under a blanket ruling and subsequently acquire the land over time at reduced prices subject to negotiation. The argument that the City dared not use provisions in the Planning Act to do this for fear of successful appeals is open to question. The City argued that Section 16(a) was too loose.
Regardless of this untested belief, it seems that Section 16(b), with its reference to subdivisions needing compliance with proposed or existing general plans, gave the City more than adequate security against appeals. Also, under Section 21 the City could have circumvented the appeal route by asking the Provincial Planning Board for a waiver against applying the Subdivision and Transfer Regulations altogether. Chances were the City could have convinced the Board that subdividing land in Fish Creek was, according to the Planning Act, “impracticable and undesirable … because of circumstances peculiar to the proposed subdivision.”

The prevarication and reluctance on the part of the City to pursue available measures to secure Fish Creek for park purposes and the change in policy after 1970 respecting development in the 45-100 year flood zone would appear to indicate a typical compromise in the making. In that context, it is interesting that the much-maligned Wesco received the go-ahead to continue its subdivision above the creek because the Calgary Planning Commission disagreed with both the Planning and Parks and Recreation Departments and considered that the damage from dumping over the escarpment was not as serious as first thought.\textsuperscript{141} Without the intervention of the Province and in spite of the strenuous efforts by the Fish Creek Centennial Association, there was a good possibility that subdivision would have occurred on the higher benches of Fish Creek. Whether due to a lack of daring, resolve, or even commitment to the whole valley, the City ultimately played a minor role in the preservation of one of Calgary’s “natural treasures.”

Nose Hill
The dispute over Nose Hill showed the developers and the City in a different context than in Fish Creek. This time a determination on the part of the developers to use the hill for residential purposes was met with City co-operation subject to certain conditions. Again the crucial turning point came in the form of citizen outrage. Of all issues, the debate over Nose Hill provides the clearest example of how local government responded to developer pressure from one side and the force of its citizenry on the other. Though a resolution of sorts was manifest by 1973, it was subject to compromises. It also provided a further rationale for outward expansion.

The Nose Hill issue was far more complex and contentious than that in Fish Creek for several reasons. Unlike Fish Creek, the General Plan of 1963 had set Nose Hill aside for development between 1971 and 1980.
Second, it was a more definable area. Fish Creek's visible environmental assets reinforced its value as a recreational area to be best preserved in its natural state. It was also a long lateral flood plain where development was limited by utilities constraints, and was more oriented towards country-style residences. Nose Hill, on the other hand, was a compact grassland area. From a popular standpoint, it was recognized for its views and outdoor recreational potential rather than for its aesthetic or ecological value. Therefore, initially at least, its preservation as a pristine natural environment was not as widely appreciated as in Fish Creek. Thus, development on its lower slopes and on the undulating plateau that formed its crest was an expected outcome. With its magnificent views in all directions and steep slopes that enhanced a natural rural-type setting, Nose Hill was a developer’s dream come true.

It will be remembered that developers had been interested in Nose Hill in the 1950s but had been prevented by federal regulations specifying clear flight zones in the proximity of the airport. A subsequent freeze was ordered on any development on the hill, a situation which effectively dissuaded developers in the first half of the decade.

By 1966 the arrival of the jet age had rendered the existing airport and terminal obsolete, and plans were put in place for a new facility farther north. Though the current development freeze was to remain in place until 1969, it was clear that Nose Hill would not be affected by the new flight paths. Carma was the first to move. In April 1967 it discussed its five year construction plan with the City, one which included development on the Nose Hill plateau. In July 1968, the corporation submitted a Conceptual Plan for the development of 953 acres on the plateau of Nose Hill. The “Top o’ the Hill” plan envisaged a mixed residential area with low density development on the plateau itself. In addition to a 15-acre commercial site, schools, churches, and a community centre, a scenic drive was to extend around the brow of the hill. Grades exceeding 15 percent were to be left as park. Then in 1969 United Management, the owner of Nose Hill lands to the west of Carma’s, began preparing plans for “a delightful living environment” that embodied a terraced multi-family complex and two shopping centres on the gentler slopes.

There can be no doubt that senior City management anticipated residential development on Nose Hill. First and foremost, it had the approval of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation. In August 1968, Walter de Silva, architect and planner for the corporation, called Carma’s plan “a very exciting and viable proposition” and “a fresh collaborative effort between the City Planning Department ... and a large developer.” He
reaffirmed the C.M.H.C. position by adding that “there is no question that the time is right to develop this and it makes economic sense.” A year later City Planner Mike Rogers told Commissioner George Hamilton that certain areas of Nose Hill comprised “prime residential land” that needed to be developed.

The City’s rationale for wanting development aside from the tax windfall was also linked to a desire to acquire land on the hill for a regional park. A regional park in the north had been on the discussion board for some time, and as early as 1967 the Parks and Recreation Department had isolated Nose Hill as a prime location. The City perceived that the hill was large enough to facilitate both a regional park and residential development. It was reasoned that if development was permitted on the plateau and lower slopes, the developers could be forced to cede the remaining slopes in return for density transfer to the residential areas. It was sound reasoning, that the two main developers accepted. In return for releasing 1,400 acres for residential development the City would receive around 1,000 acres of natural parkland at no cost. Had events unfolded as Carma and United Management hoped, and as M.V. Facey the City’s Principal Design Planner predicted, development on Nose Hill would have begun in 1970.

A combination of several factors put the City in a delaying mode. First, the Engineering Department was convinced that due to transportation and utilities constraints, residential development on the hill was at least three years away. The Chief Engineer argued that since no population projections had been established for Nose Hill, it was impossible to provide for utilities sizing or for the carrying capacities of arterial roads. Moreover, the final alignments for crucial transportation corridors like Shaganappi Trail, 14th Street, and 64th Avenue had still not been agreed upon. Another source of contention concerned the eligibility of certain slopes for density transfer and the per acre figure at which such density would be granted. Finally, the discussions were taking place at the same time the Planning Department was restructuring its sector plans for the whole city. Like many others in new areas, the Nose Hill Sector Plan was in a state of limbo, and this meant that no development could proceed until specifications for land use and transportation patterns for the entire area were established.

As the above obstacles persisted throughout 1970, the developers became increasingly anxious and fearful. In fact one developer was prepared to give up his holdings on Nose Hill on a 3.5 acre-to-1 basis for City-owned land in adjacent West Thorncliffe. In response to this pressure
the Planning Department approached the Planning Commission on November 4, 1970 with a proposal for development on Nose Hill. The proposal advocated development on the lower slopes and the plateau and offered a number of options based on projected populations ranging from 25,000 to 43,000. The Planning Commission was interested but tabled the proposal pending an Engineer’s report on the utilities and transportation costs.\(^{152}\)

The Planning Department resubmitted its proposal on March 31, 1971 with the requisite figures. According to the chief engineer it could cost over $6 million to furnish the Top o’ the Hill development with utilities and transportation up to 1975 for either 20,000 or 35,000 people.\(^{153}\) What was of great interest to the Planning Commission was that the City’s share of the $6 million plus amounted to only $320,000. Thus, though the proposal was again tabled pending additional information on the acreage involved and density, it was clear that development on Nose Hill was not only likely but imminent. One has only to note the Planning Commission’s decision at the same meeting to reject an option to reserve the entire area for recreational use. Such a course of action, it was reasoned, was “unrealistic.”

The potential for houses on Nose Hill seemed more than likely on April 7 when the Planning Commission approved the development of 255 acres on the lower slopes at 18 persons per acre. With another 11 persons per acre being granted against 150 acres of adjoining steep slopes, a total population of 6,240 was envisaged. A population of 20,000 was approved for the top of the hill to be developed at a density of 11 per acre, but no specifics for density transfer were given.\(^{154}\) The Planning Department was authorized to prepare a sector plan for the area and to investigate the feasibility of implementing the development proposal as recommended. The developers saw this decision as vindication and the “green light” they had long awaited. Two weeks after the Planning Commission’s decision, Carma advertised its intention to provide a 337-acre park which by encircling its subdivision would not only add visible integrity to the area’s natural beauty but also ensure “a major green area for all Calgarians to enjoy.”\(^{155}\) By late July the corporation was begging for permission to commence grading operations. As a hedge, Carma later secured the annexation of its land holdings (MacEwan Glens) on the northern reaches of the hill. In November 1971 Western Realty Projects prepared an outline plan for the subdivision of Leaside located on the lower slopes. The plan called for mixed development of low density, medium rise apartments and town housing. Enthusiastic spokesman
Norman Trouth was of the opinion that “this unique piece of land and the development proposal therefore is and will be a continuing economic and aesthetic asset to the City of Calgary.”

Two factors intervened to save Nose Hill from the bulldozers. The first was the mounting citizen pressure on a level the City had never before witnessed. Since the fall of 1970 a steady stream of letters had been piling up at City Hall from residents who wanted Nose Hill to remain a recreational area. Momentum picked up after the April 7 decision. Letters continued to pour in lambasting developers and censuring the City for its indifference. In a biting editorial The Albertan argued that residential development on Nose Hill would “constitute a crime against the community,” and called on the citizens of Calgary to see it as “a test of our readiness to give things of the spirit their weight.” The barrage of protest was maintained into the fall, and though no authorization for development had been issued, it was becoming increasingly clear that if and when it did, City Hall would have a fight on its hands.

The second factor concerned the City’s predisposition to rethink its priorities. In sanctioning development on Nose Hill no one at City Hall had apparently given much thought to the guidelines established by the recently adopted General Plan, which specified that urban growth must be closely related to environmental and economic considerations. Arguing that development of Nose Hill as recommended had not taken into consideration priority claims by other developable areas in the city, and furthermore involved capital infrastructure that anticipated subsequent but as yet unplanned development beyond Nose Hill to the north, the Technical Co-ordinating Committee and the Planning Department, on April 6, 1972, proposed a moratorium on development of the upper slopes and plateau pending a study of the full economic implications. However, it also gave the go-ahead to develop Leaside on the lower slopes.

Carma was incensed. In a letter to the City, president Joe Combe expressed his frustration: “Since early 1968 significant time and energy have been expended … with the feeling on our part that final negotiations for development were never too far away.” Combe went on to plead for permission to begin on the grounds that land on Nose Hill was highly desirable compared to elsewhere in the city. Ten days later Carma’s consultants protested to the City about the sudden change in policy, arguing that the corporation desperately needed the land and that previous discussions had never included Nose Hill as part of a larger integrated area. Carma was supported by other landholders who asked that development on the hill be approved as soon as possible.
It was to no avail. On May 31, 1972, following a six-hour debate, the Calgary Planning Commission recommended “after long and careful review” that Nose Hill and the land beyond to the north remain an area of policy review and that development not be permitted until the full economic implications were known. This recommendation was to go before City Council at a public hearing on July 3.

Both sides in the debate went on the attack. The Calgary Field Naturalists Society argued for Nose Hill’s unique flora and fauna and stressed that merely retaining the undevelopable slopes for park purposes “would not ensure the survival of this unique area.” More significantly, surrounding communities became involved. Following a meeting on June 20, some nine communities bordering Nose Hill established a committee to prepare a brief for submission to Council. Under the guidance and assistance from the Faculty of Environmental Design at the University of Calgary and supported by the Federation of Calgary Communities, the brief advocating the protection of Nose Hill from development was completed in time for the July 3 hearings.

Carma pressed its case in a press release on June 8. The corporation noted the availability of utilities and that no major upgrading was necessary for development on Nose Hill at a density of 11 persons per acre. In referring to the unsatisfied demand for housing, reduced buyer choice and “arbitrary interference in the mechanics of the free market,” Carma argued that the decision to freeze development on Nose Hill “was not in the public’s best interests.” A week later Carma ran an advertisement in the North Hill News. Entitled “How to build a neighbourhood for 2,000 families without anyone noticing,” the advertisement stressed Carma’s long history of involvement in the area, one which had proceeded according to sound planning principles. An insert at the bottom of the advertisement encouraged readers to submit their opinions as to whether they wanted residential development to go ahead “so that all Calgarians can have access to and enjoy this attractive natural area.” In a letter to the Herald, Joe Combe praised his company’s “$75 million labour intensive project,” and re-emphasized the fact that no houses would be visible on the hill.

The public hearing on July 3 was a lengthy and rancorous affair. City Council heard 21 briefs. Carma, another developer, and the North Calgary Businessmen’s Association argued for development, while seven community associations and the Calgary Field Naturalists Society pleaded for park preservation. The most persuasive, however, was the brief presented by two professors from the Faculty of Environmental Design on
behalf of ten community associations. The North Calgary Communities Brief on Nose Hill Land Use advocated boundary conditions above and below the escarpment “so that no development will interfere with the recreational use and view of Nose Hill’s natural features.” The brief further called for community involvement in the preparation of the stalled sector plan for Nose Hill. It was enough to convince City Council, which on an 11-to-2 vote passed a motion to adopt the North Calgary Communities Brief on Nose Hill as a guideline for the protection and use of Nose Hill, and the Planning Department in conjunction with university personnel prepare a sector plan for a public hearing within a year and that the development in Dalhousie 6, Leaside and West Thorncliffe be deferred and that consideration be given to acquiring a major portion of the hill for recreation purposes.168

Preparation of the sector plan for Nose Hill was described by one community spokesman as “a unique opportunity to participate in the planning process.”169 It was if anything an understatement, for the work done by the north Calgary community associations and their supporters in the fall of 1972 and winter of 1972–73 marked the first time that Calgary citizens were actively involved in determining the future of their communities. Or, as another supporter sardonically noted, “the first time in
Calgary that citizens have actually been encouraged to make their position known before the bull dozers start carving up the land. The work itself was facilitated by a special council chosen from the community associations supported by a small executive committee. Crucial links included liaison with the Planning Department and the Faculty of Environmental Design, which handled the technical details. A questionnaire was sent out to 20,000 homes and displays mounted in shopping malls. The growing momentum for a sector plan that protected Nose Hill was evidenced through the several submissions to the Council and in the support of traditional allies like the Local Council of Women, the Calgary Field Naturalists Society, and the National and Provincial Parks Association of...
Canada, as well as other groups like the University Women’s Club and the United Church Women of Rosedale. Two groups prepared independent studies that supported the park concept. In November 1972 the Calgary Field Naturalists Society released its year-long study of natural areas including Nose Hill, and three months later, in January 1973, students in the Faculty of Environmental Design produced their “Nose Hill: A Resource Study.”

Carma tried to bolster support by commissioning a private consulting firm, Socio Systems Ltd., to undertake a public opinion survey. Five communities were chosen: Three were affected by the issue and two were in the city’s southwest. One hundred households in each were surveyed with an average response rate of around 75 percent. Carma tried to show the results in a positive light. While admitting that the survey showed that more people were against than for development, even in the two most removed communities, Carma advertised the fact that when asked to decide between a City expenditure of $12 million for a park or allowing Carma to develop, most people favoured the latter. However, one could dispute the validity of this result given the “loaded” nature of the question and the fact that the slight majority for development was supplied by the two southwest communities. The developer on the lower slopes took another approach, arguing that the halls of academia were being given too much credibility in the preparation of the sector plan. According to the lawyer for the Leaside development, “faculty members are without practical experience and their recommendations may have some theoretical merit but may lack it from a practical point of view.” The Urban Development Institute pointed out that preservation of Nose Hill for park purposes would mean that Calgary would have almost double the amount of park land per head of U.S. cities.

Despite differences within the community council respecting the size and type of park, the battle for Nose Hill was won on April 16, 1973 when City Council, in a public hearing, voted to reserve 4,100 acres for park purposes between John Laurie Boulevard on the south and 80th Avenue North, and between the Sarcee Trail on the west and 14th Street on the east. Council also instructed the Land Department to “proceed with land purchases on an opportunity basis.” While the decision itself was not unexpected, the specification of 4,100 acres came as a surprise to some. The original, but far from unanimous, recommendation from the North Calgary Communities Special Council was for 2,600 acres. The decision to reserve 4,100 acres was doubtless the result of last-minute lobbying on the part of disaffected groups within
the Council. Furthermore, the nature of the park had not been decided. The Parks and Recreation Department, for example, wanted a developed rather than a natural park.

It was not to be a complete victory, however. In January 1976, City Council voted to remove 1,600 acres from the park’s west end between Sarcee and Shaganappi Trails. Cost implications were given as the reason. To *The Albertan*, the original 4,100 acres was “probably financially unrealistic while as early as January 1975 the *Herald* referred to aldermen ‘shrink[ing] before the cost.’” Interestingly, most of the severed land belonged to Carma, the company most affected by the decision to turn Nose Hill into a park.

The developers’ response to this loss was typical. They accepted it without protest, having doubtless realized that their cause had been dealt a mighty blow in the Council decision of July 3, 1972. For example, a week before the April 16 public hearing, United Management took the high moral ground and notified the Mayor and Council that

> recognizing that it may be in the best interests of the people of Calgary and future generations to so restrict development, United Management Limited, as a good corporate citizen, is giving serious consideration to the withdrawal of the application to develop Leaside and to abandon its intentions to ultimately develop the escarpment and the plateau.

Instead, developers sought to compensate by other means. Carma argued successfully that since it had been the most penalized by the land freeze on Nose Hill, it should be compensated by annexation of lands under its control to the northwest. Together with Western Realty, another loser on Nose Hill, Carma simply moved north beyond the hill and began petitioning for annexation there. In the short term, however, the developers pinned all their efforts on securing adequate financial compensation for the loss of their lands. It proved to be as big an issue as the battle for the park itself.

The difference in opinion between the developers and the City on the value of potentially developable land in the event of its being frozen or designated to non-developed uses was virtually irreconcilable in the absence of any accepted formula for arbitration. According to Carma, its lands on the hill were worth $10,000 an acre, and at one point the developer felt that even if they were designated for park purposes they still might be worth more than adjacent City lands in West Thorncliffe. Another landowner wanted over $12,000 an acre. The City, on the other hand, appraised Carma lands at $8,000 an acre but only $1,200 an acre
when frozen. The City bargained for a median price of $3,000 an acre but eventually settled for $5,000. One could argue that the developers had gained a measure of victory when the City paid $39,000 for Nu-West’s 7.8 acres. However, these costs had to be assessed against the need to procure land as quickly as possible in an era of escalating prices. Even frozen land, in all fairness, had to be assessed in terms of the going rate for its developable equivalent. For example, by 1980 the steep undevelopable slopes were assessed at $1,200 an acre. However, despite the developers’ insistence that they were disadvantaged both practically in terms of land inventory, and financially with respect to loss of developable land, evidence suggests that Carma at least was determined to turn a lost opportunity to advantage. In July 1973, just two months after the decision to freeze land on Nose Hill, Carma availed itself of a long-held option and took title to two sections of land right in the middle of the hill. The reasons for this strange, even bizarre action were revealed seven months later when Carma laid an offer on the table. In view of straitened City finances and the refusal of the provincial government to assist in purchasing Nose Hill lands, it was a daring, even brilliant strategy by a corporation never known for its lack of gall.

On February 27, 1974, Carma presented the City with a two-pronged offer. The first involved a clean swap of 560 acres on Nose Hill for equivalent City-owned land in the adjacent West Thorncliffe subdivision. Carma even offered to lend the City $250,000 interest-free to develop the Nose Hill lands for park purposes. However, the bold assumptions implicit in this first prong of the offer were more than matched by the second. Here, Carma offered to sell its remaining 1,570 acres to the City for $15.7 million, or $10,000 an acre. It appears, however, that this high price was designed to make a second suggestion, and doubtless Carma’s real intent, more palatable. In this alternative, Carma asked the City to include the corporation’s lands in standard developer agreements in the northwest and north up to 1981 in return for the gradual annual release of Nose Hill lands to the City free of charge. The implications were immense in that Carma’s holdings would be given priority in subsequent developable areas both within and outside the City in return for the gradual transfer of Nose Hill lands.

The City blanched over handing Carma a monopoly of land development in the north and northwest for the next decade, and thus gave short shrift to the graduated exchange offer. Carma did acquire West Thorncliffe, though not via a clean swap. In June 1974, the City exchanged 180 acres in West Thorncliffe for 1,052 acres of Carma lands in Nose Hill plus
$1.3 million. It was a good deal for both, though it is arguable who came out the better. The City assumed ownership of 1,052 acres of prime Nose Hill lands for around $1,500 an acre.190 On the other hand, Carma stood to reap handsome dividends. According to *The Albertan* the land was worth $2 million and would gross Carma between $5 and $7 million.191

The purchase of Nose Hill dragged on. By 1980 the City had acquired only 1,297 acres. The official declaration of Nose Hill as one of Canada's largest urban parks had to wait until June 1992. Ralph Klein, Alberta's Minister of the Environment, was on hand, and his comment that "the only people weeping today are the developers" was testament to a long battle, a combination of City prevarication and resoluteness, and a triumph for and by the citizens of Calgary.192

**Discussion**

There can be no doubt that City Administration favoured residential development on the plateau and lower levels of Nose Hill on the grounds that it enabled a regional park on the slopes at no cost. The value of the entire area as an ecological preserve was never a factor. The City Parks and Recreation Department, for example, saw it as primarily as a park in the traditional sense, or as one Parks spokesman said, "This kind of money can't be justified on just preservation principles."193 The area's survival in its pristine state was due entirely to the sensitivity of City Council to community outrage and the willingness of affected citizens to take concerted action on their own behalf.

The Fish Creek experience also had an impact on Nose Hill. The provincial government assumed responsibility for Fish Creek only a few weeks before Council endorsed the 4,100-acre park concept. It is more than likely that with the removal of Fish Creek and its financial burden, the City was much more inclined to consider a northern regional park at some cost. More significantly, the precedent set in Fish Creek demonstrated provincial willingness to use its powers to restrict development of certain lands pending public purchase, and in so doing gave sanction for similar municipal action. The freezing of land on Nose Hill was therefore justified by precedent.

The developers had always assumed that development was going to go ahead on Nose Hill. The fact that the land in question was under a freeze by the national Department of Transport had not dissuaded them. Carma had been involved since 1960 and United Management acquired land there in 1965. Carma held much of its land under option. Yet when the...
developers lost Nose Hill they demanded special consideration, one even taking out an option to purchase on the hill. In this context questions arise as to the legitimacy of their claims for higher financial compensation. Furthermore, civic attitudes towards Carma provide an excellent example of what can only be seen as over-compensation. As argued above, it is debatable who profited more in the land exchange between the City and Carma. Yet the City went further. The subsequent annexation to the northwest was sought solely to compensate Carma for lands lost on Nose Hill. Finally, while the reasons for removing 1,500 acres from the park in 1976 were linked to cost, the fact remains that much of the severed land belonged to Carma. The present suburb of Edgemont is a standing testimony to Nose Hill Park’s loss, to Carma’s gain, and to a vision of what the rest of Nose Hill might have looked like had the developers had their way.

