STRATEGIC NONVIOLENT POWER

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Mark A. Mattaini

STRATEGIC
THE SCIENCE OF
NONVIOLENT
SATYAGRAHA
POWER

MARK A. MATTAINI

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For all of those, living and dead, who courageously stand
in solidarity for justice, beauty, and liberation

and, of course, for Christine

I am but a humble explorer of the science of nonviolence.
— Mohandas K. Gandhi, November 20, 1924

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

One day in February 2011, Ines Doukali, a twenty-three-year-old call centre worker, stood on the west side of the Casbah plaza in Tunis, holding up a sign that read simply, "Peaceful." She and thousands of other protesters were there to demand the resignation of Mohamed Ghannouchi, the prime minister. Ghannouchi had close ties to the country's long-standing dictator, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who had been forced into exile by the popular revolution the month before. As Steve Coll reported in "The Casbah Coalition," Doukali chose to take this action to try to prevent the young revolution from disintegrating into violence. Up to then, she had not participated in the protests, but she found the courage to stand for liberation, informed by a clear instinct that nonviolent struggle was the route to achieving it—an instinct that is consistent with current research. In *Why Civil Resistance Works,* Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan persuasively argue the point: nonviolent resistance simply works better. Many scholars and leaders of civil resistance campaigns could be acknowledged here: both their names and their work are woven into the fabric of this volume. The real credit for the advance of justice and freedom, however, must go to Ines Doukali and the millions of other ordinary, courageous people who change the history of humanity by participating in campaigns of civil resistance, proving that the ultimate power lies with the people. It is my belief that the insights of behavioural systems science can contribute significantly to the effectiveness of these struggles for justice and that advancing this science is one way to stand in solidarity with ordinary people taking such extraordinary action. Therefore . . . this book.

I want to thank members of the Illinois Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends and the 57th Street Meeting for the extensive support they provided throughout the development and production of this volume. I especially want to thank Athabasca University Press for their tremendous contributions in strengthening the manuscript and particularly for making it possible for people anywhere in the world to access this work without cost. For the sake of justice, knowledge must be part of the Commons.

PART ONE

UNDERSTANDING NONVIOLENT POWER

Mohandas K. Gandhi often stated that nonviolence—by which he meant nonviolent struggle for liberation, not passive acceptance—is, or could be, a science. This book takes him at his word, applying the emerging science of behavioural systems analysis to the practice of nonviolent struggle and civil resistance. A valid scientific approach requires an acceptance of uncertainty and a tentativeness and humility regarding "truth," both of which characterized Gandhi's life and thinking. In adopting a stance of humble curiosity, practitioners of science can advance human and other life; should they lose their humility, science can contribute to terrible damage. In attempting to bring state-of-the-science knowledge to nonviolent struggle in this book, I fully acknowledge that such work is in its early days.

Valuable social science research exploring dimensions of nonviolent struggle is available. Over four decades ago, Robert Klitgaard used game theory to analyze Gandhi's tactics, with some success, while Amut Nakhre subsequently employed survey methods to study commitment to nonviolent norms among those practicing civil resistance.[1] Gregory Wiltfang and Doug McAdam have researched predictors of such activists' willingness to engage in high-risk and high-cost activities, and James Downton and Paul Wehr have examined factors that contribute to the persistence of peace activism.[2] Clearly, these and many related investigations have made valuable contributions. The approach taken here, however, draws on a different body of scientific knowledge and theory, which I believe has unique contributions to make not only to the study of resistance movements themselves but also, and especially, to the practice of effective resistance. As Gene Sharp, the most important civil resistance scholar and practitioner of our time, once told me, the study and practice of nonviolent struggle needs to be examined from many different perspectives if we are to continue to advance both theory and methods.

In Part 1, I reformulate current thought about and experience in nonviolent struggle for liberation by drawing on behavioural science theory and research, and emphasizing the behavioural systems that constitute both resistance movements and structures of oppression. The first two chapters introduce the current state of knowledge and stress the urgent need to know more about nonviolent struggle (chapter 1), with particularly attention to the central place of strategic analysis (chapter 2). Chapters 3 and 4 bring contemporary behavioural systems science to that analysis. Chapters 5 and 6 explore the possible contributions of that science to the process of developing and sustaining cultures of resistance prepared to engage in nonviolent struggle. The chapters in part 2 then explore in depth the scientific principles and dynamics underlying major methods of nonviolent action.

A reminder for us all, however, is in order: the analyses and conclusions presented here should be held lightly in hand. Like war, nonviolent struggle is complex and messy, and all science-based knowledge in complex areas should be regarded as tentative and constantly open to correction and refinement. Given these caveats, though, I have little doubt that science can contribute much more to the cause of justice and liberation than it has to this point.

1

NONVIOLENT POWER

> There is such a terrible urgency about halting the machinery of death that is still unimpeded. *For our actions even to be effective as symbolic actions—as actions that speak the truth of our condition*—they must communicate this urgency.
>
> —Barbara Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*

Barbara Deming, a key figure in the recent history of nonviolent struggle, challenges us with the "terrible urgency" of action to confront the human rights violations, genocide, oppression, and violence that Gandhi recognized as so deeply interwoven into contemporary human life. "I do not know whether you have seen the world as it really is," wrote Gandhi to his son Harilal in 1918. "For myself I can say I perceive the world in its grim reality every moment."[1] The World Health Organization reports that over two hundred million people died as the result of collective violence in the twentieth century alone.[2] In addition, the lives of hundreds of millions of others either ended or were deeply affected as a result of structural violence, violence resulting from social structures and institutions that cause and maintain poverty, imprisonment, systemic oppression, and lack of access for many to education, health care, and other basic human rights, while simultaneously supporting the comfortable lives of the privileged.[3] These realities are not new; the history of "civilization" parallels, in many ways, the history of the emergence of structural injustice.

Such oppression ultimately and inevitably breeds resistance, however cloaked or circumspect.[4] Scott Wimberley, exploring the roots of guerrilla warfare, succinctly summarizes this situation: "Resistance, rebellion, or civil war begins in a nation where political, sociological, economic, or religious oppression has occurred. Such discontent is usually caused by a violation of individual rights or privileges, the oppression of one group by a dominant group or occupying force, or a threat to the life and freedom of the people."[5] While the resulting violence may be terrible both to those directly involved and to third parties, history—and science, as we shall see—teaches us that resistance is a natural response to experiences of oppression. Violent resistance often seems the natural, or perhaps the only, response to violent oppression, whether physical or structural. When violence meets violence, groups on each side strive to develop and access strategies and weapons that increase their capacity to create damage to the enemy while minimizing damage to themselves, leading each group to continuously intensify the struggle.

Governments and their corporate surrogates have invested unimaginable human, financial, and scientific resources to what Deming calls "the machinery of death"—the science and practice of weapons development, the science of armed conflict and war, the science of repressive policing.[6] Insurgencies have drawn on and contributed to those sciences and practices. Yet victories obtained through these practices are seldom, if ever, clean or stable; as noted by Václav Havel—the notable Czech playwright and dissident, and, ultimately, the country's president—violent revolutions typically are "fatally stigmatized by the very means used to secure [them]," and current research supports that assertion.[7] Given the enormous costs of violent resistance, the search for other possible options is critically important but has proven difficult in a world deeply immersed in hatred and death. Faced with utterly dehumanizing conditions, threats of terrorism, or deadly repression, escalating counterviolence often seems like the only realistic option. This "escalation to extremes" has only continued our historic march toward an increasingly dangerous and inhuman world.[8]

Nonetheless, history demonstrates that there are, in fact, powerful routes to liberation from oppression that do not involve violence. To clarify the potential and strategies for such options, Mohandas Gandhi called for a science of nonviolent action—but remarkably few resources have been dedicated to the serious pursuit of such a science. This lack of attention is rather puzzling; as will be seen, hundreds of examples of the successful use of nonviolent power over many centuries and on every inhabited continent on earth have been well documented.[9] Historians of nonviolence and scholars of peace studies have chronicled many successes and failures of nonviolent struggle from which others can learn.

While we know that nonviolent action has been powerful in many cases, some quite surprising, we do not know the limits of either obstructive or constructive nonviolent resistance, nor do we have a clear understanding of what forms of action are most effective under what circumstances. Activist David Dellinger's observation in 1965 that the knowledge base for nonviolence was only at a "primitive" state of development remains nearly as true today.[10] The need and potential for an extensive program to refine, extend, and leverage what we know seems evident.

Without question, the challenges of nonviolent struggle in such places as Somalia and Afghanistan are enormous; they are nearly as great, if perhaps not as newsworthy, in dozens of other contemporary struggles for justice around the world. And it is not enough to simply interrupt injustice, difficult as that often is. As David Cortright insists, nonviolent campaigns must also make a real difference in shaping a new reality. While engaging "legitimate concerns for justice and human rights," those involved in social change "have a political and moral responsibility to devise constructive alternatives to the policies they oppose."[11] As discussed later, we know much less about such constructive alternatives than we do about protest and disruption. Advances in this area are therefore an especially high priority.

Other limitations to present knowledge include, for example, the extent to which and conditions under which nonviolent practices could replace military, police, and other currently legitimated forms of force. The potential contribution of nonviolent methods in cases of genocide is unknown, and more study in this area is clearly required; in such cases, a policing strategy appears to be required, but how such a strategy might be effectively implemented remains obscure. A scientific perspective requires maintaining an open mind about such questions and a commitment to pursuing them without bias. Despite these knowledge gaps, however, there is very strong evidence that nonviolent strategies can achieve substantial reductions in threat and violence across a broad range of situations.

The challenges to developing a rigorous understanding of nonviolent struggle are serious. Although the variables involved in effective nonviolent resistance (as well as in failures of such struggles) are, at root, behavioural and cultural, the behavioural and cultural sciences have thus far paid little attention to exploring them. The thesis of this volume is that those sciences, particularly the study of behavioural systems dynamics, have unique potential contributions to make to the further refinement of strategic nonviolent resistance. Both the promise and the uncertainties call urgently, as Deming noted, for deeper analysis. Before turning to that work, however, it is important to ensure a common language. We begin, therefore, by briefly defining and tracing the history of nonviolent struggle.

UNDERSTANDING NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

For at least two and a half millennia, and probably much longer, countless groups and individuals have dedicated—and often sacrificed—their lives to nonviolent struggle. These include activists and resistance movements; community organizers; spiritual communities, including the traditional peace churches (Quakers, Mennonites, and Brethren) but also members of many mainstream religious groups; scholars, particularly in peace studies, history, and political science; and an astonishing array of ordinary citizens. Many of these groups offer somewhat different perspectives on what nonviolent resistance is (and what it is not), but a number of understandings of the concept are now well established, including the following:[12]

1. Nonviolent resistance is not passive, nor is it weak. Rather, such action is an *exercise of power*—what Gandhi called *satyagraha*. The word, which derives from *satya*, "truth," and āgraha, "appropriation" or "insistence," is commonly translated as "truth force" or "soul force." A recurrent emphasis on truth is repeated throughout discussions of nonviolent resistance, as will be seen repeatedly in what follows.

2. There are times when negotiation and mediation are effective approaches for resolving conflicts, but basic human rights cannot be negotiated away. History offers few, if any, cases where individuals or groups perpetrating structural violations of human rights have been willing to give up significant power and privilege without struggle; effective resistance requires challenging that power and privilege with opposing force.
3. Nonviolent resistance is not necessarily safe. While the exercise of nonviolent options generally results in fewer casualties (particularly to innocent noncombatants) than do violent alternatives, nonviolent campaigns that face serious oppression do experience casualties and therefore often require substantial and continuous courage. As Gandhi declared, “There is no *Swaraj* [interdependent self-governance] without suffering. In violence, truth is the first and the greatest sufferer; in non-violence it is ever triumphant.”[13] The more intense the level of dehumanization present, the more costly and challenging that dehumanization is likely to be.[14]
4. The many forms of nonviolent action (Gene Sharp lists 198 methods in *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*) range from relatively modest persuasive efforts to major disruptions of the social fabric. Because nonviolent struggle is complex, substantial humility is required in trying to capture its power coherently and comprehensively, yet that effort is critically important.
5. While some nonviolent movements have emerged from deeply spiritual stances or other passionately principled positions, most nonviolent campaigns and most participants in such campaigns have not acted primarily out of such convictions. As Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler observe, “In the overwhelming majority of known cases of nonviolent conflict, there is no evidence that concepts of principled nonviolence were either present or contributed in a significant way to the outcome. . . . Often nonviolent action is chosen because a viable military option is simply not available.”[15]
6. Effective nonviolent action is difficult, if not impossible, to sustain when driven by hatred, although many participants may initially engage with a movement out of anger. It appears that in the most successful cases, nonviolent struggle confronts oppression aggressively while maintaining respect for all parties as human beings. For example, Gandhi recommended that “men composing the government are not to be regarded as enemies. To re-

> gard them as such will be contrary to the non-violent spirit. Part we must, but as friends."[16] And Deming recommends what I refer to in later chapters as the "two-hands principle": that in nonviolent campaigns against an opponent, activists "have as it were two hands upon him—the one calming him, making him ask questions, as the other makes him move."[17] For Deming, the message, at its core, should be "We will not hurt you, and at the same time, we will not allow oppression to continue." The issues here are two. First, neither hatred nor anger can provide direction for what is to be built. Second, structural oppression is always maintained not by a single individual but by an entire system; this fact has extensive implications, as explored in depth in later chapters.

Theorists of nonviolent resistance differ regarding the extent to which actions involving some level of coercion, interference, property damage, and the induction of stress are acceptable. Deciding on such actions involves both moral and practical considerations; a scientific perspective can be genuinely helpful with the latter and even, to some extent, with the former. The language used to describe nonviolent resistance also varies: the terms *nonviolence, nonviolent struggle, nonviolent conflict, nonviolent social action, nonviolent resistance, satyagraha, civil disobedience, civil resistance, political resistance, direct action,* and *positive action,* among others, have been used. In the present work, *civil resistance, nonviolent action,* and *nonviolent struggle* will generally be privileged because of the emphasis of each on actions taken; the dynamics of nonviolent power are best captured through words that reference verbs (resist, act, struggle). These terms are therefore consistent with a behavioural science perspective, and they are also favoured in the most important contemporary literature.[18]

Within the nonviolence field, there is growing recognition of the importance of strategy and strategic action for optimal results.[19] Strategic perspectives from outside the traditional nonviolence disciplines can make unique contributions here. Such perspectives include the dynamics of organizational behaviour; community organizing; behavioural systems science; strategic studies of insurgency, guerrilla action, and resistance movements; and military strategy (particularly as related to counterinsurgency). Given an emerging understanding that nonviolent methods may function as partial or full equivalents to violence in struggles for liberation (although with key differences in outcomes), it is not surprising that strategic experience in military campaigns and resistance movements of many kinds offer both insights and cautions.

NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE IN HUMAN HISTORY

Nonviolent resistance is deeply embedded in the history of collective action for liberation. A comprehensive review is not my purpose here; a number of outstanding historical reviews are available to the interested reader.[20] Early examples of nonviolent thinking and action include the lessons of the Buddha, as well as the teachings of Mozi, of the Zhou Dynasty in China; the stance of early Christians, who generally refused military service and endured some of the most brutal repression in history; and the campaign among the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) led by Skennenrahowi ("the Peacemaker") to end intertribal warfare, which took place long before the coming of the Europeans.[21] The following list provides just of few of the numerous examples of relatively effective nonviolent struggle around the world.

- Africa: Gandhi's campaigns in South Africa in the early 1900s; the Women's War of 1929 in Nigeria; Kenneth Kuanda's "positive action" in Zambia in the 1950s and 1960s
- The Middle East: the 1973 OPEC oil embargo; early stages of the revolution against the Shah of Iran in 1979–80, subsequently marred by post-revolutionary violence; the First Intifada of 1987–93, which, in its early and more successful stages, was largely nonviolent; and certain of the 2011 Arab Spring movements
- Europe: opposition and resistance to Nazi occupation in the Netherlands, Norway, France, and elsewhere; resistance movements that ultimately overcame totalitarian rule in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s and led to the fall of the Soviet Union; the Green Movement in Germany in the late twentieth century
- Asia and the Pacific Islands: Badshah Khan's hundred thousand–strong nonviolent Pashtun army in Afghan and Pakistani tribal areas, in alliance with Gandhi's campaign in India; the People Power revolution in the

Philippines in 1986; ongoing struggles for justice and democracy in Burma, which appears at this writing to be moving in cautious but probably inexorable ways toward advancing freedoms[22]

- The Americas: the overthrow of the Salvadoran dictator Maximiliano Hernández Martinez in 1944; the US civil rights movement; Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers union
- Australia and New Zealand: the Maori Parihaka Movement from 1870 into the 1900s; green bans in Australia, in which workers refused to work in environmentally destructive projects; protests against participation in the Vietnam War

There are hundreds of other known examples and, no doubt, many more that have never been documented. Such an extensive history suggests that the nonviolent alternative must be taken seriously.

Many historical links can be made among nonviolent movements and theorists around the world, particularly during the past two centuries. Members of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), explicitly committed to nonviolence since 1660, have been deeply involved with numerous campaigns for justice, including nonviolent abolitionist and suffrage movements.[23] Both the Quakers and the transcendentalists, particularly Henry David Thoreau, were important influences on the development of Gandhi's thought, as was Leo Tolstoy, himself influenced by the Quakers.[24] The American sociologist, historian, and civil rights activist W.E.B. Du Bois "felt that Gandhi had discovered a marvelous new method of nonviolent struggle that could be used to liberate black Americans."[25] The *Chicago Defender*, Marcus Garvey, and many other African American publications and leaders followed Gandhi's efforts closely, with an eye to what they might contribute to their own struggle for liberation.[26] Watching what was developing in the United States, Gandhi stated presciently, "It may be through the Negroes that the unadulterated message of nonviolence will be delivered to the world."[27] Bayard Rustin, a gay African American civil rights and antiwar activist in the 1950s and 1960s, spent six months in India and returned to advise Martin Luther King Jr., who, until that time, was not entirely committed to nonviolence in his struggle. Many other connections could be cited; the movement toward nonviolent resistance has been a global phenomenon for at least the past two centuries, with extensive cross-fertilization and mutual learning. Further globalization of resistance movements, given the expansion of communications and electronic media, seems a certainty.

A recent ground-breaking study by Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan examined the relative success of nonviolent versus violent forms of resistance, including over three hundred campaigns from 1900 through 2006. The findings surprised many, including the authors of the study: nonviolent methods proved twice as effective as violent methods, with the rate of success increasing over time. Nonviolent campaigns fully succeeded just over 50 percent of the time, with partial success in another 25 percent of cases; violence achieved full success about a quarter of the time, and partial success another 13 percent of the time. Violent campaigns failed completely 60 percent of the time; nonviolent campaigns just 22 percent of the time. Nonviolent campaigns were also more likely to promote democracy, *even when they failed to achieve their immediate objectives*. Democratic governments successfully emerged from only 5 percent of violent insurgencies, compared to 57 percent of nonviolent campaigns.[28] David Cortright suggests that "nonviolent movements create more freedom and democracy because they are by their very nature free and democratic."[29] Indeed, successful nonviolent campaigns require widespread participation and open communication; guerrilla efforts rely primarily on small cadres of fighters operating largely in secret. Furthermore, not surprisingly, the methods used in the resistance movement, whether violent or nonviolent, tend to continue after the campaign succeeds.

