Globalization and Higher Education

Working Toward Cognitive Justice

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“There is no global social justice without global cognitive justice.”
Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Joao Arriscado Nunes, and Maria Paula Meneses, “Opening Up the Canon of Knowledge and Recognition of Difference” (2007), ix

This essay works within the context of three major challenges facing higher education today.¹ I phrase them as questions:

1. How can educators in the global north and global south devise better ways of sharing our knowledge and our sense of the obstacles that stand in the way of solving global problems?
2. How can humanists and social scientists communicate across our divisions and learn to benefit from the strengths of our differently focused research?
3. How can those of us situated within universities learn to share our research and teaching functions with the increasing number of private and public civil society organizations that also claim knowledge production and research rights?
In asking these questions, this essay intervenes in current knowledge politics debates to advocate goal-oriented forms of interdisciplinarity structured around contextualized problem solving within ethically self-conscious frameworks. My argument here is that interdisciplinarity, internationalization, globalization, and cognitive justice need to be thought of—and addressed—together. Exactly how these will be addressed is one of the major issues facing higher education today. This volume presents a range of approaches to what Ian Angus, in his essay, calls “the ‘what’ and ‘for whom’ of knowledge.” I come to these questions from the contentious interdiscipline of postcolonial studies as it seeks to ask what David Slater terms “postcolonial questions for global times” (1998). In seeking to negotiate between what Santos, Nunes, and Meneses term “knowledge-as-regulation” and “knowledge-as-emancipation” (2007, li; emphasis in the original), I begin with the premise that universities are not well designed to address global problems or respond to the changing conditions brought about by globalization. As Fred Riggs argues in his “Global Studies Manifesto,” “Far-reaching transformations in the contemporary world system make a new paradigm for academic teaching and research necessary, but deeply entrenched traditional ways of thinking block the needed changes” (2004, 344). At this high level of generality, such an argument for transformation may be used to remodel the university according to market values or to critique those models from a position that queries both market values and traditional defences of the liberal university. This essay aligns itself with the latter approach. Universities need a new form of globally involved interdisciplinarity advocating for the university as a forum where values may be debated and where previously excluded modes of knowing may enter the discussions. In that respect, this essay aligns itself with arguments made by Ian Angus, Lorraine Code, Len Findlay, Harvey Graff, and Morny Joy in other essays in this volume.

Sandra Harding puts the case for such a position in language that vividly suggests the limitations of current forms of knowledge production across the disciplines. “Western sciences and politics, and their philosophies,” she argues, “need an exorcism if they are to contribute at all to social progress for the vast majority of the globe’s citizens!” (2008, 3). Lorraine Code’s essay in this volume explores more fully what such an
interrogation into the politics of science might mean. My focus here falls more centrally on the implications of such an argument for work within and across the humanities and social sciences. While Harding’s social progress argument may superficially appear to share instrumentalist assumptions with those who argue for increased marketization of knowledge and technological transfer, the first position operates according to an unquestioned market logic while the second asserts an alternative value system, which respects human creativity, including its capacity to question and transform its thinking on an ongoing basis. In its commitment to what Bonnie Honig terms an “agonistic cosmopolitics” (2006, 117) such an approach is more affirmatively complex, open-ended and ultimately unpredictable than that adopted by market logic.

In Globalization of Education, Joel Spring links postcolonial approaches to the globalization of education with world system theories, contrasting what he sees as this combined approach to that provided by world education culture on the one hand and culturalist approaches on the other (2009, 17). This essay challenges his classificatory system by presenting a more nuanced approach to cultural and political questions of knowledge production in global contexts, drawing on insights from Indigenous research, globalization theory, and postcolonial cultural work in dialogue with the kind of work within interdisciplinary studies discussed by Julie Thompson Klein and within cross-disciplinary literacy studies discussed by Harvey Graff, elsewhere in this volume.