The Fish Creek and Nose Hill experiences reflected the resilience of developers. To be sure, they saw the two areas in terms of prime developable land and fought hard to secure the right to develop them. Yet when they were denied, they simply shifted their interests, bypassed the two parks, acquired land beyond, and rationalized their lost opportunities by pursuing annexation more forcibly. In this sense the City’s acquisition of two magnificent urban parks furthered the process of outward growth.

Conclusion

This period saw the formalization of the relations between the City and the developers. Agreements became longer, more complex, and increasingly differentiated according to specific requirements. The City’s policy of imposing heavier financial burdens on the developers whenever possible was continued and widened. Although resisted and to a degree ameliorated by the developers, the end of this period saw no change in the City’s desire to push its intent as far as it dared.

The City retained a cautious attitude towards developer suggestions for subdivision innovation. Golf course and lake creation were readily accepted. Others that involved subdivision experimentation or enhancement were not. Doubtless part of the reason lay in an awareness by the City that intent was often not translated into commensurate practice and that developers tended to neglect some of the financial implications and practical limitations of their suggestions. Nevertheless it seems that the City might have paid more attention by initiating more dialogue and evincing a readiness to be more experimental.
The issue over the two parks reflected a lack of will on the one hand and a lack of policy on the other. From the outset the City wanted to preserve Fish Creek for park purposes. It simply did not have the will to enter into purchase, nor, it appears, did it have the savvy to request the Province to freeze the land in the first place. In fact, had not the Province bailed the City out in early 1973, the developers’ clamorous efforts probably would have paid off.

On the other hand, there can be no doubt that the City wanted residential development on Nose Hill. Its failure to produce a sector plan before 1970 that stipulated both park and residential use on the hill put it in a stalling mode and allowed citizen outrage to emerge and then mobilize. The absence of a sector plan meant a lack of certainty about utilities sizings, road alignments, and specifics regarding development to the north beyond Nose Hill. In effect the City was virtually unable to respond effectively to the developers’ requests. Arguably, it was almost a relief to both Council and Administration when the north hill communities virtually made up their minds for them.

Finally, the issue of the parks is informative with respect to the developers themselves. On the one hand it shows their high interest in developments that blended town and country. Though they saw them primarily in terms of low density they were also quick to realize that creek or view lands contained much undevelopable acreage and therefore lent themselves to density transfer and to different types of residential development, including low cost. Carma’s changing concepts for its Top o’ the Hill subdivision stands as a case in point. The role of the developers as risk takers deserves some comment. Art Sullivan, Kelwood, and Wesco gambled in Fish Creek, knowing from the start that the area had been favoured for park purposes. Carma’s action in exercising a purchase option on land in Nose Hill that had already been reserved shows another form of risk taking, the gamble here lying in a profitable deal with the City. Kelwood was forced to sell at cost plus interest. Art Sullivan held out, hoping against hope for a better financial settlement; Nu-West and United Management cut their losses while Carma struck a deal. Risk-reward was part of the developers’ business. It seems likely, however, that in the case of the two parks the rewards, though nowhere near as high as anticipated, did outweigh the risks.
In terms of land use and outward growth, City Hall’s policies during this period remained largely unchanged. Developers retained their pragmatic approach in doing business with the City. The most noticeable aspect of land development in Calgary during this period was thus its predictability. Despite several major planning initiatives in the form of general plans, sector plans, design briefs, development control and zoning bylaws, and other policy interventions, the Calgary’s urban form in 1978 was not greatly dissimilar to that of 1954. The outward low density subdivision process that had begun in that year had continued unchecked. As in the 1950s, higher density development was constrained. For example, between 1970 and 1976, the population of the inner city and inner suburbs declined by over 22 percent, or around 20,000 people. On the other hand, population in the outer suburbs increased by 103,000, or 121.8 percent. The role of zoning as a “no growth policy” was reflected in stringent attitudes towards density change. Flexibility was apparent in the density transfer policy, a process which fell to the developers to initiate. Utilitarian notions about the disposition of reserves in subdivisions remained. This paucity of selective green space, as much as the blandness of architecture, gave Calgary subdivisions their internal monotony. Though joint efforts were made to incorporate social, low cost, and affordable housing into new land use and design practices, they were not consolidated. In short, land
use patterns in the city in this period, particularly with respect to zoning and low cost housing, reflected the same dynamic that had characterized City/developer relations in the 1950s.

**General Plans**

General Plans were authorized by the Province. They were essentially guidelines for future growth and were subject to ongoing revision. Calgary's four General Plans during this period were released in 1963, 1970, 1973, and 1978. Common to all four was an attempt to delineate future land use. The 1963 Plan endorsed a specific growth pattern. The subsequent three Plans were reactive in that they tried to modify this process without changing its intent. In terms of future development, the 1963 Plan was pivotal in that it accepted outward growth as the norm. It stressed an expanded industrial and commercial taxation base and a transportation infrastructure based on increased automobile usage, and furnished a detailed assessment of the utilities needed to accommodate population requirements to 1981. The Plan recognized the pre-eminence of low density housing. The 1970 and 1973 Plans were very similar documents, with the latter being more an update than a new version. They recognized adverse elements in the 1963 Plan by stressing corridor growth and a specific density formula for developing areas, but did not call for a change in direction. Similarly, the 1978 Plan noted the failure of these responses, and advocated a more flexible approach to density. Yet actual implementation was put in a delaying mode.

Calgary's initial Plan in 1963 was a straightforward document. Its primary focus lay in a provision for industrial growth in order to guarantee population increase. In 1961 John Steel, Commissioner of Works and Utilities, told the Planning Advisory Commission that the City was overly reliant on the residential property tax base and that the commercial/industrial sector was contributing nowhere near the ideal 60 percent of taxation revenues. Tax contributions from industry in 1961 were less than 4 percent of all revenues. Noting that the days of existing for the countryside were over, the Plan proposed to develop large industrial sites in the flat lands of the Bow Valley, along Nose Creek, and to the east where the rail links were concentrated. Recommendations were for the release of 200 acres per year to allow the development of nine industrial parks. To complement this industrial concentration, residential development was recommended in the northeast up to 32nd Avenue. The City's success in attracting industry to these areas was partly
responsible for continued residential development north of 32nd Avenue later in the 1970s.

The General Plan saw commercial development in a new light. Previously, commerce and street use went hand in hand. The 1963 Plan made the two mutually exclusive. Arguing that streets were for moving traffic and “emphatically not to accommodate business,” the Plan discouraged commercial activity along main streets, which were to be designed to enable the free flow of traffic. The way was thus paved for large shopping complexes, controlled access, and most significantly, extensive off-street parking areas. In recognizing the primacy of the automobile both in the General Plan and in the transportation studies that preceded it, the City had given the clear go-ahead for urban sprawl to continue.

With respect to residential development, the Plan tried to provide for future needs by recognizing existing trends and constraints. With surprising honesty, it was admitted that past policy had overly encouraged single family residences; that it was “greedy of land,” and reflected proportionately high servicing costs. Yet the Plan also showed no inclination to change, as the following comment attests: “No consequential changes of policy can be immediately foreseen, and, therefore to be realistic any plan for future development inevitably must recognize these policies, and the land requirements to accommodate Calgary’s forecast future population are based upon the densities currently prevailing.” The discussion on zoning seemed resigned to the inevitable. In acknowledging the “heavy demand for single family homes within every residential subdivision regardless of zoning,” and that “areas zoned for residential use other than single families have not produced increased density,” the authors of the Plan rationalized: “While effective zoning has a contribution to make in the orderly development of a community, to be effective it must work within the terms of reference set by the determined and publicly accepted policies which incline heavily towards the low densities currently prevailing.” The low density profile in suburban areas was further compounded by the General Plan’s visions for high density development. It was believed, naively so, that this would and should occur automatically, and only in the inner city areas: “The extension of new residential development progressively further from the city centre will enhance the propensity of near downtown redevelopment.” Thus, high density residential concentration in outer areas was discouraged.

The Plan emphasized the importance of utilities and how they influenced growth and expenditures. For example, extensive expansion to the north had to wait until the 1970s when connections to the Bearspaw
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Dam ensured an additional water supply. Thus, population projections in the Plan showed no development in the northeast until the mid-1970s. In the meantime a large concrete reservoir was required for the Spyhill pressure zone. Similarly, areas to the northwest were stretching the limits of the Bonnybrook sewage treatment plant’s capacity, and a new $2 million plant was projected at Shouldice near Bowness on the Bow River. Population projections reflected this as well. Only 15 percent of the city’s growth between 1966 and 1970 was expected to occur in the northwest. Further large utilities expenditures were anticipated in the new industrial areas in the northeast and southeast. As in the 1950s, utilities issues were dictating the direction and extent of growth.

The revised General Plan of 1970 was a tacit recognition of deficiencies in the 1963 Plan. The dominant issue, however, was not curtailment, but how to pay for transportation infrastructure. In April 1968, Council approved the City Transportation Study (CALTS). This study accepted the growing dependence on the automobile. In noting that few suburbs were presently beyond 20 minutes of driving time from the downtown area, the authors warned that “it was essential that transportation corridors be developed to accommodate increased automobile usage.” So while a desire for restraint was evident in the 1970 Plan, it was obvious that the issue facing civic administrators was not how to control growth but rather how to pay for its continuance. In a remarkably frank statement, City Planners acknowledged that a commitment to maximum growth, an acceptance of continuous outward expansion, and an emphasis on private transport were implicit factors in the City’s development policies. In forecasting a possible revenue deficit of $460 million by 1986, the Plan could only recommend a review of policies and costs and advocate more effective evaluation procedures.

The 1970 Plan also affirmed a density policy in all new residential areas of the city. The acceptance of a uniform density pattern of only 22 persons per acre in all developing areas was proof positive that nothing had changed. An updated Plan released three years later, though couched in the rhetoric of environmental concern, was simply a more detailed version of the 1970 Plan. Like its predecessor it stressed corridor residential development, a need to address housing costs, and the merits of increased densities, while at the same time accepting the fact that “existing forms of growth must be honoured.” Evidence of a lingering mentality was also revealed in the section of the Plan that dealt with Zoning. Though the original R2 zoning was modified to create a mixed residential family zone, it was still designed to continue low densities. Second, all
residential zoning areas save one were described solely in terms of “allowables.” The single family designation, however, was couched in much more specific language: “To protect existing residential areas with low population densities and conventional single detached housing from disruption by the encroachment of unconventional or multiple dwelling units.” This statement of intent plus the reaffirmation of a low 22 persons per acre density policy showed that while the City had recognized the negative implications of outward residential growth, no significant change had taken place.

At first glance the 1978 Plan seemed far more forceful in trying to influence change. The 22 persons per acre policy was abolished in favour of a “more flexible process that permits much more discretion in its application.” In addition to encouraging higher densities throughout the city, the Plan stressed density increase in the inner city and in areas adjacent to transportation routes. A desire to reduce dependence on the automobile was reflected in policies to encourage public transportation and decentralization. In noting its variance with previous policies, the 1978 Plan wanted to encourage greater competition in the development of land by ensuring “that wherever possible, development take place in concentrated rather than scattered form.”

Yet despite its call for more purposeful control over growth, the 1978 Plan in many ways was an overstatement. The “flexibility” to which it referred had always been an option in new areas under Development Control. Moreover, every previous plan had favoured multi-residential development in proximity to main roads and transportation routes. True, the 1978 Plan was in reference to the proposed Light Rail Transit system, which certainly did introduce a new element to the city’s transportation infrastructure. However, the principle adopted as a central policy in 1978 was not new. The contention that past development had been “scattered” is valid to the extent that expansion had always occurred simultaneously in different quadrants of the city. All the 1978 Plan did was focus on growth corridors, a pattern of development that had been observable since the early 1970s and which was still pushing the city outwards in four directions (north, northeast, northwest and southeast). Finally, the Plan was misleading in its policy statements about increasing densities throughout the city. Most of the new developing areas with a potential population of 242,256 were already covered by design briefs under the old 22 persons per acre policy. The City’s intention as stated in the 1978 Plan to allow existing density policies to “guide the consideration of development proposals” in effect meant that the new flexible density
guidelines were applicable only in those areas subject to annexation and to four land parcels within the city not covered by design briefs, the combined projected population of which was around 100,000. In short, the actual issue of flexible density application was for the future.

Though the sequence of General Plans reinforced patterns of outward growth, their frequent revisions fostered uncertainty. Since all planning decisions had to be compatible with the current General Plan, changing guidelines led to inconsistency and confusion. For example, developers acquired options on Nose Hill in line with residential projections in the General Plan of 1963. In the 1970 Plan, the area was placed under policy review. Three years later it was designated as a park, and in the 1978 Plan, the west portion was slated for residential development. Plans for the inner city suburb of Victoria Park showed similar variance. As a broad blueprint for future growth the General Plans exhibited a certain uniformity of purpose. However, their frequent updates also made long-range planning more uncertain, and explain in part why developers were so intent on maximizing their landholding options.

**Sector Plans and Design Briefs**

With respect to land use, the policies outlined in the general plans were implemented through sector plans and design briefs. Acknowledging the deficiencies of the neighbourhood concept, the 1963 Plan called for the development of larger units or sectors each accommodating between 20,000 and 30,000 people. These sector plans were described as a “statement of an overall concept for the development of a geographic area of the city into an integrated community unit which is usually bounded by the natural or man-made physical barriers as rivers escarpments railways and freeways.” Intended as a frame of reference for the developer prior to the preparation of an individual subdivision design, the sector plan sought to enable efficiency and control with respect to traffic circulation, and the location of schools, parks, and shopping facilities.

As they evolved in the late 1960s in conjunction with a review of sector plans, design briefs became the first stage of sector plan preparation. After 1973, the term “sector plan” was abandoned and design briefs became the primary unit for operational planning. Design briefs were prepared by the City and followed a process involving formulation, circulation, post-circulation review, and public hearing before being adopted by Council. Design briefs were more prescriptive than the original sector plans in that they provided clearer and more focused direction for
Source: City of Calgary Archives, Cartographer: Robin Poitras
developers. For example, the Silver Springs Design Brief completed in June 1971 encompassed 835 developable acres and projected a population of 17,900. This multi-page document specified the location of schools, commercial establishments, institutional facilities, roads and streets, pedestrian circulation systems, and open spaces. It was accompanied by maps that showed land use, transit routes, and utilities locations as well as the specific location within the city itself. The design brief also included a discussion of other influencing factors, including physical constraints, existing land use, and possible legal hurdles. It further provided for residential development in four community nodes. However, aside from recommending multi-family densities in all four, the brief was silent as to the scope and type of dwelling to accommodate the 17,900 potential residents. This was entirely up to the developers. It was clear that City planners believed that the combination of design brief specifics and the 22 persons per acre guideline were enough to circumscribe developers.

The sector plans and design briefs were well-intentioned guidelines for efficient land use, and on a broad level it could be argued that they served their purpose. They suffered, however, on several levels. The City's servicing and road layout standards were inflexible, and this often...
prevented efficient overall land use integration.\textsuperscript{13} Since it took time to build out a design brief, obsolescence became an issue.\textsuperscript{14} Often, development had begun before the design brief had been completed. The 1973 General Plan, for example, detailed 39 design brief areas covering all developed and undeveloped land within the city. Yet only eight design briefs had been approved. In 1976, Carma secured approval to proceed with the development of Leaside Park (south Edgemont) even though the design brief for the area had not been completed.\textsuperscript{15} The fact that design briefs necessitated public input was a further exacerbating factor. Design briefs in new areas adhered to low density principles. Both the sector plans and design briefs were subject to inconsistent interpretation. Lastly and most significantly were the implications of the developers’ role in implementing them.

The five original sector plans prepared under the first General Plan in 1963 failed to achieve their purpose. First the criteria governing their preparation were very vague. They mirrored the Neighbourhood Plan in that they were built around expected school locations. The fact that sector plans encompassed both developed and undeveloped areas made it more difficult to integrate new development into existing infrastructure. All zoning in undeveloped areas was tentative but relatively fixed elsewhere. The major problem, however, was related to major roads. While their general location was known very early, details respecting their specific placement, alignments with surrounding thoroughfares, size, and timing of construction might remain uncertain for years. In 1968, for instance, Carma complained about the difficulty of aligning subdivision thoroughfares with the sector plans. It was not surprising that by 1968 only one of the original sector plans retained any validity at all and even it was problematic since disposition of over half the area was uncertain.\textsuperscript{16} This vagueness in sector plan preparation was reflected by developers who focused their attention primarily on larger land parcels in undeveloped areas.

Density requirements in the design briefs contributed to low density development. The 22 persons per acre standard was too low, imprecise, and difficult to achieve over an entire design brief. Essentially it was reasoned that two children from every single family residence would attend either an elementary or a junior high school within a design brief area. Since the capacity of these schools was limited by the size of the community reserve, which in turn was based on the area of the design brief itself, planners projected the school populations and set them against single family density figures to reach a maximum overall density figure.
of 22 persons per acre.\textsuperscript{17} It seemed a strange way of deciding on such an important policy. The method was oblique and imprecise. It failed to deal specifically with the multi-family component. Nor did it take into account the changing household demographics associated with declining birthrates or, children leaving home. In the period 1968–1974 single family occupancy dropped from 3.96 persons to 3.58 persons per dwelling, well below the 4.0 figure upon which the 22 persons per acre was established.\textsuperscript{18}

The density figure of 22 persons per acre was not consistently applied over the entire design brief, with the result that subdivisions maintained their low density profile. Whitehorn was developed at 19.1 persons per acre, Temple at 20 persons per acre, south Edgemont at 20.3, and Braeside at 19.83 to name just a few.\textsuperscript{19} Part of the reason was due to incremental development which might allow a lower density figure in an early subdivision on the assumption that it would be counterbalanced elsewhere in the design brief. Often this did not occur. Kelwood developed its Bonavista subdivision at 13.0 and 14.4 per acre, with the overall 22 persons per acre to be attained on the remaining undeveloped lands only “if feasible.”\textsuperscript{20} Adjacent Lake Bonaventure was developed at 12 persons per acre.\textsuperscript{21} It is highly doubtful whether 22 persons per acre were ultimately distributed over the entire design brief. By 1975, the City Planner considered the problem of achieving overall densities of 22 persons per acre in design briefs serious enough to suggest a forum to find a solution.\textsuperscript{22} Whether it was for upper, middle, or lower income housing, the same pattern developed. A very high percentage of residential space was reserved for single family residences, with the presence of higher density development being purely a numerical exercise to achieve the overall 22 persons per acre. In other words, low density was the norm, and high density an add-on to achieve an overall figure that was too low anyway. A subdivision in the lower income district of Penbrooke Meadows in 1971 provides a typical example. The plan provided for a population of 6,776 people on 308 acres. Two hundred and forty acres were set aside for low density housing (18.5 an acre), and 30 acres for reserve requirements. To attain the required 22 persons per acre the remaining 38 acres were simply given over to multi-family dwellings at 60 persons per acre.\textsuperscript{23}

The 22 persons per acre figure thus emerged more as a contrivance than an articulated plan for effective density control and distribution. Multi-family development was the variable in that it was a response to conditions based on single family development. For example, in 1971 two sites in Dover were developed at 50 and 57 persons per acre; one in Southwood at 68.3 persons per acre, and another in Glenbrook at 60 per
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acre. Although no reasons were offered, it is safe to assume that their variation bore a direct relation to what was happening with single family house construction in the area. Sometimes multi-family provision just vanished, replaced by single family houses in the interests of “market demand.” In 1971 Nu-West wanted to reclassify its R2 areas to R1 in Canyon Meadows because of “an unsatisfied demand for R1 lots.” It was not surprising that the 1978 Plan, in abandoning the 22 persons per acre policy, termed it “inflexible and largely ineffective,” and its failure was attributed to “previous decisions relating to relatively low density being permitted.”

Sector plans and design briefs were too loose. First, they had no legal force. In 1973, for example, the Provincial Planning Board allowed BACM to change the Marlborough Design Brief on the grounds that a design brief was “not by nature a zoning bylaw.” Second, they were subject to changes and modifications. The Dalhousie Design Brief provided for a school that was never built. The Marlborough Design Brief put a “Commercial” designation on property intended for residential use. Poor communication lines hindered citizen participation in the Strathcona Design Brief. In referring to sector plans, the General Plan of 1970 noted that “all too often in the past, changes have been made at a late stage and destroyed any confidence that the public might have had.” For example, a subdivision was turned down in Albert Park in 1964 because it violated the sector plan. However, the Planning Department was directed to reassess the sector plan and co-operate with the developer to reach a satisfactory solution. Two years later Engineered Homes succeeded in amending the area sector plan to secure a 35-acre commercial site in Forest Lawn. In 1976 the Planning Commission blocked a move to remove 1.06 acres from golf course lands in Silver Springs for R1 residences on the grounds that it violated the Varsity Acres Design Brief.

Design briefs were also subject to updating, which led to confusion and developer protest. Qualico was impacted negatively by the updated Glamorgan-Glenbrook Design Brief, which changed land use guidelines. Sometimes the provincial government stepped in. The Provincial Planning Board upheld BACM’s appeal in 1973 for reclassification that ran counter to the area design brief. In this context one can find some level of sympathy for Carma in 1975 when it submitted an outline plan to develop 21 acres in Silver Springs even though the area was not covered by a design brief.

For the purposes of this discussion, the sector plan/design brief approach to planning and land use defaulted to the developers. They had
input into the preparation of design briefs, and sometimes initiated their implementation. The changes to the Midnapore Design Brief stands as a good case in point. According to a Planning Department official the Midnapore Design Brief was initiated following pressure from BACM, who wanted to develop its lands south of Fish Creek. Commissioner George Hamilton described the sector plan as “look[ing] to the developer himself to prepare the detailed subdivision design.” This statement was lent authority in the 1973 General Plan, which noted that the onus for development in new areas “was on the builder-developer to submit proposals which are compatible with existing uses.” The following comments taken from a City Planning memorandum in 1969 represent a typical example of this strong developer presence. In reference to the Silver Springs Sector Plan, M.V. Facey noted:

Carma has acquired 800 acres within this area and is beginning to prepare plans for early development…. The first phase of their development will be in the southeast corner, fed by the 40th Avenue extension, south of their golf course subdivision presently being processed. Jim Whitehead has done some initial studies for this area and we are to work with Carma in preparing the sector plan simultaneously with their development of a conceptual plan.37

A similar comment concerned a subdivision owned by Quality Construction in the southeast: “Very little work has been done in this area to date but it is now owned by Quality who is being represented by Dick Newby and who are wanting to start planning the area as soon as possible. We will therefore be largely working with them in preparing the sector plans.”38

Thus it was the developers who gave substance to the various design briefs. They determined the population distribution and prepared the zoning/land use classification and development guidelines. They broke down the reserve and roadway dedications and chose the type of multi-dwelling housing projects. They had input on school locations and commercial nodes. While the City argued that it exercised control by insisting on modifications where necessary, the point is that in terms of developer input, the sector plan/design brief process was essentially no different from the old Neighbourhood concept of the 1950s. In fact developers probably had more control, since sector plans and design briefs covered much larger areas. It seems clear that the pace and pattern of residential development was set by the developers with few limitations beyond density factors, and even they changed prior to a zoning bylaw. Design briefs were altered in the interests of the market. In 1966 Engineered Homes
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SILVER SPRINGS DESIGN BRIEF

- SC: Sector shopping centre
- NC: Neighbourhood shopping centre
- PSH: Public senior high school
- PJH: Public junior high school
- PE: Public elementary school
- SJH: Separate junior high school
- SE: Separate elementary school
- FS: Fire station
- Major open space
- Local open space
- Major road
- Collector road
- Pedestrian walkway
- Road right of way
- Residential areas

succeeded in having an area in Palliser reclassified from multi-family to single family. In response to an argument by Premier Land Developments in 1972 that “multi family housing demand was light,” the Calgary Planning Commission recommended that 48 acres in the Marlborough Design Brief be reclassified as single family. Similarly, eight acres in Oakridge were reoriented to single family on the grounds that “economic development on the existing classification was not desirable.”