All campaigns, regardless of their degree of success or failure, are useful for understanding the dynamics of nonviolent power. A good number of defeats and partial defeats of nonviolent campaigns are found in the historical record, and one assumes there were others that never progressed far enough to be remembered. Campaigns in Burma in 1988 and in Tiananmen Square in China the following year resulted in massive killings by the military; both are excellent cases for analysis, in part because those struggles continue to reach into the present on some level and also because they are extensively documented. In the Chinese case, since Tiananmen, acts of civil resistance have become commonplace, although full freedom remains distant; the news on the day I write this includes the report of large protests in Qidong Province that resulted in the cancellation of an environmentally sensitive wastewater pipeline. During the same week, thousands took to the streets of Hong Kong to protest the imposition of a Chinese "patriotism" curriculum in the schools.[30] Civil resistance in the face of massive repression has also repeatedly emerged in remote ethnic areas of China.[31] In other parts of the world, many apparent defeats of nonviolent resistance proved temporary, as in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia in the second half of the twentieth century: each of these countries achieved full liberation in the late 1980s, but only after some decades of apparent defeat.[32]

In many historical struggles for justice and human rights, the grievance group has employed a mix of violent and nonviolent strategies. For instance, Malcolm X, although he disavowed violence later in life, in his early years advocated taking "any means necessary" to achieve success, which no doubt seemed natural when his people were experiencing brutal repression and unyielding structural violence in the form of Jim Crow, lynchings, and deeply rooted structural violence. However, Havel's assertion that violence can be fatal to the cause of liberation has considerable support. Violent resistance has usually failed in the face of superior weaponry and forces, as has been the case with many Indigenous groups around the world, as well as with conflicts in Palestine, sub-Saharan Africa, and many colonial situations. Should a violent campaign to some degree succeed, the framework of repressive violence established by the victors is commonly maintained to sustain control and structure privilege for themselves.[33] Even "defensive violence" (or the threat of it) can be counterproductive, as in the case of the Black Panther movement in the United States, in which the media focused on the weapons the Panthers carried rather than on their community building and advocacy for racial justice.[34]

Additional reasons to refrain from mixing violence into a nonviolent struggle are evident in the historical record. Violence, once used, becomes tempting in other circumstances, and incorporating violent actions into a largely nonviolent campaign tends to alienate the uncommitted and third parties who are potential allies.[35] Moreover, the risk to noncombatants is substantially greater in violent campaigns (as witness events in Syria in 2011–13).[36] In fact, a majority of the two hundred million killed as a result of collective violence in the last century were noncombatants.[37] And finally, the potential for leveraging moral persuasion as one dimension of satyagraha and encouraging defections from opponent forces are also higher when the opponent knows him or herself to be physically safe.[38]

Jonathan Schell, in *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People*, makes a compelling case that while violence played a part in some successful revolutions, nonviolent resistance was actually responsible for much of the success in those cases. For example, Schell argues that in the American Revolution, war did not decide the outcome; rather, the military needed only to endure while noncooperation and the constructive of parallel institutions produced an autonomous nation. Unity among the colonies (e.g., the Acts of Association), Committees of Correspondence, and independent local governance structures in each of the colonies built the new nation; noncooperation in taxation, refusal to participate in British justice structures, and other acts of noncooperation withheld real power from the Crown. As described by historian Gordon Wood, "The royal governors stood helpless as they watched para-governments grow up around them, a rapid piecing together from the bottom up of a hierarchy of committees and congresses that reached from the counties and towns through the provincial conventions to the Continental Congress."[39] The war that followed was essentially a war of self-defence requiring not victory but simply avoiding loss.[40]

As Schell notes, in some cases revolutionary overthrow was carried out with little or no bloodshed, but the foundation of the new order that followed was bathed in blood. In France, for example, the storming of the Bastille involved little actual violence; the governor turned it over to an angry crowd because the French defenders would not take up arms against their own people (a common pattern, as we shall see). In Russia in 1917, despite later propaganda to the contrary, Imperial troops refused to fight the people, since that would have violated the values they shared with the struggling poor.[41] Schell quotes Leon Trotsky, who, speaking at his trial for his involvement in an earlier uprising in 1905, foreshadowed the Bolsheviks' refusal:

> "No matter how important weapons may be it is not in them, gentlemen the judges, that great power resides. No! Not the ability of the masses to kill others but their great readiness themselves to die—this secures in the last instance the victory of the popular rising." For: "Only when the masses show readiness to die on the barricades can they win over the army on which the old regime relies. The barricade does not play in revolution the part which the fortress plays in regular

> warfare. It is mainly the physical and moral meeting ground between people and army."[42]

Gandhi made the same point many times—satyagrahis needed to be willing to suffer, even to die, if necessary. This principle played out in Peshawar in the North-West Frontier Province in India in April 1930, when two platoons of the Royal Garhwal Rifles refused to reinforce British troops who had massacred dozens of nonviolent protesters. In late 2009, a series of similar events occurred in Iran; the police became increasingly unwilling to attack the people, suggesting an underlying weakness in the regime, although repressive forces later regained the upper hand as protesters began to threaten violence. Troops in Tunisia also grew increasingly resistant to participating in violent suppression during the nonviolent revolution of 2011, as, subsequently, did those in Egypt. In each case, however, some among the resistance needed to suffer, and some to die, to evoke this change in the actions of security forces.

The history of nonviolent struggle has many important lessons to teach, the first of which is that nonviolent resistance can be extraordinarily and surprisingly powerful, but, as is the case in war, it can also be unpredictable. There will always be limits to what is known, and perhaps to what can be known. To the extent possible, however, it seems imperative and urgent to further explore nonviolent power such as Gandhi's "truth force" and Trotsky's power of the masses with an eye to understanding the dynamics involved in ways that go beyond historical anecdote.

THE NATURE OF NONVIOLENT POWER

The potential efficacy of nonviolent struggle is well established; understanding why and how nonviolent resistance can be so powerful is more complicated but is central to strategic execution. There is widespread agreement among activists and scholars that effective nonviolent struggle is not primarily symbolic. While Gandhi's strategy has often been viewed as "the politics of the moral gesture," he in fact had no patience with mere symbol.[43] In nonviolent struggle as he understood it, real power for liberation directly challenges oppressive power. Consistent with Gandhi's perspective, Cortright asserts, “To be politically effective, nonviolent action must be able to challenge power. Symbolic protest is not enough. One must also confront and undermine oppressive power with forceful action. . . . Such actions are more than an attempt to persuade. They actually undermine and impede the exercise of power.”[44]

Emphasizing the potency of satyagraha, Gandhi affirmed that “civil disobedience . . . is a full substitute for armed revolt” and that it is “a complete, effective, and bloodless substitute” for such revolt.[45] Ronald McCarthy and Gene Sharp argue that violence and nonviolence “may function as, and be viewed by participants as, alternative approaches” for pursuing justice.[46] David Dellinger, a lifelong justice and antiwar activist, described nonviolent action as a viable and accessible alternative to “counterviolence of the victimized.”[47] Whether nonviolent action does, in fact, function as a “full substitute” for violence is a complicated question. It is clearly not an exact substitute, since the long-term effects of the two differ in important ways, as noted above and explored in further depth later in this book.

There have been many dramatic protests that were largely symbolic, did not have an impact on power dynamics, and, in some cases, produced very high casualties. Sharp gives as examples the mass demonstrations in Burma in 1988 and in Tiananmen Square in 1989.[48] But separating symbol from the exercise of power is complicated. “To define clearly which actions are symbolic—and which more than that—one has to often look twice,” suggests Deming. “A bold foray that is absolutely certain to be stopped is, surely, symbolic action.”[49] Although the Burmese and Chinese actions may be seen as such “bold forays,” they did have psychological impact and will probably prove to have been more than symbolic over the long term in that they redefined reality for important segments of the population and contributed to later advances toward freedom.

Acknowledging that nonviolent action can be powerful raises another question: What is the substance of that power? Gene Sharp, in his seminal and widely used work *From Dictatorship to Democracy,* argues that dictatorships have weaknesses and that the power of nonviolence lies in exploiting those weaknesses. In doing so, the grievance population acquires further power. Sharp’s extensive historical work demonstrates that political defiance has particular strengths:[50]

1. It can be difficult to combat.
2. It can "uniquely aggravate weaknesses" of the oppressor and "sever its sources of power."
3. It can be targeted directly at the issue—for example, using political methods for political issues and economic methods for economic issues.
4. It can effectively use the grievance population as a whole and, because of the dispersion of power among the population, can therefore have democratizing effects.

Francis Fox Piven recently examined the power of civil disruption in the history of the United States. She acknowledges that the control of resources, especially wealth and force, provides power, but she asserts that "interdependent power"—the power to disrupt established networks of cooperation and interdependence, especially in a densely interconnected society—can be a potent counterforce.[51] Piven further emphasizes that resisters do not draw their power primarily from being obstreperous but rather from the disruption of "a pattern of ongoing and institutionalized cooperation that depends on their continuing contributions."[52] This profoundly important insight clarifies why understanding behavioural systems dynamics is so important. The better we can understand networks of interdependence, which are the core of behavioural systems science, the more nonviolent action can be targeted to have the greatest potential impact.

Barbara Deming's analysis of nonviolent power contributes essential additional dimensions to our understanding. Deming forcefully argued that violence is counterproductive in liberation movements—*because it is not radical enough*. Violence is the method of the oppressors; one joins those oppressors by choosing their methods. Deming criticized activists of her time for being too meek, claiming that much more radical action, nonviolent revolutionary action, is required to achieve justice. She believed that the direct disruption of public order is essential—but also that power is leveraged through the liberation of minds: "The most effective action *both* resorts to power *and* engages conscience."[53] Nonviolent action, according to Deming, must forcefully prevent the continuation of oppressive action: "If . . . we will wage battle without violence, we can remain very much more in control—of our own selves, of the responses to us which our adversaries make, of the battle as it proceeds, and of the future we hope will issue from it."[54] While Piven's work may seem more easily subjected to a scientific analysis, Deming's thought is also highly consistent with what we know of the workings of behavioural systems.

A SCIENCE OF NONVIOLENT POWER

And so we come to the science. Gandhi often suggested that nonviolence was a science, and he clearly meant this literally: "My life consists of nothing but experiments with truth," he declared.[55] As Schell notes, Gandhi's practice was consistent with his words: he made constant revisions to his actions and thought based on experimentation, thus avoiding fixed dogma. Furthermore, Gandhi presented the principles of nonviolent action as scientific laws, equivalent to the law of gravity, which work whether people believe in them or not.[56]

David Cortright highlights the need for careful analysis of nonviolent social action: "There is no contradiction between acting out of deeply held belief and striving to achieve concrete results. Nonviolent social movements are sometimes successful, and it is important to know why. . . . We know that certain strategies and tactics are more likely to succeed than others and that the study of strategic effectiveness matters."[57] Such study is the potential realm of the science that Gandhi sought. Yet, at least in terms of scientific work, the situation has improved only marginally since 1955, when the American Friends Service Committee declared, "There is now almost no place in our great universities, few lines in the budgets of our great foundations, and little space in scholarly journals, for thought and experimentation that begin with the unconditional rejection of organized mass violence and seek to think through the concrete problems of present international relations in new terms. It is time there was."[58] A decade and a half later, Deming deplored the lack of such study: "There should have been by now . . . much more extensive discussion and research on the whole question of different kinds of power, a much more vigorous attempt to define for the country the alternatives to military power as a means of defending what we value."[59]

The remainder of this volume clarifies work to achieve a scientific understanding of the dynamics of the networks of interdependence that Piven emphasized, an understanding that has important potential for defining and refining the alternatives to which Deming refers. While respecting and drawing on existing work by activists and scholars of other disciplines, the behavioural systems approach offers a unique perspective and therefore potentially unique contributions to the rigorous analysis of the dynamics of nonviolent struggle.[60] A behavioural systems analysis can help to clarify the interdependencies present in conflict situations and can suggest experiments for leveraging those interdependencies in the cause of justice and human rights. In the next chapter, we begin by looking at the importance of strategy and strategic analysis in nonviolent theory and praxis, before moving on to discuss behavioural systems science in chapters 3 and 4.

2

STRATEGIC NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

> One must develop a wise grand strategic plan for liberation and implement it skillfully.
>
> — Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*

The history of nonviolent resistance is a mixed narrative encompassing spontaneous, often reactive responses to oppressive situations, as well as thoughtfully executed campaigns. In some spontaneous cases, the resistance group happened upon the right tactic or method; in many, it did not. In the latter half of the twentieth century, an increasingly widespread recognition of the value of rigorous strategic analysis for effective action emerged among nonviolent theorists and practitioners. Work in this area by Gene Sharp, Robert Helvey, and Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler is especially noteworthy.[1] Ackerman and Kruegler, for example, made an important start toward empirically examining the real-world utility of a set of strategic principles that they extracted from the historical record. Still, the current near-consensus on the critical importance of strategic analysis and planning is best viewed as an attractively persuasive hypothesis that has not yet been rigorously tested. In this chapter, I trace some of the most important thinking of these and other theorists of nonviolent struggle and, in doing so, clarify several areas in which the behavioural systems science outlined in the next two chapters may have value.

Strategy is a central dimension of what Sharp and Ronald McCarthy term the "dynamics of social action": "Dynamics are the processes that occur during actual conflicts in which nonviolent action is used, especially as they either increase or decrease the likelihood that activists will achieve a conclusion acceptable to them. Dynamics include preparation, training, strategy, and organization and the kinds of interactions that conflict groups have with their adversaries, their supporters, and third parties who may be hostile, neutral, or indifferent. Lastly, dynamics refers also to the steps and stages that bring about a conclusion, particularly the mechanisms of change that may operate when successes are achieved."[2] Commonalities (and differences) between military strategy and nonviolence strategy are increasingly recognized. Strategically executed insurgency and guerrilla campaigns, as well as recent work related to counterinsurgency efforts (specifically, *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* developed by General David Petraeus and others), may also be potential sources of transferable knowledge. (At the time of writing, the jury is still out on the long-term success of those counterinsurgency strategies as they have been implemented in Iraq and Afghanistan.)

In this chapter, I focus specifically on current principles and understandings of strategic analysis and planning from both within and outside the field of nonviolent struggle, thus providing important background for what follows. The next two chapters then bring a behavioural systems lens to strategic analysis and, more broadly, to the *processes* of nonviolent action, which have sometimes been viewed in a more static and descriptive manner. Behavioural systems science elaborates and predicts patterns of interactions among actors and groups in testable ways. It therefore has the potential to refine strategic analysis more deeply than can collections of distinct constructs like "preparation," "stages," and "mechanisms"—relatively imprecise nouns that can be difficult to operationalize in consistent ways across campaigns.

STRATEGIC ANALYSIS AND ACTION

Gene Sharp describes four nested levels of strategy important to nonviolent struggle:

- Grand strategy: a master plan for the conduct of the campaign
- Strategy: "the major conception of how most efficiently to achieve objectives in a conflict"
- Methods: individual forms of action (e.g., picketing, consumer boycotts)
- Tactics: actions taken by a group when applying its chosen methods in a specific encounter with opponents[3]

Grand strategy, as Sharp defines it, provides direction for how the ultimate goals of a campaign are to be reached, a plan for how the struggle is to be won, a vision of the alternative reality to be built, and it outlines "in broad strokes how the nonviolent struggle group should conduct the conflict."[4] Most overall conflicts require addressing multiple objectives over time; the plan for how those objectives are to be pursued is roughly what Sharp refers to simply as *strategy* (or *campaign strategy,* in earlier work). Strategy "requires the continuous and simultaneous evaluation of a complex set of variables," which in turn requires a coherent perspective on and understanding of the dynamics involved.[5] *Methods,* for Sharp, are roughly parallel to "operational art" in military strategy: particular options for pursuing strategy. *Tactics* are specific decisions about how to act at a certain place and time to realize larger strategic objectives.

One critical strategic consideration—often neglected, to the ultimate disadvantage of the struggle being waged—is what happens should the campaign succeed. There are examples of struggles for liberation in which nonviolent resistance succeeds in bringing down a tyrant, but the resulting vacuum is filled by a coup that gives power to yet another tyrannical leader, or in which apparent liberation is followed by bloody conflicts.[6] The point at which a successful conclusion is in sight or major objectives have been achieved can be a high-risk time during which continuing strategic analysis and action planning are required to structure and sustain a new vision for the populations involved. As some of the recent spontaneous struggles in the Middle East have demonstrated, campaigns that focus on ending oppression but do not have a vision and plan for what is to be constructed should the campaign succeed are at high risk for producing limited benefit.

In strategic nonviolent action, methods and tactics should flow logically from strategy and on-the-ground realities within the conflict context. History suggests, however, that intuition and creativity are also important in strategic planning, given the uniqueness of every campaign. One of the central principles for nonviolent struggle emphasized by Ackerman and Kruegler is "expanding the repertoire of sanctions."[7] (Sanctions, as Ackerman and Kruegler use the term, are roughly equivalent to Sharp's "methods.") They note that the sanctions chosen should be creative and original, easily and widely replicable without requiring extensive training, within the experience of the people to the extent possible, and likely to build momentum; they should also facilitate seizing the initiative. Ackerman and Kruegler suggest that the last of these should not be left to chance; rather, progressively escalating steps should be integral to strategic planning.

Saul Alinsky, the well-known guru of community organizing for social action, offers nine "rules of power tactics" that should be taken into account in tactical planning:[8]

1. Power is not only what you have but what the enemy thinks you have.
2. Never go outside the experience of your people.
3. Wherever possible go outside the experience of the enemy.
4. Make the enemy live up to their own book of rules.
5. Ridicule is man's most potent weapon.
6. A good tactic is one that your people enjoy.
7. A tactic that drags on too long becomes a drag.
8. Keep the pressure on.
9. The threat is usually more terrifying than the thing itself.

Some of Alinsky's rules are engaging restatements of current widespread understandings. Rules 2 and 3, for example, mirror the guidance offered by Ackerman and Kruegler. Rule 4 is one dimension of Václav Havel's profound principle of "living in truth," which we will revisit later. Some of Alinsky's language, however, directly contradicts the perspectives of other theorists. I am reasonably confident that neither Gandhi nor Deming, for example, would consider the terms "enemy" or "terrifying" appropriate to nonviolent struggle, nor would they favour ridicule as a primary tactical option. Such disagreements ultimately require experimental testing, but in some cases, established principles of behavioural systems science strongly suggest the likely outcomes of such testing.

Detailed listings of a wide variety of methods and tactical options are available elsewhere; Sharp, for example, offered a preliminary list of 198 methods.[9] Examples will be presented throughout this volume to illustrate the breadth of possibilities.

POWER IN THE PEOPLE

Before looking in detail at the several ways in which nonviolent strategy has been understood, it is essential to stress the single most central strategic principle underlying nonviolent resistance, a principle on which nearly every theorist and practitioner agrees. Although it is not always obvious and, in fact, often seems counterintuitive, in every situation, to the best of current knowledge, *power finally lies in the people*. Every theoretician and practitioner of nonviolent struggle relies on this principle, at least implicitly and usually explicitly. Jonathan Schell explains Gandhi's confidence in this principle: "All government, he [Gandhi] steadily believed, depends for its existence on the cooperation of the governed. If that cooperation is withdrawn, the government will be helpless. Government is composed of civil servants, soldiers, and citizens. Each of these people has a will. If enough of them withdraw their support from the government, it will fall. . . . The central role of consent in all government meant that noncooperation—the withdrawal of consent—was something more than a morally satisfying activity; it was a powerful weapon in the real world."[10] History repeatedly demonstrates that no oppressor, no matter how many financial resources or how much physical force he or she controls, can stand indefinitely once legitimacy is lost. For this reason, as David Cortright notes, "the collective withdrawal of consent . . . is at the heart of the Gandhian method, and it is crucial to the strategy of nonviolent social change."[11] According to Gandhi, "The truth is that power resides in the people. . . . Civil disobedience is the storehouse of power."[12] Gandhi's unique contribution, his emphasis on mass action, emerged directly from this central principle; in Gandhi's eyes, all liberation was self-liberation.[13] Note that no one claims that exercising this power will be painless, simple, or quick—only that history indicates that it can ultimately prevail.

In describing the revolutions of the twentieth century, Schell writes, “In the new world of politically committed and active peoples, it was not force per se but the collective wills of those peoples that were decisive”—even in cases where they faced severe repression.[14] In the 1986 People Power revolution in the Philippines, President Ferdinand Marcos, essentially a dictator by this point, called for the surrender of rebel military leaders who had joined the nonviolent revolt led by Corazon Aquino and had taken refuge at two military camps in Manila. Fidel Ramos, at the time the vice chief of staff of the Philippine military (and later the president), gave a response that testifies to the power of the people: “We have no intention of surrendering as it is the people’s power protecting us. This certainly is a more powerful weapons system at our disposal. These people are unarmed. However, the power that they hold to support us is much more powerful than the hardware at Marcos’ command.”[15]

It is not only nonviolent theorists who recognize that populations hold final power. *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, written by General David Petraeus and colleagues, states that the civilian population is the “center of gravity—the deciding factor” in counterinsurgency efforts.[16] The manual therefore concentrates primarily on how to engage and leverage that power. Similarly, in 2009, the Taliban leaders in Afghanistan made a strategic decision to position themselves psychologically as a local Pashtun liberation movement. Taliban fighters were instructed in a code issued by their spiritual leadership (a) to avoid such actions as killing civilians in suicide bombings or public executions, (b) to assist with needed community improvements, and (c) to live and work in harmony with local populations. One former Taliban official acknowledged in a *New York Times* interview that the change occurred because the Taliban leaders had come to recognize that to win, they needed the support of the people.[17] As with other guerrilla campaigns, the primary target became the minds and hearts of the entire population: the guerrilla troops, the enemy troops, and the civilians. This is standard practice in insurgencies. Scott Wimberley points out that in effective insurgencies, guerrillas work side by side with the people to build communities, always with attention to being respectful and courteous.[18] As noted by senior military strategist John Collins, “both sides seek support from or acceptance by the same population” and “primary battlefields thus lie within human minds.”[19] These are important lessons for those attempting to engage populations in campaigns of nonviolent struggle as well.

This central message, that no other force—whether military dictatorship, structural economic oppression, or terrorist network—can finally stand against a population that withdraws legitimacy and support, has been consistently repeated by military strategists, guerrilla leaders, nonviolent activists, liberation theologians, and savvy political analysts. Recall Frances Fox Piven's discussion of interdependencies: according to her, political power emerges from interlocking networks of continuous interactions (a corollary of behavioural systems theory).[20] If those interactions are interrupted, power dissipates. The people have the potential to disrupt the interactions supporting oppression; this is where their power lies.

Gene Sharp and Robert Helvey discuss this reality in terms of "pillars of support," organizations and institutions that a regime or a resistance movement relies on for successful operation.[21] Sharp identifies six "sources of power," in various combinations and strengths, that are expressed in these pillars of support:[22]

- Authority and legitimacy
- Human resources
- Skills and knowledge
- Intangible factors (e.g., cultural values, attitudes toward obedience)
- Material resources
- The ability to apply sanctions

These pillars are neither unchanging nor untouchable; weakening them requires analysis of what Sharp calls the "balance of dependencies" between the oppressor and the grievance group.[23] That balance can be shifted by disrupting the networks of interlocking practices that actualize central pillars. For example, financial resources are required to maintain power, but the existence of a bank account alone cannot support a ruler. Networks of human interactions are necessary to direct those resources toward those who act to support the regime. The key function of nonviolent action is to have an impact on such interdependent networks of interactions.

ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INTERDEPENDENCIES

Given her emphasis on dynamic interdependencies, Frances Fox Piven's work provides an important initial explanation for the sources of power underlying Sharp's pillars. Speaking of those at the bottom of hierarchical relations, Piven emphasizes that their power lies primarily in their ability to disrupt existing systems.[24] Given the growing complexities of a globalizing world, she believes that capacities for disruption are increasing, despite appearances of increasingly centralized power. Interdependencies are not generalized; rather, they are unique to "particular groups who are in particular relationships with particular capitalists or particular state authorities at particular places and particular times."[25] As examples, Piven traces the distinct dynamics of interdependencies and disruption that powered a number of historical movements in the United States, including mob actions at the time of the American Revolution, the abolitionist movement, the New Deal, and the Great Society. Consistent with behavioural systems theory, she demonstrates how political action occurs within a matrix of social relations among multiple institutions and communities (economic, political, family, religious), all of which are vulnerable to disruption.

Piven maintains that "strategies are forged in a dance of conflict and cooperation between the parties to interdependent relations."[26] While coercive force and manipulations of the material bases of biological and social life are integral dimensions of oppression, oppressive power also depends on cultural constructions: the ways in which the population understands reality. Unless the grievance population recognizes their contribution to the support of the current state, their place in networks of social relations, they are unlikely to act. Once those realities are recognized, options for strategically mixing and phasing cooperative and disruptive options emerge: a focused disruption may reverberate widely throughout densely interconnected societies.

Most cooperative relations are rule-governed. Disruption therefore requires breaking the rules—rules that are deeply embedded in current interdependencies and the cultures they shape. Rule-governed behaviour and social constructions are areas that behavioural science has come to understand well, including how they become fixed and how they may be shifted. As we shall see, in tracing the dynamics of networks of social relations, behavioural systems science can help to identify potential leverage points, further people's consciousness of their real power, and help to determine how most efficiently to exercise it.

STRATEGIC THINKING IN NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

The recent emergence of an explicit emphasis on strategic analysis and action in nonviolent struggle is an important development. A handful of major figures have been primarily responsible for this advance, although many have contributed. The paragraphs that follow summarize key contributions; readers are strongly encouraged, however, to explore the richness of the original sources, which can only be hinted at here.

Gandhi

Gandhi's collected works comprise about a hundred volumes; obviously, we can only touch on his strategic thinking here. His campaigns were generally organized into three stages: (a) persuasion, in which he attempted to reach a peaceful solution; (b) sacrifice, both to reach the conscience of the opponent and to purify the grievance group for the coming struggle; and (c) active noncooperation.[27] Gandhi's satyagraha was rooted in spiritual commitment to an ethic of loving struggle and in strict discipline and self-sacrifice.[28] When it was necessary to maintain nonviolent discipline, Gandhi turned to "*satyagraha* against ourselves," fasting even unto death to pressure his followers to end violence that sometimes emerged among or was perpetrated by supporters of his cause.[29]

Gandhi's campaigns had a single overarching goal: *Poorna Swaraj*, or complete self-governance. Self-governance referred both to individuals and to the group, and was understood to be possible only within a dynamic of interdependence. At the same time, Gandhi was fully aware that "Civil Disobedience can never be directed for a general cause such as for Independence"; rather, it must be "centred round a particular issue, i.e. free speech. . . . The issue must be definite and capable of being clearly understood and within the power of the opponent to yield."[30] Gandhi's general strategic model, then, began with clarifying the issue and appealing to the opponent for change. If this approach was not successful, the campaign moved toward a solemn commitment to the struggle and the maintenance of strict discipline, a public information campaign, "the generation of an ambience of moral authority and pressure, and finally a compromise solution to save the face and honor of all concerned."[31]

Clearly, "the generation of an ambience of moral authority and pressure" covers a great deal of strategic ground. The strategic direction that Gandhi regarded as most important and most powerful, his "constructive programme," is also probably the least known and certainly the least analytically well developed. Constructive noncooperation (the term used for the "constructive programme" by Schell in *The Unconquerable World*) involves the construction of a new reality within the shell of the old and is discussed in depth later in this volume. Better-known methods used in Gandhi's campaigns include, for example, boycotts of British cloth and liquor, the Salt March and the subsequent nonviolent raid on the Dharasana salt works, and the refusal to pay land assessments and other taxes. Maintaining nonviolent discipline across India during such campaigns proved exceedingly difficult, however, and more than once, Gandhi called off an action or turned to the "*satyagraha* against ourselves" mentioned above to try to bring matters under control. More successful in maintaining discipline was Gandhi's close ally, Badshah Khan, who organized a hundred thousand–strong nonviolent Muslim army in the Pashtun tribal lands between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Stating that "nonviolence is not for cowards," Gandhi proposed that the Pashtuns' long history as warriors had better prepared them for courageous, disciplined action than was the case for dissidents in India.[32]

Gandhi brought nonviolent struggle to the attention of the world, and we learned an enormous amount from his "experiments" about what works and what doesn't. His campaigns are still being mined for guidance. Gandhi's campaigns evoked violent and punitive responses from the British that could not be hidden from the world. At the same time, a number of those campaigns got out of control, and in some cases Gandhi's strategic plans were vague. He experienced considerable disappointment regarding how few people accepted the moral basis of nonviolent struggle and how difficult maintaining nonviolent discipline proved to be.[33] Nonetheless, as Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall point out, "Nonviolent action did not force out the British in 1930–31, and it did not work the way Gandhi had expected—but it worked. The suffering of protesters did not change the minds of the British, but *it did change the minds of the Indians* about the British. For tens of millions of Indians, *satyagraha* and its results changed cooperation with the raj from a blessing into blasphemy."[34] The colonial government had lost all legitimacy among the population, and its fall became inevitable.

Gene Sharp and Robert Helvey

Gandhi brought worldwide attention to the power of nonviolent struggle and devoted strenuous effort to attempts to refine and understand it, but he was not primarily an analytic strategist. It was chiefly Gene Sharp who initially brought focused attention to the potential of strategic analysis and action to leverage power in his three-volume work *The Politics of Nonviolent Action,* particularly in volume three, *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action.* His more recent works—including *From Dictatorship to Democracy, Waging Nonviolent Struggle, Self-Liberation,* and *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle*—refine his early insights. Drawing on such military strategists as Carl von Clausewitz, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Liddell Hart, Sharp identifies the multiple and interconnected levels of strategic thinking, examines key factors relevant to strategic analysis, and outlines strategic options that are consistent with the outcomes sought (conversion of the opponent, accommodation by the opponent, nonviolent coercion of an unwilling opponent, or complete disintegration of the opposition). Based on his extensive study of the history of nonviolent struggle, he has clarified strategic guidelines for success in nonviolent struggle. Among these are the following, some of which may be surprising but all of which have significant historical support:[35]

- Develop a thorough understanding of the dynamics and mechanisms of nonviolent action before attempting to formulate a strategic plan.
- Plan your struggle so that success relies only on the actions of your own group rather than on third parties.
- Carefully formulate the objectives for both the overall struggle and individual campaigns.

- Strengthen the population, the resistance group, and independent institutions in preparation for and in the course of the struggle.
- Undermine the opponent's sources of power.
- Defy the opponents' violent repression.
- Maintain persistent nonviolent discipline

Throughout his work, Sharp particularly emphasizes the strategic importance of undermining the opponents' pillars of support. In his manual *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, he stresses that in strategic nonviolent struggle the work does not begin by challenging the opponent but rather by "strengthen[ing] the oppressed population themselves in their determination, self-confidence and resistance skills" and by strengthening autonomous institutions and associations among that population. (Note the similarities to Gandhi here.) The leadership of the resistance movement that emerges is then in a position to develop a "grand strategic plan for liberation."[36] It is important to note that most of Sharp's guidelines, rather than simply being opinions based on anecdote, are supported by the scientific analyses presented later in this book.

Sharp maintains that "a liberation struggle is a time for self-reliance and internal strengthening of the struggle group" and that "against a strong self-reliant force, given wise strategy, disciplined and courageous action, and genuine strength, the dictatorship will eventually crumble." His work provides nuanced discussions of dozens of critical strategic refinements. Enormous knowledge, experience, and wisdom inform Sharp's work; anyone interested in nonviolent resistance should begin there. His *Self-Liberation* and the online resources cited therein are particularly useful resources for those organizing a resistance campaign. In that volume, Sharp speaks of all effective liberation as self-liberation, a crucial message for resistance movement participants.

Robert Helvey, who has an extensive background in military strategy, undertook to expand on Sharp's ideas in his 2004 work, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals*. Helvey places particular emphasis on operational realities (down to weather and terrain), psychological operations and propaganda, and the preparation of a "strategic estimate."[37] Of particular interest for our purposes are his notion of strategic estimate and his identification of a core body of knowledge critical to strategic nonviolent struggle.

Helvey's outline for a strategic estimate begins with the development of a mission statement that specifies both goals and strategies for removing the current oppressive structure and, critically, a vision of what is to take its place to avoid replacing one coercive structure with another. An adequate mission statement also clarifies who will be responsible for overall planning and implementation of the campaign (often an umbrella organization). The strategic estimate goes on to detail the existing situation, including the physical, political, police, and military contexts; specific strengths and weaknesses of both the opponent and the grievance group; and the potential impact of third parties. Analyses of these variables and of likely (and other possible) courses of action by the opponent then lead to decisions on the overall strategic directions. Most of those involved in the field of nonviolent resistance believe that there are significant potential benefits in preparing an overall strategic plan for a nonviolent campaign prior to engagement. At the same time, as Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler remind us, we do not yet have any historical examples of the use of a fully explicit strategic and operational plan for nonviolent struggle. We should, therefore, hold such assertions lightly, particularly given the success of many relatively spontaneous campaigns.[38]

Helvey also proposes "a core package of knowledge and skills on the theory and application of nonviolent struggle"—an intriguing and promising idea given the enormous complexities of current knowledge and historical experience.[39] (Sharp's *Self-Liberation* might be seen as an effort to provide such a package.) Helvey's proposed core might best be viewed as a series of hypotheses to be tested over time, given that sociocultural events are determined by a multitude of factors within contexts of enormous complexity. Helvey believes that the following elements should be included in a body of core knowledge:

- The importance of selecting final and intermediate objectives for the struggle
- The pluralistic nature of power, its sources, and how that power is expressed in institutions and organizations called "pillars of support"
- Exposure to the vast arsenal of nonviolent tools and methods
- Fear and techniques for overcoming its effects
- Exposure to fundamentals of propaganda
- Contaminants to nonviolent movements[40]

Surprisingly, missing from this list are the fundamentals of constructing a strategic estimate; perhaps Helvey felt that this went without saying given its central place in his manual. Attention to understanding the dynamics of interdependencies that structure contemporary interconnected social and cultural networks is addressed in his list only in terms of "pillars of support." The metaphor of pillars, however, has a more static feel than does a focus on matrices of dynamic interactions, as discussed later.

Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler

Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler's *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century* (1994) marks an important milestone in strategic thinking.[41] For Ackerman and Kruegler, strategy is a fluid process of conflict analysis oriented toward "how to gain objectives at minimum expense and risk."[42] These authors also draw heavily upon—and view their work as refining—Gene Sharp's analysis. Notably, quoting Thomas Schelling, they explicitly recognize the interdependencies present in conflict situations:

> The tyrant and his subjects are in somewhat symmetrical positions. *They* can deny *him* most of what *he* wants—they can, that is, if they have the disciplined organization to refuse collaboration. And *he* can deny *them* just about everything *they* want—he can deny it by using the force at his command. . . . It is a bargaining situation in which either side, if adequately disciplined and organized, can deny most of what the other wants; and it remains to be seen who wins.[43]

Ackerman and Kruegler's principles are meant to guide the grievance group in shifting this dynamic balance toward a more just outcome. The emphasis in their work is on obstruction rather than construction of a new reality; while the latter is not absent in their writing, it does not emerge as centrally as in some of the other perspectives discussed.

The work of Ackerman and Kruegler is rich and nuanced. They separate their twelve principles into five principles of development, four principles

TABLE 1. Principles of strategic nonviolent conflict

Principles of Development
1. Formulate functional objectives.
2. Develop organizational strength.
3. Secure access to critical material resources.
4. Cultivate external assistance.
5. Expand the repertoire of sanctions.
Principles of Engagement
6. Attack the opponents' strategy for consolidating control.
7. Mute the impact of the opponents' violent weapons.
8. Alienate opponents from expected bases of support.
9. Maintain nonviolent discipline.
Principles of Conception
10. Assess events and options in light of levels of strategic decision making.
11. Adjust offensive and defensive operations according to the relative vulnerabilities of the protagonists.
12. Sustain continuity between sanctions, mechanisms, and objectives.

SOURCE: Reprinted with permission from Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century, table 2.1, 23.

of engagement, and three principles of conception (see table 1). Principles of development involve strengthening the environment for conflict before engaging. Principles of engagement relate to how the struggle is waged under the pressure of events. And principles of conception involve ongoing strategic thinking, assessments of what has been done, and decisions about further directions.

Ackerman and Kruegler caution readers that the principles listed are "exploratory rather than definitive"—they are hypotheses to be tested rather than established fact.[44] In *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, their primary agenda is to examine a set of exemplar cases to explore whether the presence or absence of the concepts listed in the identified principles does in fact tend to predict success or failure. This approach is consonant with a scientific approach to understanding the dynamics of nonviolent conflict. For example, the data presented suggest that principles of development may be important for success but cannot stand on their own: the successful cases studied conformed with these principles; partial conformity was associated with stalemate, but both cases of failure largely conformed as well. Lack of conformity with principles of engagement and conception was often associated with stalemate or failure in the cases studied. Overall, full conformity with the proposed principles was associated with success, a mixture of nonconformity and partial conformity with stalemate, and—perhaps surprisingly—a mixture of partial conformity and full conformity with failure.[45]

Finally, Ackerman and Kruegler assert, "There is no substitute for a deep grounding in the context and the unique circumstances of an individual case."[46] Like war, nonviolent struggle is always complex and often at least temporarily chaotic; the best-established principles, therefore, can only serve as promising guides. Ackerman and Kruegler found no cases that conformed fully with every one of their principles, and it is likely that no finite set of principles can capture all of the dynamics of complex campaigns.

Although Ackerman and Kruegler's results are based on only a handful of cases, they offer preliminary evidence of the value of such analysis and, in doing so, constitute a real advance. They have offered a useful inductive approach that they acknowledge to be incomplete. This is not a criticism; it is the way rigorous science works, relying on a progression of partial advances. An alternative approach that can help identify missing or hidden dimensions is one grounded in established theory, the direction taken later in this book. The best science typically emerges from the interweaving of inductive and theory-based analyses.

Barbara Deming

This book began with Barbara Deming's call to urgent action. We return to her here as, in some ways, the grandest of grand strategists. Deming (1917–84) was a writer, journalist, and feminist advocate—but above all, she was a revolutionary. In her essay "On Revolution and Equilibrium," written in part as a response to Franz Fanon's *The Wretched of the Earth* (1963) and published in her 1971 book *Revolution and Equilibrium*, she asserts, "If the genius of guerrilla warfare is to make it impossible for the other side really to exploit its superior brute force, nonviolence can be said to carry this even further" (210). Deming believed, however, that up to the time she was writing in the 1960s and 1970s, advocates of nonviolent methods had commonly lacked a sufficiently radical vision. Nonviolent action had usually been far too timid in challenging injustices that required revolutionary nonviolent resistance, revolutionary coercion, the exercise of revolutionary power. This was a difficult leap, because most people "are in deep awe of things-as-they-are," believing that somehow what-is must make sense (264). Deming's challenge to nonviolent activists is to act much more aggressively, to use the power that nonviolent action offers to its fullest extent. With few exceptions, Deming therefore supported the use of most forms of nonviolent power that did not cause physical injury to another being. She insisted that both noncooperation and disruption, to whatever degree necessary, were likely to be required in the pursuit of justice and human rights.

Complementing this clarion call were Deming's strategic insights, which were brilliant, accessible, and, as will be clear in later chapters, highly consistent with what we have come to know of behavioural systems dynamics. She recognized that the oppressive system "*relies* on our cooperation. This is how we stand up for ourselves nonviolently: we refuse the authorities our labor, we refuse them our money (our taxes), we refuse them our bodies (to fight their wars). We strike. We go even beyond this and block and obstruct and disrupt the operation of that system in which we cannot feel like free men. . . . One can make life as usual, business as usual, simply impossible for our antagonists" (223; emphasis in the original). Crucially, however, Deming further argues that the choice commonly drawn between engaging conscience and resorting to coercive power is false; both are essential:

> Noncooperation, disruption, can be violent or nonviolent. When it is nonviolent I believe it is immensely more powerful in the long run. Because one has then, as it were, two hands upon the adversary. With one hand one shakes up the adversary. With one hand one shakes up his life drastically, makes it impossible for him simply to continue as he has been. With the other hand we calm him, we control his response to us. Because we respect his rights as well as ours, his real, his human rights—because we reassure him that it is not his destruction that we want, merely justice—we keep him from responding to our actions as men respond to violence, mechanically, blindly. (224)

Deming further notes that the control achieved goes beyond control of the response of the opponent to the control of ultimate outcomes and explains why an approach ensuring the opponent of their safety provides further leverage. "If, as revolutionaries, we will wage battle without violence," she writes, "we can remain very much more in control—of ourselves, of the responses to us which our adversaries make, of the battle as it proceeds, and of the future we hope will issue from it" (195). She goes on to argue that maintaining a respectful attitude toward our opponent in fact enhances the effectiveness of our resistance:

> We can put *more* pressure on the antagonist for whom we show human concern. It is precisely solicitude for his person *in combination with* a stubborn interference with his actions that can give us a very special degree of control (precisely in our acting both with love, if you will—in the sense that we respect his human rights—and truthfulness, in the sense that we act out fully our objections to his violating *our* rights). We put upon him two pressures—the pressure of our defiance of him and the pressure of our respect for his life—and it happens that in combination these two pressures are uniquely effective. (207; emphasis in the original)

Deming was particularly aware that those defeated in a successful nonviolent campaign under almost all circumstances must subsequently be lived with as part of the new system. This is one of the reasons she gives for the need to act both radically and with respect. Perhaps even more importantly, however, the battle engaged in is for humanity, for human community, and, like most other nonviolent theorists, she does not believe that inhumane action can increase such community: "We have to be gentle . . . with those who are frightened by us—try, as we act, not to sever all community with them. Because it is for human community that we are struggling" (261). Clearly, this is grand strategy.

One further note: Deming believed that not only had activists not taken disruption nearly far enough, but they had also stopped far too short of constructive noncooperation "that confronts those who are 'running everything' with independent activity, particularly independent economic activity" (205). This is a central insight, strongly supported, as we shall see, by behavioural systems science.

VIOLENCE AND PROPERTY DAMAGE

A crucial strategic question in campaigns challenging serious injustice is whether it is just, realistic, or important to expect complete nonviolence on the part of participants in a resistance movement. A related question is whether property damage is acceptable as part of a nonviolent campaign. Both questions are complex, although there is more general agreement on the first than on the second.

Violence

It is important to recognize that the issue of whether to expect complete nonviolence really involves three questions. Is it just to expect that someone who is being violently oppressed will refrain completely from violence? Perhaps not. Is it realistic? The evidence from many campaigns around the world suggests that it is very challenging, but possible, for a disciplined nonviolent campaign to avoid violence altogether. The most complex question is how important such restraint is to the outcome. Might it be useful at key moments to incorporate "a little" violence into a largely nonviolent campaign challenging severe injustice? And is there a point where violence becomes the only option?

These have been difficult questions for resistance movements and their supporters. It is common for relatively spontaneous mass protests to involve some property damage and some degree of violence. In *Challenging Authority*, Frances Fox Piven discusses the power of mass social and economic disruption over the course of US history, from the American Revolution through the events of the 1960s. Some of these movements produced rioting, threats of mob action, and looting, and, in Piven's view, because of those destructive actions, they were able to bring about significant social change. With respect to armed conflict, David Cortright sees "a certain degree of revolutionary romanticism . . . among some American progressives," citing events like Oliver Stone's posing with armed Zapatistas in 1996.[47] There can be little doubt as to the injustices faced by the Indigenous peoples of Mexico; in general, however, the Zapatista revolt has refrained from any except limited defensive violence for over fifteen years, finding other strategies more useful. Both Malcolm X and Nelson Mandela at one time refused to rule out violent resistance but later supported nonviolent methods exclusively. Reverend Martin Luther King Jr., certainly one of the great figures in nonviolent struggle, ultimately committed to complete nonviolence, but not without some struggle. It is difficult to argue from a justice perspective that violence, particularly defensive violence, is always immoral; from most perspectives, it is not. But that is not the central question in taking a scientific approach.