Beyond these debates within the academic community, there is often also a lack of fit between what many students and employers think a university education should provide and what university professors tend to think our role should be. These issues are coming to a head around the “competency provisions” that the European Bologna Process is designed to deliver. Universities today no longer hold a monopoly on knowledge production, the training of citizens, the provision of skills for the contemporary workplace, or the certification of professionals. Challenges to university authority and legitimacy come from many quarters. Furthermore, higher education institutions are undergoing reforms that may be shifting balances of power in ways that potentially offer space for the development of alternative educational alliances.
My interest lies primarily in the implications of such shifts for research questions of design, process, adjudication, and dissemination as they feed into curricular and pedagogical reform, and as they are challenged by decolonization and feminism. These need to be worked through in relation to questions of education for global citizenship, global governance, and the renewal of democratic practices at local, national, and global levels. Calls for market-oriented reforms are drowning out calls from feminist and postcolonial perspectives and in many cases encouraging a retrenchment of established positions instead of serious rethinking for cognitive justice. I see no necessary contradiction between education for the workplace, if broadly conceived, and education for societal participation. Similar skill sets, breadth of knowledge, and aptitude for innovation will be required for both. Each requires nourishment of the capacity to learn and to unlearn and to grow through experience. At the same time, it is important to resist a narrowing of educational functions to meet either restricted notions of workplace needs or new enthusiasms for the internet as an alternative to current educational systems.

The ongoing global crisis within the financial system is pushing North American universities toward what Lloyd Armstrong (2008)—one of the bloggers whose work I follow—suggests may be a tipping point in the globalization of higher education. That tipping point represents new dangers and opportunities in two related areas: the institutional and the epistemological/philosophical. Whereas Lorraine Code addresses these challenges in relation to science and ecology elsewhere in this volume, my approach focuses more centrally on the challenges posed to public university systems and humanities and social science research.

First, universities will need to adjust to these economic changes, which include challenges to the hegemony of northern universities from universities located within the global south and challenges to universities outside the European Union from a reformed European system. Many of the assumptions built into current institutional structures and practices are now being questioned from different angles. Second, challenges to the very assumptions about what constitutes knowledge, how it may best be generated, assessed, conveyed, and utilized, and how it contributes to contested ideas of the true and the good are emerging in more urgent forms as the global system reorients itself away from the imperial
legacies of the past. It is in this sense that I am employing the shorthand term “cognitive justice,” coined by Boaventura de Sousa Santos (2007b) to refer to what he describes, in the subtitle of his book *Cognitive Justice in a Global World*, as “prudent knowledges for a decent life.” In this essay, I use “cognitive justice” to refer to the goals of reciprocal knowledge production based on dialogues across differences and attempts to compensate for power differentials in the interests of promoting social justice. Part of achieving cognitive justice will involve understanding and challenging the ways in which different kinds of “epistemologies of ignorance” (Alcoff 2007; Sullivan and Tuana 2007) are built into and produced by current modes of knowing. In postcolonial theory, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak has spoken of various kinds of “sanctioned ignorance” (1999, 279), by which she means ignorance that is actually socially encouraged, as calling for a process she had earlier described as “unlearning our privilege as our loss” (1990, 9).

The pre-eminence of universities in the global north is being challenged by other knowledge producers in the north and global south, ranging from the rise of public and private universities to local, regional, and global networks of Indigenous and social activist groups. As a result, conventional disciplinary categories of knowledge preserves, constructed around imperial knowledge formations and the territory of the nation-state, are now being challenged by potent combinations of demands for interdisciplinarity and internationalization.

In this emerging situation, interdisciplinarity and internationalization mean different things to different people. I come to interdisciplinarity through trial and error. By interdisciplinarity, I mean the developing practices emerging out of dialogue between people working within and out of different disciplinary structures on topics of mutual interest, such as the complex connectivity involved in understanding globalization and autonomy, the focus of my own collaborative research over the past eight years. Now I am working within a new team project, “Building Global Democracy.” This project is linking academic, civil society, and policy communities, in a multi-faceted exercise built around a set of sub-projects, each of which demands interdisciplinary, international attention. Out of such dialogue, newly appropriate ways of making meaning might
emerge, with a potential for understanding and addressing some of the
problems the globe, as an emergent community, now faces.

For the purposes of this essay, I am using globalization to refer largely
to the spread, growth, and speed of transplanetary social connections,
which are leading to changes in transworld interconnectivity that cannot
be limited to neo-liberalism alone. With globalization, there is a growing
awareness that many of the most pressing issues facing the world today
now require concerted attention at a transnational level. If a full un-
derstanding of these issues is to be achieved, interdisciplinary attention must
be brought to bear upon them. Yet those interdisciplinary approaches
are difficult to develop and even harder to institutionalize within a uni-
versity system where disciplinary brands still carry the most weight.
Internationalization is different from globalization, since it still relies on
interstate relations that many aspects of globalization challenge. By argu-
ing for internationalization in the contexts of university reform, I mean
something different from those who argue for this process on the basis of
commercial opportunities alone. Instead, I refer to the dialogue that post-
colonial scholars insist must be begun on more equitable terms between
different parts of the world and the cultural logics they have developed to
address their changing circumstances.9