Zoning

Zoning was the other major vehicle for land use control, but in Calgary it was combined with development control to produce a level of flexibility not experienced in other cities. Zoning is rigid in that it prohibits evolutionary changes in land use. Development control, on the other hand, is more flexible in that it defines steps to be taken before approval, with the onus being on the developer to submit proposals. According to the 1973 General Plan, “it permits the fullest account to be taken of altered circumstances and conditions while allowing for more spontaneity and innovation.” In that it referred specifically to areas in a state of growth or transition and thus permitted extensive modifications in the design brief stage, development control was a potentially powerful change agent. As a design brief unfolded in new and in transition areas, development control gave planners and developers all the leeway necessary to integrate new density balances. However, these options were vastly underutilized, with the result that Calgary’s zoning profile bore little difference to that of Edmonton, which had a zoning bylaw only. According to a paper presented by the Faculty of Environmental Design at the University of Calgary, development control that had the potential to induce innovation in both the private and public sectors was not being applied effectively in Calgary. Instead, there continued to be “too much emphasis on the auto, the sprawling suburbs of single family dwellings…” The failure of the City to capitalize on the flexibility afforded by development control reflects the continuing adherence to traditional views about zoning.

Updated zoning bylaws followed the release of every general plan and provided tight specifications for residential, commercial, and industrial land use. They were prescriptive, and could be amended only by City Council through a bylaw subsequent to citizen notification and involvement. Though developers were constrained by the inflexibilities inherent in zoning bylaws, the fact that the Planning Commission could recommend amendments encouraged them to submit non-compliant proposals.
The vast majority of their applications fell on deaf ears. Carma was accused of setting too much land aside for apartments in Varsity Acres in 1965.44 In the same year the Planning Commission refused to allow apartments in Acadia because they “would materially affect R1 properties to the east.”45 An application to rezone for a 25-unit apartment was rejected because it “would be discriminatory against those owners who have developed in good faith in the area.”46 Rezoning was allowed for town houses and apartments, often over community protest especially if they were seen as a buffer between residential and commercial districts. Yet they also could be rejected simply because there were better sites in the same area or because of current trends in apartment development.47 In 1976 an 11-unit town house project in Mount Royal was described by the Planning Commission as being of “excellent quality re design, amenity area and parking,” but was rejected because the front yard widths were a few feet below regulation.48 An apartment in Sunnyside was turned down on the puzzling grounds that apartments only comprised 5 percent of the area.49 Another apartment development was refused since it would set a premature trend.50 When Clearwater Construction applied for rezoning for two apartment buildings on the north side of 58th Avenue near the Chinook Shopping centre, it was informed that it would result in “stereotype development with buildings having identical appearance, uniform setback and large areas of open parking at grade.”51 In turning down an apartment application in Rosedale, the Planning Commission’s main reason was that the “extra traffic would create nuisance value to residential areas.”52

In spite of rapidly expanding growth, planners were slow to apply development control to transitional areas. Here the best example was in the subdivision of Manchester, where commercial, industrial, and other related activities had largely replaced small houses built more than a half-century earlier. Applications to rezone the remaining two blocks from residential to commercial were turned down no fewer that six times over an eight year period so as to protect “an enclave of residential development.”53 Developers consistently brought forward proposals for apartments, duplexes, and town houses in newer and older areas, many of which were already in transition. In refusing an application for apartments in an inner city neighbourhood in 1969, the Planning Commission noted that “although the size of the property would appear to lend itself to an apartment development, the general development of the area is of a lower density use and attractive design. There are many well kept houses in this particular area. The development of apartments therefore would be an intrusion into an older area.”54
Often the developers' proposals for rezoning for higher densities were based on sound principles. In applying to rezone an area in Southwood to accommodate apartments, Eagle Investments Ltd. argued that there was definite need for cheaper accommodation in the area and that rents in the projected dwellings would be $140 per month in comparison to the several duplexes in the area that were renting at $200–$250 a month. The application was rejected on the grounds that “the need for cheaper accommodation cannot be used as a criterion for rezoning,” and that “any rezoning at this time would be a breach of faith with those developers in the area who have constructed duplexes.”

In justifying his request for rezoning to allow two duplex developments on Elbow Drive in Britannia, the developer emphasized their location on a major thoroughfare, and stressed the fact that single family lots there were not selling. He further offered to work co-operatively with the City to develop a suitable plan that would make the duplexes look as attractive as single family residences. His rejection was accompanied by the comment that rezoning would be “a breach of faith with single family owners in the area.”

A rezoning application in Sunalta was rejected because the Planning Commission believed that high density development should not be on the same street as single family residences.

In an application to rezone an area in Bowness for apartments in 1969, Lennon Developments Ltd. based its argument on current mortgage preferences and the need to overcome the area’s “backward stigma.” The application was rejected as it represented “an intrusion into an area which is substantially developed with one or two family dwellings.”

There can be no doubt that the City’s reluctance to permit changes under either zoning or development control was due to potential community opposition. In such cases, the Planning Commission, and City Council if need be, were confronted with petitions, angry delegations, and appeals if necessary. Often the threat was a sufficient dissuading factor. In protesting an application for an apartment which was “absolutely incompatible with the surrounding area,” the president of the Ogden Millican Community Association simply warned that it would “generate a great deal of protest.”

Thus over the years, in spite of development control options, a plethora of rejections underscored an enduring belief in the sanctity of existing residential patterns. The refusals were all couched in similar language. Whether the applications represented breaches of faith, unwelcome encroachments, or intrusions into privacy, their flat dismissals...
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showed that in spite of the powers available under development control, the zoning mentality prevailed. A fitting articulation of the City’s philosophy towards zoning can be seen in a 1973 rezoning application for a medical clinic in a transition area on 12th Avenue and 14th Street N.W. In dismissing the applicant’s argument that the land was too valuable to allow residential construction, the Planning Commission observed caustically that “the price of land should be a reflection of zoning not vice versa.”\(^{60}\)

**Multi-Density Options**

In addition to the protection of property values, zoning policies served to ingrain the concept that multi-density development in developing areas was to be isolated and predicated on specific factors. The City remained opposed on principle to large-scale, high density development on the periphery of suburban areas, arguing that “it is considered that the setting aside of substantial tracts of raw land for speculative development of high density apartments can only serve to drain the potential of redeveloping the central and other developed areas.”\(^{61}\) In defending the new R2 zoning bylaw in 1972, City Planner George Steber stressed the need “to restrict multi family densities in suburban areas in order to maintain a strong residential component in the downtown area.”\(^{62}\) Density limits in inner city zones were 290 persons per acre. In the suburbs it was 150. Furthermore, even after narrower lot widths were allowed in 1975, the 22 persons per acre policy prevented higher density patterns.\(^{63}\) High density zoning belonged in proximity to commercial complexes or shopping centres.\(^{64}\) Thus, they emerged as concentrated nodes, their actual density determined entirely by the market demand that governed the extent of single family homes in the sector plan or design briefs. In short, while in theory all subdivisions in residential areas were built to fixed low densities, the rigidity of zoning policies resulted in very wide density distribution, and fractured neighbourhoods.

The City’s multi-density guidelines prepared in 1966 reflected this narrow view. Based on a checklist, the guidelines measured proposals against transportation factors, open space, proximity to schools, and land use relationships.\(^{65}\) Admittedly, their application bore some positive results. A good example was Village Green in Acadia, described as “one of Calgary’s first examples of luxurious suburban living.” Set on 4.5 acres, the $1.6 million complex included 17 six-unit apartment buildings and
13 town houses designed to “stress landscaping and lighting to create a park like effect,” albeit in an isolated environment.66

Being far too sketchy, however, the guidelines were generally of little value either to the City or the developers. They ignored design factors, the practicality of multi-age groupings and were very community-selective. One has only to note an example in 1972, when an application to develop a 16-storey commercial and apartment building in Glamorgan was flatly rejected. In observing that “the applicant is proposing to develop a whole site without regard for any amenity other than suite balance,” the Planning Commission, in obvious reference to outdated guidelines, concluded that “this practice while acceptable to some degree in the past is certainly not in keeping with present trends.”67 It appears that the real impact of the guidelines was to lend substance to the belief that multi-family dwellings were to remain isolated from the rest of the community. For example the protection of low density environments is reflected in the specification that multi-family dwellings had to be under 28 feet in height if they were within 100 yards of an R1 or R2 house. More significantly, they were self-identifying.

Though the developers’ interest in higher density development was predicated on market demand, it was also dependent on the willingness of the City to allow them to take risks. Often this did not happen. In spite of Carma’s pleas for more apartment construction in suburban areas, the City turned down an application to develop a comprehensive 1,200-suite complex in the Varsity Acres area in 1965 on the grounds that “the parcel was too large for high density zoning in an essentially suburban area.”68 An application for a proposed subdivision on the eastern end of Dover showed the willingness of a developer to test new ideas while meeting market demand. In 1976, Devco Properties Ltd proposed a 20-acre 441-unit multi-family rental townhouse development catering to a mix of young families and seniors and supervised by a full-time manager and resident caretakers. The project which envisaged suites with access to central courtyards was described as “a planned unit development providing an excellent landscaped residential environment and offering some of the finest housing in the city at moderate rental rates.”69 Though the increased population would not violate the 22 persons per acre in the Dover Design Brief, the project was refused partly on the grounds that the area was already built to high densities.70

The Dover project is illuminative for other reasons. Its refusal was also linked to site unsuitability through proximity to light industrial zoning. Yet this flew in the face of the C.M.H.C’s current interest in providing
money for residential development in areas close to industrial zoning, sites that were normally considered as “not totally suited to housing use.” Shortly after the Dover rental project was refused, the City allowed Conforce Products Ltd., a cement manufacturing company, to move its operations from Inglewood to Dover. Despite community outrage far greater than that directed towards the rental project, the Genstar subsidiary was allowed to relocate in Dover even though its new site was designated urban reserve, which according to the General Plan “was to protect land for urban development from premature subdivision which may prejudice future intended use or which may be a disruptive influence on present and future communities.” The chief reason given for this highly contentious decision was that it would cost the company $700,000 more to buy available land in Foothills Industrial Park.

Community opposition to multi-family densities in low density areas was ongoing and doubtless was a major contributing factor in maintaining existing patterns. In 1976 the Huntington Hills Community Association complained bitterly over the construction of a 120-unit condo town house complex on the grounds that the additional children “would be a catastrophe.” In appealing a 141-unit complex in Palliser by Abacus Cities in 1976, four surrounding communities offered this comment: “Abacus Cities has another development in our area and maintenance has been poor resulting in an eyesore for the rest of the community. They admit this and we don’t want another. One per community is enough.”

An excellent example of the power of community pressure concerned the new R2 Zoning classification approved under the General Plan of 1970. It was intended to encourage redevelopment on larger city lots in older R2 areas by allowing threeplex and fourplex development. Difficulties soon arose and several appeals were upheld by the Development Appeal Board. On the grounds that “these units will detract from congruous development and devalue our properties,” a community petition asked Council to change the bylaw to its original form and allow duplexes only. Despite a Planning Department recommendation that it would be “a retrograde step,” Council amended the bylaw to satisfy the petitioners.

The developers’ solution to the limitations to high density development in suburban areas imposed by general plans, sector plans, design briefs, and zoning lay in two interrelated directions. The first was to try to maximize commercial zoning as much as possible. The second was to build up densities around these commercial nodes, and in particular the emerging regional shopping centres, through the novel use of what was known as density transfer.
Developers continued their efforts to secure as much commercial zoning as they could. In 1968, Carma accused the City of obstructing free enterprise by denying the corporation additional commercial space in Huntington Hills. Developers often submitted too many commercial sites. Kelwood, for instance, had a commercial site deleted from its Willow Park subdivision. In 1966 the Planning Commission resisted a developer by ruling that there was no justification for commercial development to intrude into a residential area that is bordered by late model homes. Kelwood was upset in 1972 over the Bonavista Design Brief, which allocated residential zoning right up to Macleod Trail. With prophetic accuracy Bob Kimoff described the zoning as “unrealistic” in light of the demonstrated demand for property in the “most successful commercial area in the city.” Daon’s successful solution to potential community opposition to Sunridge Mall was to provide amenities. According to the President of Rundle Community Association in 1974: “We are confident that Daon Development Corporation which has been a very strong motivating force in establishing this area will continue with such innovative ideas as the wonderful and unique community center, the planting of trees, tennis courts play areas etc.”

However, despite the sector plans and design briefs, commercial zoning seemed subject to flexibility and inconsistency. In the 1960s tentative plans for shopping centres were often non-specific with respect to parking requirements. Sometimes, as with Carma in Varsity Acres, the responsibility of the developer respecting adjacent roads was unclear. A lack of guidelines resulted in the proliferation of service stations. Disputes occurred over commercial areas intruding into residential districts. Braeside residents, for example, were upset over the location of a commercial centre which they maintained was inconsistent with the design brief. Richfield Properties was discouraged on these grounds in its early efforts to promote a regional shopping centre on Memorial Drive and 36th Street S.E. in 1975. Another good example was the battle with Mayfair and Kelvin Grove residents over the location of a commercial complex on Elbow Drive south of Glenmore Trail. Strange things happened. Stadium Shopping Centre agreed to relocate provided freedom from competition could be assured.

Zoning practices linked commercial and residential development, in that higher densities were encouraged close to shopping centres. However, the extent to which the presence of commercial nodes could be used as a focal point for increased residential density was limited by the 22 persons per acre policy. In this context Carma tried to change the rules when it
used the City’s density transfer policy to achieve higher densities. The Market Mall example is a classic case of a developer using a City policy to promote a new concept in suburban residential development.

Density Transfer

The density transfer policy as stipulated in the 1970 General Plan was intended to compensate developers for undevelopable land. Originally it concerned the loss of land required by the City for freeway or interchange purposes. Instead of the City purchasing the required land from the developer, the latter was granted density transfer on the property in question at a specified rate. In 1970, when the City needed 9.7 acres for construction of Shaganappi Trail, it allowed Western Realty a density transfer at 22 persons per acre, which translated into an allowable addition of 213 people \((9.7 \times 22)\) on the developer’s subdivision in Brentwood Heights.

In the same year Quality Construction gave up 21 acres in Bonavista Downs for the Anderson Road right of way. In this case the density was differentiated according to single and multi-family guidelines and was applied to the developer’s adjacent subdivision in Queensland Downs. Later, as was seen in Fish Creek and Nose Hill, density transfer was a way for the City to acquire recreational space. Technically the City had the power to freeze such land. However, by granting density transfer at a lower rate, the City secured title to the land while the developer received some compensation. For example, had residential development on Nose Hill gone ahead, the density transfer against the steep slopes was to be 11 persons per acre. In east Marlborough BACM set aside more than the required 10 percent reserve to create an extensive green space area on the assumption that density transfer would be granted against the excess. However, it was Carma’s actions in Varsity Acres with respect to a golf course and the Market Mall shopping centre that showed how the potential value of density transfer was thwarted by poor planning.

Market Mall

The development of Market Mall as Calgary’s first regional shopping centre in the northwest is illustrative on a variety of levels. Aside from being the most significant example of density transfer in that it involved residential, commercial and recreational land, the debate over Market Mall evinced the intense competition between developers. In Carma’s
case it also demonstrated the advantages of combining residential with commercial development. Finally, it showed the difficulties inherent in general plans. Without the specificity of design briefs they were unhelpful in helping City officials make solid long-range decisions, especially involving complex and high cost projects like major shopping centres.

The issue of Market Mall cannot be separated from a companion shopping centre a short distance to the east. The possibility of a major shopping complex on Crowchild Trail at 37th Street had been promoted as early as 1962. Led by long-time Calgary businessmen Harry Cohen, M.T. Riback and Norm Green, and buttressed by the promise of two “anchor” retail stores, Northland Village seemed destined by early 1966 to become the city’s first regional shopping centre in the northwest.90 However, Carma too had been interested in developing commercial property farther to the west for the same reason. But as with Northland Village, the City Planning Commission deemed the project too premature.

Matters changed dramatically in the late summer of 1966 following a planning study which unexpectedly determined that not only was a regional shopping centre viable in the northwest but that more than one could survive. Much to the displeasure of the applicants, the City Planning Commission recommended that both proposals should proceed to the rezoning stage.91 The two enabling bylaws were discussed together at a public hearing in January 1967. Both applicants pressed their case, arguing consistency with the General Plan and enlisting support from surrounding citizen groups. City Council, however, ruled in favour of Carma and Bylaw 6917 passed third reading on January 30, 1967. Bylaw 6918 to rezone land for Northland Village was abandoned, albeit temporarily.92 The reasons for this unexpected decision are conjectural. Possibly it had something to do with the fact that there were more citizen dissentients to the Northland proposal than to Carma’s. More revealing, however, is the fact that just before Council’s decision, Carma offered to put down a $25,000 bond and construct a golf course in the area.93

Impetus for the Market Mall proposal came in the middle of 1969 when Carma brought forward its ambitious plan. Three separate but interrelated proposals were involved. First was a plan to develop the subdivision of Varsity Village (now Varsity Estates). The second involved the construction of a private golf course to enhance the appeal of the subdivision. The third was the development of a nearby regional shopping centre. Carma’s idea was to transfer density from the proposed golf course to multi-family complexes adjacent to the shopping centre. The plan was received favourably, being described as “an exciting planning philosophy.”94
Problems, however, soon arose over the 10 percent community reserve. Quoting the Willow Park golf course as a precedent, Carma wanted the golf course acreage excluded from the computational formula, arguing that much of it was not suited to development, and that it (Carma) had provided extensive green space, albeit undevelopable elsewhere in the subdivision. The City dismissed the Willow Park golf course example, noting that density transfer had not been a factor there. On the other hand, density transfer had been granted in this instance against the entire golf course, which thus made it de facto developable land. Though the City's case was the stronger, Carma prevailed, but only after it agreed to a timeline for completion of the golf course and to a stipulation that it would be open to the public. The City justified its decision to defer community reserve requirements with the rationale that the golf course contributed to open space and thus “became in effect its own reserve providing public use was allowed.” The fact that this “public use” was not free to the public did not seem an issue. Also, soon after his appointment as Commissioner, Denis Cole rightly questioned the wisdom of allowing a developer to operate a revenue-producing facility after receiving density transfer against it.

The Market Mall agreement was signed on November 19, 1969, under which, in addition to the density transfer, the City agreed to construct Shaganappi Trail from the Trans-Canada Highway to Valiant Drive just beyond the shopping centre, and to share with the developer the costs of widening and extending 40th Avenue. The developer agreed to construct an overpass across Shaganappi Trail to connect east Varsity Acres to the shopping centre, to pay the disputed acreage assessment on the golf course lands which in some situations amounted to $951 per acre, and to build the required service road to the shopping centre. The end result was the construction of Silver Springs Golf Course, and Market Mall, Calgary's first regional shopping centre in the suburban northwest.

The City's rationale was difficult to follow. Why even entertain the concept of two regional shopping centres within blocks of each other? Though Northland Village ultimately went ahead, a poorly conceived agreement ultimately cost the City a million dollars in a payout to the developers when extensive modifications to projected high rise developments on the west side of Shaganappi Trail forced a reduction in densities from 5,279 to 2,200 people. Clearly, zoning problems, the projected interchange at Shaganappi and Crowchild Trails, and the sentiments of the Dalhousie community had not been taken into consideration. Not that the community of Varsity Acres was entirely happy with Carma and
Market Mall: Residents argued that the City had capitulated to developer pressure in agreeing to construct a major arterial thoroughfare solely to serve what they perceived was a poorly located shopping centre. Some felt betrayed on both sides, claiming that the City had caved in by allowing 40th Avenue to bisect the community as well as accusing Carma of misleading tactics and downright lying over the specific location of the golf course.  

However, it was the issue of density transfer that is most puzzling. Much of Varsity Acres was already being developed at less than 22 persons per acre. This meant that density transfer from a large area such as a golf course to the relatively small multi-family sites adjacent to Market Mall shopping centre would result in densities of over 300 an acre. This far exceeded City maximums even in inner areas and was almost double the allowable density in suburban areas per acre. It also foreordained an extremely inequitable distribution over the design brief area. However, not only was the transfer density to Market Mall ineligible under the City’s density guidelines, it also violated existing policy with respect to the shopping centre itself. Under existing policy, if a large site under a single ownership was slated for both commercial and multi-family density, its residential component could not exceed 22 persons per acre over the whole site.

It seems inconceivable that the City should have been unaware of these two existing policies. In any case, realization plus citizen pressure prevailed during the preparation of the subsequent design brief. The Varsity Acres Design Brief, released in March 1974, recommended an overall density of 22 persons per acre over the whole Market Mall site including the multi-family areas. In terms of overall density this meant that the optimum 22 persons per acre was not achieved in the suburb of Varsity Acres since the Market Mall agreement did very little to compensate for lost density due to the golf course. Moreover, the benefits of density transfer had not been demonstrated.

The Market mall project thus invites speculation. In defence of the City it seems that the customary pragmatic factors were at work. For example, the agreement to build Shaganappi Trail was not the capitulation it seemed, since the City and the Province had already agreed on its alignment, and to build it on a cost-sharing basis. As for site, any choice would have been challenged by affected residents, or as Planner Mike Facey wryly noted on one occasion: “We are damned if we do and damned if we don’t.” Also, once the need for a regional shopping centre in the northwest was accepted, the choice of site was predicated on several
factors that went beyond engineering feasibility and potential merit. Here, Carma’s offer of a golf course was not easy to ignore. Finally, the fact that development often ran ahead of detailed planning information was a recurring reason for ill-informed decisions. Existing sector plans were obsolete by 1967 and were subject to revision in the late 1960s, while design briefs were not yet available. The density transfer issue, however, remains problematic and beyond explanation.