Drawing on the extensive available history, most students of nonviolent social action agree that violence in resistance movements can be costly. Helvey views violence as a contaminant that, for several reasons, places a campaign at risk.[48] One practical consideration is immediately apparent: oppressors almost always have superiority in weaponry and the capacity for violence; choosing to fight with weapons similar to the opponent's is usually a prescription for high casualties and probable defeat. As Moncef Marzouki, of the Tunisian League for Human Rights, noted, the 2011 revolutionary movement in Tunisia realized that it "couldn't overthrow this kind of dictatorship by guns" because its members would be "treated as terrorists. . . . So what was left? Only civil resistance."[49] Advancing technologies of death (including from invisible sources in the sky) have only intensified this issue. Indeed, Sharp observes that whatever the rhetoric offered, campaigns of guerrilla warfare have seldom produced real benefits for oppressed groups and have always proved very costly to those populations.[50]

Deming makes another pragmatic argument for eschewing violence: nonviolent resistance is simply more effective in reaching the goals of freedom and community building and in reducing casualties. Nonviolent activists, in her view, can limit the level of violence from all sides by remaining nonviolent; if they shift to violence, an escalating cycle of reciprocal violence is assured.[51] Sharp concurs, stating his own version of Deming's "two hands" argument alluded to earlier. He observes that it is nearly always important to try to engage police and military on a human basis and to clarify that they and those they are supporting are not at personal risk: "Troops should learn that the struggle will be of a special character, designed to undermine the dictatorship but not to threaten their lives."[52] This understanding suggests that actions like those in Iran in 2010, and in a number of countries during the 2011 Arab Spring, with crowds chanting "Death to the dictator!" and similar slogans, may be counterproductive, since those known to be supporters of the individuals being threatened are likely to feel threatened themselves.

A second consistently used argument against the use of any violence is that doing so, even as a small part of an overall campaign, risks alienating a movement's supporters. The evidence here is strong. The first Palestinian intifada began as a largely nonviolent movement, relying on boycotts, strikes, and other nonviolent methods. Some youth, however, engaged in throwing stones (and, later, Molotov cocktails) against armed Israeli troops. The media and public image of the movement quickly became primarily one of "the children of the stones."[53] The US civil rights movement developed a strong following among the general population in large part due to its disciplined use of nonviolence. Urban riots from 1964 to 1968, however, dramatically shifted public opinion and risked weakening the public's commitment to action to achieve equal rights; many came to view the African American population as unpredictable and potentially dangerous. Cesar Chavez argued that maintaining complete nonviolent discipline was essential to keeping the support of allies like the religious community and the general public and that it would also reduce the risk of violence toward union members.[54] Chavez also strongly believed in the moral superiority and spiritual power of disciplined nonviolence.

Summarizing these pragmatic arguments, Cortright concludes: "Violence is counterproductive, undermining a movement's ability to claim the moral high ground and alienating third parties. . . . Disruptive methods are most effective when they remain strictly within the framework of nonviolence. . . . One of the surest ways for adversaries to undermine a social movement is to portray it as violent."[55] He gives the persuasive example of the relatively rare bombings and overt violence that occurred during the period of the Vietnam War protests and reduced support for the peace movement among the general population by associating protesters with extremists. Many war resisters themselves lost faith in the movement.

The pragmatic arguments have, until recently, been supported largely by anecdote. It is not difficult to find examples where incorporating some violence was counterproductive, but there have also been instances of success despite some failures of nonviolent discipline. Here also, then, open questions remain. Recently, however, it has become possible to begin to test some of these questions. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, in their analysis of 323 nonviolent and violent campaigns, persuasively demonstrate that the risk of subsequent civil war almost doubled when a nonviolent campaign co-existed with actions by armed groups, in comparison to cases in which nonviolent campaigns alone were present.[56] As discussed later, their data also suggest that violence appears never to be necessary to overcoming repressive regimes and that it probably is not necessary in challenging other cases of structural injustice, either. Given these data and the substantial advantages of nonviolent campaigns outlined in chapter 1, the importance of maintaining nonviolent discipline seems clear.

Self-Injury

Particularly because of a series of self-immolations in the Middle East in early 2011, the question of the place of self-injury in nonviolent struggle needs to be considered. There is a substantial history of fasting as protest, including "fasts unto death" by Gandhi, Cesar Chavez, Anna Hazare in contemporary India, and others. Such action sometimes places enormous pressure on opponents, is clearly within the mainstream of nonviolent action, and does not meet the most common definitions of violence as discussed early. Highly lethal actions like self-immolation are clearly something different. Some such actions, like Vietnamese monks setting themselves on fire as a disciplined form of protest, emerge from serious, often collective, discernment processes. Those actions are consistent with a Buddhist culture that appreciates the power of self-sacrifice and should probably be regarded as consistent with most understandings of nonviolent social action.[57] Recent self-immolations in Tibet (twenty-nine in a one-year period) share some cultural dimensions with those in Vietnam, but in many cases, they appear to have resulted more from intense frustration than from principled commitment.[58]

Then there are examples like Mohamed Bouazizi, in Tunisia, who set himself on fire in December 2010 after experiencing sustained harassment at the hands of a municipal official and her aides; cases like these are closer to the suicides of desperate people. While such acts often have a protest function, as with a recent series of self-immolations among Tunisian young men and even some women, in many cases they reflect psychological displacement or relatively desperate escapes from unbearable situations.[59] As Michael Nagler notes, these acts are inconsistent with most understandings of nonviolent struggle because they are not part of a conversation with the opponent or an organized campaign for change.[60] They are more a cry of pain and outrage. At the same time, they can have profound social impact under conditions where many share similar pain. Acts of rage may serve as models for similar acts directed toward others. The principles elaborated later in this volume are helpful for further analysis of the utility of such acts; the violence that almost immediately followed Bouazizi's action suggests the attendant risks, but the success of the subsequent (largely nonviolent) movement initiating the Arab Spring raises new questions that require exploration.

Sabotage and Property Damage

Students of nonviolent struggle express a considerable range of opinions as to the value and costs of property damage as a method of action. Cortright presents a thoughtful discussion of this issue, on which I draw here.[61] Gandhi saw such damage as violence, although not to the same degree as violence against persons; he believed that violence against property suggests the potential for personal violence.[62] This is probably not a false connection; in domestic violence and in contemporary "Black Bloc" protests against globalization, for example, escalation from property damage to physical attack is common. Gandhi therefore explicitly rejected sabotage and other property damage in his campaigns. Dorothy Day also rejected property damage as a method, even in cases that involved damaging the war machine.[63] Her stance on this question, according to Cortright, may have been shaped by her experience of damage to Catholic Worker facilities and documents by right-wing groups.[64]

Although Cortright claims that Sharp presents sabotage as a legitimate nonviolent method, this appears to be a misreading. In 1973, Sharp argued that "the introduction of sabotage will seriously weaken a nonviolent action movement" because the dynamics and mechanism of sabotage and most forms of property damage conflict with those of nonviolent struggle, a point that he reasserted in 2005.[65] He points to several reasons why sabotage can damage nonviolent campaigns:[66]

- Nonviolent action by its nature involves a direct person-to-person challenge, while sabotage is secret and impersonal.
- Sabotage is likely to reduce support from third parties.
- Sabotage commonly results in highly disproportionate levels of repression, often against the general population (in part because the perpetrators cannot be identified).
- Sabotage can risk injury to innocent people.

At the same time, Sharp suggests in *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action* that such actions as destroying files or removing key parts from machinery in ways that involve no risk to people but disrupt oppression or violence might, under some circumstances, be acceptable.

Deming's position on property damage is finely nuanced and grounded in her radical but frankly loving perspective.[67] Certain forms of property damage can be consistent, in her view, with a dual emphasis on making a powerful revolutionary statement while reassuring the opponent that he or she will experience no harm. Although parts of the death machine can be legitimate targets for destruction, activists should avoid harming personal property. In her own words: "May they also be scrupulously careful not to destroy the kind of property that has valid life meaning for people. . . . Some property of course is like the very extension of a man's life—or the extension of many men's lives. . . . Destroy only property that is by its nature deathly or exploitative, and unambiguously so."[68]

Deming emphasized the need to encourage growing support for a movement among the general public. She believed that respect for personal property as an extension of the person was important for achieving this. Resources that clearly support oppression, however, were viewed as appropriate targets offering opportunities to demonstrate radical resolve. One dimension of Deming's stance, as she was well aware, raises a question. Most nonviolent theorists have emphasized the need to make one's statement publicly, standing ready to take obstructive action and face the consequences—thus "standing in frankness before the *public.*"[69] This was, of course, the approach taken by Gandhi, the US civil rights movement, and many other nonviolent movements. The failure to stand before the public is among Sharp's objections to the secrecy associated with sabotage. For Deming, however, the issue with “standing” is that under certain circumstances, such action suggests unearned respect for the authority of the oppressor. She therefore suggests some alternatives—such as going into hiding but surfacing at public gatherings, or sharing statements through taped or filmed interviews—but does not offer a final resolution to this question.

One related criticism of radical globalization protesters like the Black Bloc is that when they damage property (sometimes targeting symbolic corporate sites but occasionally causing more indiscriminate destruction) and, in some cases, attack police before disappearing into the streets, they fail to “stand” and are thereby not accountable for their actions. There are, of course, other issues with such movements. Most who study nonviolent struggle believe that the failure of these actors to demonstrate respect for opponents and bystanders, their indiscriminate damage to property with “valid life meaning for people,” and their readiness to shift into violence blur the distinction between the movement and the opponent, and thereby reduce support among the general population. As Cortright maintains, street trashing conveys “lawless rampaging rather then concern for global justice.”[70] The responses of the protesters—that new methods are needed since the old have lost power, that their actions constitute an important symbolic refusal to accept hierarchy, that “diversity of tactics,” including sabotage or violence is necessary to keep the opponent off-balance, or that violent oppression deserves a violent response—clearly place them outside the mainstream nonviolent resistance community.

Cortright further argues that destruction by a few cannot take the place of action by the many and that “movements are most successful when they reach toward the political mainstream.” Chavez emphasized “the ability of dignified suffering to attract sympathy and political support.”[71] And Deming was adamant about the importance of getting the general public on one’s side: “As we strike at the machinery of death, we have to do so in a way that the general population understands, that encourages more and more people to join us. This is surely the great challenge to the movement: How to make the public understand that it’s ‘all right’ to attack the death machine—that it is necessary? How to free their minds to see this and join us?”[72] We will return to approaches that contribute to “winning hearts and minds” to support nonviolent action for justice in later chapters.

THE PLACE OF THIRD PARTIES

A crucial related question is the place of third parties in nonviolent campaigns. One strong assertion shared by both nonviolent activists and insurgent movements is that, to use Sharp's words, "if the liberation of oppressed people is to happen and be genuine and durable, it must . . . be essentially self-liberation."[73] This recognition has been widely accepted in the nonviolence community; Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Cesar Chavez, and many others had much the same understanding. By contrast, John Galtung, in his theory of the "great chain of nonviolence," claims that political change does not come through resistance but from the actions of others on behalf of the grievance group.[74]

History clearly shows, however, that third parties (e.g., nations, other ethnic or racial groups, international and nongovernmental organizations) can almost never be relied upon to set their own interests aside over the long term, and their support may therefore be inconstant. At the same time, the evidence also suggests that third parties may provide valuable support to an internally strong resistance movement. In general, nonviolence evokes support while violence repels it (for either side). There is evidence that shifts in opinion among the British public as a result of the violence perpetrated by their own forces in the Dharasana salt works protest and the response of the American public to the use of whips, dogs, and firehoses against civil rights activists changed the balance of power in each case. In a world of globalized communications, "world opinion, " however inconstant, is now a consideration for even the most repressive regimes.

Another use of third parties, nonviolent accompaniment, involves one or more outsiders who physically shadow members of the resistance, creating both a small immediate audience and, potentially, a much larger distal audience should injury be done to the accompanier. In a great many cases, Cortright notes, the presence of an audience is essential to the effect of nonviolent actions; Sharp discusses this dynamic in terms of "political ju-jitsu"—excessive brutality produces widespread revulsion, which both aids in recruiting additional activists and creates pressure from the wider public and other third parties favouring the resistance movement.[75] Third parties may be essential in campaigns to stop genocide, working in collaboration with both the population of the target group and that of the group committing the atrocities.

As noted by McCarthy and Sharp, "the audiences for methods of nonviolent protest and persuasion are often multiple," and third parties are often among those audiences.[76] Deming recognized the ability to mobilize the broader population and third parties as "the special genius of nonviolence."[77] Chenoweth and Stephan, drawing on considerable historical experience, provide practical guidance for governmental and nongovernmental actors wishing to aid resistance movements. They conclude that "although there is no evidence that mass nonviolent mobilization can be successfully begun or sustained by external actors, targeted forms of external support were useful in a number of cases."[78] Among the many options they list are boycotts, diplomatic support and penalties, the creation and maintenance of independent media and technology, technical capacity building for elections, and provision of educational materials about successful nonviolent movements. While offering support to local opposition groups can be meaningful and helpful, however, "they are never substitutes for local participation." Ultimately, power for liberation lies in the people.

Paulo Freire approached the third-party issue by recognizing the interdependencies present: "We can legitimately say that in the process of oppression someone oppresses someone else; we cannot say that in the process of revolution someone liberates someone else, nor yet that someone liberates himself, but rather that human beings in communion liberate each other."[79] Freire's recognition of such interdependency suggests the value of an analysis of specific current and potential interconnections and thereby leads directly to the kind of behavioural systems analysis introduced in the next two chapters, after which we can return to questions of the place of third parties in greater depth.

A great deal is currently known about nonviolent struggle, and something is known of the dynamics involved. At the same time, much of our current knowledge consists of historical anecdote, extensive listings of possible methods and tactics, and sets of rules of thumb. Efforts to systematize strategic thinking in the field have definitely advanced in the past two decades, as clarified in this chapter, but most proposed principles of strategic nonviolent conflict have been extracted inductively rather than out of coherent theory. In cases where suggested principles do not seem to apply, a coherent conceptual approach for studying why remains elusive. One promising resolution to this challenge, I believe, is to bring the well-established theory that underlies behavioural systems analysis to the formidable tasks before us, as elaborated in the next two chapters and, in fact, in the rest of this book.

3

BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE PRINCIPLES FOR NONVIOLENT STRATEGY

Strategic analysis is widely recognized as important for nonviolent struggle; lacking such analysis, much resistance effort can be wasted. Ineffective efforts sap limited resources and discourage both participants and observers. Poorly planned or executed nonviolent campaigns may themselves spark violence, a repeated issue in Gandhi's campaigns.[1] In complex situations, however, strategic analysis is seldom straightforward; rapidly changing conditions and the nonviolent equivalent of the "fog of war" are the norm. Gene Sharp describes nonviolent struggle as a "fluid, changing, interactive process" in which understanding the interactional dynamics of oppression and nonviolent action is central to liberatory action.[2] Those dynamics play out among interdependent systems—governmental, military, economic, and other institutions, as well as various organizations and communities. The grievance population participates in these dynamics on many levels, and as members of that population organize, they construct interactional networks of their own. Under such conditions, rigorous and flexible systems analysis is particularly valuable.

Systems thinking in nonviolent struggle is not new. In the mid-1960s, Carl Oglesby, president of Students for a Democratic Society, noted that "the enemy is not a few men but a whole system."[3] In the same era, Barbara Deming stressed the systemic nature of oppression: "It is necessary to remember . . . that when the men with whom we struggle confront us it is as functional elements in this system that they do so, behaving in a certain sense automatically." At the same time, though, she insisted that activists must treat them as more than such elements, as human beings.[4] Gene Sharp and Robert Helvey are also clear that no single person, nor any subsystem like the police or the military, is the enemy—the opponent that must be challenged is an entire interlocking system. According to Helvey, "The target of the opposition efforts is the 'system' that allows for human rights abuses and corruption and the movement is not against all those who both serve that system and are equally its victims."[5] He maintains that "it is the system that needs to be replaced, not the thousands of honest and honorable people whose training and skills are necessary to serve and protect a democratic society."[6]

Gandhi dramatically emphasized the place of the grievance population in this interactional field: "It is because the rulers, if they are bad, are so not necessarily or wholly by reason of birth, but largely because of their environments that I have hopes of altering their course. It is perfectly true . . . that the rulers cannot alter their course themselves. If they are dominated by their environment, they do not surely deserve to be killed, but should be changed *by a change of environment.* But the environment are we—the people who make the rulers who they are."[7] These are powerful and challenging assertions. Human behaviour is undeniably shaped in critical ways by its environmental context, the ecological matrix within which it occurs. Behavioural systems science focuses explicitly on understanding and, in applied research, changing the environments within which critical actors and classes of actors are embedded. As Gandhi noted, tremendous power for change lies here. As we shall see, parallels between understandings of reciprocal interactions in behavioural systems theory and in nonviolence theory have been recognized for decades, including in Sharp's brief essay "Skinner and Gandhi on Defeating Violence."[8]

Complex systems are constituted from interactions among simple elements; the dynamics of those interactions is the subject of this chapter. A central theoretical advance in systems science occurred through clarifying that it is not individual elements but rather the interactions among such elements that are central to understanding dynamic systems, whether physical, behavioural, or cultural. Those interactions in fact construct and continuously reshape the participating elements.[9] A few basic behavioural science principles, summarized below, are crucial for understanding interactions within and among the elements of larger complex systems (for example, organizations, institutions, communities, and states) in ways that support the struggle for justice.[10] These are only some of the important theoretical principles involved, and they can only be lightly sketched here, but this introduction is meant to prepare the ground for the systemic analyses of nonviolent campaigns explored in subsequent chapters.

SELECTION BY CONSEQUENCES

The most central and well-established theoretical principle grounding the science of behaviour is selection by consequences. Changing environmental conditions shape species, human action, and culture over the course of time.[11] While selection is complex, the basic principle of selection by consequences underlies the gradual evolution of biological, behavioural, and cultural characteristics. Natural selection is the biological elaboration of this principle. In the behavioural case, selection by consequences means that all else being equal, behaviours that "work" for a person—that is, that produce positive outcomes—within a current set of environmental conditions tend to persist, as do practices that work for certain members of a group or the group as a whole. In other words, success breeds more of whatever actions have been associated with it—again, all else being equal. Practices that prove costly or ineffective tend to fade, a process that is referred to as behavioural extinction. A central strategic consideration in nonviolent struggle, therefore, is the availability of desirable outcomes and incentives associated with actions taken. The connections between actions and the consequences of those actions are labelled "contingencies," since the repetition of action is generally contingent on the previous consequences of that action (as well as on contextual factors, discussed below). In general, given multiple available options, people do more of what works for them and less of what does not.

The same is largely true at the level of behavioural systems. Cultural groups (such as farming communities, corporations, institutions, and professions) that adopt practices resulting in positive outcomes within a particular context tend to survive.[12] Those cultural groups that are most sensitive and adaptable to changing environmental conditions tend to thrive. Nonviolent theorists have, at some level, recognized this reality, although without placing it within a scientific context. For example, Barbara Deming recalled that during the San Francisco to Moscow Walk for Peace, "a passage I had recently read in a history of the Quakers kept coming into my head—in which the author points out that in evolution not the most powerful creatures but the most sensitive survive."[13] All humans and human groups are sensitive to selective processes, although history and current conditions may blunt sensitivity to a marked degree. The additional principles outlined below help to explain why this is so and how it occurs.

Frances Fox Piven implicitly applies the principle of selection by consequences in her discussion of a resistance repertoire, which she defines as "a historically specific constellation of strategies to actualize interdependent power."[14] She explains that such repertoires are selected and shaped over time by experiences in previous struggles, based on whether they produced successful reforms or failures. According to Piven, "Strategies are forged in a dance of conflict and cooperation." The strategies of both sides in a conflict "are shaped in a 'dialogic' interaction, and, indeed, in 'multilogic' interactions within the matrix of relations with family, church, and community relations that bear on the mobilization of interdependent power. Or, put in another way, repertoires are forged in a political process of action and reaction."[15] One inherent limitation of such selective processes is that while adaptations are selected largely by past experiences, environmental conditions are dynamic. In cases of rapid change, timely adaptation to changing conditions often does not occur apace. Piven notes that the "drag of the past" can be a powerful challenge to liberatory movements: "Once-constructed strategies tend to persist because they become imprinted in cultural memory and habit, because they are reiterated by organizations and leaders formed in past conflicts, and because strategies are shaped and constrained by the rules promulgated in response to earlier conflicts. . . . Only slowly, through the experience of defeat and repression on the one hand, and the contingencies of imagination, invention, and the welling up of anger and defiance on the other, do new repertoires emerge that respond to new institutional conditions."[16]

Similarly, in his examination of labour organizations, Marshall Ganz observes that organizational arrangements that prove adequate during low conflict times often become institutionalized, producing a loss of organizational resourcefulness that "may only become apparent when faced with new challenges"—that is, when the environment changes.[17] As a result, resistance movements usually rely on repertoires that have succeeded in previous campaigns. For example, large demonstrations were once highly disruptive and threatening actions that carried real power in the United States. More recently, however, institutions and governments have, in many cases, adapted to such protests, which has significantly reduced their impact. In contrast, given very different histories, recent large demonstrations in the Middle East have initiated dramatic changes.

There are important limits to the power of selection. Biology sets outer boundaries for human behaviour: some actions that might be desirable are simply impossible for some or all humans. Individuals, for instance, who have been exposed to severe physical or social deprivation or toxicity may have cognitive limitations. The neurobiology of persons exposed to chronic trauma often profoundly changes their sensitivity to experiences of threat or support. Persons with a long history of disempowerment typically require much more intensive and extensive experiences of success before developing a sense of their own power. Crucially, what is valued, what has the power to select, is highly variable across cultures—including among racial, ethnic, religious, occupational, gender, sexual, and other groups that, at least to some extent, share a common set of practices. Even given such variations and limitations, however, selection is a central and powerful dynamic.