Jan Aart Scholte notes, “Most accounts of globalization have been silent
on its consequences for knowledge frameworks” (2005, 27). Postcolonial
theory marks an exception to this conclusion that merits closer attention,
not only because it will be important for achieving cognitive justice but
also because it enables scholars to get a better grasp on what is happening
in the world today. Postcolonial work has always focused on what Anna
Lowenhaupt Tsing calls those “zones of awkward engagement, where
words mean something different across a divide even as people agree to
speak” (2005, xi). Like Tsing, postcolonial theorists recognize that these
zones are complexly located and shift over time, requiring the negotia-
tion of alternative meaning-making systems to achieve a fuller sense of
the options before us.

I stress the “zones of awkward engagement” and the dialogue between
different and evolving cultural logics as an alternative to two dimensions
of culturalism, which currently distort attempts to communicate across
systems of cultural difference. Christoph Brumann provides a preliminary
definition of culturalism as denoting a form of “cultural fundamentalism . . . [which] posits the existence of a finite number of distinct cultural heritages in the world, each tied to a specific place of origin” (2005, 68). Such a notion fails to take sufficient account of the multiple ways in which cultural systems are situated and continually renegotiating their understandings. Two problematic derivatives of culturalist ways of thinking may be observed, first of all, in the clash of civilizations thesis, advocated by Samuel Huntington and ably critiqued by Edward Said and others, and, second, in the current tendency to force scholars born in the global south and educated within Western scholarly traditions to perform as native informants within a Western logic of identity politics, which is overdetermined in many cases by US experiences of racism and multiculturalism and habits of culturalist thinking derived from imperial systems of representation.

The blockages to cross-cultural dialogue thrown up by culturalist thinking and practices are too major a topic to address in this essay. For now, my point is a simpler one. In attempting to create more equitable exchanges between the global south and the global north, notions of absolute and incommensurable difference, which tend by implication to deny full humanity and autonomy to Western others are not helpful. Neither is it sufficient to assume that any scholar, simply by virtue of birth and workplace location within an area of the global south, will necessarily be committed to bringing subaltern and subjugated forms of knowledge into dialogue with the status quo. The opposite also holds. Much criticism has been directed at expatriate postcolonial theorists working within the global north, as if their very expatriation makes them inauthentic comprador intellectuals automatically performing as complicit native informants. Attention must be paid, then, less to the identity or physical location of these intellectuals and more to the substance of the analysis they offer and its relevance to the context they address.

These are issues research teams I am involved in are confronting in concrete ways as we attempt to reconceptualize democracy and reestablish more equitable forms of exchange with our colleagues in different parts of the global south. In setting up the steering committee for the “Building Global Democracy” project, Jan Aart Scholte was careful to establish gender parity within a context of ensuring that a variety of
ideological orientations and geopolitical locations be represented, with the weighting skewed toward locations in the global south. The principle of gender parity works efficiently to counter the token woman problem. Efforts are also being made to reduce the dominance of English, by ensuring that translation is available for those more comfortable working in a different language. Another team project, “Collaborative Globalization Research Across Cultures and Disciplines,” has held two workshops led by W. D. Coleman, focusing on emerging issues in regionalization and multiple literacies or meaning-making systems while seeking to bridge the digital divide through turning to the promise of new technologies.11

I come to these projects as an English professor specializing in postcolonial cultural studies who has been morphing into a particular type of globalization studies scholar concerned with the conditions necessary for renegotiating community and building local and global democracy. As an educator, I am especially interested in determining what kinds of pedagogies and curricula are needed to educate citizens about globalization, citizenship, and culture and am increasingly convinced of the value, indeed necessity, of international partnerships to achieve these goals. I am finding my greatest inspiration in working with colleagues (teachers and students) based in Brazil, each of whom is grappling with the expanded range of literacies that globalizing processes are requiring.12 As part of that process, we are reframing our understanding of the potential of the Americas as a region within the evolving global system.13

As a Canadian, I am concerned that Canada suffers from the lack of a national educational policy. Canada is in danger of falling behind in an increasingly competitive and rapidly changing field. Canadians need to work more efficiently across provincial boundaries within the Canadian nation-state while also forming more robust partnerships with colleagues globally if we are to continue to create research and learning opportunities for thinking and working in our changing times. The Bologna Process, as it is developing in Europe, and shifting priorities around the globe represent a major challenge as well as opportunity.14 The Association of Universities and Colleges of Canada (AUCC) has taken steps to address the Bologna Process and its implications for Canada’s universities, but primarily within the context of seeking means to enhance Canada-Europe co-operation.15 I am arguing here that the
Bologna Process carries larger global implications, which require attention to Canada’s place within the global system. There is also a danger that the mobility, exchange, transparency, and quality controls that this process could enable will come at the expense of diversity and flexibility in program offerings, pedagogical innovation, and research design, conduct, and evaluation. This is a real fear.