Possibly the fiasco over density transfer to Market Mall diminished the potential for this seemingly viable tool for density adjustment generally. In that sense it is a pity that its principles were not applied differently. Rather than simply accentuate higher densities in designated areas, it would have been much better to use development control to apply it more widely throughout subdivisions. A strict application would have maintained the 22 persons per acre standard while adding green space. Was it due to market demands and the maximization of space for residential construction, to unwillingness by developers to reconfigure design briefs to accommodate small green areas, or to awareness by the City of the implications for maintenance costs? Whatever the case, it appears that density transfer represented a lost opportunity for the City and the developer to secure more widely dispersed higher densities and more open space.

By the end of this period it was obvious that multi-family development in Calgary had a long way to go with respect to consistency and long-range planning. Part of the problem had to do with the market. Planners agreed that since the developers were forced to cater to consumer demand, it was virtually impossible to predict, let alone control, the ratio and timing of construction of low as opposed to high density housing. For instance, demand for apartments escalated in the late 1960s. By the early 1970s it had swung back to single family residences, and by the end of the period, consistently rising prices had brought the market for multi-family construction back into play.

**Green Space**

It is undeniable that Calgary’s topography, with its several ravines, coulees, and watercourse valleys lends itself to the preservation of large open spaces. An examination of a current map of the city makes that point abundantly clear. Several subdivisions built in this period, such as Edgemont, Varsity Acres, Charleswood, Lakeview, Deer Ridge, and even older suburbs like Pleasant Heights and Altadore, have easy access to
large open spaces. However, some of these spaces represent undevelopable land. Others were tied into a broad green belt network pursued as a result of civic policy. A couple resulted from private bequests. In many other areas, green or open space was confined to school sites and to isolated small places where a swing or some form of constructed playground equipment stands isolated and devoid of any contextual integration with the surrounding built environment. In the 1950s it was clear that community reserves in developing subdivisions meant school sites and little else. Unfortunately, even given a growing awareness of the stifling elements of the built urban form in the late 1960s and 1970s, this perception did not change. Despite the presence of beautiful large parks and man-made lakes, it is this jarring lack of small but aesthetically pleasing open spaces in Calgary's subdivisions as much as monotony of house construction or duplication in subdivision design that imparts blandness and lack of identity to the city's built suburban form.

The underlying reasons for a lack of interest in incorporating meaningful open space into subdivisions had to do with basic assumptions about reserve requirements. They were seen as the basis for density calculations though their relationship with school capacities. By the end of this period it was not uncommon to find three schools and a recreational facility located on large, consolidated reserve parcels. After allocating reserves for schools in Silver Springs, only 4.7 acres were left over for ornamental parks and tot lots over 835 developable acres. As a Planning Report noted in 1973: “In the City of Calgary at the present time the total 10 percent dedication is being completely absorbed within the subdivision for school sites and tot lots.” Second, the concept of the 10 percent reserve was viewed purely in utilitarian terms. It was simply an obligation that had to be fulfilled. One indication for lost potential could be seen in the provincial Planning Act of 1970, which changed the 10 percent from a minimum to a maximum. As a result reserves became subject to negotiations that arguably begged their intent. Since reserves were applied over an entire design brief, equitability was sacrificed in certain subdivisions. The first phase in Midnapore received only half of its reserve entitlement. The City and developers argued over whether or not the green buffer strips often used near interchanges, thoroughfares, or between different land use areas should be used to calculate reserve requirements. In fact a suggestion was made to transfer industrial reserves to main thoroughfares to make them look more attractive. A similar debate occurred over the 60-foot strip on the top of escarpments. Generally the developers lost the former battle but won the latter. Finally, since reserve
entitlement only covered land that had been subdivided, this presented problems in multi-density redevelopments not subject to subdivision.

Negotiations between the City and developers also resulted in under-dedication of reserves. In spite of the fact that Calgary Suburban Developments was below its reserve requirement by 7.85 percent in North Haven, the Planning Commission gave its approval, noting that the developer was well over the 30 percent required for streets and roads.108 Three Southwood developers in 1967 secured permission to reduce their reserve allocations and to apply the land to interchange requirements.109 Developers used density changes to plead for reserve reductions. For example, in 1972 BACM requested that its reserve commitment be lowered, arguing that its actions in changing uncommitted land in Oakridge from 30.1 to 18.3 persons per acre were “consistent with this company’s objectives and with the prevailing trends in the Calgary housing market.”110

A major factor impacting the deficiency of open space in residential areas was the policy of allowing what was called in lieu payments instead of reserves. The practice began in 1964 when the Provincial Planning Board ruled that the City could accept payment in place of reserves under certain conditions, with the intent being that the City would use the money to buy the balance, ostensibly within the subdivision.111 Quality Construction agreed to pay cash in lieu of reserves on a town house project on Richmond Road.112 The City secured land from Burns Ranches free of charge to build the Fish Creek sewage treatment plant on the condition that the land would be used to offset reserve requirements in subsequent industrial subdivisions.113 Instead of working out where additional reserves might be placed on 780 acres in Willow Park, Kelwood and the City simply exchanged cash for an over-dedication of roads and an under-dedication of reserves.114 By 1971 reserve allocations in 19 communities had been impacted by in lieu payments.115

The problem was that as late as 1972 no compensatory expenditure from these in lieu payments had occurred. By the end of 1971 the City had accumulated over $300,000 from residential subdivisions and a lot more if payments from industrial areas were considered. To quote Commissioner Denis Cole: “It is conceivable that there is over $1 million allocated for parkland acquisition but in respect of which no action has been taken.” The negative effects of failing to honour the intent of the in lieu policy were reflected in the two communities most penalized.116 Both Southwood and Acadia had earlier registered their displeasure with their plight. In 1968, the Southwood Community Association complained to the City about what it perceived as “a complete lack of green areas.”117
The under-dedication of reserves in Acadia and Fairview had also been noted a few months earlier by the Acadia Community Association in a strong letter to City Council. Furthermore, the relevant departments seemed indifferent. According to a 1972 interdepartmental correspondence from recently appointed Commissioner Denis Cole, he had had no success in securing the information he needed to address the issue. Furthermore, remediation did not solve the problems of green spaces within subdivisions. In spite of the subsequent inquiry, policy changes and expenditures, the affected communities, being largely built-up, stood little chance of benefiting unless the City had set aside land for a school, which still meant a predominantly built-form site. The bulk of the money went towards land purchases for major park purposes throughout the city.

These above points are not to suggest that in lieu payments and reserve deficiencies were the norm for Calgary subdivisions. They were not. Nor can developers be accused of consistently trying to evade their obligations. Indeed, over-dedication did occur, as witness BACM in Marlborough East and Kelwood in Parkland and Canyon Meadows. The point here concerns the place of small open spaces in new subdivisions. In this context, the statement by E. Rashleigh seems particularly apt. In general reference to the monotony of suburban design, he noted: “This low line of houses is occasionally broken by a square of park but rarely by more imaginatively planned open space designed to contrast with the street.” In short, intent to vary subdivisions through the judicious placement of open space was not a consideration either by the City or the developers.

On a final note, there is the matter of unused but developable open space generally. As was demonstrated in the issue over Nose Hill, the City had little abiding interest in preserving open space in its natural state, and even less if it was deemed developable. An excellent example was the tangled open space area between Glenmore Lake and the 14th Street expressway. Efforts to rezone the area for commercial activity had dated from the early 1960s. All had failed. When the area was designated for potential residential development in the Glenmore Design Brief (1973), the way was cleared for a more concerted effort to develop the area. In June 1976, Campeau Corporation proposed a comprehensive medium density development on 38 acres consisting of two apartment towers containing 72 suites each and 509 town houses. Not dissuaded by City Council’s rejection on July 5, Campeau waited the obligatory six months and, after negotiating some areas of contention with the City, reapplied on February 23, 1977. In the meantime seven surrounding communities
formed the Grant MacEwan Park Association and campaigned to have the City buy the area for a natural park.

For the purposes of this discussion the point is not so much that the Planning Commission approved the project on the grounds that it met the requisite guidelines for multi-density development, or that it dismissed community objections with the curious and indefensible statement that “these same arguments are offered to every multi-family development proposal in the city.” It was rather the absence of any official sense of obligation to preserve lakeshore property on the city’s only publicly owned body of water. The Parks and Recreation Department had no objection, stating that “there is a large amount of park around the Glenmore Reservoir.” In fact in 1967 it had argued that the area’s contribution to the Glenmore Parks system “must be of the lowest priority.” Even the original intent had been to satisfy reserve requirements through in lieu payments. As for the Planning Department, it behaved politically and sought refuge behind the General Plan of 1973, which had not included the site in its parks system projections. It also deferred to the design brief as though it were an act of God. Fortunately, sustained citizen opposition ultimately doomed the project. Instead, the commercial centre of Glenmore Landing was located a short distance to the south, leaving a still-existing wild natural area where the apartments would have been.

Environmental matters were not treated with the sensitivity they warranted. In 1976 the Planning Commission gave its approval to a BACM proposal to raise the Bow River flood plain to enable the development of a subdivision in the Queensland Downs area. Though reviews found that the river channel and flow would not be affected, a 1974 report had recommended that future development within the reaches of the river should take the form of open recreational space. It is to be noted that in approving the project the Planning Commission stressed that it “would not constitute a precedent for similar developments.” Yet at the same time the Planning Commission approved an outline plan that also required some elevation for the development of 24 large lots near the Bow River in Bowness. In recommending that the 15 acres be retained as a natural park, J.D. Hodges, president of the Bowness Community Association, referred to the findings of three earlier reports, and further noted that the proposal was an example of “uninformed, inappropriate and unsound planning practices.” That the ecological integrity of unused land was of low priority was also exemplified in 1973 when the Planning Commission recommended against spending an additional $132,000 so that utilities installations could bypass what was admitted
to be an ecologically sensitive area.\(^\text{126}\) In spite of a strong recommendation to spend $48,000 to replace the trees cut down to widen MacLeod Trail in 1974, nothing was done.

The Developers and Low Cost Housing

As in the late 1950s, the City's approach to the growing problem of low cost housing was tentative and linked primarily to the availability of higher government funding. When these monies became available in the early 1970s, the developers and the City worked co-operatively to address the problem. By the end of the period, however, a change in tactics was evident. In attempting to force low cost housing requirements into the developer agreements, the City reverted to a tried and tested method. Not surprisingly, it was strenuously resisted.

The developers continued to promote low cost housing with more enthusiasm than forethought. Carma's proposal for a low cost subdivision in 1967 is an excellent case in point. In October 1967, the City received an application from Carma for what it termed a "no frills" subdivision in north Vista Heights. The proposal involved smaller lots, increased densities, and some consideration for reduced amenities. The application

<table>
<thead>
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<th>TABLE 7</th>
<th>Assisted Housing Units to 1975</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Limited Dividend</strong></td>
<td><strong>Public Housing</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>1950s</td>
<td>806</td>
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<tr>
<td>1965-1965</td>
<td>348</td>
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<tr>
<td>1967-1967</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1968</td>
<td>120</td>
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<td>1969</td>
<td>450</td>
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<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>363</td>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>1,144</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
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<td>1973</td>
<td>360</td>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>248</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>3,946</td>
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Source: Planning and Building Department, Social Housing Policy
was rejected on the grounds that it undermined a belief in the protection of property values and was “a step in producing a retrograde residential area.”\textsuperscript{127} It was a lost opportunity in which both Carma and the City shared the blame. Had Carma chosen a different location, it might have been more successful. North Vista Heights, being too close to the airport, was scarcely a site with which to woo the sceptics at City Hall. The City’s predictable and dismissive response translated into a lost opportunity to work co-operatively with an innovative and buyer-sensitive developer to address the issue of affordable housing in another area of the city. In fact the City was as uncomfortable in 1967 as it was in the late 1950s with any suggestion to reduce home costs by relaxing standards.\textsuperscript{128}

So why did the City change its attitude in 1969 towards developers and low cost housing? Three reasons seem probable. The availability of federal monies for public housing was one. The second was the formation of the Alberta Housing Corporation (A.H.C.) in 1967 and its interest in promoting low cost housing through a policy of relaxed building standards. The third was a pending specific federal initiative which set aside $200 million for experimental housing projects. The result was the first example of civic leadership and developer involvement in the provision of low cost housing.

Relaxation in standards took several forms and variations, including reduced street and right of way widths and bases, modified sidewalks and curbs, narrower boulevards, shallower sanitary sewer slopes, and single service sewer connections. The most significant and enduring modification, however, was the reduced lot frontage. The developers were quick to take advantage. Typical was BACM, which argued in 1970 that while it was already supplying the cheapest serviced land in the city at $73 per frontage foot in Marlborough, it could not go lower and still build to City standards. In asking for lot frontage reductions from 50 to 40 feet, BACM claimed that it would result in a 900-square-foot home at a savings of $1,900. Mortgage qualifications would be $82 less and monthly payments reduced by $26.50.\textsuperscript{129} The provision for reduced frontages within certain areas of subdivisions marked the first integration of higher densities in detached housing since the 1930s when R2 zoning usually meant basement suites. It also encouraged the developers, who soon saw the attendant advantage in reducing lot frontages in more expensive areas. Not surprisingly, lots with 40-foot frontages became standard in late 1975. In this context it could be argued that the measures taken to reduce lot frontages to enable lower cost housing in the early 1970s sealed the fate of the suburban bungalow.
Though the developers had long clamoured for the right to develop cheaper traditional detached housing as opposed to apartment or public complexes, it was the City that provided the leadership in innovation through a pilot project in West Dover. In July 1969 several officials visited Winnipeg to see the subdivision of Wildwood Park, one of the few adaptations of Clarence Stein and Henry Wright’s 1928 innovative suburb of Radburn in Fair Lawn, New Jersey. They were impressed by elements of the Radburn design that saw blocks of houses facing each other across a common walkway connected by paths to recreation areas and accessed by vehicles through road-width lanes at the rear. The walkway spine was strongly recommended to Council, and after assembling and servicing land in a subdivision in West Dover, the City sold lots on a 40-foot frontage to interested developers at cost. The new design afforded significant cost savings as well as allowing more seclusion and safety for young children.

The innovative housing concept became a reality in 1970 when the federal government set aside $200 million for experimental housing. Under an amendment to the Provincial Planning Act, a municipality could apply to have land within the city designated as an experimental housing area for low cost housing in order to qualify for long-term subsidized interest financing from both the federal and provincial governments. By April 1970, nine developers had submitted applications for over a dozen experimental areas designed for annual income earners of less than $5,000 a year. Many more were at the processing stage. However, despite this great optimism, only four projects were approved, and in September 1970, the C.M.H.C. informed the City that no further monies were available.

Yet by most yardsticks the experimental housing projects were highly successful. Of the 1,033 units constructed, the majority went to owners, not renters. Developers had some freedom of design but were still subject to the usual monitoring in the form of specific agreements so that no development “may differ substantially from that on which the City’s request for an order was based and in which reasonable standards for the protection of the public are not maintained.” Nu-West was commended for its project in Dover which, according to Planning Director, Mike Rogers, “appears to succeed in lowering costs without sacrificing any standards.” In early 1976, a City review found that residents in the experimental housing areas were saving $20-25 per month in mortgage payments and that with proper design the projects could be incorporated into design briefs without jeopardizing the 22 persons per acre guideline.
Earlier, a panel consisting of City officials, developers, and the C.M.H.C. conducted an evaluation of the four experimental housing projects.\textsuperscript{138} Panel members stressed their overall satisfaction with their integrity, and legitimatized their evaluation by arguing that their criteria could be applied to any development in the City. They liked the walkways, the single service utilities connections, and the dished pavements. Significantly, the panel noted the high level of resident satisfaction. In one project this figure was an astounding 95 percent.

However, the panel was also critical in certain areas. Some projects were too isolated and unrelated to the overall community plan. Green space provisions were inadequate. The panel believed that the developers were too tightly constrained both in terms of time and the range of design they were allowed. It had a point. Nu-West, for example, was very upset over the fact that it could not deal with the City until the C.M.H.C. had approved its application. According to president Ralph Scurfield, “it is absolutely necessary that a developer be able to work with the city departments prior to making application as there is no way he can finalize design or costs for submission to C.M.H.C. without doing so.”\textsuperscript{139} Though the City encouraged him to do so anyway, the fact remained that developers were forced to deal with uncertainties and possible changes.\textsuperscript{140} After describing a project in south Ogden as “one of the best we have received,” the Planning Department could not understand why City Council had demanded time-consuming and expense-added modifications.\textsuperscript{141} In calling for less City interference, Planning Director Mike Rogers observed that “the developer will more clearly identify the characteristics of the development he will be associated with for a number of years and will therefore be encouraged to seek innovations which are less likely to incur him future expenditures.”\textsuperscript{142}

The failure of the City to encourage more of these subdivisions is surprising given their reputation for resident satisfaction and resale value. Indeed, in Calgary's highly lucrative housing industry, innovation might have been an expected market response, especially from the more daring developers. Yet what happened in Calgary mirrored the North American experience, where the Radburn design exerted minimal influence. Allusion to privacy factors does not explain fully why Calgary followed the rest of North America in rejecting these innovative open space design elements. Perhaps a simple explanation lies in the fact that in Calgary, like everywhere else, the land development industry was too inherently cautious and mistrustful of change to do anything that would challenge the existing demand formula for new housing.
Aside from the experimental housing projects, the developers were involved in both the building and design of public housing projects in the period 1970–1973. However, as the most proactive of all the developers, Carma set its sights on capitalizing on available government money in other ways. Soon after the federal government announced its $200 million experimental housing program, Carma presented a proposal to the City for an entire low cost substandard subdivision north of Nose Hill outside the city limits. Innovation was to be achieved via the walkway system adopted by the City in West Dover. It was an interesting ploy geared towards securing annexation and a low cost subdivision financed in part by the federal government. In responding to the proposal, Planning Director Mike Rogers criticized Carma for violating the intent of the Experimental Housing Programme, which in his words was not “to provide an excuse for developers to abandon standards and pressure the city to waive the needs for such items as paved roads....” Rogers was also highly critical of Carma’s cost estimates, which he believed were no lower than those for Nu-West in Marlborough, where a standard subdivision was envisaged. Like its “no frills” initiative in 1967, this unsuccessful proposal by Carma evinced the “nothing ventured, nothing gained” philosophy characteristic of the land development industry during this period.

Carma took matters a step further in 1975 when it bypassed the City altogether and tried to deal directly with the Province. The corporation’s aim was to promote a low cost housing scheme in order to take advantage of the provincial government’s $300 million Starter Home program, which provided mortgage financing and preferred low interest loans for modestly priced houses up to $42,000. In May 1975 Carma President Roy Wilson wrote directly to Bill Yurko, provincial Minister of Housing and Public Works, with a proposal that “would provide the government with the advantages of ‘public land banking’ without the usual weaknesses and liabilities associated with these programs.” Essentially in return for guaranteeing the annexation of Carma’s lands in both MacEwan Glens and Scenic Acres, Wilson offered to freeze 2,000 lots a year for ten years at a discounted market value. Under a formal agreement, Carma would commit to financing, developing, and marketing the serviced lots to home builders according to a pricing formula approved by the government. Yurko’s department, however, evinced little interest, not even advising the City of the proposal. It was September before the City heard of it through a copy given to Denis Cole by Roy Wilson. Cole duly noted “the undisguised efforts to buy annexation,” and felt that involving the provincial government in municipal regulatory functions was “quite
However, Cole also believed that the proposal suggested a “germ of an idea,” and passed it on to the Planning, Land, and Engineering departments for their comments. In a joint report dated October 1975, the three departments saw merit in “the notion of providing special consideration to a developer who will voluntarily make provision for housing for lower income ranges.” However, they were not so positive about the proposal itself. It was too non-specific with respect to crucial financial details. Transportation and utilities presented prohibitive problems. The report questioned Carma’s ability to provide land cheaply enough. It also noted the fact that Carma was taking very little risk. The report concluded that while the proposal had merit, “there was not sufficient substance to make the offer irresistible [sic].”

The Province became actively involved in December when the Alberta Housing Corporation met with City officials to discuss the matter. It was clear that the issue was not the proposal itself as much as the areas involved. The City was adamant that it would not be pushed into annexation and that transportation and utilities installations made the proposal non-viable economically. While Housing Corporation officials liked the proposal and promised co-operation, they made it quite clear that the City should not feel bound. The comment was interesting since Commissioner George Cornish immediately made allusions to the greater suitability of Carma lands within the city in the northeast currently under a freeze because of sour gas issues. The meeting ended with a decision to prepare an official joint response to Carma’s proposal.

The joint report went to Carma on January 20, 1976. Couched in terse and mildly critical language, it categorically rejected Carma’s proposal primarily on the grounds detailed above. However, the report did not close the door completely. Carma was offered the opportunity to go elsewhere: “It is understood that Carma owns lands in north-east Calgary which are presently affected by the sour gas problem. The City of Calgary and the Alberta Housing Corporation would be pleased to work with Carma and other developers in this area ... to initiate a starter home project and to help remedy the sour gas problem.” It was a brilliant strategy by the City, one that reaped two benefits. Developers like Carma were induced to provide the type of affordable housing suggested by the proposal but in a location of the City’s choice. They were also enjoined to work together with the Province to redress the sour gas issue that was holding up development.

In January 1978, four developers, including Carma and Daon, agreed to assume the costs of relocating the gas well that was holding up
development in the northeast. Soon after, in return for receiving approval to develop Falconridge Phase II, Carma had to agree to construct 50 percent of all homes to conform to the Starter Home Programme. Similarly, Daon was allowed to develop part of Temple provided that 50 percent of the dwellings were marketed at below the maximum price allowed by provincial or federal assisted housing programs. A result of co-operation between the City, the Alberta Housing Corporation, and the developers, these arrangements for affordable housing were due originally to Carma’s bold proposal to the provincial government, and to the City capitalizing on its potential.

The issue of affordable housing pitted the City against the developers in late 1975. There were two dimensions to this controversy. First was a renewal of a familiar pattern by the City to force developers to assume more responsibility for the costs of development. Second, while this period saw a growing consciousness of design as a response to the ugliness and stigmatization associated with most public or social housing projects, the debate between the City and the developers in 1976 considered for the first time its potential for integrating lower cost housing in subdivisions.

As early as 1971, the importance of design had been raised by the Planning Department. In reference to the Experimental Housing Programme, City Planner Stuart Round questioned its guiding premise when he commented that “the experimental programme has relied on houses which could have been built conventionally as far as compliance with the building code is concerned. Waivers have been almost entirely confined to subdivision and city servicing standards. In other words experimentation has been on land development rather than on building form.” In 1975, the evaluative panel reached the same conclusion when it said that the appearance of over crowding was due to poor design and not high density. The huge controversy over a high density 116-unit town house complex in Huntington Hills is a case in point. Alderman Pat Donnelly called the proposed structures “boxes that no one in their right minds would accept,” and argued that “it is the poor design and not the number of town houses and apartments that has created a running battle in City Hall between developers and the Huntington Hills community.” Yet this nascent interest in design was accompanied by more uncertainty than conviction. Design innovation was approached cautiously. One developer accused City Planners of wanting “far out” designs that were too expensive and which allowed no scope for expansion or modification. A spokesman for H.U.D.A.C. offered the opinion that “to try innovative
design simply increases the length of the development process thereby falling further behind the housing demand. A 1976 C.M.H.C. study on low income multiple housing projects in Alberta headed by a University of Alberta sociologist concluded that while design in housing was important, it was not a panacea. The study found that residents were more concerned about what the design offered in practical terms rather than the design itself. Yet it was this growing awareness of the practical value of the aesthetics of design that led the City and developers to consider other and better ways by which the contentious issue of affordable housing could be approached. The release of a report on social housing provided that opportunity.