At the same time, selection does not occur through blind destiny, nor is it immutable. Cultures of resistance can be purposefully shaped and sustained through selective processes. Recall Gandhi's statement that it is the people who constitute the environment and "who make the rulers who they are."[18] The power of nonviolent struggle lies precisely in the selection of new practices on the part of the resistance group that shift the matrix of consequences experienced by the oppressor group ("the rulers") and others who exert influence on the situation.

BEHAVIOURAL EXTINCTION

The extinction process is one form of selection by consequences that is highlighted here because of its central importance to nonviolent resistance. In the extinction process, consequences previously associated with an action are intentionally withheld with the goal of reducing or eliminating future occurrences of that action. The dynamics of extinction are well understood from a scientific perspective.[19] All else being equal, an action that has been selected because its consequences have been desirable is likely to be repeated. But if those consequences are consistently withheld, the frequency of that action will decline and ultimately, in the best of cases, become extinct.

Two crucial issues must be considered, however, in applying extinction as a strategy. First, the natural immediate response of opponents or oppressive regimes to the withholding of valued consequences is to intensify the use of aversive tactics such as violence and repression. This intensification is referred to as the "extinction burst." As Sharp reminds us, "challenge brings repression."[20] This entirely predictable pattern is one for which, in choosing to adopt the extinction option, the grievance group must be prepared, trusting that, if their analysis of the situation is correct, repressive measures will eventually fade away because they are no longer producing the desired consequences. A second critical point is that, although applying the extinction principle may persuade the opponent to give up on one form of repression, it will not specifically prompt more desirable actions; the opponent may simply turn to alternative forms of repression.[21] In many cases, therefore, withholding consequences to extinguish an undesired action is best used as one tactic of a strategic plan that also offers incentives for preferred action.

The great majority of Gene Sharp's 198 methods of nonviolent action rely at least in part on this single basic behavioural principle of extinction. The dynamics of extinction are present in many descriptions of nonviolent struggle. For example, in 1978, Sharp described the role of extinction as a strategic response to violent modes of repression, noting that both B. F. Skinner and Gandhi "argued that a more effective way exists to end violent attacks than either to resist them with counter-violence or to submit to them and grant the attacker's objective. This other way is simultaneously to withhold both counter-violence and also submission, refusing to provide that which the attacker wants."[22] Repressive governments and other oppressors rely on threats, intimidation, and violence to maintain their power: historically, those practices have evoked compliance and cooperation from the population and have therefore been selected. In other words, compliance and cooperation act as incentives for the continuation of repressive practices. History shows that, all else being equal, if the population withholds compliance and cooperation in consistent ways, extinction will occur—the repressive regime will ultimately abandon these failing tactics. The extinction process is therefore key to most struggles for liberation.

BEHAVIOUR IN CONTEXT

The reader has probably noticed that "all else being equal" is a repeated qualification in the discussion of selection by consequences. Context ("all else") matters enormously, because human behavior and cultural practices are determined in large part by surrounding conditions and events. Nonviolent theorists and practical activists have consistently recognized this reality. For example, in discussing the work of Charles Tilly, Frances Fox Piven notes that activist repertoires are "at least loosely determined by institutional arrangements," with changes in prevailing forms of social action reflecting "the emergence of the big structures of capitalism and of the nation-state."[23] Robert Helvey's work on the strategic estimate focuses largely on the multiple contextual variables that need to be taken into account, as does Scott Wimberley's research on assessing the social dynamics, institutions, and the physical environment present in the area in which guerrilla action is planned.[24] Much of the relevant context involves the interlocking practices among groups—the grievance population, activists, opponents, allies, institutions—shaped by ongoing processes of mutual selection (as discussed in chapter 4). A few basic principles and processes underlie a good deal of this complexity. We focus in this section on four: the matching law, motivating processes, modelling, and the availability of resources. In the subsequent section, we consider the powerful impact of verbal processes.

The Matching Law

Individuals have, at any moment, many possible choices of action and many overlapping sets of contingencies. When ordered to leave an area by authorities, a protester may, for example, comply, peaceably refuse to leave, or strike back. Each choice may produce multiple consequences—physical, emotional, legal, social, spiritual—and the full range of consequences is seldom certain in advance. An important body of research predicting how actions will be allocated among the available alternatives has established a principle known as "the matching law." The matching law states that, all else being equal, actions are allocated proportionately to the relative payoffs associated with each option.[25] For example, the more payoff there is for participation in a certain act of resistance, the more behaviour will be allocated to that act. If an activist group wants to encourage greater use of a particular repertoire—say, "stand and endure"—the matching law offers several approaches. First, the group can offer more recognition and respect for such action. Second, the group can consistently withhold recognition from those who fail to stand, regardless of what else they may do. Third, the group can reduce the amount of attention and recognition for irrelevant actions, however entertaining or engaging they may be. To get more of one behaviour, the group must ensure that the desired behaviour results in higher payoffs than other available options by sending clear messages that this action, and no other, is what is valued under the present conditions. This is a key dynamic in establishing and maintaining nonviolent discipline.

Research related to the matching law has produced another crucial principle valuable for strategic planning. The research has consistently found that not all action is allocated to the richest alternative; although more action is allotted to richer options, some is apportioned to other options. This helps to explain choices made by grievance populations that at times appear to be inconsistent. For example, villagers in contemporary Afghanistan may sometimes act to ally themselves with coalition forces and at other times with the insurgency. This is in part a matter of immediate context—one tends to agree with the armed man facing you. However, each group may also offer something of value, so it is likely that actions will be distributed so as to cooperate with each. The relative values of the options are important in determining that distribution. In addition, unpredictability about the final political situation may support cooperation with both sides—uncertain outcomes are associated with risk, and acting to minimize such risks is natural. Note that the matching law applies even with nonverbal organisms, but as discussed below, human cognitive and verbal processes also have a strong impact on choice.

Motivating Processes

Research on how contextual circumstances can increase or decrease the motivation to act demonstrates that the primary factor is the perceived value of the existing consequences of a particular action. The principle here is that if the consequences of an action can be made more desirable, individuals, and analogously groups, are increasingly likely to pursue that action; conversely, they are less likely to choose that action if the consequences become less desirable. The key to understanding the rate at which a particular action is chosen is thus the *valence* of the consequences that presently exist. Changes to patterns of action do not necessarily presuppose shifts in the consequences themselves. Depriving people of valued consequences that should otherwise be available often leads to an enhanced recognition of the value of those consequences, which can increase the motivation to act. A young person who is denied safety, respect, and opportunities for success will often act to attain these goals despite high risks, because the possibility of achieving those outcomes has such a strong valence. Humiliation and oppression also frequently function as motivating factors. Members of an oppressed population will often take aggressive action against those perpetrating the abuse, not only to gain the respect and the experience of empowerment that have been withheld but also because retaliation appears to relieve biologically, personally, and socially aversive conditions.[26] Historically, humiliation has therefore been a common accelerant for liberation movements and social action. The experience of helplessly witnessing members of one's own group being harmed also tends to provoke retaliation when the opportunity presents itself.

Aversive or coercive control predictably produces the phenomenon of countercontrol. Coercive control increases the rate of countercontrolling resistance behaviors by increasing the value of such consequences as self- and social respect. Ultimately coercive control is therefore counterproductive. According to a substantial body of research, individuals and groups experiencing coercive control by others typically respond with efforts to "control the controller," albeit often at great cost to themselves. Typically, countercontrol also relies on coercive means, risking reciprocal escalation of aversive exchanges. Murray Sidman discusses the multiple forms that countercontrol may take in schools, families, and prisons, as well as within repressive governmental systems.[27]

As Sidman notes, prisons are a form of aversive control—society's aversive response to crime, which attempts to end the aversive impact that criminal activity has on society, which is itself grounded in the aversive personal experiences that criminals have typically had with social institutions. Such a potentially endless spiral of coercive and highly aversive countercontrolling reactions is unlikely to lead to promising collective outcomes; the growing prison system in the United States, for example, produces enormous collective costs, financial and human, and structures vast violations of human rights, particularly for the African American community.

The danger of uncontrolled mutual escalation is well known to nonviolent theorists. Václav Havel recognized that violence would not construct that supported and defended human beings, but one of further violence.[28] Barbara Deming concurs: "Battle of any kind provokes a violent response—because those who have power are not going to give it up voluntarily. But there is simply no question that—in any long run—violent battle provokes a more violent response and brings more casualties. Men tend not to think in long-run terms, of course; they tend to think in terms of isolated moments."[29] She elaborates further, acknowledging the "extinction burst" referred to above: "In any violent struggle one can expect the violence to escalate. It does so automatically, neither side being really able to regulate the process at will. . . . In nonviolent struggle, the violence used against one may mount for awhile (indeed, if one is bold in one's rebellion, it is bound to do so), but the escalation is no longer automatic; with the refusal of one side to retaliate, the mainspring of the automaton has been snapped and one can count on reaching a point where de-escalation begins."[30]

Spiralling cycles of countercontrol often have no obvious exits unless the groups involved turn to entirely different strategic options. The natural impulse to strike back may produce immediate satisfaction but usually does not lead to constructive outcomes.[31] As Deming notes, "It is one thing to be able to state the price the antagonist paid, another to be able to count your own real gains."[32] Gene Sharp points out that both Gandhi and B. F. Skinner recognized the instinctive impulse toward countercontrol (including counter-violence) and discussed alternative approaches for managing that dynamic.[33] Although both nonviolent struggle and behavioural science have continued to advance since Gandhi and Skinner made their observations, the alternatives they suggested have proven robust. Resistance and revolution are themselves forms of countercontrol; the challenge for the leadership is to leverage the impulse toward such action in directions consistent with the long-term interests of the grievance population. The nonviolent option in resistance reduces aversive threats to personal well-being and, at its best, offers the opponent attractive options for abandoning coercive spirals.

Modelling

Humans (and other higher animals) are genetically tuned to modelling: observing the results of the actions of others, imitating those actions that produce good results, and avoiding those that lead to pain or unpleasant consequences.[34] This evolved process is highly efficient; humans can learn from others' experiences and can use observation as one particularly effective way to learn. Because of this innate tendency, the observation of other activists acting in consistently courageous ways is one of the most powerful dynamics in nonviolent action. While their charismatic skills were certainly critical, Gandhi, Badshah Khan, Martin Luther King Jr., and Cesar Chavez also served as powerful role models for their followers; any successful nonviolent campaign produces many such models of disciplined action from whom others can learn. Modelling by persons much like oneself can be a particularly powerful motivating factor in evoking courageous action. The combination of available models of courageous, disciplined action and the positive consequences for such action is a powerful dynamic present in all effective nonviolent campaigns. Attention to modeling is demonstrably important both to building solidarity within resistance movements and for maintaining nonviolent discipline.

Availability of Resources

The choices that humans make are to a large extent limited by the availability of resources that facilitate or are required to carry out those choices. They are more likely to take actions that require minimal effort and less likely to take those that are very demanding. There are any number of resources that make it easier or more difficult, possible or impossible, to maintain structural oppression. Many such resources are provided through Sharp's "pillars of support"—institutions and social segments that supply and sustain the oppressive system, providing food, weapons, and more symbolic resources. Without functioning and cooperating military, police, financial, communications, labour, and even, in many cases, religious institutions, the oppressive system may be immobilized and may even dissipate. The levels and types of resources available from such networks is highly correlated with the extent of repression that is possible. Many examples of the power of such factors will be discussed in the cases presented in later chapters.

VERBAL PROCESSES: RULES AND EQUIVALENCE RELATIONS

For humans, reality rarely speaks for itself. Rather, perceptions define reality. As singer and lifelong activist Joan Baez said, "Action is directly connected with vision. You can't act, you don't know how to act, unless you can really see things, and the trouble with most of us is that our vision has been clipped short in a variety of ways."[35] Frances Fox Piven notes that even the definition of injustice is susceptible to perception: "Injustice is not even injustice when it is perceived as inevitable."[36] Much of human behaviour is governed by rules—explicit or implicit statements about the consequences of action—that shape perceptions.[37] Examples of disempowering rules might include "If I resist, my family may be in danger" or "Resistance is futile." (The elaborated rule here is "Acts of resistance will produce no good consequences.") Extensive research has established that such rules can become inflexible and insensitive to current conditions, but more recent research has demonstrated that such inflexibility can be successfully challenged.[38]

In addition to such rules, human beings often make judgments based on what contemporary psychologists refer to as "relational responding."[39] Such responding involves relating two (or often many) stimuli in arbitrary ways. For example, the English word *horse* and the animal to which it refers are not inherently connected. The relationship between the two has been conventionally established by language. This kind of learned connection is technically termed an "equivalence relation," which is the form of relational responding that is most useful for our purpose of examining the dynamics of oppression and resistance.[40] In an equivalence relation, two or more concepts, words, conditions, or entities become associated in ways that are analogous to set theory. For example, the statement "I am powerless" states a verbal equivalence relation, which can be diagrammed as {I ≈ one of a group of people who can be described as powerless}. The mathematical symbol ≈ can be translated as "equivalent to in some respect(s) ." Members of an equivalence relation function interchangeably in some ways but not usually in all. For example, all persons with the same birthday are members of the same equivalence relation on the dimension of birthdays, but not on everything else.

Other examples with relevance to nonviolent struggle include viewing illegal acts of resistance as wrong ({illegal ≈ wrong}), or viewing a resistance movement as a member of the set of hopeless causes. Equivalence relations (also referred to as *equivalence classes,* particularly when they include multiple members) may usefully be thought of as relational networks in which multiple stimuli become associated with each other. Research shows that if this occurs, people are likely to respond to different members of such a network in much the same way.[41] For example, if the equivalence relations {women ≈ weak} and {weak ≈ unimportant} are established, the two are likely to merge, yielding the new equivalence {women ≈ unimportant} and the new equivalence class comprising all three equivalences and their interconnections.

Building hope, changing values and attitudes, and establishing legitimacy for the struggle occur through changes in both rules and equivalence relations within the social context. Helvey, for example, argues that "restoring the public's confidence in its ability to pass judgment on the actions of the rulers and then to act on those judgments is critical to the success of nonviolent struggle."[42] In other words, reframing the actions of the rulers (changing equivalence relations) and believing in one's power to act effectively (changing rules) are essential. Although not described in scientific terms (and therefore often implemented without full rigour), shifting equivalence relations and rules have always been common strategies in effective civil resistance and peacemaking. For example, Lorenzo Kamel and Daniela Huber describe a process of "de-threatenizing of the Other" among Israelis and Palestinians.[43]

Maia Carter Hallward and Patrick Shaver discuss the widely different interpretations of a boycott strategy to challenge Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which range from the view that the boycott is an anti-Semitic action intended to delegitimize the Israeli state to the view that it is a principled form of support for human rights.[44] Both of these examples demonstrate the importance and power of verbal processes (in these cases, relational responding).

Many other examples will be cited in later chapters, but it is worth noting here some of the mechanisms for changing rules and equivalence relations. Rules can often be challenged through the actions of respected others, either verbally or through modelling, but are most reliably changed through a combination of such challenge and experience. Participation in even small acts of resistance, preferably with encouragement from respected others, can demonstrate that such acts sometimes lead to success, thus challenging an existing rule that resistance results in terrible consequences.

The available research indicates that it is difficult to change equivalence relations through direct challenges. For example, stating "Muslims are not terrorists" is, somewhat paradoxically, likely to *increase* the equivalence relation {Muslim ≈ terrorist}, which then joins a larger equivalence network—for example, {Muslim ≈ terrorist ≈ violence ≈ evil}. A more effective way to shift equivalences is to learn a new relation that is inconsistent with the problem relation—for example, "Muslims are deeply spiritual people" or "Muslims have been some of the bravest nonviolent activists in history."[45] This learning is most likely to occur with modelling, frequent pairing, and social reinforcement from respected others as an incentive. Explicit attention to such verbal and cognitive processes should be a central focus in cases where confidence, hope, commitment, and shifts in understandings of reality and power are required. Many effective leaders have natural skills in this area, but understanding the dynamics in terms of verbal processes can help.

CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACHES

In reviewing what had been learned at the time (1974) about changing human behaviour, the psychiatrist Israel Goldiamond made a strong recommendation to the effect that efforts to address social problems should give priority to constructing new patterns of behaviour to replace problem patterns, rather than emphasizing the suppression of undesirable behaviours. His rationale, which has been widely accepted by behavioural scholars since that time, was both ethical and practical. On the ethical side, he believed that, of necessity, suppression relied on practices like threat and punishment, which often risked the violation of human rights (as is common in prisons and some other institutions). On the practical side, he concluded, as had B. F. Skinner before him, that the data demonstrated that constructing new patterns supported by arranged or preferably natural reinforcement was (a) more acceptable to people and (b) more likely to result in lasting change, whereas suppressive strategies did not take away the inclination to act and therefore were ever fragile.

While the first explicit goal of resistance movements is most often to stop or reduce the exposure of the population to pain, suffering, torture, or other aversive events, the available research and the history of nonviolent movements strongly urge a strategic emphasis on constructing and supporting positive actions instead of or in combination with more coercive approaches wherever possible.[46] There are two important variations of constructive nonviolent strategies:

1. Gandhi's "constructive programme" (Schell's "constructive noncooperation"), which emphasizes the progressive expansion of autonomous power and institutions within the shell of the oppressive system (the subject of chapter 7)[47]
2. The use of incentives to encourage the opponent to act in more acceptable ways, which lies at the heart of persuasion strategies, most third-party strategies, and some forms of public pressure (discussed in detail in chapter 8)

Jonathan Schell has provided strong arguments that constructive nonviolent resistance was the primary dynamic present in the American Revolution, the liberation of South Asia and South Africa, the US civil rights movement, the Vietnam War, the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and many other successful campaigns (despite the mythic power of military action in the common narratives of some of these cases).[48]

Constructive approaches have several advantages over more obstructive approaches and, especially, violence. First, constructive action builds the collective power of the resistance group, often, if carefully designed, without evoking strong countercontrol. By contrast, if opponents are treated in obstructive or threatening ways, it is not only likely that they will respond in kind, but also that they will escalate their responses until the grievance group yields.[49] Even if the opponent backs down in the face of pressure, constant vigilance may be required, as the inclination to revert to previous patterns when opportunity presents often remains strong. Perhaps even more importantly, rather than simply immobilizing or increasing costs to the opponent, constructive action begins to shape the world in ways desired by the resistance group, who thus “make the road by walking.”[50]

Only strategic planning makes it possible to move beyond the isolated moment to construct a sustainable improved reality. As will be discussed in later chapters, there are many contexts in which escalating (nonviolent) punitive conditions and sanctions can be important nonviolent strategies. The key point here is that the choice of obstructive approaches generally involves considerable costs and may be counterproductive (especially if designed without careful strategic analysis), so it is always valuable to consider available constructive alternatives or additions.

CREATIVITY

Creativity is essential to maintaining extended campaigns of resistance.[51] The behavioural principle here is satiation: the power of and attraction to incentives and tactics, as well as the aversiveness of sanctions, tend to fade over time. Novelty can help avoid this issue. Members of the resistance group tire of doing the same thing over and over, especially if the returns gradually diminish. Much like what happens with a favourite food, activists can tire of the same tactic, while opponents can adapt to tactics they have experienced many times, which therefore become less aversive. Both the resistance and the opponent in this scenario experience satiation, and the activists may also experience behavioural extinction as their actions fail to achieve the desired consequences. Consistency is essential in the use of certain strategic options, especially in extinction, but maintaining that consistency will often require increasing levels of creative mutual support among the activist group.

New strategies are usually needed to meet new realities. Frances Fox Piven notes, for example, that "the new economy has its own distinctive vulnerabilities," among which she includes the following:[52]

- Extended chains of production and distribution across global logistical chains creating multiple junctures of interdependence
- The potential for "reconstruction on a global scale of . . . worker-consumer alliances"
- Expansion of and increasing reliance on the Internet, adding an additional dimension of fragility and vulnerability for institutions
- "New 'repertoires' that both extend across borders and tap the chokepoints of new systems of production and new systems of governance"

Creative solutions emerging from thorough strategic analysis will clearly be required to leverage such vulnerabilities, reducing the drag of the past.

The behavioural principles and processes sketched in this chapter are important elements in elaborating a behavioural systems perspective on nonviolent struggle. Selection by consequences (including in extinction), the power of context and verbal processes, a preference for constructive approaches, and creativity each have unique contributions to offer, but it is in the integration of these basic elements among individuals and organized groups that their full power becomes evident. Because complex, interdependent systems as a whole, rather than individuals, are typically the targets for liberatory change, a coherent and rigorous framework for such integration through behavioural systems science is our goal here. In the next chapter, we explore how nonviolent resistance can challenge structural oppression by leveraging the power of this science.

4

BEHAVIOURAL SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

> The science of nonviolence is yet taking shape.
>
> — Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Mohandas Gandhi: Essential Writings*

Behavioural systems science offers insights into nonviolent struggle that are not immediately obvious. A behavioural system is an organized group of human beings, or a set of organized subgroups, that persists over time and through changes in membership. In saying that such a group is "organized," I mean that the group establishes its own boundary through densely interconnected behaviour, is self-organizing (at least to a considerable extent), and is characterized by a unique network of interlocking practices selected for their utility to the group or its members.[1] Those interlocking practices constitute the culture of the group. Examples of behavioural systems include families, organizations, associations, communities, movements, and nations. Such systems can obviously be very complex, both internally and in their interactions with other systems. The analysis of such complexities is the critical challenge for understanding oppression, struggle, and liberation.