Still, the kinds of global integration that may come with internationalization need not involve the choices usually posed by anti-globalization activists: either relativist celebrations of multiplicity or imposed cultural homogenization and rigid standardization on Western terms. Indeed, thinking in terms of these kinds of dichotomies is part of the problem in the way globalization debates are currently conducted. Possibly, with creative design, the integration of governance arrangements can be arranged to enable greater appreciation of local divergences and cross-cultural understanding. Support for diversity is in theory at the heart of the Bologna Process. Bilingualism and multilingualism, increased translation across different linguistic spheres, and increased attention to critical, multimodal, and global literacies should all be encouraged in order to enable the responsible exercise of local, national, regional, and global or “planetary” (Spivak 2003, 97) forms of citizenship. Extended and layered forms of citizenship can strengthen democracy across the nested scales of engagement that are beginning to characterize our world.

Such renewed forms of citizenship require highly developed critical thinking skills. Faculty often agree that critical thinking is the main goal of university instruction, but there is as yet little recognition that such thinking is best learned through experiencing interdisciplinary approaches to a problem that is shared across many different fields of expertise and experience. Research on globalization and globalized research, that is, research conducted through internationally based teams, can help us appreciate the potential of evolving approaches.

Part of that interdisciplinarity will need to involve participation from the full range of global knowledge producers, neither limiting itself to the ethnocentrism of Western approaches alone nor relying on forms of interculturalism that exoticize Western others. Such an expanded involvement cannot be approached in an ad hoc or additive fashion, however. The old coverage model cannot simply be expanded to take in new
forms of thinking. Instead, the ideal of coverage needs to be abandoned in favour of reorienting knowledge production toward modes of thinking and imagining that can recontextualize problems across a range of scales, within contexts geared toward recognizing the changing demands of lifelong learning. This argument is importantly made by Arturo Escobar (2007), who explains that the knowledge produced by what he terms the “meshworks” of anti-globalization social movements (AGSMs) “should be an important part of academics’ own theorizing and research agendas. It is no longer the case that some produce knowledge (academics, intellectuals) that others apply (social movements).” Such boundaries “are completely disrupted at present, as movements become knowledge producers and intellectuals are called upon to engage more and more in activism” (2007, 282–83).

There are at least two cautions I would add to Escobar’s argument. First, in questioning the theory/practice divide between theorists and activists, it is also necessary to question the implied divide structuring modernity, which separates the global north as knowledge producer from the global south as knowledge user. Escobar’s argument emerges from utopian beliefs that another, better world is possible. However, its articulation relies on privileging pragmatism over scholarship (as he notes), with all this implies, including a tendency toward anti-intellectualism with a potential bias toward thinking in terms of the moment. Therefore, my second caution is this: Attempts of these AGSMs to open the hierarchical knowledge systems developed in the (Western) university to inputs from below can easily be partnered with those disturbing developments that Martin Jay has analyzed so well in “Educating the Educators.” The “unsettling mix of inchoate forces that emerged ‘from below,’” as Jay describes them, “include everything from computer hackers to body piercers, postmodern performers to underground ‘zine’ cartoonists, skater dudes to cyberpunk bands, gangsta rappers to queer activists” and may be extended to include “kooks who think Darwin is the Anti-Christ” (1998, 107–8). All derive their newfound legitimacy through participating in what Jay cites Peter Sloterdijk as calling “‘cynical reason,’” which Sloterdijk defines as ‘enlightened false consciousness’” (1998, 107). How to distinguish among these varieties of critique to achieve new forms of knowledge production that might advance “cognitive justice in a global
world” (Santos 2007b) is the challenge before us. It would be wrong to throw the baby of postcolonial and subaltern critiques out with the bathwater of cynical reason. But any reformer must “proceed with caution” (as Doris Sommer [1999] reminds us).

This essay finds its sense of direction from the range of inspiring work emerging from within the dialogues developing across various knowledge networks within the social, political, and cognitive justice movements. While many universities have added the fostering of global citizenship to their vision statements, insufficient attention has been given to how this goal might best be achieved. The lack of curiosity about and respect for the wisdom of other cultures within North America can be discouraging, but our growing awareness of the interdependence of our world, environmentally, economically, and politically, can be recruited to encourage a new openness to difference, a receptivity to change, and a willingness to experiment with internationally based forms of interdisciplinarity. To turn such openness into action, university rewards systems will need to be changed and current institutional structures loosened.