The civic report on social housing was a response to the problems of affordable housing in the mid-1970s. Released in October 1975, the Report noted the lack of activity in non-profit, rental, co-op, and public housing despite available financing from higher government levels, and attributed it in large part to the costs of land assembly. Accordingly, the Report recommended that developers be required to set aside 10 percent of their net developable land for social housing programs. Fearing the repercussions, Council ordered further consultation with the developers. Not surprisingly the U.D.I. and H.U.D.A.C. registered their strong opposition. Instead, they stressed co-operation. They recommended the use of higher government financing to integrate public housing units into subdivisions. Their inclusion should be on a random basis and their design such as to make them indistinguishable from adjacent housing. The Commissioners accepted the developers’ argument, and on March 22, 1976 City Council adopted a motion to take the matter forward by approaching the Alberta Housing Corporation and the C.M.H.C. “requesting their support for public housing on a random basis in new developments.”

Unfortunately the initiative did not go ahead as planned. Both the A.H.P and C.M.H.C. were wary of the idea and were loath to accept proposals. Only four were approved in two rounds of proposals in the fall of 1976. The A.H.P. especially did not like the idea, preferring instead to lease City-owned land and assume total responsibility for projects. Also the fact that 206 Starter Home Programme units were built in 1976, plus another 371 under the formerly little-used non-profit incentives, likely dulled the City’s will to pursue the matter further. In November 1976, City Council renewed its interest in the Social Housing Report’s initial recommendation. Over the strong objections of the U.D.I. a clause compelling developers to set aside 10 percent of their net lands for social housing was inserted into the first draft of the 1977–1978 Development Agreement.
The U.D.I. refused to back down, and following a series of meetings, the City's Operations and Development Committee recommended the deletion of the clause. The issue vanished from official interest, as evidenced in the 1979 and 1980 Development Agreements. Yet it also seems that U.D.I. pressure alone may not have been pivotal. The City did not have the legal right to compel developers to give up the 10 percent. However, according to the City Solicitor, there was nothing to prevent the City from dealing with individual developers on issues related to social housing within subdivisions. Clearly this was something the City was not prepared to do.

Discussion
The mechanisms to control growth did not function as well as intended during this period. The need to revise general plans so frequently created a state of constant flux. This situation was compounded by the length of
time involved in the preparation of design briefs and sector plans, which required extensive coordination via several departments as well as public participation. Sometimes they were virtually obsolete before they were built out. It seemed too that especially in the 1970s the increasing role of the provincial government made long-range planning a more protracted and complicated process. The developers were constrained by delays occasioned by these planning considerations and wanted speedy decisions where none was really possible given the way the City operated. In short, planning controls did little to curb the patterns of urban growth defined in the early period.

It appears also that both the City and the developers had begun to realize the merits of increasing and dispersing densities within subdivisions. It was feasible, given flexible options through development control and density transfer plus the willingness of developers to become involved. Yet nothing was done and the zoning inflexibility typical of the 1950s remained. Certainly one reason was an abiding belief in protecting property values. Another was linked to federal and provincial financing and to the difficulties with the A.H.C and the C.M.H.C. However, the popular association of increased densities with the “evils” of social housing was probably a greater factor. Aldermen especially were not prepared to disagree with their constituents who equated increased densities with a diminished quality of community life. The hybrid solution of continuing low suburban densities and complementing them with very high concentrations in peripheral areas led to bifurcation and a lack of community cohesiveness. Over a year after the integrated public housing initiative fell through, Alderman Stan Nelson, in referring to high density concentrations in Beddington, remarked that “we need to find ways of blending multi family sites into the community.”\textsuperscript{162} Two years later a Planning Department official referred to mixed density neighbourhoods as appearing to be “the type of thing we need.”\textsuperscript{163} The trouble was that in 1979, no one was really listening.

The City’s failure to further promote the experimental street and walkway alignment developed in West Dover is puzzling given its implications. According to one of the officials who saw the Winnipeg prototypes in 1969 the design had tremendous potential:

It is noteworthy that although both developments were originally designed for purchase by families with modest means, they are now largely owned by professional people including a professional planner. Furthermore the subsequent adjoining development of high priced houses on large lots were
deliberately located in close proximity to the previously built walkways which are regarded as value-enhancing factors in each neighbourhood.164

It seems that the above comment might have helped the City to persuade developers to popularize the concept in all socio-economic housing areas within the city. The failure to capitalize on this interesting design principle seems a double shame today, when a summer stroll down one of these walkways is a delightful experience and a major testament to what might have been elsewhere.

The concept of green open space was as limited in this period as it was in the 1950s. It usually meant undevelopable land converted where possible into large parks. Within subdivisions it was associated with playing fields, usually on school grounds and with the occasional tot lot. The City's refusal to apply density transfer to secure more green space or to offer other incentives for the developers must also be measured against the latter's general reluctance to contribute more than the requisite 10 percent. Both were culpable. This failure to integrate public green spaces more fully into subdivisions reflected an attitude born of the times. Homeowners had their own private green space.
Ironically, in demonstrating an affinity with green open space, the proliferation of strips of manicured front and back lawns probably made a greater statement about the private domain and urban sprawl than the houses they surrounded.

Picturesque pathway replacing street in experimental homes project in West Dover. Houses are behind the trees and facing each other across the pathway.
Conclusion

The foregoing discussion has tried to explain suburban residential urban growth primarily in terms of the relationship between the City of Calgary and the various land developers. Given the intentions of both, the resulting urban sprawl was inevitable. The first point of note is that each fostered urban sprawl for different reasons: The City favoured expanding the city's gross area because of a powerful and abiding belief in the merits of the uni-city concept. This was compounded by inflexible attitudes towards zoning. The developers sought annexations to assure land inventories and to maximize profits through ready access to easily serviced land at the lowest possible cost. Both catered to the demand for single residence construction.

The overall argument has stressed the importance of utilities in determining the pace and direction of urban growth. Utilities, it appears, played at least as big a role in the subdivision approval process as the more obvious transportation issues. In this context one wonders about the sizing factor. What were the implications of sizing for density changes within subdivisions? Did they preordain initial density patterns in that once laid, they were too expensive to modify? It seems that the whole issue of utilities installations deserves more attention, both within the context of points raised in this discussion and with respect to their complex role in the overall planning process.

Did the City err in handing over the control of suburban construction to the developers in the early 1950s? Could it and should it have continued to control the rate, direction, and priority of infrastructure construction through local improvement taxes? The City and the developers always maintained that the private sector route was cheaper, ultimately more efficient, and therefore beneficial to the homeowner. According to a City report in 1977, homeowners would not have been better off had the City undertaken the work and charged everything to local improvement.\textsuperscript{1} Evidence suggests that this opinion was correct. Certainly the City, and probably the homeowner, profited in that the private sector route was less expensive. But did the City lose more than it gained? The City abrogated the development process to the developers, who decided when and where subdivisions would be opened. Would things have been different
Conclusion

otherwise? A negative answer is suggested, especially since City Hall philosophy held that its proper role lay in planning and monitoring growth, not in actualizing it. A corollary argument concerns the overall costs of suburban growth. Regardless of acreage assessments, developer agreements, and other civic measures to wring financial concessions from developers, one wonders whether the City indirectly subsidized developers by providing facilities, amenities and utilities, and transportation infrastructure to accommodate a process that was essentially out of their control, and arguably, unnecessary.

A central point in this discussion concerned the relationship of land supply to housing costs. Even disregarding the fact that the price of a lot as a percentage of the total housing package in Calgary did not diverge markedly from other major cities, the developers' argument that house prices could be controlled only through a steadily increasing supply of land is contestable. According to Peter Spurr, any direct correlation between land supply and housing prices is far too simplistic.\(^2\) One also wonders about the assumption that new house prices set the standard for the city generally, especially given the fact that they comprised an annual addition of only about 3 percent to the overall housing stock. It appears that prices were determined by what the market would bear rather than by availability of land.\(^3\) As seen in West Thorncliffe, the relatively low cost of the land bore little relation to the price at which it was sold, and therefore the ultimate prices paid for the houses. Finally, using the developers'

### Table 8

**Comparative Housing Costs, 1968 & 1977***

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>1968</th>
<th>1977</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Raw Land per Lot</td>
<td>$1,220</td>
<td>$7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction Costs (including profit)</td>
<td>$17,200</td>
<td>$37,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Costs per Lot</td>
<td>$2,250</td>
<td>$8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous Costs and Development Profit</td>
<td>$343</td>
<td>$6,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cost</td>
<td>$21,013</td>
<td>$60,050</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* 1,080 Square foot bungalow on a 50’ lot

own rationale, it must be concluded that there was an upward limit beyond which people simply could not buy. Any policy of restrictive growth therefore could drive land prices up by only so much. In this situation developers probably would have maximized profits by releasing their diminished inventories more slowly. However, this could be a staying measure only, and in order to stay in business, they would have had to turn to modifications in density and design. However, the City lacked the will to test the developers’ arguments about the relation of land availability to housing prices. This allowed them to continue to promote the single family residence as a way of life, and, as a consequence, the necessity of the ever-expanding corporate suburb. The City’s major error in the land supply debate lay not so much in an unwillingness to combat expansion-hungry developers but in its acceptance of their arguments. There was thus no give and take dialogue between the two over how the city should grow.

The City inadvertently fostered outward growth by its reluctance to speed up the decision-making process. Annexation resulted in part from the temporary unavailability of developable land within the city. Large areas of land were withheld from development pending decisions on road alignments, utilities installations, and other issues. The presence of sour gas in the northeast, the ongoing debates over the future of Fish Creek and Nose Hill, and indecision over the best land use along the Barlow Trail led developers to plead the land shortage argument while at the same time securing raw land beyond the corporate limits. The City might have worked harder to secure the release of land in Strathcona and the northeast, or better still take the advice of one its planners and use development control to provide higher density housing. It did neither. Instead it took the pragmatic route and sought annexation.

The City’s failure to go into residential land banking was an error. A publicly owned land bank, judiciously managed, would have aided affordable housing policies and growth control while providing a yardstick by which private sector activity could be gauged. One has only to note the envy directed towards Edmonton which, because of its Mill Woods project, was able to offer land for social housing at below market prices. In its three opportunities to enter land banking, the City shrank before acquisition costs at current market prices. There seemed to be no awareness that they might represent future bargain values. As late as 1977 R.O. Leitch, the architect behind the City’s very successful industrial land banking program, in responding to a query about a residential land bank, noted that “we are not in it but it’s never too late.”
Rising land values thwarted efforts to meet demands for low cost housing, with the issue revolving around who would supply the land and who would administer the projects built on it. Each party wanted the other to provide cheap land in order to maximize the benefits under federal and provincial social housing program. Both refused. The City felt that some relaxation of building standards was as far as it could go. The developers believed that the best alternative to cheap land was for the City to act as a clearinghouse by diverting all government monies to them, since they were the best equipped to meet the demand for affordable housing. According to Clarence Semrau, Vice President of H.U.D.A.C. in Calgary, “the City’s role should be to provide the correct environment so the private sector can respond to the social housing needs. We believe that industry can do the job more efficiently than the City if given the same opportunities, conditions, subsidies etc that are at the City’s disposal.”

This impasse was evidenced in the failure of the City and the developers to persist with workable solutions in the absence of federal and provincial financial assistance. For example, once A.H.P. and the C.M.H.C. financing was not forthcoming, both the City and the developers lost interest in integrating lower cost housing into overall subdivision design.

Zoning emerges in this study in terms of controls rather than as a progressive instrument to manage growth imaginatively despite the flexibility afforded by development control. The options provided under development control were under-utilized. Moreover, there were few incentives for experimentation or compensation for risk taking. The Faculty of Environmental Design articulated the City’s lack of leadership in influencing the way Calgary grew when it noted that “government is content to see the private sector remain responsible for basic decisions governing the character of urban growth.” Along with annexation, the City’s failure to capitalize on zoning options was a primary reason behind the unchecked urban sprawl in Calgary during this period.

Several observations can be made about the relationship between the City and the developers during the period covered by this study. Though their formal relationship seemed proper enough there is evidence to suggest that behind-the-scenes animosities were commonplace. This is not surprising and to be expected. And certainly while there were instances where the City seemed to yield to developer influence on a general basis, the prevalence of unbridled palm greasing and collusion is certainly not substantiated in the evidence available. In terms of what each thought of the other, a couple of consistencies are suggested. The City saw the developers as grasping, sometimes overbearing, and ignorant of inherent
practical and political complexities. To the developers, the City was primarily interested in squeezing as much money as they could while cluttering the approval process with bureaucratic red tape. Both tended to shift the blame for the rising cost of housing onto the other. Yet because they had to work together, there existed a grudging respect for each other’s professionalism.

It does not appear that developers reaped inordinate profits compared to industry generally or with their counterparts in other cities, certainly not before 1975, and even after that it is difficult to measure given rising inflation and carrying costs. Calgary’s housing costs did not vary significantly from the rest of the country. For almost this entire period, Calgary compared very favourably with other Canadian cities. As late as 1972, Calgary ranked 15th out of the 22 largest Canadian cities in terms of new house prices. Even after 1974, when Calgary land and housing prices rose markedly, they were still behind Toronto, Vancouver, Ottawa, and Victoria. While monopoly presence was an issue, especially in the 1970s, it was never associated with price collusion.
Since it lacked both the right and the mandate, the City showed virtually no interest in encouraging variety in subdivision design. This was unfortunate, for despite the developers’ claim that they followed a variety of building designs, Calgary’s subdivisions were monotonous and bland. Developers defended their profit-driven practice based on the mass production principle by indicating the absence of customer dissatisfaction and the ready resale values for all designs. Instead, they sought other areas to stress their individuality. For example, Kelwood had the lakes; Melcor became adept in building on sloped land, while Qualico focused on pre-fabrication design. In the final analysis the City was probably wise in not wasting energy or time in trying to encourage more diversity in subdivision design. The developers had realized from the outset in the 1950s that it was the idea of “one’s own house” which counted, and while the location might matter somewhat, the design was a minor consideration. Faced with financial limitations, the vast majority of potential homeowners settled for house over design. Some even accepted the persuasive sales pitch that the flat roofs, the stucco siding and the squat anonymity of the bungalow meant cheaper maintenance, easy add-on potential, and most of all equal opportunity in the resale market.

Finally, the relationship between the developers and the City can be seen as a power struggle. One may be excused for wondering why, since the City held all the ultimate decision-making authority. In theory and often in practice the developers filled the compliance role. Yet, the developers succeeded in achieving a much more balanced power relationship than that suggested by their secondary status. Some would argue that the reason lay in co-option through money and collusion, and doubtless this was true in isolated cases. However, evidence seems to suggest that the developers’ growing power was related to the inability of the City to combat them on a united front. The developers’ focused approach to City Hall was based on clear profit-driven criteria and market indicators, and in the long run was a great equalizer when faced with a multi-layered decision-making process involving executive and political components. As was indicated in the Introduction, theoretical power generally does not translate into equal efficacy in practice, especially one subject to a bureaucratized chain of command.

By 1978 the City was dealing with a new Planning Act. Six years in the making, the Planning Act of 1977 helped the City by removing specifications in general plans, by allowing a very loose Land Use Bylaw, and by extending legal force to design briefs (Area Restructure Plans). However, it also weakened the City’s powers to deal with the development process.
For example, provisions in the section pertaining to “Money in lieu of Reserves” placed heavy financial constraints on the City with respect to land purchases, appraisals, and its ability to provide adequate parkland in new communities. The subdivision process was made far more lengthy and complex. Most significantly, the Province seemed determined to insinuate itself into City policymaking. It weakened the City’s autonomy with respect to replotting schemes, claimed the right to control development in any area impacting the welfare of any person or property,” and reserved the power to establish “special planning areas” under its control where and when it saw fit. While the offsite levy was continued, the Province reserved the right to set a maximum. Then a year later the City was again hit hard by two decisions, one by the Supreme Court and the other by the Provincial Planning Board. Hailed by the U.D.I. as “milestones for the development industry,” the first prohibited the City from acquiring more land than sufficient for public roads and utilities from developers without compensation. The second established that developers did not have to sell additional land to the City at set or arbitrary rates.

A final note concerns the philosophical underpinnings about the ideal city during this period. Certainly a belief in the modern city as opposed to earlier forms was evidenced by infrastructure to support the automobile. An adherence to the Garden City ideal typical of the period was expressed in the cultivation of the private domain, mainly through the single family detached dwelling. Best articulated in the General Plan of 1963, a mutual belief in the efficacy of these two principles bound the developers and the City in a common quest.

As the late 1970s unfolded there was no slowing down in Calgary’s suburban development. Potential homeowners still wanted their quarter-acre as much as they did in the 1950s. The developers and the City were only too willing to accommodate them. There were few laments. Though housing affordability had become a bigger issue, it was not enough to slow the momentum. Developer profits were at an all-time high, as were local taxation revenues. Though increasingly beleaguered by provincial constraints, City policymakers had their sights set on big city status and the growth statistics that went with it. A silent and very real casualty was the land. Much of Calgary’s suburban domain that sprawled like a malignancy across the river valleys and prairie was being built on chernozemic black soil, the best in the world. In 1978, few understood. Fewer cared.
Chapter 1

1 Fred C. Lowes was Calgary’s most important real estate entrepreneur in the boom years 1909–1912. His work in Roxborough and his aims for the Britannia area stamped him as the city’s first developer. It would have been interesting to see how he would have developed and completed these subdivisions had he not gone bankrupt. For more details on Lowes, see Max Foran, “Fred Lowes: Booster Extraordinaire,” *Alberta History* 37:2 (1989).


6 Quoted in Donald Miller, “Local Innovations in Controlling Sprawl: Experiences With Several Approaches in the Seattle Urban Region,” in Richardson and Chang-Hee Christian Bae, 256.

7 This statistic is for broad general purposes only, since well over half this area would be taken up by infrastructure, green space, industrial, and commercial areas etc. However, residential density during this entire period was well under 20 persons per acre. This will be discussed much more fully later on in the narrative.

8 City of Calgary Archives (CCA), RG 24 Land Department Files, Box 23, file folder 193.


16 Ibid., 347.
20 Ibid., 27, 35, 295.
31 In the matter of an inquiry into certain matters connected with the good government of the City of Calgary under Section 728 of the Said (City) Act. Report of His Honour Judge L. Sherman Turcotte, July 27, 1959 (Turcotte Inquiry).
34 Two examples would be “Community Aspirations, Territorial Justice and the Metropolitan Form in Calgary and Edmonton,” in Guy M. Robinson, ed., *A Social Geography of Canada* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 1991), 245–55; D.G. Harasym,


38 I offer as an example the popular reaction by most laymen (and some academics) on hearing of this study. What salacious stories am I going to tell? Am I going to go after those “bad guys”? etc.


40 It is ironic that the party most penalized financially by rising house prices and taxes during this entire period should be touted so often and so loudly by the both the City and the developers as the ultimate arbiter. Unfortunately, buyer awareness of this powerful status was not so manifest.

41 This is one the central points made by Peter Spurr, who argues that the entire housing market must be considered here, not just the price of new houses.


43 *Statutes of Alberta, 1951*, Chapter 9, An Act Respecting Cities. “The City Act.” Assented to April 7, 1951. Debenture borrowing was limited to 20 percent of total assessable ratable property.


45 McNally Commission, City of Calgary Brief, December 1954, 19.

46 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 65, file folder, “Metropolitan Commission, 1954–58.”

47 “Predict Grant Increases in Calgary’s Indebtedness,” *The Albertan* (Calgary), January 22, 1955.

48 See John McLeod’s statements in Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 83, file folder “Land Development Policy, 1957–1959,” Minutes of Land Development Meeting, November 28, 1957. Ten years later, the Urban Development Institute attributed the housing shortage to the inability of thousands of potential buyers to secure a mortgage.

49 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 74, file folder H1, “Housing General 1952.” The quote is attributed to David D. Mansur, President of the C.M.H.C., in a
correspondence from H. W. Hignett, Supervisor, Prairie Region to Max Seigler, a potential investor in Calgary real estate, November 15, 1951.

50 Wetherell and Kmet, 256.

51 CCA, Technical Planning Board, Box 1, file folder 8, Minutes of Meeting, December 18, 1957.

52 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 9, January 22, 1958.

53 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 14, correspondence dated July 22, 1959.

54 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 5, March 14, 1956.


56 CCA, Calgary Planning Commission, Box 2, file folder 16, Minutes of Meeting, February 13, 1967.


58 James Lightbody, “Council Multiplicity and the Costs of Government in Canadian Metropolitan Areas,” Canadian Journal of Urban Research 7:1 (June 1998), 27–46. Lightbody argues that it cost Calgary $5.01 per capita less to govern than Edmonton and that Calgary’s core city was cheaper to run than Edmonton’s by 10 percent (p. 39).

59 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 189, file folder 393.

60 Masson, 174.


62 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 264, file folder “Correspondence Land Bank 1976,” memorandum from Alderman Pat Donnelly to City Council, December 4, 1975.

63 Though this issue will be dealt with in greater detail, reference should be made to CCA, Board of Commissioners Publications, Box 3, Land and Housing, “Genstar Report 1973.”

64 To give Lorimer his due, it was this group towards which his criticism was directed, and not so much the builder-developer of earlier times.


66 In Calgary, water mains and pipes carry potable water from the Glenmore and Bearspaw reservoirs. Sanitary sewers convey waste effluent to the Bonnybrook and Fish Creek sewage treatment plants and thence to the Bow River, while storm sewers take water runoff to rivers, creeks, wetlands, holding ponds, and drainage areas.

67 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 1, August 19, 1953.

68 CCA, Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 19, file folder 165, correspondence dated June 15, 1953; Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 6, November 28, 1956.