Consider the internal organization and processes of a resistance movement. Such a behavioural system commonly includes several classes of actors: typically, a core cadre of leaders, a larger group of activists, an even larger group of supporters, and the general population that the movement wishes to win over. Movement leaders consciously intend to affect the practices of each of the other classes of actors. They generally know what practices they would like to see established among the activists, for example—practices that will engage the population in ways that encourage people to join the class of movement supporters. Leaders therefore arrange incentives for activists to act in the desired manner, incentives that are often social but may also include experiences of success or feelings of moral rightness. They may further encourage desired action through verbal processes like liberatory education, through attention to the matching law (discussed in the previous chapter), or by relying on other basic behavioural processes. The activists then use similar processes to influence the actions of members of the population. At the same time, activists and even the general population simultaneously influence the practices of the leadership group, intentionally or unintentionally. If, for example, the actions of the leadership group are experienced as highly coercive, activists or members of the public may complain, refuse to comply, or simply withdraw. Typically, whether directly or indirectly, the practices of each class of actors within the movement influence the practices of each of the other classes.

At the same time, the opponent—a repressive government, for instance—may also attempt to change the practices of the movement in an effort to induce members of the population to renounce the movement or its leadership to soften their stance. A good example is the extended campaign by the government of South Africa to gradually moderate the radical stance of Nelson Mandela in preparation for supporting him as the leader of the inevitable majority rule, which the government recognized years before it happened.[2] That government itself was not a monolithic entity but rather a network of interlocking classes of behavioural systems and actors: elected leaders, members of the security forces, intelligence officers, and the population of Afrikaners, for example.

The actions of members of the government can only affect the actions of members of the movement if the former somehow shift either the consequences experienced by the latter or the context within which events unfold. This is the case in all interdependencies; ultimately, it is people, individually or collectively, who act, not abstract systems. Efforts to influence must finally touch human beings to bring about change: for instance, threats against a group have power only if they are experienced as threats by members of that group.

The actions of the grievance group reciprocally influence the practices of those in power. As Jonathan Schell notes, "Gandhi was surely the first to suggest that the victims were creating a bad moral environment for their masters—and to preach reform to *victims*."[3] While others had made similar points previously, Gandhi's clarity here had a significant impact. To influence the powerful, he insisted, the victims' own practices need to change; in fact, this is the only way to exercise influence. The processes of resistance and change rely on the same elementary behavioural principles as those that influence other apparently simpler human action; the complexity lies in the interactional interlocks, in the interdependencies within and among behaviour systems.

A number of analytic methodologies can be useful for clarifying those interdependencies; the three presented below are used in subsequent chapters to explore the dynamics of strategic options for nonviolent struggle. Each analytic approach can suggest directions for strategic action, which can then be tested in the field and the results fed back into the analysis for further refining. Behavioural systems analysis is, at root, an empirical science, drawing on the overall strategy of all ecological science. Marston Bates, commonly regarded as the founder of modern ecology, argued that knowledge in ecological disciplines is an accretionary process resulting from multiple iterations of (a) observation, (b) elaboration of conceptual and theoretical frameworks consistent with observations, and (c) field testing of hypotheses emerging from those conceptual advances.[4] An iterative approach of this kind that gradually captures complexities not immediately evident is promising for a science of nonviolent struggle.

Recognition of the need for systems (particularly behavioural systems) analysis is increasingly pervasive in the field of strategic planning, whether related to nonviolent struggle, military action, or insurgency. The *US Army/ Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Manual*, for example, lists systems thinking, based on the systems sciences, as one of the six key considerations in designing a counterinsurgency campaign.[5] Scott Wimberley, in describing strategic planning in guerrilla warfare, discusses the need to concurrently assess a number of contextual factors, including the following, and to assess the interactions among them:[6]

- Enemy leaders
- Military installations and units
- Industry
- Transportation
- Potential targets
- Political, economic, and social problems and strengths
- Enemy strengths and weaknesses
- Educational institutions
- Religion and religious leaders
- Ethnic makeup
- Local attitudes toward the enemy
- Communication facilities
- Geography
- History
- Local leaders

Helvey's strategic estimate for nonviolent struggle calls for examining most of the same factors in order to establish a holistic perspective on the field of action.[7] Determining which among the many interlocking factors should receive primary attention in strategic planning and action is a serious challenge; this is precisely where behavioural systems analysis may be most helpful. Such analysis can also suggest which strategic and tactical options are likely to fail.

The aim of biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy in proposing what he called general system theory (now usually general systems theory), beginning as early as 1926, was breathtakingly ambitious: the unity of all science.[8] Remarkably, over the last several decades, considerable progress toward this goal has been achieved. Systems analysis is well developed and widely applied in both basic and applied sciences, including biology, ecological and environmental sciences, cybernetics, chemistry, sociology, and economics, as well as in medicine, engineering and the design of weapons systems. The most crucial recent scientific discoveries have occurred at the borders between disciplines and have largely been systemic in nature.[9] The natural science of behaviour, epistemologically and methodologically distinct in important ways from the social sciences, has increasingly moved in this direction as well.[10] Most important human and social problems are complex and systemic in nature; behavioural systems analysis can help clarify the interlocking dynamics within and among human collectives in relation to those issues.[11]

One key principle in systems theory is the operation of homeostatic balance.[12] Living systems survive by establishing a dynamic "steady state" adapted to current environmental conditions. In the event of disruption, survival is generally enhanced by homeostatic dynamics that guide the system back toward a previous relatively stable state. Homeostatic forces are as important in nonviolent struggle as in other sociocultural processes. For example, Frances Fox Piven notes that disruptive movements are usually short-lived.[13] The internal dynamics within the activist group is one factor in limiting duration; the high of exhilaration fades (i.e., satiation occurs), the effort required cannot be indefinitely maintained, and other valued ways to spend time must be neglected to continue the fight. External factors also contribute to the dynamic field: as resistance increases, for instance, repression typically hardens. Crucially, as Piven observes, over the course of time, "pressures come from all sides in the multiple relations in which people are embedded to restore normal daily life."[14] In order to insulate their members from such homeostatic pressures, radical movements and security forces often attempt to isolate them from the larger society. Furthermore, concessions won are often conditioned on willingness to reintegrate into normal social and political processes (raising the risk of co-optation). As with other systems principles, such as tipping points and contagion, the dynamics of social homeostasis can be best understood through behavioural systems science.

In the sections that follow, examples of nonviolent struggle, from the local to the national to the global, are analyzed from the perspective of behavioural systems dynamics. Although dictatorship, for example, is certainly different along many dimensions from problems like environmental degradation, each of the examples discussed is grounded in oppression, and each is likely to require significant levels of nonviolent struggle to move toward justice. The use of diverse examples is therefore meant to expand attention to the potential for developing general practical and scientific principles across multiple issue areas, as well as to establish the generalized applicability of nonviolent struggle.

ANALYSIS OF SUPPORTING AND OPPOSING PRACTICES

In most cases of nonviolent struggle, multiple groups and institutions are involved in maintaining or challenging oppressive conditions. A particularly accessible approach for analyzing current situations and identifying possible intervention points has been developed by Anthony Biglan of the Oregon Research Institute. Biglan's work, which is grounded in rigorous behavioural systems science, offers avenues for rich theoretical explorations of the nature of cultural practices, substantive strategic approaches to change, and useful analytic methodologies. Only the last will be presented here, but readers are strongly encouraged to further review Biglan's work in detail. The approach is straightforward enough to be useful in working with communities to explore conditions and identify realistic options for change.

Biglan's approach, presented in his book *Changing Cultural Practices,* is a useful starting point for localized analyses as well as for the full range of crucially important global issues, ranging from sexual coercion to environmental degradation. His central thesis is that the practices of multiple community sectors support the maintenance of or changes in complex conditions and that as many of those sectors as possible should therefore be included in the analysis. Such analysis then offers multiple potential points for leveraging change and has particular utility for understanding and potentially changing conditions and actions like hopelessness and violent responses among young people, or for facilitating alternatives like youth activism supporting community health and nonviolent struggle.

About 50 percent of the world population is under age 30 (about 26 percent is under fifteen).[15] In the Middle East and North Africa, however, approximately 65 percent are under thirty.[16] In this region (and elsewhere), youth and young adults have been extensively marginalized both economically and politically; recent upheavals in the Middle East were largely fuelled by this group. In the uprisings in Egypt and Syria in 2011 and 2012, young people were central. The differences between the largely nonviolent, if still unpredictable, events in Egypt and the turn to violence in Syria are stark, particularly in terms of civilian casualties, which varied between the two by orders of magnitude. Injustice ultimately leads to revolt of one kind or another. The challenge is to prepare young people to choose alternatives that are most likely to lead to relatively peaceful and lasting change.

In the West, youth have often been treated by both social scientists and the political system primarily as problems to be solved, threats to be contained, or service recipients.[17] An alternative view of young people as a resource, as a powerful political force to be mobilized, and as one potential centre of a movement for peace and justice is, however, emerging. A particularly strong example, which will be discussed in detail later on, is that of Otpor, a youth movement in Yugoslavia that is widely recognized as the central pillar of a successful liberation movement.[18] In table 2, Biglan's method is applied to identify examples of the practices of multiple social sectors that might either support or oppose the expansion of youth activism of this kind. Some of the entries in the table have considerable empirical support; many, however, draw primarily on well-established theory, as presented in this and the previous chapter, and on real-world organizing and movement-building experiences of those in the field.[19] The final column in the table is theoretically crucial in that it begins to clarify incentives, disincentives, and facilitating conditions that make supporting or opposing practices more or less likely. Many of the sectors listed in the first column are also crucial in determining whether collective action taken by youth is primarily violent or nonviolent; a similar table could easily be produced to indicate supporting and opposing practice for violent rebellion. Schools (including universities), religious communities, and nongovernmental organizations are particularly important in teaching the theory, skills, and rationale for nonviolent activism for justice, but many additional sectors could make meaningful contributions if the necessary incentives and facilitating conditions were established.

One critical issue that needs to be addressed in efforts like those listed in table 2 is the importance of hope for youth engaged in activism. Kristen Atkinson, in her recent study of largely disadvantaged youth engaged in an urban "freedom school" program, found that it was difficult for young people to sustain belief in the possibility of real, sustainable change.[20] For this reason, it is crucial that early efforts achieve success; the reinforcement that such success offers can be important to sustain longer-term efforts, which are often necessary to achieving major change. Repeated exposure to alternative ways of framing possibilities (i.e., creating equivalence relations and rules supporting hope) is also essential here, as demonstrated in Atkinson's work.

TABLE 2. Sample practices, in key community sectors, that support or oppose youth activism

Sector	*Practices supporting activism*	*Practices opposing activism*	*Incentives, disincentives, and facilitating conditions*
News media	Locate and provide coverage of positive youth actions and activism; portray youth as powerful community resources	Portray youth primarily as "predators" or as incompetent and lacking good judgment (adultism)	Community response to news stories; advertising dollars; access to positive stories
Schools	Staff act as mentors, models, and allies in youth activism within and outside school; youth voice respected; issues of social justice and history of nonviolent action integrated into curriculum	Suppress youth voice related to curriculum, policies, issues, and solutions	Encouragement from school administration and parents; partnerships with activist organizations
Local Government	Shape, support, and respond to actions taken by youth councils; include youth in planning of youth programming and community development efforts	Create youth programming that views youth as a problem to be managed and controlled	Voter responses, legal limitations, and incentives related to access to and use of funds
Entertainment media	Portray youth as courageous contributors to community life and justice; offer alternative social narratives emphasizing social justice (i.e., create new equivalences and rules)	Portray youth in dangerous, incompetent, or violent roles; emphasize models of self-indulgent overconsumption and violence in programming	Viewer response; advertising dollars; regulation of portrayal of violence; community encouragement of portraying and advocating for sustainable lifestyles
Churches	Offer youth opportunities to explore moral and spiritual implications of and potential responses to social issues; provide opportunities to partner with adult activists and allies	Focus exclusively on interior spiritual life without significant attention to social injustices	Guidance of church hierarchies and elders; response of church members
Local business	Partner with and provide resources for youth-led projects; partner in economic development projects involving youth	Treat youth as neighbourhood threat to be managed primarily through exclusion, security monitoring, and law enforcement	Media attention; actions of respected models within business community
Civic organizations	Support youth-led grants programs for community improvement and justice	Focus primarily on working with law enforcement to exercise social control	Media attention; awareness of models in other communities

TABLE 2. *(continued)*

Sector	*Practices supporting activism*	*Practices opposing activism*	*Incentives, disincentives, and facilitating conditions*
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)	Facilitate connections among youth-led organizing efforts locally and globally; offer training in strategic options including nonviolent resistance and peacemaking	Establish youth programs that treat youth primarily as service recipients, problems to be contained, or clients to be treated	Available funding; examples of other NGOs; partnerships with activist organizations
Police	Reach out to youth to develop common projects, circles of understanding, and visible contributions to communities	Contact youth primarily for surveillance and enforcement; practice unjustified "stop-question-and-frisk"	Policies established and monitored; supervisory practices; respected models within and outside departments; governmental and activist organization monitoring
Universities	Offer access to courses, activities, and faculty engaged in community activism; expand emphasis on active engagement with social justice and rights issues in the curriculum; encourage community engagement among students and staff	Maintain academic distance from local and global community activism; discourage active involvement in social issues in favour of primary emphasis on finding a place within corporate capitalism	Faculty activism and leadership privileging attention to social justice and human rights issues; funding sources; courageous and visionary administration
Arts community	Actively reach out to youth and serve as mentors and allies in arts projects directly or indirectly related to social justice and human rights issues (including murals, photovoice, music, theatre, dance)	Maintain distance from youth; regard youth as "difficult to work with" or unprepared to make genuine artistic contributions	Availability of funding; inspirational artist models; support from arts venues (galleries, theatres, local business communities) and local government
Political parties	Engage youth in political campaigns emphasizing social justice rather than "broken" status quo political agendas; offer youth genuine voice in platform decisions	Exclude youth from active participation except to support maintenance of status quo	Demands of party members; respected models of activism within parties; availability of alternative political parties with primary emphasis on social justice and sustainability

Similar analyses of the operations of multiple sectors affecting the practice and continuation of dictatorial systems, racist structures, and other forms of oppression that are structurally embedded in a society are possible. The level of rigorous data available on these justice issues varies considerably, and in many cases, there is a need for additional observation, conceptual interpretation, and verifying experimentation (Marston Bates's model) to strengthen the analysis scientifically.

Biglan's *Changing Cultural Practices* also offers a useful analysis for reducing environmentally harmful practices, which are often driven in part by corporate interests that preclude attention to damaging externalities (negative costs of corporate practices that lie outside of the corporation's cost-benefit accounting system). Important recent work by Lyle Grant demonstrates that dramatic shifts in cultural practices will be required if conditions conducive to sustainable and fulfilling human lives are to be assured (a position with which many now agree) and applies key elements of behavioral systems analysis to clarify the interactional changes that will be necessary.[21] Given current political realities, the need for social action directed toward achieving sustainability and challenging practices leading to environmental degradation is both substantial and increasing. The green movement has so far had relatively limited success in shifting societal practices anywhere in the world. Biglan offers several analytic tools for determining both where intervention may be useful, as illustrated in table 2 above, and for exploring the usually multiple consequences associated with changes in societal practices. Increasing fuel prices, for example, may produce both benefits and costs for farmers, the tourist industry, or people of colour that differ from those for other groups; all of those consequences must be taken into account in an adequate analysis. The next analytic methodology presented expands on this recognition.

FORCE FIELD ANALYSIS

Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler characterize conflict as "an inherently adversarial process involving the direct exchange of sanctions, either violent or nonviolent, with a view to inflicting costs on one's opponents, inducing them to change their behaviour." They propose that "by creating a better risk-reward relationship, nonviolent methods may make waging conflict a more efficient option than either violent conflict or compromise."[22] Force field analysis offers a methodology to assess the current risk-reward balance and to explore options for shifting the behaviour of opponents, whether individuals (e.g., a dictator) or classes of actors (e.g., members of a military junta or of a dominant and oppressive ethnic group). *Note that the actual target in this analysis is not the person or the group, but their actions*—this is a critically important distinction.

An intentional attempt to change an opponent's behaviour requires clarity regarding the objectives to be achieved—that is, which specific actions of which individuals or groups, are to be the targets for change. While broad goals like "freedom" or "liberation" can inspire, action planning requires specificity. This requirement is widely recognized in the literature of nonviolent struggle but has been overlooked in many campaigns on the ground. For example, Václav Havel emphasizes that strategic decision making can only occur in relation to a concrete task; Gandhi similarly stresses the importance of aiming for clearly defined changes in the practices of the opponent—changes that must be within the power of that opponent to make.[23] Gene Sharp counsels that when struggling with great oppression, it is "often wise to fight on a limited specific expression of the large problem"—for example, getting a clean-water well built as a small step toward liberation from apartheid in South Africa.[24] Mobilizations like the Occupy movement are an important beginning; only as such movements clarify their overall vision and specific objectives that can contribute to that vision, real change becomes possible.

Once clarity of objective is achieved, force field analysis methodology can assist in exploring both how the current state is being maintained and how change might occur. Force field analysis, originally developed by the psychologist Kurt Lewin, has been used in multiple variations in the social sciences and in organizational change efforts.[25] Numerous activists, including community organizers and those aiming for organizational change, have used the approach.[26] The basic analysis begins by gathering available information and organizing these data into a graphic representation of both the forces that support the current actions of the person or group in power and the forces that oppose those actions. This provides a model of the current dynamic balance.


Worst State Likely
Dictator remains & executes protesters
Status Quo
Dictator remains in country
Goal State
Dictator leaves country
Driving Forces
Restraining Forces
Withdrawal of support from major military actors
Escalating demonstrations
Withdrawal of support from business and finance
Possible opportunities for safe exile
Pressure from internal security forces
Consistency with personal rules/values
Pressure from political and financial allies
Fear for self and family

FIGURE 1. Sample force field analysis

Obviously, every case is different, but figure 1 offers a representative example. It can be useful to vary the thickness of the arrows in order to depict the strength of the force, although this may introduce more complexity than is necessary for some audiences.While most people can easily understand the basic framework, exploring what these "forces" really are in terms of consequences, context, and verbal processes takes the analysis to a substantially higher level of precision. Each force typically involves one or more actions by one or more classes of actor, each of which can itself be analyzed in detail. (Analytic diagramming, as discussed in the following section, can be helpful here.)

The goal of the resistance movement in the case depicted in figure 1 is to have the dictator leave the country; what movement members would least like to see is increased violent repression. An array of "forces"—that is, sets of driving and restraining actions of others that serve as context and consequences for the actions of the dictator—maintain the status quo. That dynamic balance can be shifted in two primary ways. The first option is to augment the driving forces, either by increasing the intensity of forces already present or by adding additional drivers like the threat of war crimes charges. The second option is to decrease restraining forces, perhaps by co-opting elements of the internal security forces.

In the real world, there are always multiple, constantly shifting contextual factors that can have an impact on the actions and decisions of oppressors, resistance leaders and movements, members of the general population—in fact, of all actors and classes of actors present in conflict situations. We have many historical examples where military leaders withdrew support from dictators and that action greatly contributed to the dictator's decision to give up power (Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and Hosni Mubarak in Egypt, for example).[27] With this as a possible leverage point, analysis then proceeds to examining how context, verbal processes, and consequences for military leaders might be shifted. A force field analysis diagram for military leaders' possible withdrawal of support can facilitate this analysis. Can those among the leadership who tend to support the resistance be induced to encourage other leaders to do the same? Can high-status individuals be induced to take the first steps (modelling for others) through personal assurances of safety and a voice in a new order? Can contacts with highly respected religious leaders begin to shift equivalence relations for some leaders: for example, a shift away from {loyalty to Mubarak ≈ honourable} toward {action to preserve liberty and protect the people ≈ honourable}?

This kind of analysis can be used to understand, and perhaps develop strategic approaches to, the many groups of actors with important presence in the original force field diagram—in some cases, by developing cascading diagrams analyzing potential actions of those groups and of those who, in turn, might influence them. It is possible, by using more complex diagrammatic techniques, to examine many elements of these realities concurrently, as discussed below, but force field analysis provides a simple and powerful initial step that can easily be adopted by activist communities and resistance groups, working just with paper and markers. Force field diagrams can suggest focuses for experimentation; the resistance can select one or several factors to attempt to influence first and can then monitor movement on the part of the focal person or group toward or away from the desired target behaviours. Such experimentation could conceivably be quite rigorous if access to relatively immediate information about the decision-making processes of the focal person or group can be accessed. When a finer-grained analysis of the interlocking actions of multiple persons and groups is necessary and realistic, a more rigorous analytic methodology, cultural practice diagramming, can be used.

ANALYSIS OF CULTURAL PRACTICES

The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA), an important force for resistance, recognizes the education of girls and women as one of the key goals for achieving human rights.[28] Much of the Western world also considers such education both a crucial human rights issue and a central factor in community and economic development.[29] Despite severe threats and punitive violence, many Afghan women and girls continue to attend schools, a powerful act of resistance and constructive noncooperation.[30] Attending school is an action performed by a changing class of actors (women and girls) over a period of time and supported by a culture of resistance; in behavioural systems terms, it is a “cultural practice.” A contextual analysis of factors known or hypothesized to support this practice can be deepened diagrammatically.[31] A sample practice diagram analyzing school attendance among Afghan girls (the class of actors) is shown in figure 2. This diagram, simplified for presentation here, can be used in a campaign to encourage attendance: the motivating context might be strengthened, adequate levels of required resources assured, levels of positive consequences enhanced, and levels of negative consequences decreased. Although for very young girls, the primary emphasis may be on the practices of parents, the courage of the very young should not be underestimated.