To make this argument, this essay raises some of the questions that necessarily precede curricular reform, pedagogical innovation, and revised and enlarged definitions of research, if educators are to move closer to enacting “cognitive justice,” de Sousa’s term for equitable ventures in knowledge production. We university educators now share the world of advanced knowledge production with many rivals, not just private providers and think tanks, government and non-government agencies, but also business and civil society groups who no longer necessarily accept our authority. I don’t think that universities will disappear, but I do expect that they will change, and possibly quite rapidly, over the next few years. How will those of us in universities direct that change so as to promote “cognitive justice”?

I approach this question as a feminist and postcolonial scholar who is only too well aware of the inequities defended in the name of tradition and social cohesion. My work responds to that of the many scholars who are rethinking assumed dichotomies between tradition and innovation, individual and community, to stretch our imaginations (Code 1998) toward alternative modes of sociality and continuity, modes better suited to recognizing the ways in which preservation of a culture’s governing
logic may well depend on continual renewal rather than freezing certain practices in time.\textsuperscript{19} To “preserve” what is best about universities, then, we need to redesign an institution built for the needs of one historical moment to better meet the needs of very different times.\textsuperscript{20}

Concepts linked to “cognitive justice” that lie behind the arguments of this essay include ideas about the operations of the “instituted and instituting imagination” developed by Cornelius Castoriadis (1991); valorizations of the “grassroots imagination” and “the right to research” developed by Arjun Appadurai (2000, 2006); the principled insistence on challenging what Spivak calls the “sanctioned ignorance” (1999, 279) that operates within established forms of knowledge by developing “transnational literacy” (1996, 295) and cross-disciplinary “interruptions” (2003) as theorized by Spivak; and the continuing need to “decolonize the imagination,” as argued by thinkers from Fanon to Ngugi to successive generations of Indigenous thinkers such as Linda Tuhwai Smith (1999), Marie Battiste and James (Sákēj) Youngblood Henderson (2000), and Aileen Moreton-Robinson (2004, 2007), as well as in the collectively authored *Reasoning Together* (Acoose et al., 2008).\textsuperscript{21} Len Findlay’s call to “Always Indigenize!” (2000) is part of this movement, as is Dipesh Chakrabarty’s to “provincialize Europe” (2001), along with the now extensive efforts of Walter Mignolo and Arturo Escobar to theorize a “decolonial option” to globalization, presented in their anthology *Globalization and the Decolonial Option* (2010). In thinking through the complex connectivities and disjunctions running through these trajectories, each with its own differently situated starting points and vectors of analysis, it will be helpful to learn from Tsing’s nuanced investigations into the enabling and blocking dimensions of global “friction.”

This essay accepts as background to its position Immanuel Wallerstein’s (2007) argument that the modern “divorce” between philosophy and science separated the search for what was true from the search for what was good, leading to many further problems. Several essays in this volume address this history and its legacy in more detail than I can venture here. Briefly, as Wallerstein explains it, “however hard scholars worked to establish a strict segregation of the two activities it ran against the psychological grain.” As a result, attempts “to reunify the two searches returned clandestinely, in the work of both scientists and philosophers,
even while they were busy denying its desirability, or even possibility.” But because this reunification happened secretly, “it impaired our collective ability to appraise it, to criticize it, and to improve it” (2007, 130). These are some of the difficulties that led Bruno Latour to conclude, in the title of one of his books, that “we have never been modern” (1993). While these contradictions, which Latour argued comprised a “hidden constitution,” have haunted modernity since its genesis, they have emerged with a new urgency now.

At the most general level, then, there is a growing sense that knowledge producers need to rethink how they approach the big questions of how we know what is true and what is good and how we can think these questions together—if we can. The implications for universities are two-fold: first, the re-emergence of these questions throws the university’s previous monopoly of knowledge production into question; and, second, these questions require a re-examination of how research is organized, evaluated, communicated, and implemented, both within the university and beyond.