69 Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 9, file folder 165, correspondence dated June 15, 1953.
Chapter 2

1 McNally Commission Report.
2 Ibid, Chapter 4, 8.
3 CCA, City Council Minutes, June 30, 1943.
4 City Council Minutes, December 5, 1945.
5 City Council Minutes, July 16, 1941.
6 Ibid.
7 City Council Minutes, March 29, 1944.
8 Abstracted from CCA, City Land and Housing Department, Box 3, file folder 3.1.
9 Ibid.
10 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 23, file folder 192.
11 Turcotte Inquiry, 23–25.
12 City Land and Housing Department, Box 3, file folder 31, correspondence dated March 4, 1950.
13 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 169, file folder 25, correspondence dated September 16, 1953.
14 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 89, file folder 293. Total charges were about $24.00 per frontage foot or $1,200 per year for a 50-foot lot. Homeowners paid about $2.00 per frontage foot per year. To take sanitary sewers as an example, the total charge was $3.45 per frontage foot or $172.50 amortized over 15 years. Homeowners paid an annual charge of 23 cents per frontage foot or $11.50 on a 50-foot lot. The only amortization period over 10 years was for residential paving and sanitary sewers (15 years). The homeowner’s share was over half, usually between 60 and 70 percent.
15 Technical Planning Board Minutes, December 17, 1952.
16 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series III, Box 35, file folder 325.
17 Technical Planning Board Minutes, December 8, 1954. Specifications were for a 6,000 square foot lot on a 50-foot frontage and 120-foot depth.
18 Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 19, file folder 168, Engineer’s statement, January 6, 1953.
19 Statistics abstracted from City of Calgary General Plan, 1961, “A Preliminary Draft.”
20 City Commissioners Papers, Series III, Box 25, file folder 129, Calgary House Builders Association, presentation to Calgary City Council, October 15, 1951.
21 Planning and Building Department, Box 4666, file folder, “First General Plan, 1961–65.”
22 Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 19, file folder 165; Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 83, file folder, “Land No. 1, 1952–1957.”
23 These statistics are contained in the City’s Brief to the McNally Commission Report, December 1954.
25 Technical Planning Board Minutes, November 22, 1952.

27 Lot prices of $1,000 led to only three sales.

28 “There Must Be a Better Way Than This,” Calgary Herald, August 22, 1953.


30 City Council Minutes, July 26, 1954.


32 Planning and Building Department, Box 4666, file folder, “First General Plan, 1961–65.”


34 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 83, file folder “Land Development Policy, 1957–59.”

35 Incorporated May 1, 1953, No 15936.

36 Calgary Herald, September 2, 1953.

37 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 2, August 19, 1953; “New Subdivision Up for Approval,” The Albertan, August 29, 1953; City Council Minutes, August 31, 1953; “Cushing Bridge Passes First By Law Reading,” Calgary Herald, September 1, 1953.

38 Haddin, Davis and Brown unsuccessfully sought financing from the Royal Bank and had also approached Seattle First National Bank in Spokane. The money was ultimately raised by the members of Kelwood following its formation.

39 The land in question was owned by the uncle of prominent building contractor and founding member of Kelwood, Bill Jager.

40 According to Ed Davis, the name Kelwood was chosen by Ellis Keith’s lawyer, Ken Dixon of the law firm of McLeod Dixon. Ed Davis is an interesting figure with extensive involvement in the development industry and with the City. A graduate in Civil Engineering from the University of Alberta, Davis was President of Kelwood from its inception in late 1953 to 1963. He was also President of Haddin, Davis and Brown from 1950 to 1964, and later was President of Athabasca Tower Ltd (1965–93) and Eau Claire Estates Ltd (1963–73). He served on the City of Calgary Thoroughfare Committee in 1957–58, and was Chair of the Calgary Transit Commission from 1961 to 1963. As of this writing, Davis is President of Systems Investments Ltd.

41 Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 27, file folder 225, correspondence dated July 22, 1954.

42 Keith warrants more serious study. His name is spoken with reverence by former employees and competitors alike, and certainly his contribution to the early Calgary building industry is substantial. A larger than life character in his own right, Keith elicited respect and affection from those with whom he worked. Stories abound about him. He loved to gamble, and his visits to Las Vegas were fuel for anecdotes. He was also a stickler for propriety. He was always known by his employees as Mr Keith. Every employee had to have a haircut from a barber who visited the office every three weeks.
It is interesting that, according to Ed Davis, Keith originally was not interested in land development but saw himself as primarily a builder. Not long after the formation of Kelwood, he offered to sell his stake in the company to prominent businessman Harry Cohen. Cohen refused, but later told Davis that it was one of the worst business decisions he had ever made.

Kelwood Corporation Limited incorporated November 12, 1953.

Interview with John C. McLeod, Manager and later owner of Spyhill Development and Holding Company, Calgary, November 1, 2006. McLeod, who would have turned 100 in March 2007, died not long after this interview, but on the day we spoke he was incredibly bright and alert, and blessed with a phenomenal memory for facts and details. I will always cherish the memory of our conversation that day.

According to McLeod, the City assisted in the development through survey work.

Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 189, file folder 393, Commissioners’ Office to John McLeod, May 21, 1954.

McLeod Interview.


Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 2, September 28, 1953.

Ibid.

Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 27, file folder 226, F.A. Howie to Ivor Strong, January 12, 1954.

Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 27, file folder 226, E.H. Davis to Ivor Strong, January 18, 1954.

*Alberta Gazette*, September 30, 1954. Order Number 15820, file number C110-14. The original effective date was December 30, 1954, but was later changed to December 30, 1953. See *Alberta Gazette*, November 15, 1954.

*Alberta Gazette*, September 30, 1954. Order Number 15833, File Number C110-G. Areas included in this annexation were part of Wildwood, Rosscarrock, Glendale, the Richmond area, and Glamorgan.


Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 189, file folder 393, L. E. Wade, Glencoe Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. to Ivor Strong, September 15, 1954.

Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 27, file folder 225, correspondence dated September 16, 1954.


Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 21, file folder “Annexations 1977,” Sykes was speaking to the Housing and Urban Development Association of Calgary, April 6, 1977.

Houses were to be a minimum of 1,400 square feet.

*Calgary Herald*, September 1, 1953.
Chapter 3

1 In addition to McNally the Commissioners included G.M. Blackstock QC, retired chairman of the Board of Public Utilities, Ivan Robison, Calgary realtor, Percy G. Davies QC, lawyer and former MP from Athabasca, and Charles Patrick Hayes, President of the Alberta Association of Municipal Districts.

2 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 89, “Metropolitan Commission, 1954–1958,” “Summary of Submission to be made to the Royal Commission on the Metropolitan Development of Calgary and Edmonton.”


5 A newsletter from the Office of the Aldermen in March 2003 quoted, “The Royal Commission on Metropolitan Development of Edmonton and Calgary, or the McNally Report—1956 has long been viewed as the definitive argument for UniCity.” See http://content.calgary.ca/CCA/City+Hall/Municipal+Gov

6 Bowness also had a beautiful natural park which afforded fine recreational attractions, including a fine natural swimming pool which became a prime winter outdoor skating rink.

7 CCA, RG 1, #1162, Box 240, “Report on Land Uses Within the City of Calgary,” May 1956.

8 Zoning Bylaw 4916 came into effect on June 20, 1958.

9 City Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 42, file folder 357, correspondence dated March 2, 1956.

10 Statutes of Alberta, 1956, Bill 77, Metropolitan Interim Development Act, Section 5(5).

11 Ibid.

12 For example, see Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 187, file folder 361, Art Sullivan to Technical Planning Board, February 20, 1956.

13 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 187, file folder 361, Ivor Strong to Ivan Robison, January 5, 1956. For further negotiations respecting these annexations see Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 89, file folder “Metropolitan Commission, 1954–1958,” Ivor Strong to Ivan Robison, October 3, 1955.


15 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 187, file folder 361.


18 Alberta Gazette, June 15 1957 Decision: June 4, 1957. Effective December 29, 1956. The Application was granted in part on August 31 under Order no 18401, then adjourned to hear certain problems with municipality of Rocky View. New hearings were held on March 13, 1957.

19 “Strong Opposition Developing Towards Midnapore Annexation Plan,” Calgary Herald, November 21, 1958. Haysboro was bought for around $700 an acre, while the Earl of Egmont's property (now Willow Park) was purchased for $1,017 an acre.

20 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 187, file folder 361, B.L. Gienow to Mayor Don Mackay, November 12, 1955.


23 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 65, “Metropolitan Commission, 1954–1958,” correspondence dated September 11, 1958. In its presentation to the Board of Public Utilities in September 1961, the City quoted population projections to buttress its case for large-scale annexations. The figure given was a “conservative” 420,000 by 1974. It wasn’t far off. Census figures for that year were 433,389.

24 Planning and Building Department, Series IV, Box 1690, P.J. Smith, “A Study of Calgary’s Past and Probable Future Population Growth,” prepared for City of Calgary Planning Department, December 1959, 3. Interestingly, City figures prepared in 1957 were more accurate than Smith’s. They forecast a population of 456,462 by 1977. It was short by less than 30,000. The projections for 1966 were only 15,000 off the mark.


26 Ibid, Rennie to Aumonier March 12, 1958.


28 Board of Commissioner Papers, Series V, Box 222, file folder 6200.1 Master Plan, 1962. Between November 1959 and October 1963, 3,020 lots were developed in the north and 4,322 in the south. The gap had gradually narrowed from 30–70 to 46–54. The main growth was in the suburbs of Mayland Heights, Vista Heights, and Forest Lawn.


30 Law Department, Box 82, file folder “Submission to Public Utilities Board Concerning Annexation Application,” March 18, 1958.

31 Calgary Herald, October 9, 1958.

32 City Council Minutes, July 5, 1959. Behind the latter were Farmers and Merchants Trust Co. Ltd., Wade Construction, and Silton Developments.

33 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 18, file folder “Annexations 1974.” Landowner R.J. Burns wrote to the City on September 17, 1974 respecting the big annexation debate at the time, and noted that when annexation took place in 1961 landowners in the Fish Creek area had not gotten a “tax haven.”


36 Ibid.


38 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 150, file folder 120.3, correspondence dated April 27, 1959.

39 The bid clearly was premised on a tacit understanding reached between the City and the landowners. In its judgement, the Board of Public Utilities noted that one of the main reasons for the inclusion of the 270 acres in the annexation bid “was to honour the understanding between the City and the owner of the land.”

41 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 140, file folder 4801. The decision was handed down on June 14, 1963. LAB Order No. 813, File C-110-D. The Town had installed water sewer through a 25-year provincial loan at 3.5 percent plus sidewalks, curbs, and gutters via a provincial grant of $69,000. Interestingly, eight submissions accompanied the annexation bid. Four were against annexation.

42 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 140, file folder 4801.4. LAB Order 1429, File C-110-Q.

43 “Oversize” refers to instances where the City found it necessary for the developer to lay a pipe larger than that necessary to serve his subdivision. The City paid for the cost of the extra diameter.

44 City Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 42, file folder 357, Contract governing Thorncliffe Heights development, 1955.

45 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 175, file folder “Land and Rental, 1955,” Minutes of Land Committee Meeting, April 22, 1955.

46 City Council Minutes, February 24, 1956.

47 City Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 27, file folder 226, correspondence dated April 26, 29, 1954.


52 Ibid.

53 The financial implications of acreage assessments were realized early. In 1955, the City Engineer forecast a five-year expenditure of over $4 million on sanitary sewers alone. These costs were now to be levied against current developers as well as those who subsequently developed land in the area. For example, in 1960 developers remitted 20 percent of a $140,000 storm sewer in the north. The rest was paid by the City but charged via acreage assessments to new areas as they were developed. See City Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 42, file folder 357, City Engineer’s Report, August 22, 1955; Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 292, file folder “Development Committee Minutes, 1960–1963,” meeting dated July 17, 1960.

54 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 122, file folder “Subdivision and Development Policy, 1957.


57 Ibid., October 6, 1960.
58 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 224, file folder 6200.14, C.J. Combe to Board of Commissioners, December 30, 1960.


60 The two relevant pieces of legislations were the Town and Rural Act, Chapter 113, 1953 and the City Act, Chapter 9, 1951. The Town and Rural Act, Sections 46(c) and 74(b) referred to Council powers with respect to replotting schemes, including a special levy in Section 48(2). However, the wording was specific with respect to land within the replotting area whereas the acreage assessments were on facilities beyond the replotting area. The City Act, Sections 538, 539, and 600 referred to special taxes for utilities, but these were to be charged to local improvements. Acreage assessments were paid directly to the City by developers.

61 Ibid., V.S.G. Lewis, President U.D.I. to Commissioner John Steele, April 10, 1961. Acreage assessments per acre for areas were: Waterworks-Spyhill Pressure Zone, $186; South Glenmore System, $221; areas served by Sanitary Sewers-north of Bow River, $20; area served by Fish Creek Plant, $215; areas served by Storm Sewers-Nose Valley trunk, $250; Highwood-Thorncliffe trunk, $81; North Thorncliffe trunk, $253; Haysboro trunk, $270.

62 City Council Minutes, July 31, 1958.

63 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 122, file folder “Subdivision and Development Policy, 1957,” correspondence dated September 29, 1958.

64 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 344, file folder “Storm Sewer Report on Future Major Storm Sewer Trunks, 1961,” City Planner’s Report to City Commissioners, June 18, 1959.

65 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 150, file folder 120.3, correspondence dated March 3, 1958.

66 They were in order of subdivision acreage under contract: Kelwood 139.67, Carma 136.19, Spyhill 96.67, Clearview Developers Ltd. 43.68, Horizon Holdings 40.0, Columbia Land Development Ltd. 37.14, Vista Heights Development Ltd. 25.49, Neufeld Construction Limited15.0, Premier Land Development 13.10, D.M. Black Real Estate, 6.75, Braul and Dick Construction Ltd. 3.92, Quality Construction Ltd. 3.36, Gyulay Investments Limited 2.87. See Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 224, file folder 6200.14.


70 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box100, file folder 6D 41.


72 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 27, file folder C3, correspondence dated August 10, 18, 1955.
73 City Council Minutes, May 10, 1956; Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 82, City Land Committee Minutes, January 29, 1958.
74 City Council Minutes, February 28, 1956.
75 City Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 17, file folder 137, correspondence dated May 29, 1957.
77 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 4, file folder 143, Land Committee Minutes, January 2, 1962. Interestingly, it was later contended that the City's abandonment of University Heights had a significant impact on the subsequent pattern of residential development in the northwest. The statement is puzzling considering the nearby presence of the university, already an established fact.
78 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 4, file folder 143.
79 See Marie Morgan, From the Ground Up: A History of Carma Developers, 40th Anniversary, 1998. Carma was named for Bennett’s daughter, Carol and his wife, Margaret. In addition to Bennett, Wilson and Ross, the first board of directors included Nado Galleli, Bob Davies, Tony Usselman, Ralph Scurfeld and Joe Combe. For more information on Carma, see Goldenberg, 94–108.
80 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 82, “Land Committee #2, 1958,” Albert Bennett to Land Committee, February 24, 1958.
82 Carma’s original aim was to limit membership to 50, of which 46 were to be builders and the other four comprising consultants and subcontractors. There was a fixed limit of 500 shares, with each one-dollar share equal to $100 on a debenture basis.
83 Land Department, Box 17, file folder 133, correspondence dated March 25, 1959.
84 The Winnipeg-born Combe was the son of the Winnipeg Tribune’s financial editor. A commerce graduate from the University of Manitoba and the recipient of the Distinguished Flying Cross for service in World War II, Combe came to Calgary in 1954 where he became district manager for Texaco before joining Carma. According to his assistant, “everybody did what he asked of them – immediately.” Morgan, 8.
85 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 4, file folder 143.
86 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 12, file folder “Development Committee Meetings, 1963, April 26, 1963. According to Suburban, the City was over charging by over 25 percent.
87 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 10, May 28, 1958.
88 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 3, file folder 13, April 27, 1960.
92 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 13, April 22, 1959.
93 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 82, file folder “Westgate Development Company,” correspondence dated April 22, 1958.

94 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 4, file folder 143, Land Committee Minutes, October 4, 1960.

95 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 344, file folder “Storm Sewer Report on Future Major Storm Sewer Trunks, 1961,” correspondence dated March 1, 1961. The suggestion was rejected by the City Engineer, who pointed out that eventually upgrading would be necessary and probably more expensive.

96 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 187, file folder 361, Burns Ranches to Art Sullivan, August 2, 1955.


98 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 5, January 18, 1956.

99 Ibid., Art Sullivan and Co. to City Commissioners, February 8, 1956.

100 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 5, March 14, June 6, 1956; Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 187, file folder 361, correspondence dated February 3, 8, 9, 1956.

101 City Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 27, file folders 225, 226, correspondence dated May 19, July 19, 1954. The water was taken between 11:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m., when demands were light.

102 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 175, file folder 281, Land Committee Minutes, April 5, 1957. The City really got the better of the deal. It bought the 13 acres which the company had intended to divide into 56 lots for $40,000. The 50 lots elsewhere were going to cost the company $50,000.

103 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series III, Box 154, file folder 120.3, correspondence dated October 29, 1959.

104 Ed Davis remembers the price as $400 an acre. City records show it as $1,300.


106 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 4, file folder 143, correspondence dated April 5, 1960.

107 Ibid., September 7, November 24, 1961. The subdivision involved a 170-acre parcel east of 14th Street and north of Cambrian Heights. The three bids were: Calgary Suburban Developments Ltd, $3,630 per acre Carma, $3,352 per acre and Spyhill Servicing Company, $3,250 per acre. A day before the note to Batchelor, Carma had notified the city that it was sold out of land on the north hill and that it was looking forward to developing these parcels in the spring of 1962.

108 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 13, April 22, 1959.

109 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 12, file folder 159, Development Committee Meeting, June 7, 1963.

110 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 293, file folder “Development Committee Minutes,” July 26, 1963.


112 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 12, file folder 159, Development Committee Meeting, April 26, 1963.

113 Calgary Herald, November 21, 1957.
114 City Engineering and Environmental Services, Series III, Box 27, file folder 226, correspondence dated August 18, 1954.
115 Planning Advisory Commission, Box 1, file folder 8, April 27, 1961.
117 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 5, February 8, 1956.
118 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 6, August 8, 1956.
119 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 5, February 1, 1956.
120 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 6, August 23, 1956. Apparently, Mayfair residents did not agree and three years later began agitating for land to the west for park purposes.
121 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 6, September 12, 1956.
122 Technical Planning Board Minutes, September 19, 1956. Kelwood had apparently reduced the size of some lots by 5,000 square feet. The Technical Planning Board subsequently ordered the Corporation to construct a small playground.
123 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 15, December 16, 1959.
125 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 10, July 2, 1958.
126 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 3, file folder 16, January 27, 1960.
127 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 3, file folder 16, January 27, 1960.
128 Harasym, 168.
129 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 15, November 12, 18, 25, 1959.
130 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 13, April 15, 1959.
132 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 4, file folder, 143.
133 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 14, August 19, 1959. In fairness to Hashman his under-provision for a school site was more than offset by the developable land that he had provided elsewhere.
134 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 4, October 26, 1955. The Technical Planning Board settled for a 400-foot square of land plus a block for recreational purposes.
135 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 4, October 5, 1955.
136 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1 file folder 7, December 19, 1956.
137 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 7, January 9, 1957.
138 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 7, June 5, 1957. Meetings involving airport officials were held on January 30, May 8 and May 26. It was never made entirely clear what parts of Nose Hill were precisely impacted by airport regulations. Certainly, City Planner A.G. Martin thought that the regulations did not demand the sort of concession given by the City. The point was made that the top of the hill intersected with the accepted take-off angle of two degrees.
139 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 8, July 24, 31, 1957.
141 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 9, May 22, 1958.
142 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 9, February 12, 1958.
143 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 7, February 13, 1957, Box 3, file folder 17, May 18, 1960.
144 Calgary’s experience with formal Planning dated to 1913 with the preparation of a grand Plan by Thomas Mawson. Though this Plan was abandoned, its appearance in planning decisions through the years attests to its significance. For example, the General Plan of 1973 prefaced each of its sections with a quotation from Mawson. The first provincial legislation was the Alberta Planning Act (1913), designed to curb rampant land speculation. The Rural and Town Planning Act (1929) allowed municipalities to form Town Planning Commissions. Under J.H. Doughty-Davies, Calgary’s first Town Planning Engineer, the first Zoning Bylaw (2835) was passed in 1934. From 1939 to 1951, the City Engineer acted as the Town Planning Engineer.
145 City Council Minutes, September 4, 1951.
146 The reason for the original zoning was likely linked to the popularity of basement suites. However, provision also existed for duplexes, albeit on a fairly narrow frontage.
147 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 8, October 16, 1957. The Board referred to the disappearance of basement suites as “desirable developments” and noted that Calgary’s R2 zoning compared favourably with U.S. cities.
149 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 12, February 18, 1959.
150 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 8, October 16, 1957.
151 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 2, March 5, 1953.
152 City of Calgary General Plan Bylaw 5997, adopted September 29, 1962.
153 Law Department, Box 82, Brief by A.G. Martin to Calgary Planning Advisory Commission, February 16, 1961.
155 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 1, file folder 7, May 22, 1958.
156 In 1958 the Alberta Court of Appeal declared the Interim Development Bylaw ultra vires on the grounds that the Technical Planning Board had interpreted the term, “development” in such a way as to exceed the Minister’s authority. See Planning and Building Department, Series IV, file folder GB 3, Judgment of Justice Egbert, July 12, 1958.
157 City Council Minutes, September 28, 1953.
159 At least some aldermen were not in favour of the new street designs. In an obvious hint to consider a return to the old grid system, the Technical Planning Board was directed in January 1959 to ensure that subdivisions were laid out properly. Soon after, the Planning Department received a letter from Engineered Buildings which
was “100% behind proper professional land planning techniques and so definitely feel that any steps towards a grid system is a backward step.”

160 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 9, February 5, 1958.
161 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 3, file folder 20, November 30, December 21, 1960.
162 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 10, June 4, 1956 in referring to an apartment complex in the southwest; Box 2, file folder 9, March 5, 1958 in reference to commercial zoning on Edmonton Trail.
163 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 2, file folder 14, July 22, 1959.
164 City Land and Housing Files, Box 365, file folder 2390, Petition dated July 14, 1945; City Council Minutes May 13, 25, 1946.
165 Glenbow Archives, Calgary, Chamber of Commerce Papers, Box 6, file folder 13, correspondence to City Council and Provincial Government, March 5, 1950.
166 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 74, file folder H1, Correspondence from Mayor Don Mackay to J. S. Mills, Mayor of Saskatoon, October 27, 1952.
167 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 83, file folder “Land No.1 1952–1957,” correspondence dated November 4, 1953. For more details on the Renfrew project, see Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 105, file folder H1.
169 Board of Commissioners Papers Series IV, Box 122, file folder “Subdivision and Development Policy, 1957,” meeting between developers and City, November 25, 1958; Calgary Herald, January 2, 1958.
170 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 150, file folder 120.3, correspondence dated May 13, 1959.
171 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 2.10, reports dated February 6, 15, 23, 1961.
172 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 292, file folder “Development Committee Minutes,” meeting dated February 23, 1960.
173 Planning Advisory Commission, Box 2, file folder 10, April 2, 9, 1958; Box 1, file folder 7, correspondence dated April 17, 1958. The C.M.H.C. was concerned about rising housing prices and felt it was desirable to provide specially designated areas for low cost housing through reduced frontage. The province was amenable but placed restrictions on the number of lots in each subdivision and the number of contiguous lots. Lot depths had to be 120 feet.
174 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 4, file folder 143, Land Committee Minutes, November 17, 1960.
175 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 2.10, E.W. Boley to Mayor and Council, October 6, 1958.
176 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series IV, Box 122, file folder “Subdivision and Development Policy, 1957,” meeting between City Commissioners and Developers, November 25, 1958.
177 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 2.10, correspondence dated June 23, 1960.
178 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 2.10, E.M. George to A.G. Martin, August 10, 1960.
179 Technical Planning Board Minutes, Box 3, file folder 18, July 13, 1960.
Chapter 4

1 The author bought a house in Haysboro for $14,200 in 1965 and sold it in 1974 for $30,000.

2 *Statutes of Alberta*, Chapter 43, 1963, “An Act relating to the Planning and Regulation of the Use and Development of Land.” General Plans if adopted had to be reviewed every five years. The reserves leeway mainly concerned those in industrial areas. Payment to the City could be made in lieu of reserves but the money had to be used to purchase additional park areas. Zoning caveats allowed special control over undeveloped land. Development Control did the same thing prior to the preparation of a general plan. With the latter, the Zoning Bylaw was suspended.