The data included in such a diagram may be drawn from existing research, personal observations, reports from those on the ground, and established theory. Some of these sources are more rigorous than others, but none should be lightly dismissed. The goal of a science of nonviolent struggle must be to gradually strengthen hypotheses through increasingly rigorous research, but often, enough is already known to develop relatively persuasive hypotheses from examples like figure 2, while remembering that they remain tentative. All such analyses are necessarily fluid and dynamic, and they often need to be revised to accommodate shifts in conditions and events, and new information.

In figure 2, the items included in the motivating context frame include verbal processes, models, deprivation, social support, and other types of variables. For presentation purposes, they are depicted in a single frame, although each class of variables represents a somewhat different dynamic. Important resources and conditions include those essential factors without


Motivating Context
• Exposure to models of educated women
• Availability of family encouragement
• School attendance by peers
• Previous positive exposure to schooling
• Recognition of oppression
• Experiences of humiliation
• Equivalence relation {education ≈ liberation}
• Equivalence relation {education ≈ resistance to oppression}
• Trusted assurances of safety
Practice:
Attending school
Class of Actor:
Young Afghan woman
Required Resources and Conditions
• Accessible school
• Well-prepared teacher
• Supplies (e.g., books)
• Transportation
• Adequate nutrition
• Adequate health
Positive Consequences
• Pride in achievements
• Experiences of learning
• Pride in participation in acts of resistance
• Recognition of potential for community change
• Family approval
• Teacher approval
• Peer approval
• Tribal and community approval
Aversive Consequences
• Threats and violence
• Threats to family
• Family disapproval
• Peer disapproval
• Tribal and community disapproval

FIGURE 2. Key contextual, structural, and consequential factors associated with attending school by Afghan girls and women. Adapted with permission from Mark A. Mattaini and Kristen N. Atkinson, "Constructive Noncooperation: Living in Truth," *Peace and Conflict Studies* 18, no. 1 (2011): 22.

which the practice would not be possible (e.g., if there is no school, there can be no attendance) and those that facilitate the practice (e.g., transportation to school). Given the necessary conditions, however, the primacy of consequences is always central; applying the matching law by increasing positive consequences and decreasing negative consequences, especially relative to other available consequences, will predictably increase the incidence of the practice—all else being equal.

Figure 2 is an example of a generic representation of variables common to multiple cases; what is being analyzed here is not a single individual's behaviour but a practice shared among a class of actors shaped and maintained by one or more common contingencies.[32] Not every item included will be relevant to every case, of course. This is a first level of analysis, but it is helpful in itself. When the practices of other classes of actors (parents, peers, tribal and religious leaders, NGOs, the Taliban, and others) that constitute the cultural field are also included in the analysis, the power of diagramming cultural practices can be greatly enhanced. (A mentor of mine once suggested layering transparencies for such an analysis; computerized systems, of course, can greatly simplify such a process.) Aggregating multiple analyses to simultaneously explore the interdependencies among multiple practices of multiple classes of actors is an additional valuable step.

ANALYSIS OF INTERDEPENDENCIES

The full power of behavioural systems science emerges from analysis of concurrent interactional interdependencies among multiple classes of actors. There are always interactional interlocks between oppressors and the grievance population, but the actions of classes of actors external to the direct conflict (military, police, paramilitary, religious, business, nongovernmental, tribal, local and global consumers, and many others) are always involved in maintaining structural violence and oppression, and can also play roles in challenging those conditions. The practices of multiple classes of actors and groups structure Sharp's "sources of power" referred to in chapter 2: authority and legitimacy, human resources, skills and knowledge, intangible factors, material resources, and the ability to apply sanctions. As discussed in chapter 2, these sources of power are expressed in pillars of support, groups that a regime or resistance movement relies on for continued operation. The pillar metaphor is both useful—weakening those pillars can bring down oppressive power—and potentially misleading—in nonviolent struggle, the targets are not static, structural entities to be demolished but dynamic patterns of interactions to be disrupted. Those disruptions may involve short-term actions or the establishment of ongoing changes in cultural practices.

The analysis of interlocking actions among classes of actors can assist with both understanding the current situation and suggesting potential targets for disruption. The 1986 People Power revolution in the Philippines is a useful example.[33] Ferdinand Marcos was elected president of the Philippines in 1965 as a popular reformer, widely recognized for his brilliance and charisma. By 1972, however, faced with popular unrest and a communist insurgency, he declared martial law and maintained power essentially as a dictator. When he lifted martial law in 1981 in response to popular dissatisfaction, he was again elected president despite allegations of significant irregularities. By this time, his rule was widely recognized as grounded in corruption, cronyism, nepotism, and widespread human rights violations; Marcos and his cronies plundered the country to the tune of billions of dollars in assets. Popular resistance stiffened after the assassination of his primary political opponent, Benigno Aquino, in 1983. When Marcos subsequently claimed victory over Aquinos's widow, Corazon, in a manifestly corrupt election in 1986, the population rose to support Aquino in what she insisted be a strictly nonviolent campaign to remove Marcos.[34]

There is much more to this story, of course, given the legacy of colonialism in the Philippines, but this glimpse sets the stage for our purposes here.[35] What drove this apparently all-powerful figure to abandon his presidency and leave the country within two weeks of the time Aquino began to organize her campaign of resistance? Aquino herself had no direct influence on Marcos, nor did her core group of supporters. To immediately maintain his rule, Marcos required members of the military and police to enforce sanctions, as well as the financial community to continue to keep financial resources flowing. Over the longer term, because of the economic interdependencies sustaining a relatively sophisticated emerging economy, his stability also needed the continued operation of commerce, farming, tourism, and other critical economic engines , which in turn required much of the population to act in a way that maintained normalcy. All of this required "legitimacy"—essentially, a set of equivalence relations that would support compliance based in fear: {President Marcos ≈ respected man ≈ important for our well-being}, or at least {President Marcos ≈ a man to be feared ≈ important for our well-being}.

Furthermore, by 1986, a strong civil society was in place, particularly in Manila and other large cities (although there was considerable ambivalence present within the systems making up that civil society, an example of why careful assessment of interactional processes is required).[36] Among the important sectors were a thriving artistic and literary community; networks of nongovernmental organizations, including those with international ties; a very strong Catholic culture; emerging political parties; and large business and professional communities benefiting from extensive higher education. The military and, to some extent, the police were highly professionalized. The ground was therefore fertile for cultures of resistance, with a considerable number of progressive thinkers who increasingly refused to "live in the lie," to use Vaclàv Havel's phrase, and who tested repressive controls regularly (Havel's "living in truth"), in many cases at the realistic risk of imprisonment and torture.

While many other variables were at play, these already give us a good deal to work with in analyzing events. Figure 3 depicts a limited but useful set of interactional relationships among the actions of participants in the resistance campaign, local leaders of that campaign, members of the military who refused to injure or apprehend citizens involved in the campaign, military leaders, members of the clergy, and members of the general population.[37] Some aspects of the motivating context were common to multiple classes of actors, including, for example, the call from Jaime Cardinal Sin, the most important religious leader in the Philippines, and contagious rules stating, in essence, “If we act now, change is possible.” By common report, Corazon Aquino and other leaders, from the national to the neighbourhood level, also served as models for others by showing considerable courage. Equivalence relations that shifted how the president was framed and that framed participation as just and liberty as possible were common factors among multiple classes of actors.

Some of the religious participants took part in the Philippine revolution because they viewed acting to support justice and showing solidarity with those working for justice as integral to their vocations. Many members of the military refused to interfere with the protesters in part because attacking unarmed persons, especially priests and nuns, would have been strong violations of their own values and in part because many of them, as citizens, felt personal solidarity with the protesters in their experiences of deprivation and frustration. Refusal of cooperation by military and police forces facing their own people is common but not universal in resistance campaigns. Arranging contextual factors and consequences to maximize this dynamic is therefore often an important priority, as elaborated in several later examples.

For the sake of simplicity, figure 3 does not include listings of necessary and facilitating resources for the practices of each group. It is, however, possible and often essential in behavioural systems analysis to include such variables in analytic diagramming by adding to each box another layer analyzing a specific practice performed by a particular class of actors. For example, participation in large demonstrations can only occur if a large open space is accessible, so making plans for access and transportation to such sites is necessary. Contemporary social networking tools like Twitter and Facebook can facilitate such gatherings and rapidly communicate tactical changes. If access to the Internet is denied, there are, of course, many historical and


Action/Practice
Demonstrates, participates in general strike
Actor
Civilian participant
Motivating Context
Frustration and deprivation
{Marcos ≈ criminal}
Models of courage
Rule: "Success is possible now"
Call from cardinal
Consequences
Excitement and hope
Mutual support
Support of leaders, clergy
Limited perceived risk
Action/Practice
Refuses to attack
Actor
Member of military
Motivating Context
Frustration and deprivation
Facing clergy
Facing unarmed citizens
Models of resistance
Call from cardinal
Consequences
Mutual support
Avoids injuring clergy
Avoids injuring unarmed
Excitement and hope
Action/Practice
Stands in the face of military threats
Actor
Member of clergy
Motivating Context
Call from cardinal
{my vocation ≈ justice ≈ participation}
Models of courage
Rule: "Success is possible now"
Consequences
Mutual support
Support of people
Hope for relief
Consistency with values
Action/Practice
Plans neighborhood and community actions
Actor
Local resistance leader
Motivating Context
Frustration and deprivation
{Marcos ≈ criminal}
Models of courage
Rule: "Success is possible now"
Call from cardinal
Consequences
Peer and popular support
Leadership support
Excitement
Hope for relief
Action/Practice
Encourages participants
Actor
Member of general population
Motivating Context
Frustration and deprivation
{Marcos ≈ criminal}
Call from cardinal
Rule: "Success is possible now"
Consequences
Mutual support
Excitement
Hope for relief
Action/Practice
Joins resistance leadership
Actor
Military leader
Motivating Context
Frustration
{democracy ≈ justice}
World media
Concern for self
Call from cardinal
Consequences
Hope for relief
Possible future leadership opportunities
Mutual support

FIGURE 3. Some interdependencies among classes of actors in the Philippine People Power revolution

contemporary examples of people's creativity in finding ways to maintain communication networks, even if only through whispering. An important message, therefore, is that deficits in particular kinds of resources should not be a reason for despair. The same is true across the board; if support from the military is not immediately available, for instance, other supports probably are. Similarly, if media that could expose violent oppression to the outside world cannot function, other methods can often be creatively accessed, including the development of alternative media: the “Yo Soy 132” movement in Mexico in 2012, for example, challenged distrusted mass media by establishing their own outlets.[38]

More importantly, in the Philippine People Power example, both immediate and more distant positive consequences for action were made available within the interactional matrix. Immediate support from peers and leaders within the resistance provided a bridge to more delayed positive outcomes. The growth of the movement, the support of the military and clergy in large numbers, the increasing positive reports from the media, the refusal of the military to attack—these and other intermediate positive consequences maintained participation in important ways. At the same time, rules specifying that, given action, ultimate liberation (the long-term potential consequence) was possible also contributed to sustained commitment. While the campaign experienced rapid success in its final chapter, this was the culmination of over a decade and a half of resistance activity.

Where such extended engagement is required, establishing cultures of resistance that sustain cultural practices of mutual support and solidarity are essential. Many nonviolent campaigns take years, even decades, to reach their goals.[39] Extensive scientific evidence suggests that outcomes that are distant and uncertain are usually not powerful enough to sustain widespread hope and participation among a grievance population. As Theodore Roszak cautioned, “People try nonviolence for a week, and when it ‘doesn’t work’ they go back to violence, which hasn’t worked for centuries.”[40] Arranging more immediate incentives and opportunities therefore becomes a priority for movement leadership.

Given what we know of human and group behaviour, the development of detailed analytic charts like figure 3 holds significant promise for planning. The following steps can be taken to structure such analysis:

1. Identify the major classes of actors (and, where relevant, important individual actors like Marcos or Cardinal Sin), and their actions that maintain the present situation.
2. Diagram the current situation to hypothesize how the actions of each group fit together to maintain the status quo. This first diagram will look much like figure 3 but will focus on the current state.

3. Determine which actions, among which classes of actors, need to be shifted to move toward the alternative, desired state.
4. Hypothesize the contextual factors, structural factors, and consequences that, if shifted, could leverage the desired actions by the classes of actors identified in step three and diagram an interlocking matrix like figure 3 that illustrates how all these variables would all fit together. That diagram clarifies the new reality toward which the resistance campaign is working and helps to concretize campaign objectives.
5. Test the analysis in action, evaluate the results, and modify the analysis as guided by those results.

Recalling the caution raised in chapter 2 about the need for a strategic plan to guide events after the campaign succeeds, the analytic methods discussed above can also be used to clarify the final goal state and the interlocking practices (which groups will be doing what) that will probably be required to sustain it. While the vision of success may seem obvious, elaborating and realizing that vision is usually tremendously challenging. Note, then, that ideally, three types of diagrams need to be developed and modified over time: a diagram of the dynamics of the current state, a diagram of the dynamics of the campaign of nonviolent struggle, and a diagram of the interlocking practices that will construct and sustain the final goal state.

ACT, PRACTICE, OR SCENE?

One final technical point needs brief attention. In some cases, all that is necessary is to analyze factors supporting and opposing a single act that may require few or no repetitions: an act such as attendance at a series of massive demonstrations over a brief period of time or abdication by a dictator. In many other cases, however, what is needed is to shape and sustain a set of interlocking practices over time; this is the essence of constructing culture, including cultures of resistance. For this reason, in figure 3 above, the top item in each of the actor frames is labelled "Action/Practice." Diagrams like that in figure 3 can be helpful whether one is dealing with a single act or a persistent cultural practice maintained by a group, because cultural practices are simply actions that are maintained through interlocks with other practices that are repeated across individual members of the culture and over time—often across "generations" of members of the culture.[41]

In many cases, what is actually desired is the repeated enactment of a interactional scene: for example, an activist approaching and challenging a legislator about a serious human rights issue on which the legislator has potential influence, and the legislator agreeing to use that influence. Sometimes, the scene should be analyzed as a unit. This would involve representing the two actions (or practices) on a single diagram and including for each actor not only those contextual factors and consequences that are exchanged among the two present in the scene but also the other factors that would be associated with the activist making a persuasive case and the legislator agreeing to help. In this case, the resistance movement would prepare the activist but may also have other allies who could prepare the legislator to be more open to hearing the appeal than she may have been before. Such scene analysis could advance the struggle in many instances of activism and nonviolent resistance.

At a further level of complexity, as we will see in later chapters, entire sets of interlocking practices may be selected by the larger interactional environment—or may not be. A significant literature related to analysis of such so-called metacontingencies is emerging.[42] The term *metacontingency* can be defined as the relationship between multiple interlocking behavioural contingencies that function cohesively and their aggregate outcomes. A simple example may be useful here (see figure 4). Within an overall sociocultural milieu that affects all of the systems involved, the collective action of a complex behavioural system (security forces in figure 4) produces a condition or outcome (repression). That condition affects the practices of the grievance population and of other societal sectors (e.g., by evoking compliance), and those responses then recursively sustain (or potentially influence) the collective action of the original system (security forces). The interactions defining the basic metacontingency (i.e., the interactions maintaining the condition of repression) are those depicted by the solid arrows. The dotted lines indicate sample actions by the resistance movement and others that may shift those interactions over time and lead, for example, to defections. In this example, if the grievance population and/or other sectors begin to respond differently,


Security Forces
One Security Forces Unit
Practices of senior officers
Motivating context
Consequences
Practices of enforcement personnel
Motivating context
Consequences
Practices of support personnel
Motivating context
Consequences
Practices of intelligence personnel
Motivating context
Consequences
Overall Sociocultural Milieu
Practices of resistance movement
Practices of grievance population
Repression
Practices of other sectors
Motivating context
Consequences

FIGURE 4. An example of a metacontingency and some of its component systems and dynamics

the actions of the security forces are likely to change. An assumption in early versions of metacontingency theory was that the interlocking practices within the security forces will change if the outcomes of their collective action change but that the interactional details of what happens inside the security forces need not be known. The reality is more complex, however, and that complexity both presents challenges and offers new opportunities for nonviolent action.[43]

One challenge is that, given the drag of the past and the likelihood that the rules guiding the security forces may have become rigid and disconnected from outcomes, the actions of the security forces may not shift, at least for some time, even if those of the population do—this is especially likely if the population's actions are not dramatically different from the status quo. But the opportunities here are multiple, primarily because the security forces are not a monolithic entity, although they may initially look that way. They comprise individual units (for simplicity, only one is shown in figure 4), and the most common way in which security forces defect to the resistance is not en masse but unit by unit (although such action may quickly cascade through multiple units). Individuals often also defect, but this typically has a less dramatic impact. Historically, resistance movements and other sectors have often been able to influence individual units to defect. This may come about through contacts with enforcement officers (police officers or soldiers on the street) and/or with the leadership within individual units, influences that are shown in figure 4 with dotted arrows. In the first case, if resisters influence some enforcement personnel, those may begin to influence others within the unit (dotted arrows among the persons and subsystems). In the second, the actions of the resistance or other sectors may influence or be accurately observed by the officer corps, who may extract new rules (expectations for outcomes of actions taken) and subsequently shift the practices of the unit to support the resistance.

The original concept of "metacontingency" suggested that while the interlocking practices within the focal system (e.g., the security forces unit) are important to its functioning, the primary determinant of the actions of the unit as a whole is the response of "receiving systems" outside the system itself (e.g., the population and other sectors).[44] However, because the unit is at least partially self-organizing, it may be possible to affect subsystems within the larger system independently from outside (e.g., individual personnel); it may also be possible to influence the rules on which the leadership (e.g., officer corps) base decisions as to what actions the system will take.[45] In this example, the resistance may be able to simultaneously (a) manipulate the metacontingency affecting the security forces as a whole (by inducing a large portion of the population to respond differently to repression); (b) shift the loyalties of enforcement personnel, who can then shift the internal culture of individual units; and (c) influence the rules by which the officer corps within individual units make decisions to participate in a campaign of repression, to stand aside, or to resist the campaign. It is important to remember that it is ultimately individuals who act, whether separately or collectively, and it is possible to analyze why they do, at least to a reasonable degree of precision. Those actions, however, are influenced in crucial ways by the systemic context, which can be captured through behavioural systems science by analyzing force fields, matrices of cultural practices, metacontingencies, and other conceptual models discussed later.

The key message in this chapter has been that analytic frameworks and conceptual models grounded in behavioural systems analysis offer a valuable means to describe, understand, and potentially influence cultural attitudes, institutions, and patterns of behaviour that variously sustain or challenge oppression and that such modes of analysis can help civil resistance movements better serve the goals of social change and human liberation. Resistance movements themselves are cultural entities—behavioural systems or interlocking networks of behavioural systems. The same kinds of tools can therefore be used to analyze resistance movements themselves. In the next two chapters we apply the model to such movements, examining, in chapter 5, behavioural systems approaches for sustaining the critical dynamics of solidarity, discipline, and courage and, in chapter 6, examining the behavioural dynamics of effective leadership within social movements.

5

SUSTAINING RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS: SOLIDARITY, DISCIPLINE, AND COURAGE

> We shall have to have people tied together in a long-term relationship, instead of the evanescent enthusiasts who lose their experience, spirit and unity because they have no mechanism that directs them to new tasks.
>
> — Martin Luther King Jr., *Where Do We Go from Here: Chaos or Community?*

Nonviolent struggle is at root a collective enterprise. While charismatic leaders such as Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr., Cesar Chavez, and Aung San Suu Kyi have clearly been crucial to the movements they led, none could have brought about change alone. Furthermore, in many nonviolent struggles, such leaders have not played a central role. As Dr. King suggests in the comment quoted above, successful nonviolent struggle ultimately demands widespread commitment on the part of the population, often over an extended period of time.[1] Although, under certain circumstances, a one-time mobilization of masses of people can succeed in bringing about change, strategic nonviolent action generally requires organization and the construction of a persistent culture of resistance within the grievance group.[2] Lack of an organized resistance community makes collective strategic action impossible; disorganized, nonstrategic struggle is risky and can lead to uncertain results, as evidenced in the variable outcomes of the 2011 Arab Spring. At the same time, organized movements often emerge from relatively inchoate uprisings of dissatisfaction.

In this chapter, I examine what is known with some certainty and what is believed to be true about constructing such resistance communities, providing interpretations grounded in behavioural systems science that may provide additional clarification. It is important to note that theorists of nonviolent struggle tend to have strong beliefs about what works and what doesn't within resistance movements. Experience and historical interpretation contain considerable wisdom, and the material that follows draws extensively on such sources. But despite the comfort of certainty, a scientific perspective requires that common understandings be regarded as hypotheses that merit testing rather than as fixed truth. No doubt, much is yet to be learned.

Several characteristics of cultures of resistance have been emphasized in the literature of nonviolent struggle. Solidarity, nonviolent discipline, and courage have received particular attention, and each will be explored in some depth here. Similar dimensions emerge in the literatures of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and community organization: important lessons may be extracted from those bodies of work as well, some of which are integrated into what follows.