The goal of “cognitive justice” challenges the hierarchy of knowledges that has come to characterize our current system, and it recognizes that many of the challenges confronting the world now are too complex for any single person or discipline to comprehend. Universities have been struggling with the challenge of interdisciplinarity since at least the 1970s. This essay argues that the rise of globalizing pressures is now reaching a tipping point where institutional and intellectual pressures are converging in a quest for genuine change. Older notions of academic community are breaking down; how might they be reconstituted in more equitable and effective forms? Community always needs to be negotiated, but right now it needs to be fundamentally rethought. How might disciplinary loyalties be opened to alternative modes of thinking and meaning making? How might we learn to think, with Appadurai, of the “right to research” as a right that belongs to everyone? How follow Santos’s lead in asking what “cognitive justice” requires in a global world?

In moving from postcolonial to globalization studies, I have been struck by the prominence of what James Scott terms, in the title of an influential book, “seeing like a state” (1998) in political, international, and globalization studies. Humanist studies can interrupt those assumptions, as Julie
Cruikshank does, by asking surprising questions that shift the frames of reference, such as “Do glaciers listen?”—the question she uses to title her 2005 book. Fictive imaginations can reaffirm Giorgio Agamben’s challenge to imagine a “nonstatist politics” that derives from a form of thought that “has as its object the potential character of life and of human intelligence” (2000, 8–9). Agamben argues that “it is necessary that the nation-states find the courage to question the very principle of the inscription of nativity as well as the trinity of state-nation-territory that is founded on that principle” (2000, 24). In other words, while the nation and the state can be thought of as self-reinforcing structures, they can also be employed to productively interrupt one another.

Despite their differences, the humanities and the social sciences have to a large extent built themselves around Agamben’s trinity of nation-state-territory, which has authorized two assumptions whose givenness is now being brought into question. First, there is the primacy of the nation-state as a unit of analysis, leading to what Ulrich Beck calls “methodological nationalism” (2006, 24–27). This naming prompts the question as to what methodological alternatives might prove superior for understanding globalization today. Several critics, for example, have suggested models of “planetarity” (Gilroy 2005; Spivak 2003), cosmopolitanism (Appiah 2006; Beck 2006; Benhabib 2006; Cheah 2006) or critical humanism (Said 2004). Others advocate new forms of regionalism, polycentrism, or multiculturalism. Second, there is the stubborn persistence of culturalism or the “culturalization of politics” (Brown 2006, 19–24, 151, 167). Culturalism, as noted earlier, is a habit of thought assuming that the West and its habits of knowing exist outside and beyond culture, in opposition to its civilizational or barbarous others, who remain in thrall to their communal cultures. While a large body of work now exists to contest these assumptions, they remain influential within both disciplinary and common-sense knowledge formations today, helping account for what Catherine Dauvergne, in Making People Illegal, terms “fact resistance” (2008, 99–100). When confronted with counter-intuitive information that challenges their preconceptions, she argues, policy makers often resist the facts as academics present them. At the same time, facts themselves, as representational constructs arising from certain moments in history and reflecting its emergent and now dominant ideological assumptions,
are coming under increasing examination as the fact itself is historicized and therefore problematized as one way of knowing among others. In other words, while the fact may once have enjoyed a certain status as above and beyond interpretation, it is now being reconceived as itself an interpretive construct (Poovey 1998). Recourse to facts and a discourse of fact denial, therefore, cannot serve to resolve disputes in favour of unquestioned reason but only to shift the terrain to another field of interpretative engagement. This renewed reflexivity of rationalism cannot be wished away by attacking postmodernism. Rather, it is another sign of the emergent discursive formations encouraged by globalization.

Much has been written on the limitations of methodological nationalism and culturalism, and the need for newly imagined forms of interdisciplinarity. Yet the summary conclusions put forward in Globalization: A Critical Introduction, Jan Aart Scholte’s influential introduction to the topic, suggest that the impact of globalizing processes on the production of knowledge have not yet substantially changed the status quo. He notes that “global (as distinct from international) data continue to be in short supply. Most statistics are still calculated in relation to state-country units.” Furthermore, “interdisciplinarity generally remains more aspiration than actuality in globalization studies” and “the widely recognized need for more intercultural approaches to the subject has gone largely unanswered. Most writings remain heavily west-centric—and many are more narrowly Anglo-centric or US-centric to boot” (xiv). Given this situation, more sustained cross-cultural, south-south, and south-north engagements with interdisciplinary globalization studies seems called for. Scholte’s chapter “Globalization and Knowledge: From Rationalism to Reflexivity” argues three main points:

1. “Contemporary globalization has not substantially weakened the hold of rationalism on the social construction of knowledge, although some rationality has become more reflexive”;
2. “The rise of transplanetary connectivity has encouraged some growth in anti-rationalist knowledges like religious revivalism, ecocentrism and postmodernism”; and
3. “The growth of transworld relations has promoted some shifts in ontology, methodology and aesthetics.” (2005, 256)