3 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 21, file folder “Annexation,” “Preliminary Report on Residential Lot and Land Availability as at 27 June, 1973,” July 5, 1973; Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 302, file folder “Master Plan, 1972.” The breakdown was Single Family 40 percent, 14,730 units; duplexes 10 percent, 3,480 units; town and row housing 9 percent, 3,288 and apartments 41 percent, 15,048.

5 Calgary Region Growth Study, Report A.6, “Housing: Inventory and Demand,” Calgary Regional Planning Commission, 1975. The figures were 7,500 and 12,500.
6 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 302, file folder “Master Plan, 1972.”
7 “Housing crisis may hit cities in late March,” The Albertan, January 22, 1976.
8 No condominiums were registered in 1972 and 1973. There were 12 in 1974 totalling 590 units; 21 and 1,309 units in 1975, and in the first six months of 1976, 1,746 units. See “Lack of expertise in condo selling area of concern to HUDAC,” The Albertan, July 21, 1976.
10 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 18, file folder “Annexation 1974,” correspondence dated June 27, 1974.
11 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 2, file folder 12, March 2, 1966.
17 Described by the Financial Times of Canada as “octopus like,” Genstar Limited was originally incorporated in 1951 as Sogemines Limited a private investment company under the sponsorship of Societe Generale de Belgique. The company went public in 1955 and became Genstar in 1959. In 1972 the company controlled over 40 percent of cement manufacturing in western Canada and had a $10 million venture capital and real estate enterprise in the United States.
18 Conversation with former Mayor of Calgary, Rodney Sykes, May 22, 2007. Sykes also encouraged Melton Real Estate later Melcor to consolidate its presence in the city. The name “Daon” (1973) is an abbreviation of its predecessor company, Dawson Housing Developments Ltd.
19 J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession number 2001.004, file folder 61.06, memo from Len Fox, Manager Urban Development Division to R. Welin, City Engineer, April 30, 1976.
20 The cost of utilities between 1972 and 1976 was over $142 million; asphalt mix went from $5.85 to $15.65 a ton, and hydrant placement from $360 to $850 per unit.
21 Lorimer, 100.
22 Ibid., 99.
23 Ibid., 101–2.
25 Ibid., R. A. Nunn to V.S.G. Lewis President land Division BACM Development Corporation, June 4, 1974.
26 Basil A. Kalymon, Profits in Real Estate, the Fraser Institute, 1978.
28 J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession number 2001.004, file folder 61.06, memo from Len Fox, Manager Urban Development Division to R. Welin, City Engineer, April 30, 1976.
29 Kalymon.
Notes

30 Conversation with Morris Chornoboy, former manager and vice president with Qualico, August 7, 2006.
31 “Developers deny excessive profits,” Calgary Herald, September 3, 1976. The percentage figure given for Abbey Glen was 85, and for Daon, 88.
32 J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession number 2001.004, file folder 61.06, memo from Len Fox, Manager Urban Development Division to R. Welin, City Engineer, April 30, 1976.
33 “Housing in Calgary,” City of Calgary Background Paper No. 4, April 1976.
34 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 255, file folder, Land Inventory, 1976,” report dated February 17, 1976.
35 J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession 2001.004, file folder 58.02. correspondence dated June 23, 1975. According to Sykes, Carma’s outlay for West Thorncliffe translated into around $50 per frontage foot whereas sale prices were $345 per frontage foot. If anything Sykes was understating the latter. Prices for a 50-foot lot in West Thorncliffe ranged from $16,000 to $26,000.
37 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 264, file folder “Land Bank 1973,” correspondence dated September 7, 1973. In addition to the 7.5 percent interest rate, Carma indicated Real Estate taxes of 1.5 percent, Caretaking and Insurance 0.25 percent and 4 percent for inflation.

Chapter 5
1 City of Calgary General Plan, August 1963.
2 The Calgary Plan, A General Plan prepared on behalf of the civic administration by the City of Calgary Planning Department, May 1973, 2:3, Map 2f.
4 J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession Number 2001.004, file folder 49.11.
6 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development around the City, 1972.” correspondence dated November 29, 1972.
9 Spurr, 68.
Notes

11 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development Committee 1972,” correspondence dated March 14, 1972.
12 According to H.U.D.A.C. these policies would result in a lot shortage of 1,036 in 1973 and 3,216 in 1974.
14 “Builders join hands,” Calgary Herald, July 2, 1976. The 50 builders contributed $25,000 each and secured an option on 155 acres. The willingness to try and succeed on such a small capital base indicates the level of desperation felt by the smaller construction operations.
16 See J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession Number 2001.004, file folder 61.06.
17 The figures given for land was 17 percent and for lumber, 40 percent.
19 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 302, file folder “Master Plan, 1971.” LAB Order 5505, November 1, 1971.
20 See Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 10, file folder 59, April 12, 1972; file folder 60, April 19, 1972.
22 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 264, file folder “Land Bank 1973,” An Interim Report on the Study to Examine the Alleged Shortage of Land, the Cause of Rising Land Prices and Alternate Solutions to these Problems, June 29, 1973.
23 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 19, file folder “Annexation SB Western Realty Property Developments,” correspondence dated April 27, May 10, 16, 22, July 12, August 16, September 7, 1973; April 11, May 24, July 3, November 5, 12, 28, December 5, 1974; May 24, 1975.
24 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 19, file folder “Annexation SB Western Realty Property Developments,” correspondence dated April 27, May 10.
27 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 19, file folder “Annexation A.F. Womack,” correspondence dated February 27, 1974.
28 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 21, file folder, “Annexation,” Preliminary Report on Residential Lot and Land Availability as at 27 June, 1973,” July 5, 1973. Cole also noted that the problem was one of uneven development and believed that the best way to ensure long range orderly development via annexation was through the installation of utilities far in advance of their need.
29 Alberta Gazette, August 15, 1974. LAB Order No. 7117, File C110(A) 1, June 28, 1974. Two half sections were annexed east of MacEwan Glens in Beddington Heights under the control of Prairielands Developments Limited, and under Order No. 7118, File C110(A)-3, June 28, 1974 about three quarters of a section immediately east of
MacEwan Glens under the control of Jager Construction. Both annexations took effect on January 1, 1975.

30 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 2.10, comment by G. Heald, March 1969. Heald noted that fully serviced lots in Red Deer went for $3,500 to 4,000. In Calgary they cost $6,000 to 9,000. Heald’s comments are illuminative even taking into consideration the fact that Calgary and Red Deer were not comparable in terms of size or supply and demand for land and infrastructure.


32 Ibid., George Steber to Denis Cole, December 12, 1972.


36 Rod Sykes Fonds, Volume 10, file folder 286, Earl Snider to Rod Sykes, August 15, 1973. Snider felt that with land being taken out of circulation for land banking purposes, buyer choice was being restricted to the remaining lands. The greater competition there resulted in price increases.


39 City Council Minutes, May 13, 1974.

40 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 18, file folder “Annexations, 1974,” correspondence dated July 5, 1974.


42 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 18, file folder “Annexations, 1974,” correspondence dated June 27, 1974.

43 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 19, file folder “Annexations, 1974.” The figure given was $106 million. Utilities installations south of Fish Creek would cost $2,700 an acre, to the northwest $2,750 and to the north $3,530.


45 The reference to Sykes appears in his campaign platform. See The Albertan, October 11, 1974; also Peter Hepher, “No direction – on annexation,” The Albertan, October 3, 1974.


49 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 18, file folder “Annexations, 1974.”
50 The reference is to the smaller city of Red Deer, halfway between Calgary and Edmonton.
52 Bill Boel, “Annexation loses three to one,” *The Albertan*, October 17, 1974. The vote was 91,479 to 27,454.
58 Genstar Report.
59 Ibid.
60 The report gave figures of 37.7 percent in 1972 and 45.6 percent in 1973.
61 According to the report BACM had acquired “two large and important land parcels which are not evidenced in the public land record system.” One wonders why they would be, given the propensity to control land under options to purchase.
63 The City consulted its solicitor enquiring as to whether it had the power to take Hamilton to court over the bill. When Hamilton resigned at the end of 1974, it appears that it had nothing to do with his role in the Genstar issue. Ill health may have been the major contributing factor.
64 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 200, file folder “Genstar 1975,” Board of Commissioners Meeting April 30, 1974.
65 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 200, file folder “Genstar 1975,” A.W. Howard to Denis Cole, July 24, September 9, 1974.
67 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 200, file folder “Genstar 1975,” Rodney Sykes to Director, Investigation and Research, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, September 26, 1974.
68 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 200, file folder “Genstar 1975,” Robert J. Bertrand to Rodney Sykes, October 4, 1974.
69 City Council Minutes, September 23, 1974.
70 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 200, file folder “Genstar 1975,” Denis Cole to Mayor and Council, September 30, 1974.
71 City Council Minutes, October 3, 1974. In response to potential litigation, one alderman is reported to have said, “Let ’em sue.” Distribution of the report was probably not extensive. Copies were limited, although members of the public could buy a copy for $25.00, and one was kept at City Hall for public access.
77 “BACM blasts overstatement,” The Albertan, October 9, 1974. The report received national attention when Calgary North M.P. raised the matter in the House of Commons.
78 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 200, file folder “Genstar 1975,” Denis Cole to Ralph Scurfield, October 17, 1974.
82 “Dooley injects patronage issue,” The Albertan, October 8, 1974. Apparently one of the two chief investigators for the report had been finance chairman of Sykes’ mayoralty campaign two years earlier. The other was recognized as a Sykes supporter; Frank Dabbs, “Secret city report hints of land monopolies,” The Albertan September 27, 1974.
83 In a letter to the City Peter Spurr of the CMHC noted that inaccuracies in the report would likely make it very vulnerable to a lawsuit. Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 200, file folder “Genstar 1975,” Peter Spurr to Denis Cole, October 16, 1974.
84 Planning Advisory Committee, Box 2, file folder 46, Submission to the Alberta Land Use Forum by the City of Calgary Planning Department, February 1975.
86 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 20, file folder “Annexation General 1976,” May 12, 1976.
89 Discussed in Chapter 6.
91 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 196, file folder “General Plan 1976 January–October,” Trends in Residential Development.
Notes

94 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 20, file folder “Annexation General
1976,” City Planning Department, Review of Interim Annexation Policy.
95 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 21, file folder “Annexation–Daon
96 City Council Minutes, March 24, 1975.
97 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 19, file folder “Annexation 1975.”
Commissioner’s Report to Operations and Development Committee re Interim
Annexation Policy, May 12, 1975.
98 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 19, file folder “Annexation 1975,”
correspondence dated May 12, 1975.
99 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 19, file folder “Annexation 1975.” A
Review of the Interim Annexation Policy, City of Calgary Planning Department,
October, 1975.
100 City Planning Commission Minutes, Box 19, file folder 123, Review of Abbey Glen
101 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 21, file folder “Annexation Abbey
Glen 1976,” North Bow Community Planning Association to E. Brown, City of
102 City Planning Commission Minutes, Box 19, file folder 123, Review of Daon
103 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 19, file folder “Annexation 1975.”
104 City Council Minutes, March 7, 1977.
105 “Calgary’s Future – Decide Now: A Summary of the Alternative Strategies for
Calgary,” City of Calgary Planning Department, January 1977.
106 “Preliminary Alternative Growth Study for Calgary,” Discussion Paper No. 2, October,
Calgary,” City of Calgary Planning Department, January 1977, 12–14.
107 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 196, file folder “General Plan 1976
November-December,” Gary Reed, President to Mayor and Council, November 12,
1976.
108 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 196, file folder “General Plan 1976
November-December,” George Cornish to Gary Reed, November 22, 1976.
109 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 196, file folder “General Plan 1976
November-December,” David A. Levins to E. C. Brown, Manager, Long Range
Planning, City of Calgary Planning Department, November 18, 1976.
110 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 196, file folder “General Plan 1976
November-December,” George Steber to David A. Levins, November 29, 1976.
111 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 196, file folder “General Plan 1977
112 City Council Minutes, March 7, 1977.
113 See Denis Cole’s comments in Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 22,
file folder “Annexation. Local Authorities Board Hearing. D. Cole’s File 1978,
January 10” (hereafter cited as D. Cole’s File). Interestingly, the Balanced Annexation
Policy originally sought to minimize the annexed land as much as possible. That it
was so easily pre-empted tells its own story.
116 For some of the developers, “control” was not a factor since their subdivisions in the area were long past the planning stage and they were intent on building as soon as possible.
121 Ibid., 7.
122 Ibid., 18.
124 Giving presentations were Abbey Glen Properties Development (Genstar), Qualico Developments Ltd, Kelwood (Genstar), Carma Developers Ltd., Richfield Properties Ltd., and Nu-West Development Corporation Ltd. Others in support included Maranda Holdings Ltd., Stockhammer Holdings Ltd., Melcor Developments Ltd., and Karoll Investments.
126 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 22, file folder “Annexations 1979,” Local Authorities Board, Order No 10272, File 1(A) 25, February 20, 1978.
129 Nine thousand acres were approved in the north, 800 acres in the northwest, 5,000 acres in the south and southeast, and 1,500 acres along the eastern boundary.
133 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 22, file folder “Annexations 1979.”
was significantly reduced. The R.D.A. was abandoned and attention focused only the
TUC remained, but even then the land could be used for residual purposes.

137 Ira M. Robinson, “Trends in Provincial Land Planning, Control and Management,”
*Plan Canada*, 17:3, September–December, 1977, 172. The R.D.A. which was one of
five established in the province encompassed 343 square miles and contained
approximately 3,350 parcels of land held by 2,800 owners.

138 J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession Number 2001.004, file folder 61.01, memo from
Sykes to City Council, August 18, 1976.

139 This included 5,000 acres controlled by Daon, 1800 by Abbey Glen, 700 by Kelwood
and almost all of Nu-West’s 2,500 acres. See “Green Belt” did close,” *Calgary Herald*,
December 1, 1976.

140 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 20, “Annexations 1976,” George

141 Pat Tivy, “Expansion plan ripped by reform party leader,” *Calgary Herald*, May 13,
1978.

142 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 20, “Annexations 1976,” Alderman
Pat Donnelly to Dick Johnston, Minister of Municipal Affairs, June 14, 1976.

143 City Council Minutes, June 28, 1976. Cole advised the Land Department to do
nothing. He believed that the time to act was subsequent to annexation and upon
a definite commitment by Council to a land banking scheme.


145 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 264, file folder “Land Bank 1976,”
George Cornish to Pat Donnelly, November 13, 1975.


Chapter 6

1 See City of Calgary “Development Policy Manual” in Board of Commissioners Papers
Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development Committee 1973.”

2 For example, see Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 159, file folder
“Development Committee 1968.” Meeting with Carma Developers, February 1,
1968.

3 For a copy of the Manual, see Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 139,
file folder “Development Committee 1973.”

4 For example, see J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession Number 2001.004, file folder
60.02, correspondence dated May 13, 1976.

5 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 2, file folder 12, January 25, 1966.

6 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 497, file folder “1977 Subdivisions
General,” History of Carma Lands in MacEwan Glens.

7 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 497, file folder “The Lakes Midnapore,”
Bob Kimoff to Chair, Local Authorities Board, November 8, 1976.

8 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 159, file folder “Development
Committee 1968,” February 16, 1968.

9 City Parks and Recreation Fonds, Box 1315, file folder PL0010, Joe Combe to
M. Rofers, July 26, 1971.

10 “Planners approve cluster housing in north-east area,” *The Albertan*, April 29,
1976.
11 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 13, file folder 159, September 8, 1965.

12 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI1, Box 497, file folder “Subdivisions General 1977,” George Howarth to R.A. Welin, October 24, 1977.

13 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 13, file folder 159. Carma to Mayor and Council, November 19, 1965.


15 Interview with Les Cosman, February 21, 2007. The weeping tile issue was related to the distance of the foundation to groundwater levels. According to the City, weeping tile had to be installed if the groundwater levels were within four feet. Cosman’s testing program showed that the water levels did not change appreciatively from season to season, whereas the City wanted installation standards that took into account a much wider range between winter and summer groundwater levels. In short, this meant that the City was insisting on weeping tile in areas which Cosman believed were unnecessary.

16 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 225, file folder 6200.3. Submission of the Urban Development Institute of Alberta – Calgary Chapter to the Honourable Paul Hellyer, Minister of Transport and the Federal Task Force on Housing and Urban Development. [n.d.]

17 J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession Number 2001.004, file folder 81.07, Submission to the Minister of Housing, Minister of the Environment, Minister of Municipal Affairs and the government of Alberta by the City of Calgary, September 1977. “In reference to the Urban Development Institute of Alberta’s submission on municipal Development agreements.”


20 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 139 file folder “Development Committee 1971, comments dated January 8, 1971.


22 Ibid.


27 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 14, file folder 159, “Development Committee 1970.”

28 The formula was based on the average of existing acreage assessments, updated for construction costs and higher densities, doubled to cover financing, and converted to a residential unit charge plus $50 per unit for oversize.


31 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development Committee 1971,” UDI correspondence, January 29, 1971.


34 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 137, file folder “Development Agreements 1970–1973.”

35 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 137, file folder “Development Agreements 1970–1973.”

36 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development Committee 1971,” Bob Kimoff to Commissioner G.C. Hamilton, January 29, 1971; also Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 137 file folder “Development Agreement 1970–73.” Under the formula the finance charges were calculated by taking the annual capital expended by the City less total collections from developers multiplied by the Alberta Municipal Finance Corporation interest rate (7.75 percent in 1973) for the previous year and divided by the acreage for which the assessment is made.

37 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development Committee 1971,” correspondence dated February 4, 1971.

38 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development Committee 1971,” comment by Bob Kimoff February 11, 1971.

39 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development Committee 1971,” comment by Subdivision Development Officer, February 10, 1971.


41 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development Committee 1971,” February 9, 1972.

42 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development Committee 1971,” February 9, 1972.


45 Statutes of Alberta, Chapter 40, “An Act to Amend the Municipal Government Act,” Section 241.1. Other ways by which the assessment could be levied were $500 for each dwelling unit or 50c per square foot of the gross floor area.
46 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development Committee 1971,” Rod Sykes to Ivor Strong, January 12, 1971.
47 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 139, file folder “Development Committee 1972,” N. Trouth, Chair U.D.I. to Development Committee, February 29, 1972.
49 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 1, file folder 1, March 4, 1964.
50 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 1, file folder 2, April 3, 1964.
51 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 3, file folder 18, August 23, 1967.
52 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 3, file folder 21, March 20, 1968. Apparently Kelwood continued excavating out of the official eye at night and on weekends.
53 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 4, file folder 26, March 19, 1969.
54 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 11, file folder 65, November 22, 1972.
57 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 497, file folder “Subdivisions The Lakes (Midnapore),” Engineers Report: Recommendations re City Policies for Utilities Sizing and Development South of Fish Creek, August 1975. The City argued that utilities would be too expensive.
59 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 13, file folder 159, file folder “Development Committee 1968,” June 11, 14, 1968.
60 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 13, file folder 159, file folder “Development Committee 1968,” June 11, 1968.
64 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 498, file folder “Midnapore 1977,” June 27, 1977.
65 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 497, file folder “Subdivisions The Lakes (Midnapore),” Engineers Report: Recommendations re City Policies for Utilities Sizing and Development South of Fish Creek, August 1975. Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 477, file folder “1977 Subdivisions General,” memorandum from Lee Guyn, Manager Urban Development Division to Commissioners to Commissioners Howarth and Cornish, August 17, 1977.
66 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 18, file folder 111, August 8, 1977. The CPC allowed the construction of a temporary road which meant that the necessary road construction along John Laurie would be shortened.

67 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 10, file folder 64, August 2, 1972.

68 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 2, file folder 10, March 13, 1968.

69 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 20, file folder 125, March 3, 1976.

70 Ibid.

71 See Lake Bonavista Agreement.

72 Planning and Building Department, Box 10014, file folder 19/73, North Bonavista Design Brief, Commissioners Report, February 2, 1973.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid.

75 Planning and Building Department, Box 10014, file folder 19/73, North Bonavista Design Brief, Bob Kimoff to Harry Sales, City Clerk, December 22, 1972.

76 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 491, file folder “Willow Park.”

77 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 491, file folder “Willow Park,” July 17, 1972.

78 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 491, file folder “Willow Park.” Decision handed down January 24, 1973.


80 Probably when Keith entered the Maple Ridge agreement, he was already regretting his decision to develop and operate a private golf course in Willow Park. It is unfortunate, given his significant and sterling contributions to Calgary’s suburban development, that his popularity suffered, albeit temporarily, because of the controversy over the golf course. One wonders how much say he really had over the whole affair. Though his and Kelwood’s names were those of record, the initiator of the purchase and the controlling agent throughout the often bitter discussions was the Winnipeg-based BACM, which had recently acquired Kelwood (and Keith).

81 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 1, file folder 4, September 23, 1964.


84 The disadvantage of the Zero Lot Line idea was that given the easements it had to eventually prejudice a lot owner on one end of a block.

85 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 6, file folder 37, September 16, 1970.

86 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 6, file folder 37, September 23, 1970.

87 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 8, file folder 48, June 16, 1971.

88 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 3 file folder 16, February 15, 1967.

89 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 3 file folder 16, March 21, 1967.


91 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 112, file folder 72, correspondence dated March 24, 1972.

92 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 112, file folder 72, Denis Cole to Harry Boothman, May 19, 1972. In fairness to Cole it should be added that he doubted Quality’s ability to construct the facility for the given figure of $750,000.
However, that does not justify a lack of encouragement toward what was clearly a substantial offer.

93 The fact that any flooding tended to envelop the surrounding flood plain to a far greater degree than, for example, a flood of similar size on the nearby Bow River made Fish Creek more problematic in terms of development.