As generalizations, and within the terms of his survey, Scholte’s conclusions strike me as fair descriptions of the current scene; yet, from the perspectives I am employing in this essay, they are insufficient. Interestingly, Scholte does not mention epistemology in his summary, yet this essay argues that it is understandings of epistemology that are at stake. The problem lies with the assumptions behind the terms employed. Both sides of his dichotomy become invidious: a too-narrow, dogmatic adherence to reason (rationalism) versus a dogmatic resistance to it (anti-rationalism). Perhaps what is desirable is a rational, as opposed to rationalist, use of reason, which would necessarily (rationally) always be open to what demonstrates itself to be reasonable within an expanded understanding of reason’s scope. Such expanded understandings would likely need to find scope for understanding questions of affect and spirituality as in some of their manifestations within, rather than beyond, the domain of reason’s judgments. Scholte’s summary, in its use of established Eurocentric binaries, misses the genuine excitement of alternative approaches to knowledge production emerging from marginalized and misunderstood locations, and the very real sense of urgency that many of us now feel about the need to engage these alternatives in much more substantive fashion, if cognitive justice is to be advanced.

NOTES

1 The thinking behind this essay derives from work undertaken between 2001 and 2008 on the SSHRC-funded Major Collaborative Research Initiative “Globalization and Autonomy,” under the leadership of political scientist William D. Coleman, which has led me to continuing work both with Coleman, on “Building South-North Dialogue on Globalization Research” (2007–9), and with Jan Aart Scholte and his team working on a project funded by the Ford Foundation, “Building Global Democracy” (2008–12). This essay was in part inspired by the work on cognitive justice presented by Coleman and Nancy Johnson at these workshops, and in revision has benefited from the paper by Coleman and Josephine Dionisio (2009) published in the special issue of Globalizations on the Globalization and Autonomy project. I am grateful to the conference organizers,
Raphael Foshay and Derek Briton, for the opportunity to share and develop this research with other participants in the SSHRC-funded workshop “The Scope of Interdisciplinarity” that they organized in the fall of 2008. My work with these projects, and the research for this paper, was also funded, in part, through the Canada Research Chairs program. I am grateful to doctoral student Sandy Annett for her invaluable research assistance.

2 For an argument about the different kinds of knowledge politics and the interdisciplinarity they require, see Jan C. Schmidt (2007).

3 The project Phillip Darby calls “postcolonizing the international” (2006), might more appropriately be thought of as decolonizing the international. Part of that process, as Couze Venn (2006) notes, involves challenging various forms of violence at the symbolic heart of colonialism: “epistemic violence, that is, the denial of the authority and validity of the knowledge of the colonized; ontological violence, namely, the refusal to recognize the (non-assimilated) colonized subject as a fellow human being; and symbolic and psychic violence, the silencing of the voice of the colonized, the denial of the latter’s ability to tell his or her story” (11).

4 See also Mario Novelli (2006) for an elaboration of this distinction.

5 The metaphor of exorcism, implying that Western forms of knowing, when mistakenly taken as universal, operate as a bad spell or spirit possession, is common to much postcolonial literature. In a similar vein, an article that describes itself as “written within the spirit of the Theory of the South,” describes its authors’ model of popular education as “an antidote to neo-liberalism” in educational policy and “a struggle for the soul of Latin America” (Jones and Torres 2010, 568).

6 See, for example, Eva Hartmann’s 2008 neo-Gramscian analysis of the implications of this process in “Bologna Goes Global.”

7 Hartman suggests two hypotheses, that these developments are leading toward the “continuity of the USA as imperial power” or that the EU is becoming a “new emerging power,” before suggesting that “the current weak position of both sides provides a good opportunity for critical scholars to develop broad alliances outside and inside academia in the North and the South to establish alternative alliances and ideas for another world going beyond the fatal shortcomings of capitalist societies” (2008, 217). I share this interest in pursuing the potential of new South-North alliances for challenging these older hegemonic systems.

8 For more information on this evolving project, see www.buildingglobaldemocracy.org.

9 Since I first delivered this paper, Postcolonial Studies has devoted a special issue to this topic. See Seth (2009).

10 Fuller treatments of this topic from a variety of perspectives may be found in Brown (2006), Kapur (2005), Razack (2008), and Nakata (2007), among others. I discuss their insights at greater length in “Competing Autonomy Claims and the Changing Grammar of Global Politics” (Brydon 2009). Culturalisms are also the topic of a special issue of New Literature Review, guest-edited by Diana Brydon, James Meffan and Mark Williams (2009).
11 Fuyuki Kurasawa’s essay “Americany and the Prospects of a Hemispheric Social Imaginary” (2008) illustrates the productive potential for thinking through these two foci together that is emerging with the advance of globalization.

12 I am grateful to the Canadian Bureau for International Education scholarships funded by the Canadian Department of Foreign and International Trade for enabling PhD students to travel from Brazil to work with me in Winnipeg on different dimensions of literacy education projects and to the Brazilian government for funding the travel of colleagues coming here for their sabbaticals in this area. I am especially grateful to Professor Lynn Mario T. Menezes de Souza and Professor Walkyria Monte Mor for their research collaboration and for encouraging their graduate students to participate in this program. Such redefined literacies include critical, creative, cultural, emotional, ethical, and multimodal forms of literacy. In 2011, we were granted funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for a partnership development project, “Brazil/Canada Knowledge Exchange: Developing Transnational Literacies,” which has enabled us to pursue this research.

13 I find parallels to my thinking on these matters in Kurasawa (2008).

14 The Bologna Process derives from the Bologna Declaration of June 1999, which put in motion a series of reforms designed to make European higher education more compatible and competitive, modernizing the system, encouraging mobility within it, and prioritizing the development of a three-cycle system (bachelor/masters/doctorate), quality assurance, and recognition of qualifications. The aim is to create a European Higher Education Area by 2010. I am grateful to Rhonda Friesen for first alerting me to this process and for continuing discussion of what is at stake in these changes.


16 See David Murphy’s 2007 review essay, “Globalization, Knowledge, and the Limits of (Inter)disciplinarity” for a rehearsal of these options. In contrast, the emerging consensus in globalization studies seems to be that global integration and the renewal of local particularities are proceeding in tandem, in ways the coinage of the term “glocalization” seeks to capture. For an elaboration of research into questions of globalization, autonomy, and culture, see Rethmann, Szeman, and Coleman (2010).

17 See Rustom Bharucha’s comments on the need for Indians to resist “the increasingly sophisticated appropriations of non-western resources through new technologies and treaties” (1999, 477) and his critiques of multiculturalism and interculturalism.

18 For an extension of this argument to the vexed relation between African-American women critics and migrant scholars of Indian origin, an argument that attributes a version of this problem to contemporary postcolonial theory as practised by Spivak and Bhabha, see Namita Goswami, who asks: “What form of colonial-postcolonial—neo-colonial symbiosis between the USA and the UK, reinforced and reified by postcolonial
USA-centric and UK-centric neo-imperialistic migrancy, allows canonical postcolonial scholarship’s Eurocentric methodology to appropriate black women’s writing while excluding their scholarship?” (2008, 83). While Goswami’s posing of this argument does not avoid some problematic identity politics of its own, it does pose important questions about continuing hierarchies of valuation, assumptions about race and difference, and unconscious bias that plague even well-intentioned attempts to circumvent such systems. In thinking about the moment when postcolonial discourse entered the academy, she wonders why “an historical moment that could have created alliances caused segregation, competition, and exclusion” (2008, 85). To answer such a complex question is beyond her essay’s capacities. Its implication that somehow the (mostly migrant, in her view) practitioners of postcolonial critique might be exclusively responsible for such failure seems simplistic. Nonetheless, questions about complicity and unintended consequences must always be asked of any efforts to shift knowledge production toward ideals of “cognitive justice.”

See the volume I co-edited with William D. Coleman, Renegotiating Community: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Global Contexts (2008). My thinking has been advanced on this topic by reading Lynn Mario T. Menezes de Souza and Vanessa Andreotti, “Reimagining Community,” unpublished manuscript provided to the author.

See, for example, Bruno Latour’s eco-critically oriented argument in “A Plea for Earthy Sciences”: “While we may have had social sciences for modernizing and emancipating humans, we have not the faintest idea of what sort of social science is needed for Earthlings” (2007, 3).

This literature is too extensive to cite in full, but see DePasquale, Eigenbrod, and LaRocque (2010) and Blaser, de Costa, McGregor, and Coleman (2010) for two recent contributions.

See Brydon and Coleman (2008) for an elaboration of this argument.

See also James Tully’s discussion of this problem and everything it overlooks and misrecognizes (2008, 265).

See Pinch (1999) for a similar argument.

I am grateful to Raphael Foshay for pushing me to think more carefully about these questions.

WORKS CITED