95 Contained in “Fish Creek Park Project,” City of Calgary Planning Department, October 1966.

96 “Fish Creek Park Project,” City of Calgary Planning Department, October 1966.

97 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 205, file folder 5900.13, correspondence dated February 20, 1967, Local council of Women; and February 28, 1967, Federation of Calgary Communities.

98 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 205, file folder 5900.13, Anderson Road District Association to Mayor and Council, December 8, 1966.


100 City Council Minutes, March 13, 1967.

101 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 205, file folder 5900.13, meeting dated June 16, 1967.

102 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 205, file folder 5900.13, January 26, 1967. It is doubtful whether Sullivan owned that much land in the valley, but he had probably secured options to purchase. A list of landholdings in the valley circa 1973 showed Sullivan owning 97.8 acres.

103 Calgary Planning Commission, Box 3, file folder 16, February 22, 1967. Since the future of the creek was bound up in the ongoing negotiations with landowners, the Calgary Planning Commission was able to table the application. Arguably, Sullivan’s quixotic gesture paid positive dividends elsewhere. A month later he was given the go-ahead to develop the land in his original application that did not intrude onto the flood plain.


105 It was an interesting situation. Though the Province assumed that title to the creek bed was vested in the crown it was not completely sure and had to check and consult to verify what seemed to be the obvious.

106 For good summary of these options, see Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 205, file folder 5900.13, City Solicitor’s Office Memorandum “Re Fish Creek Park Project,” November 6, 1967.

107 City Council Minutes, January 26, 1970.


109 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 186, file folder “Fish Creek Park 1972,” Norman Trouth to Operations and Development Committee, February 18, 1971. Trouth claimed that proposal had the support from the City and the province. No evidence existed in the files to support the former claim.
10 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 186, file folder “Fish Creek Park 1972,” M. Rogers to Commissioner G.C. Hamilton, March 1, 1971.

11 The company later changed its strategy. By mid-1972, faced with diminishing prospects of any development in the valley, Wesco was making serious efforts to secure approval to build recreational facilities below its subdivision on the escarpment for public use. The recreational facilities ultimately emerged as a jogging track, and Wesco apparently used this incentive to sell lots on the escarpment. Indeed, even after the provincial government took over the area Wesco continued to press unsuccessfully for the right to go-ahead with its jogging track.

12 City Council Minutes, March 22, 1971.

13 City Council Minutes, July 26, 1971.

14 City Parks and Recreation Fonds, Box 1056, file folder PL0011, Donovan Ross to Harry Sales, City Clerk, August 9, 1971.

15 “Fish Creek Report,” Montreal Engineering Company, June 1972. The report classified the land in terms of water flow per cubic inch during flooding and divided the valley floor into three areas: Floodway, Floodplain, and Valley Bottom outside the Floodplain District, which was set as 15,000 c.f.s. The latter translated into the formula as 1-in-70-year flood plus one foot.

16 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 186, file folder “Fish Creek Park 1972,” Denis Cole to C.D. Howarth, June 12, 1972.

17 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 186, file folder “Fish Creek Park 1972,” George Cornish to Denis Cole, July 24, 1972.

18 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 186, file folder “Fish Creek Park 1972,” Art Froeze to George Steber, August 12, 1972.


20 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 186, file folder “Fish Creek Park 1972,” Minutes of Meeting between the City Commissioners and the Montreal Engineering Company, August 11, 1972.

21 Farran introduced a motion requesting the government to establish provincial parks in Fish Creek and in Edmonton on March 7. Following debate, a motion supporting the establishment of provincial parks in urban areas was carried on May 5. See *Alberta Hansard*, March 7, 23, May 5.

22 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 186, file folder “Fish Creek Park 1972,” R. Welin, Sewers Manager, City of Calgary Engineering Department to J.L. Reid, Supervisor Alberta Hydro Electric Development, September 25, 1972.

23 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 186, file folder “Fish Creek Park 1972,” Denis Cole to R. Welin, October 2, 1972.


25 City Parks and Recreation Fonds, Box 1315, file folder PL0011, details of meeting, June 25, 1972. The record shows that only four people attended this meeting held
in Southwood Community Hall. In addition to Mrs. Gorrill, attendees were Darcy Yerex and Peter Levesque from the Canyon Meadows and Haysboro Community Associations respectively, and Don Detomasi of the Department of Environmental Design at the University of Calgary.

126 For example see City Parks and Recreation Fonds, Box 1315, file folder PL0011, Rosa Gorrill to Harry Boothman, September 11, 1972.

127 For example see Rosa Gorrill, “Creation Fish Creek Park Firm Objective,” South Side Mirror (Calgary), May 18, 1972. The article features two graphically contrasting photographs, one entitled “Natural Beauty”; the other “Defiled and Polluted.”

128 Mentioned were aldermen Tom Priddle, Barbara Scott, and Ed Davis, and MLAs Bill Dickie and of course Roy Farran.

129 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 186, file folder “Fish Creek Park 1971,” Harold Riley to Rod Sykes, August 23, 1971.


132 Buckmaster, 148.


134 Interview with Les Cosman, February 21, 2007.

135 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 15, file folder 90, November 7, 1973.

136 For correspondence concerning Sullivan and the City, see Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 187, file folder “Fish Creek Park 1974.” One can understand Sullivan’s disquiet. The province’s policy was to buy at $6,000 an acre, whereas land adjacent to the park was selling for much more. Prices of over $28,000 were being offered in some areas. This sensitive and highly contentious issue of determining fair selling price on land frozen from development was to figure prominently in the Nose Hill issue.

137 For an excellent discussion of public participation and Calgary’s river park system, see H.V. Nelles, “How Did Calgary Get Its River Parks?” Urban History Review 34:1, October 2005.

138 It is true that the $2,500 per acre favoured Sullivan, whose appraiser set the per acre value at $3,271 as compared to the City appraiser’s figure of $1,271. Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 205, file folder 5900.13, City Solicitor’s Office Memorandum “Re Fish Creek Park Project,” November 6, 1967.

139 City Parks and Recreation Fonds, Box 1056, file folder PL0011, Ivor Strong to D.S. Lawson, Director Lands and Forests, December 27, 1967.

140 City Parks and Recreation Fonds, Box 1315, file folder PL0011, Adrian Berry to H.A. Buckmaster, April 23, 1971.


142 Here the ecological factor is being equated to popular perception. Certainly there were many in the city who appreciated Nose Hill’s environmental uniqueness and value. But from a purely visual perspective, Nose Hill, to many, had a view and nothing else. Fish Creek, on the other hand, had water, varied vegetation, abundant wildlife, and fine hiking and recreational opportunities.
143 The restrictions were lifted in May 1969. See Planning and Building Department, Box 6590, file folder PL0010, G.E. McDowell, Regional Director, Air Service, Department of Transport to M.V. Facey May 2, 1969.

144 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 4, file folder 23, July 24, 1968. Carma subsequently submitted variations of this plan. For example, three variants of the plan showed densities ranging from 18 to 11 persons per acre.

145 Planning and Building Department, Box 6590, file folder PL0010, correspondence dated July 18, 1969.

146 Planning and Building Department, Box 6590, file folder PL0010, Walter P. de Silva, Branch Architect and Planner to A.G. Martin, September 4, 1968.

147 Planning and Building Department, Box 6590, file folder PL0010, M. Rogers to G.C. Hamilton, July 31, 1969.

148 Planning and Building Department, Box 1056, file folder PL0010, correspondence dated April 18, 1967.

149 Planning and Building Department, Box 6590, file folder PL0010, correspondence dated August 14, 1969.

150 Board of Commissioners Papers Series V, Box 13, file folder 159, Chief Engineer’s Report, June 14, 1967.

151 City Parks and Recreation Fonds, Box 1056, file folder PL1010, Tamorel Development Co. Ltd. to Ivor Strong, December 4, 1970.

152 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 6, file folder 38, November 4, 1970.

153 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 7, file folder 44, March 31, 1971. The engineer projected the costs to 1978 at about $10.6m for 20,000 people and $13.7m for 35,000. Out of this total the City’s share would have been $2.37m for 20,000 and $3.22m for 35,000.

154 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 7, file folder 45, April 7, 1971.


158 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 10, file folder 60, April 26, 1972.

159 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 10, file folder 60, Joe Combe to City, April 19, 1972.

160 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 10, file folder 60, S. Reed Nelson to Denis Cole, April 28, 1972.

161 Ibid.


163 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 325, file folder “Nose Hill Subdivision 1972,” correspondence date June 1, 1972.

164 City Parks and Recreation Fonds, Box 1056, file folder PL1010.

165 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 325, file folder “Nose Hill Subdivision 1972.”


167 Calgary Herald, June 14, 1972.

168 City Council Minutes, July 3, 1972.
169 City Parks and Recreation Fonds, Box 1315, file folder PL1010.
170 “Nose Hill is not either-or issue,” *Calgary Herald*, December 1, 1972.
171 For a good account of citizen involvement see Buckmaster, 149–154.
172 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 325, file folder “Nose Hill Subdivision 1972.” The communities chosen were North Haven, Huntington Hills, Foothills Estates, and Killarney and Glendale in the southwest. The figures for the question on preservation versus development were 55 to 45 percent, for expenditure versus allowing Carma to develop were 47.5 to 52.5 percent.
175 City Council Minutes, April 16, 1973.
177 Buckmaster, 152.
181 Sweden, for example, had an assessment formula based on set values ten years earlier and subject to compounded annual interest rates.
182 David Mabell, “City freezes development,” *The Albertan*, July 4, 1972. The comment was attributable to Roy Wilson, Carma President and current Social Credit MLA for Calgary Bow. In 1975 Carma told the City that its lands on Nose Hill had been appraised at $21,000 an acre. See Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 86, file folder “Carma Developers 1976,” correspondence dated May 23, 1975.
183 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 327, file folder “Nose Hill Subdivision 1974,” correspondence dated August 28, 1974. Glenholme Properties wanted $12,090 an acre for its 304 acres at the base of the hill.
185 City Parks and Recreation Fonds, Box 2864, file folder PL1010. Obviously Land Director R. Leitch was wrong when he said, “I think we reasonably established the value in the Carma exchange ($3,000 an acre), and we’ll hold that position in that regard.”
186 City Council Minutes August 11, 1975; City Parks and Recreation Fonds, Box 32835, file folder PL1010, Correspondence dated October 9, 1975.
188 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 12, file folder 76, July 11, 1973.
189 Board of Commissioners Papers Series VI, Box 326, file folder “Nose Hill Park Acquisition, 1974,” Carma Proposal, February 27, 1874. For every 125 developable acres of Carma land included in future subdivision agreements up to 1981, Carma
agreed to release Nose Hill lands to the city at between 40 and 100 acres per year. The precise location of these lands was not specified.

190 City Council Minutes, June 10, 1974. Ten percent of the lots in West Thorncliffe were to be allocated by Carma “at the City’s discretion.”

191 “City challenged on Nose Hill deal,” The Albertan, June 28, 1974.


Chapter 7

1 City of Calgary General Plan, August 1963. The Plan was unique in that it did not embrace the downtown area, which was left to a subsequent study and plan.

2 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 1, file folder 8, March 16, 1961.

3 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 222, file folder 6200.1. Residential taxation revenues were $12.311m; commercial $7.047; and industrial, $920,000.


5 Ibid., 14.6.

6 The Calgary Plan, City of Calgary Planning Department, May 1973, 2.2.

7 Ibid., 14.7.

8 The Calgary General Municipal Plan, City of Calgary Planning Department, November 1978.

9 Ibid., 2.3.

10 Ibid., Table 2.3.1.


12 Planning and Building Department, Box 92-221, file folder 6276.1, Silver Springs Design Brief, June 1971.

13 Planning and Building Department, Box 17413, file folder H.3, memo, “Housing Communities in Calgary, January 21, 1975.

14 Planning and Building Department, Box 17413, file folder H.3, City of Calgary Social Housing Policy, June 5, 1975.


16 Planning and Building Department, Box 6590, file folder “Sector Plans General,” memorandum, M.V. Facey, May 12, 1969.

17 Planning and Building Department, Box 6590, file folder 6276, memorandum, M.H. Rogers, May 22, 1970.


19 See Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 12 file folder 75, June 20, 1973 for Whitehorn; Box 15, file folder 92, July 31, 1974 for Temple; Box 21, file folder 124; for south Edgemont; Box 12, file folder 76, July 11, 1973 for Braeside.

20 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 11, file folder 66, November 8, 1972.

21 Ibid., November 22, 1972.
22 Planning and Building Department, Box 17413, file folder H.3, George Steber to M. Facey, February 13, 1975.
24 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 7, file folder 41, January 6, 13, 1971.
27 See Dalhousie Design Brief in Planning and Building Department, Box 10014, file folder 14/73.
28 J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession Number 2001.004, file folder 60.02, correspondence dated June 29, 1976.
29 Frank A.E. Cserepy, “A Sense of Community: The Challenge of Participation in Calgary's Civic Affairs,” June 1974, 22. See J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession Number 2001.004, file folder 77.10. Cserepy, a community development consultant, was commissioned by the City to undertake the study in April 1974.
30 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 1, file folder 2, April 3, 10, 1964.
31 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 2, file folder 13, June 8, 1966.
32 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 21, file folder 137, September 1, 1976.
33 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 16, file folder 100, February 19, 1975.
34 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 13, file folder 78, April 10, 1972; August 15, 1973.
35 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 16, file folder 98, January 8, 1975.
37 Planning and Building Department, Box 6590, file folder “Sector Plans General,” memorandum, M.V. Facey, May 12, 1969.
38 Ibid.
39 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 2, file folder 14, August 24, 1966.
40 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 9, file folder 56, January 19, 1972.
41 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 10, file folder 61, May 31, 1972. An interesting comment made by the Planning Department showed the reliance on developers for effective regulation in commercial areas. In referring to “a first class ‘commercial park’ in Midnapore with high standards of landscaping, design and signage,” it was noted that “the ultimate success of the development resides with the Developer, and the private covenants are one proven method of achieving and maintaining the desired standards of development and operation.”
42 J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession Number 2001.004, file folder 77.10, George Steber to George Cornish, August 2, 1974.
44 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 1, file folder 6, January 27, 1965.
45 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 2, file folder 10, September 15, 1965.
46 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 4, file folder 25, January 15, 1969.
47 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 4, file folder 24, September 18, 1968.
48 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 21, file folder 137, September 1, 1976.
49 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 4, file folder 25, February 26, 1969.
50 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 4, file folder 25, March 12, 1969.
51 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 4, file folder 24, January 1, 1968.
52 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 2, file folder 8, June 9, 1965.
53 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 11, file folder 67, December 6, 1972.
54 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 4, file folder 25, January 22, 1969.
56 Ibid.
57 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 5, file folder 30, December 3, 1969.
59 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 36, file folder 670, correspondence dated June 29, 1970.
60 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 11, file folder 70, January 24, 1973.
61 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 2, file folder 10, October 20, 1965.
62 Planning and Building Department, Box 10014, file folder 1/73, report dated December 12, 1972.
63 Ibid.
64 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 2, file folder 12, March 2, 1966.
67 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 11, file folder 66, October 4, 1972.
68 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 2, file folder 8, May 26, 1965.
69 J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession Number 2001.004, file folder 60.02, F.J Jaremchuk, general manager to Mike Rumball, Land Use Planner, December 29, 1975.
70 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 19, file folder 122, January 7, 1976.
71 City Council Minutes, May 10, 1976. According to the community association the site also violated provincial policy with respect to distance from residential areas.
73 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 20, file folder 130, May 26, 1976.
74 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 21, file folder 135, August 4, 1976.
75 Planning and Building Department, Box 10014, file folder 1/73, March 1973.
76 Ibid., Planning Department Report, May 17, 1973; City Council Minutes, June 11, 1973. There were some conditions. The amendment, for example, did not apply to areas zoned R2 subsequent to the passage of the bylaw. Clearly the City was trying to protect its policy of allowing low density, multi-family development in new areas.
77 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 4, file folder 22, May 22, 1968.
78 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 1, file folder 1, February 26, 1964.
80 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 16, file folder 96, October 7, 1974.
Bibliographic Notes

81 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 1, file folder 6, February 3, 1965.
82 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 13, file folder 159, Development Committee Minutes, November 21, 1967.
83 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 16, file folder 96, November 6, 1974.
84 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 17, file folder 107, June 11, 1975.
85 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 6, file folder 36, August 26, 1970.
86 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 2, file folder 8, June 9, 1965.
87 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 5, file folder 33, May 13, 1970.
88 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 6, file folder 36, August 12, 1970.
89 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 6, file folder 38, October 21, 1970.
90 Law Department, Series IV, Box 356, file folder “Market Mall Carma Developers.”
91 Ibid.
92 City Council Minutes, January 30, 1967.
95 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 221, file folder 6200.06.03, correspondence with Carma dated June 6, 10, 30, 1969.
96 Golf course issues continued to emerge. In 1971 Carma was censured for its high green fees and following citizen protest was forced to reduce them to $7.50 a round.
97 Planning and Building Department, Box 10014, file folder 1/71, George Steber to Denis Cole, April 5, 1973.
98 Ibid., Denis Cole to George Steber, April 26, 1973.
99 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 221, file folder 6200.06.03, correspondence with Carma dated June 6, 10, 30, 1969.
100 “Paying for History, “ The Albertan,” July 6, 1972. The City had to compensate the developer $350,000 and maybe another $700,000 if the new location did not evolve into a regional centre with a major department store.
101 Ibid. In a lengthy brief to the City, concerned citizens noted “a betrayal of our legitimate expectations for this area,” and found it hard to believe that “Carma Developers could even suggest the perpetuation of such a misrepresentation.” The files also contained a copy of “an open letter to all concerned citizens of Calgary.” from “the concerned citizens of Varsity Village.” This letter stressed the inordinate costs of what the citizens felt was a capitulation by the City to the developers, and called for a public inquiry.
102 At 22 persons per acre the total allowable population of the 628-acre subdivision was 13,816. Carma planned to locate over 4,500 in Varsity Acres and transfer the balance to the three multi-family complexes.
103 J. Rodney Sykes Fonds, Accession Number 2001.04, file folder 77.08, Varsity Acres Design Brief, March 1974. “Residents Oppose Density of Market Mall Proposal,” Calgary Herald, December 14, 1972. Carma later agreed to reduce its densities from 9,280 to 6,300, and then later to 5,500. The multi-family complexes were built at 55 persons per acre.
104 Planning and Building Department, Box 92-221, file folder 6276.1, Silver Springs Design Brief, June 1971.
107 Planning and Building Department, Box 10014, file folder 5/73, correspondence dated February 11, 1972.
108 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 1, file folder 1, March 4, 1964.
110 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 11, file folder 55, September 13, 1972.
111 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 1, file folder 5, November 25, 1964.
112 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 4, file folder 26, February 4, 1969.
113 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 3, file folder 20, January 17, 1968.
114 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 9, file folder 58, March 1, 1972.
115 Planning and Building Department, Box 10014, file folder 12/74.
116 Figures for Southwood were $120,480, of which $24,440 had been expended for a school site. Technically, Acadia was compensated in a school site. Other communities included Forest Lawn $27,533, Glamorgan $11,230, and Kingsland $19,220.
117 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 36, file folder 670, correspondence dated December 30, 1968.
118 Ibid., correspondence dated August 8, 1968.
119 Ibid., Cole to Boothman, November 20, 1972.
120 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 14, file folder 86, March 6, 1974.
121 Rashleigh, 68.
123 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 20, file folder 130, May 26, 1976.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., correspondence dated March 9, 1976.
127 Calgary Planning Commission Minutes, Box 3, file folder 18, October 4, November 8, 1967.
128 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series V, Box 225, file folder 6200.3. In October 1968 the U.D.I. presented the City with a 12-point report on how to reduce the cost of a lot by $3.00 per frontage foot. The City was not impressed. See meeting dated January 13, 1969.
130 See clippings and details in Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 6234.21.
131 According to one estimation, the houses cost between $14,800 and $19,000 as compared to $22,000 to $28,000 in more expensive areas. The comparison was not pre-
scriptive enough because it did not offer sufficient pertinent details. However the $14,800 price was significantly lower than the average house price in the city.

132 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 6234.21, correspondence dated April 27, 1970.
133 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 2.1, memorandum from M.V. Facey, September 16, 1970.
135 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 6234.21, City Solicitor’s comments, May 20, 1970.
137 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 497, file folder “Review of Innovative Subdivisions,” meeting dated April 27, 1976.
138 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 497, file folder “Review of Innovative Subdivisions,” Review of Experimental Housing Projects, March 31, 1976. Representatives included one from the C.M.H.C.; three from the City’s Engineering and Planning Departments; one from H.U.D.A.C.; one from the Alberta Housing Corporation; and three from the U.D.I., Bob Kimoff, Les Cosman, and Dave Poppitt.
139 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 2.16, Ralph Scurfield to Mike Rogers, June 26, 1970.
140 Ibid., Rogers to Scurfield, June 29, 1970.
143 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 2.1, M. Rogers to G. Hamilton, March 20, 1970.
145 Ibid., D. Cole to Planning, Engineering and Land Departments, September 24, 1975.
146 Ibid., “Comments by the City Planning Department, Land Department and Engineering Department with respect to the Carma proposal to the Honourable William Yurko,” October 23, 1975.
147 Ibid., “Minutes of a meeting held between the City of Calgary and Alberta Housing Corporation regarding ‘Carma proposal to to the Honourable W. Yurko – Starter Home concept’,” December 18, 1975.
150 Planning and Building Department, Box 17413, file folder H3, Develop/AHC Sour Gas Agreement, March 15, 1978.
151 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 2, correspondence dated August 13, 1971.
152 Board of Commissioners Papers, Series VI, Box 497, file folder “Review of Innovative Subdivisions,” Review of Experimental Housing Projects.
Notes

157 City Council Minutes, March 22, 1976.
158 Planning and Building Department, Box 17413, file folder H3. Housing Committee.
163 Planning and Building Department, Box 17413, file folder H3, comments by R.K. Parker, Manager Land Use, January 9, 1979.
164 Planning and Building Department, Box 4496, file folder 2.10, “Residential Development, Winnipeg.”

Conclusion

2 Ibid., 79.
3 Ibid., 78. In June 2007, as the average price of a single detached residence in Calgary approached $500,000, realtors attributed the rising values not to reduced inventories but to demand.
8 According to Rodney Sykes, Calgary’s Mayor from 1969 to 1977, the developers never had their way under his tenure. Referring to his own wide experience in the development business, Sykes noted that the best way to control developers was through a willingness to go public, a tactic he described as “bullying from the pulpit.”
9 Spurr, 40.
10 Ed Davis, Kelwood President during the early period, said that developers built to market demand and received their guidance from real estate companies which advised them as to what sort of dwelling was preferred by buyers.


Photo Credits

City of Calgary Archives: p. 40

Ed Davis, Kelwood Corporation: p. 47, 48, 58, 66


Max Foran: p. 151, 155, 212, 214, 215
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