SOLIDARITY

Solidarity within resistance movements is characteristic of effective nonviolent struggles, and the need for solidarity has also been emphasized in the literature on insurgencies. The term *solidarity* refers to a unity of vision and to mutual support and collective commitment; some of the nonviolent action literature refers to this simply as *unity.* In Robert Helvey's view, even the appearance of disunity is a contaminant that can be fatal to a movement (and literally fatal to participants).[3] Helvey maintains that most people will join and sustain participation in a movement only if it has a clear purpose and offers a persuasive strategy for attaining their collective aspirations. By contrast, movements in which people generally feel unwelcome or that espouse values different from their own are unlikely to survive. Furthermore, as Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan suggest, given that success in nonviolent campaigns is closely correlated with high levels of participation among the population or grievance group, a movement, to be successful, must be broadly attractive to multiple sectors of the population.[4]

How, then, is solidarity built and sustained within a movement? Helvey suggests that preserving the appearance of agreement among the leadership, keeping objectives to the barest minimum so that agreement is required in only a few areas, and clearly communicating that the campaign will benefit all of society are key factors in fostering and maintaining solidarity. This advice is particularly central to sustaining coalitions among groups with overlapping but not identical orientations. There is much more to constructing cultures of solidarity, however. While an exploration of solidarity in nonviolent struggle could easily fill a volume, analyses of the dynamics of maintaining morale and carrying out political education, two essential elements of establishing and sustaining solidarity, capture much of what is known.

Maintaining Morale

Based on his direct experience and extensive study, Gene Sharp sketched four approaches for shaping and sustaining high levels of morale: maintaining rapport and solidarity, generating incentives to carry on the struggle, reducing grounds for capitulation, and using restraints or sanctions.[5] Sharp's framework provides a useful structure for exploring the behavioural dynamics of morale in the midst of difficult and dangerous struggle.

Maintaining rapport and solidarity. Sharp suggests that regular contact and communication among activists, leaders, and support groups and "demonstrations of 'togetherness'" such as mass meetings, songs, or symbols of unity contribute to feeling that one is a part of something greater.[6] Collective enthusiasm and high spirits are often important. Barbara Deming notes that "one fire kindles another," while Saul Alinsky declares: "If your people aren't having a ball doing it, there is something very wrong with the tactic."[7] In "Humor as a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression," Majken Jul Sørenson argues that humour can and should be part of maintaining "high spirits," providing examples to show how humour can serve to facilitate solidarity and support cohesive cultures of resistance.[8] Most importantly, as Malcolm Gladwell persuasively argues, citing the research of sociologist Doug McAdam, "high-risk activism . . . is a 'strong-tie' phenomenon"—that is, strong personal relationships within the activist group sustain commitment.[9] Indeed, history shows that close, trusting relationships within resistance movements are essential to maintaining participation over the course of extended, difficult, and dangerous campaigns. Gandhi called for an "unbreakable heart unity," also noting that "friendships, selfless and genuine, must be the basis for political pacts."[10]

A rich and extensive behavioural literature related to sustaining relationships and commitment contains much on which we can draw to support the importance of morale and solidarity to nonviolent action. Simple positive exchanges (e.g., sharing food, singing together, and engaging in group recreational activities) can play a major role in encouraging continuing participation. Alinsky was clearly correct: fun can contribute to solidarity and commitment. The more novel enjoyment present, the more attractive the group tends to be, strengthening relationships needed for difficult times. Consistent with the matching law, people are more likely to choose participation in the movement over other options if such participation produces multiple satisfactions (including those offered by friendship, contact with attractive participants, humour, and engaging activities). Humour can also shift equivalence relations: for example, from {dictator ≈ powerful} to {dictator ≈ ridiculous}.[11]

One useful way to think about this is to diagram scenes that might contribute to sustaining solidarity and explore the kinds of consequences and antecedents that would select those scenes. Figure 5, for example, examines a scene in which a leader invites members of an activist group to participate in a common celebratory meal, and those members respond positively to the invitation. This diagram pays particular attention to the motivating context and the consequences. Note that certain essential resources like adequate meal ingredients and materials for activities should be available, as should certain existing repertoires like cooking ability. Even without these resources, however, many groups learn to "make do" very well, since the interpersonal dynamic is generally the most powerful factor. Most important for our purposes here are the question marks, which represent questions like "What kinds of motivating antecedents would encourage the leader to invite and


Scene of Morale Building
Action/Practice
Invites and encourages participation
Actor
Leader of core group
Motivating Context
?
Consequences
• Improved morale among core group
?
Action/Practice
Participates in celebratory meal
Actor
Member of activist core group
Motivating Context
• Signal: invitation
• Participation by peers
?
Consequences
• Support from organizer and peers
• Quality food
• Excitement
?
?
?
?
?
Availability of necessary resources: food, materials for activities

FIGURE 5. A tool for exploring factors that could contribute to building morale through celebratory meals together

reinforce participation?" and "Will support from the leader and each other, quality food, and the excitement built into a program of activities that accompany the dinner (e.g., a soccer game or public reading of inspirational texts) support participation, or are stronger consequences needed?"

Whether such celebratory meals will build morale in a particular group at a particular time is an empirical question that can only be answered by experimenting, but it is a reasonable hypothesis based on experiential reports. Tools like that illustrated in figure 5 can help to determine what it might take to encourage this scene to be repeated, as well as which motivating contextual factors and which consequences, and for whom, may be missing or may be needed for success. A quick sketch such as this to encourage thinking about motivation and consequences among key actors is a simple tool that can introduce people to basic principles of behavioural science. Of course, much more rigorous analysis is possible as well. Constructing such diagrams can itself be a morale builder: this is supported by research that associates working together toward a common purpose with a positive climate.[12]

Some of the necessary antecedents and consequences for continuing engaged participation usually come from outside the group itself: for example, reports of positive results from other allied activist groups—or perhaps even reading this chapter. Such potential external antecedents and consequences are represented by the arrows with question marks coming from outside the boundary of the desired scene in figure 5. For leaders, recognizing low morale may serve as a signal to take immediate steps. Other relevant motivating antecedents for leaders may be action taken by other leaders under similar circumstances or rules like "When morale seems low, celebrating some success together will enhance solidarity and support the movement." Positive consequences for a leader, beyond seeing morale improve, may include recognition by others in the network of leadership beyond the immediate group or personal satisfaction for taking action. These are simply examples drawn from other campaigns; it is important that each situation be analyzed uniquely based on overall principles, since no two will be alike.

Attention paid to each of the question marks on the diagram can help determine what it will take to make repetition of the scene in question more likely; if experiments based on such analysis are unsuccessful, the problem probably lies in weaknesses in one of the dimensions represented by the question marks (lack of strong motivating context, lack of payoffs for participation, etc.). It is also important to examine any likely aversive experiences associated with the scene: in the example of the shared meal, for instance, if the organizers know that some participants truly dislike each other, such common celebratory meals may not be the best choice, and other options for bringing people together around common values might be explored, including some of the activities discussed in the next section ("Political Education"). How those involved in a campaign treat each other is more than a tactical question; as Dorothy Day noted, "I don't think the moral life of a social activist is a separate matter; . . . if we exploit each other personally and keep holding our placards and proclaiming our ideals to the world, then we've become hypocrites."[13] Absence of transparency and integrity will discourage participation.

In terms of daily life within an activist group, excessive seriousness is usually aversive, except at particularly important or high-stress moments. Even more importantly, a high level of aversive exchange typically generates either escape or counteraggression, neither of which is consistent with enthusiastic participation and high morale.[14] As is true in businesses, schools, and organizations, morale and climate must be taken seriously in resistance groups; both can be measured with relative rigour through observation, simple questionnaires, or discussions using focus group or community circle methods, drawing on what has been learned in other organizational settings. According to Robert Helvey, polling, which is used extensively in counterinsurgency efforts, can be useful in nonviolent struggle as a means to examine the level of morale and commitment within the resistance group, particularly in extended strategic campaigns.[15]

There may, however, be times when stress is high and a consistently comfortable climate is not realistic, such as when the movement is facing repressive violence. As discussed under the section "Nonviolent Discipline" below, the critical factor then becomes an unshakeable commitment to persevere.

Generating incentives to carry on the struggle. Gene Sharp, in a brief discussion of generating incentives, focuses on the need for participants to "believe their action is justified, the gained objectives will be worthwhile, and the means of action have been wisely chosen."[16] These beliefs involve verbal processes: believing that action is justified is an example of an equivalence relation, and the other two items are rules (statements, explicit or implicit, about the consequences of action). Despite Sharp's use of the term *incentive*, none of these is technically an incentive (reinforcer), but these verbal processes have their own power for enhancing motivation. On the basis of existing research, the equivalence {this action ≈ justified ≈ right} is likely to be strengthened by observing respected others stating the same equivalence in some way, by enthusiastically encouraging statements of the equivalence (e.g., responding to a statement of justification with "I know, right? Something had to be done! We are doing the right thing!")

Likewise, rules such as "The results will be worthwhile" can be supported through observing trusted others stating similar rules and being encouraged to state them oneself, but the strongest support comes through success. If the results of previous actions have been "worth it," the rule will be strengthened. The statement "The means of action have been wisely chosen" is interesting: while it is in part an equivalence—{means being taken ≈ wise}—it also functions as a partially stated rule, in that it implies that the means chosen will lead to good outcomes. This statement can be strengthened and supported by observing respected others within the activist community stating it with conviction, by encouragement, and by previous personal experience of the success of similar means. All of these verbal processes can be further supported through political education, discussed in the next section.

Actual incentives offered within the resistance community also have a long history of value. These do not, under normal circumstances, include tangible incentives like money, which can be detrimental to resistance movements: hiring "nonviolent mercenaries" would be inconsistent with the kind of commitment required and with many of the well-established principles of nonviolent resistance. Nontangible incentives, however, such as intentional and honest personal recognition of persistence in the face of difficulties, have demonstrated great power within organized groups. Some individuals are very talented in providing meaningful recognition, empathy, and caring, and they should be encouraged to use those skills in genuine ways within the resistance community. The research is clear: people appreciate being appreciated and are likely to repeat actions that others have recognized, as long as that recognition is sincere.[17]

Within the dynamics of an activist group, perhaps the most important variables are the overall levels of recognition, encouragement, and aversive experiences. Group workers and community organizers have found that it is both productive and fairly easy to track those levels over time.[18] While more rigorous approaches are possible, two relatively simple methods have proven useful. The first is to develop a simple questionnaire for participants, a form of polling. Members are asked to rate their own experiences in the group in terms of how often and how strongly they feel they have been encouraged and recognized for the actions they have taken, as well as how often and how strongly they have felt disrespected or scolded. Asking for examples of each will help to clarify people's experiences. Four or five questions, perhaps including ratings on a five-point scale and a request for short examples, are enough to produce useful data. Another option is to have one (or better, two) participants observe the group (e.g., in meetings), with the knowledge of the group members, and simply note or count examples of recognition and of disrespect or discouragement from others. Either approach can be repeated over time and the results charted in order to help identify when things are going well (and should be celebrated) and when they are not going so well and need attention. On paper, this may sound very "technical" but in fact, people usually like to be asked for their feedback.

Reducing grounds for capitulation. Perhaps the most important of Sharp's dimensions supporting solidarity is reducing grounds for giving up the struggle. This often requires the provision of necessities of life to participants in the struggle—including food, housing, and money as needed. Note that this is different from incentivizing people to participate; from a behavioural perspective, it is simply a matter of providing essential or facilitating resources without which participation may be extremely difficult or impossible (see table 1 and figure 2).

Sharp insists that it is particularly important that the original participants continue in the struggle, because if they withdraw, others may follow. This is more difficult than may at first appear; from a behavioural science perspective, accumulating aversive experiences (which is common in difficult struggles for justice) reduces the inclination to continue, and experiences that were initially very reinforcing naturally lose power over time due to satiation. As a result, special attention to and encouragement for original participants may be needed to maintain their active involvement. Behaviour science suggests at least four strategies that might help. First, periods of relief from the most aversive experiences should be arranged. For example, past leaders like Gandhi and Cesar Chavez commonly withdrew from action for significant periods of time, through both periodic retreats and intervals of relative quiet between campaign actions, thus avoiding continual exposure to aversive experiences. Second, leadership should, in most cases, be distributed, both to reduce stress on the original participants and to encourage growth in the activist community. Third, it is possible through a process called "acceptance and commitment" (discussed in more detail below) to learn to persist for significant periods despite one's own emotional reactions. Finally, sincere expressions of appreciation are valued by everyone, including leaders. Statements by newer group members of how important leaders have been to them as models, for example, can be very encouraging. Making such expressions explicit—for example, in a community circle or in writing—can be powerful and, as noted earlier, can act as an important social incentive.[19]

Using restraints or sanctions. The final approach to maintaining solidarity in Sharp's framework is the use of restraints or sanctions to keep people involved or to bring them back into the movement. Sharp contrasts such sanctions with the imprisonment and execution that are commonly used to punish participants who defect in war. The behavioural dynamics involved in the two are different, and not just because the sanctions used in nonviolent struggle are nonphysical. The intent of imprisonment or execution is not to bring the defector back into line but to punish or injure him—mostly to induce others not to act in similar ways. Such injury is not an active behavioural process designed to bring the offender back into the struggle. Rather, sanctions such as these establish a condition to be avoided by others, a model of what might happen to them if they defect—an aversive that does not reinforce strong commitment.

The sanctions typically used in nonviolent struggle are intended to bringing defectors back into participation in the struggle and to re-establish nonviolent discipline. Among Sharp's examples of such sanctions are verbal persuasion, public prayers, fines, publication of names of defectors, social and economic boycotts, and fasting. When protests in India slipped into violence, for example, Gandhi several times began a fast-unto-death to induce his followers to abandon violence and return to nonviolent discipline.[20] Cesar Chavez responded by fasting when he believed his movement required "purification," as when some members slipped into violence, hatred, and sabotage.[21]

Such sanctions establish an aversive state from which members of a resistance movement can escape by returning to participation and compliance. It is difficult to argue with the intent, logic, and evident success of these sanctions under varying circumstances. Still, all applications of aversives have predictable side effects. Some potential participants may avoid joining a movement to avoid the risk of sanctions, and others may defect from the movement altogether. Others may stay active but resent being pressured in this way, and they may, at some later point, counteraggress against leaders whom they have experienced as coercive. All forms of aversives, like nearly all medications, have potential side effects and should therefore be used with caution and full awareness. Well-established theory suggests that it may be possible to minimize such side effects by ensuring an overall environment that is rich in positive exchange and recognition relative to the level of aversives present, and in most cases, recommitment to nonviolent discipline and participation offers a return to powerful social incentives.[22]

Political Education

While maintaining morale is clearly important to solidarity, the historical record suggests that political education is also almost universally critical to sustained campaigns.[23] The core of such education is a collective process of becoming aware of oppression, reflecting on the reasons for its existence, developing strategies to challenge it, and analyzing the outcomes of actions taken. Gandhi, who stressed that "training is necessary as well for civil disobedience as for armed revolt," was fully aware of the knowledge gaps of those he hoped to inspire to nonviolent resistance: "The villagers know nothing of foreign rule and its evils. What little knowledge they have picked up fills them with the awe the foreigner inspires. The result is the dread and hatred of the foreigner and his rule. They do not know how to get rid of it. They do not know that the foreigner's presence is due to their own weaknesses and their ignorance of the power they possess to rid themselves of the foreign rule."[24] His booklet *Constructive Programme* is an outline of the training that he saw as crucial for nonviolent struggle; significantly, it consists primarily of political education rather than tactical instruction.

Political education is widely recognized as important for activists, but also for the general population, whose participation will ultimately be crucial to success. Participation requires tactical instruction and guidance, certainly, but preparation through political education provides crucial motivating antecedents, equivalence relations, and rules. The need for such preparation for action is widely recognized. Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler recognize the need for the corps of activists to "instruct, nurture and support the general population in the performance of nonviolent conflict."[25] Paulo Freire, whose

Pedagogy of the Oppressed has guided many justice activists, calls for a popular education that "makes oppression and its causes objects of reflection by the oppressed, and from that reflection will come their necessary engagement in the struggle for their liberation."[26] While his work has not been widely published, Myles Horton, of the Highlander Folk School in Appalachia, trained generations of civil rights activists and community organizers in similar ways. His method of liberatory education emphasizes that in the right environment, disadvantaged and oppressed people can collectively identify and analyze the problems they face. Given access to information they might need, they can then determine how to respond.[27] Recognition of the power of political education and the praxis (reflection in action) that is expected to emerge from it is also present in most treatments of military, counterinsurgency, and guerrilla campaigns. John Collins notes that leaders of insurgencies are generally aware of the need for political education and knowledge of the issues.[28]

Gene Sharp observes that training for activists themselves has been conducted "through study groups, workshops, seminars, sociodramas and other means."[29] Scott Wimberley argues that, to be effective, a participant in guerrilla struggle must have a "political awareness of the reason for the struggle . . . as acute as his ability to fight. Such political awareness and motivation is obtained through the dynamics of group discussion. . . . Group discussions raise the spirit and improve the unity of thought of the guerrilla, and they put social pressure on the weak members to perform better in future training or combat."[30] Such discussions often include local and national history, emphasize examples of oppression (always with a local focus), and help the guerrilla to see why his or her treatment of the general population is important. A similar recognition of the larger population is present in *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, which notes that the everyday actions of each soldier on the ground affect the success of the operation in generating popular support; therefore, personnel at all levels need to share a common understanding of the reasons why the struggle is being waged and an ability to persuasively share that understanding with the population.

A core principle of nonviolent struggle is that it be open and above board, which means that integrity in political education is essential. Transparency and honesty defuse fear and engage followers, as noted by Sharp and Deming, among others.[31] Secrecy and manipulation are commonly believed to be contaminants that are inconsistent with the dynamics of nonviolent struggle. Therefore, while equivalence relations, values, and understandings of reality can often be manipulated over the short term (which would be a misuse of behavioural science), doing so will weaken and perhaps sabotage campaigns of nonviolent struggle over the long term when that manipulation ultimately surfaces. Nonviolent action depends on bravery and trust; people generally do not view those who manipulate others as worthy of being followed—on the contrary, such manipulation is experienced as oppression. The trust and loyalty of third-party supporters can also be damaged through lack of integrity. Interestingly, *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* offers similar cautions, as does Scott Wimberley in his manual on guerrilla warfare.[32]

With all behavioural change, it is important to know what one is trying to achieve, what actions and behavioural scenes one wishes to increase or decrease. One goal of political education is usually simply to share information, but efforts to shift verbal processes toward a particular set of values (i.e., to shift equivalences) are usually central as well. This raises important ethical questions. Propagandists often know exactly what they want people to see and to think, and which values they want people to accept, and in many cases, they pursue those outcomes without moral scruples. An honest process of political education consistent with Myles Horton's approach, in contrast, makes room for all participants to state and argue for their strong beliefs and values while maintaining an openness to learning and mutual challenge. The desired reality is not one in which everyone blindly accepts a predetermined set of rules and values but one of mutual respect and challenge from which shared perceptions, rules, and values can emerge.

Shifts in Equivalence Relations

Assuming that political education is important to shaping and sustaining a campaign of nonviolent struggle over the extended time that is often required, what are the behavioural dynamics involved and how might they be optimized? A key aspect of political education is the offering of opportunities for activists and other members of the grievance group to re-examine their understandings of the world and to recognize oppression and its evils. Before one can act, one must recognize the reality of what is wrong and why it is wrong. This is what Gandhi was referring to in his comment to his son Harilal, quoted at the outset of this book: "I do not know whether you have seen the world as it really is. For myself I can say I perceive the world in its grim reality every moment."[33] How one sees and understands the world, and even what one sees, is largely determined through verbal processes.

As an example, in a world in which women are battered and mutilated, demeaned and disrespected, women themselves have often been taught to see themselves as weak, damaged, needy, deserving of punishment, even evil—these are equivalence relations. Shifts to equivalences like {women ≈ oppressed} but {women ≈ powerful} and {women ≈ deserving of respect} are essential to engagement in the struggle for gender justice and women's liberation. Similarly, shifting views of cultural practices from, for example, {being kept at home ≈ being protected} to {being kept at home ≈ being controlled} is challenging, but many examples clearly show that it can be done. The behavioural and behavioural systems processes involved are well known.

Simply attempting to refute or reverse existing equivalences has proven counterproductive: for example, recall that stating over and over again—even with strong encouragement—"All Muslims are not terrorists," tends, paradoxically, to *strengthen* the equivalence between "Muslim" and "terrorist," as would repeatedly stating "Women are not weak" or "The dictator is not powerful."[34] By contrast, encouraging and reinforcing statements like "Muslims are often very brave" (consistent with the evidence of the Pashtun Khudai Khidmatgars, the large nonviolent army discussed in the next chapter) or "Islam is a religion of peace" bring Muslims into equivalences that are incompatible with {Muslim ≈ terrorist}. Similarly, encouraging statements, with multiple exemplars, of women's strength or of the ridiculousness of the dictator can, under the right conditions, shift beliefs and, ultimately, actions. Facilitating new equivalence relations in this way is central to political education. Theory suggests that Freire's "pedagogy of the question," which leads people to explore examples contradictory to their current understanding and to notice connections that they have not made before, can provide tools for establishing new and more accurate equivalences.[35]

Equivalence relations (which, recall, are analogous to sets in set theory) can include many members. For example, in the process of liberating themselves, numerous women have discovered that many actions on the part of men fall into the equivalence of oppressive behaviour, including various obvious and subtle forms of intimidation, micro-aggressions, isolation, emotional abuse, blaming, and withholding money or financial information, all of which contribute to an overall dynamic of establishing and sustaining power and control.[36] As women recognize that a particular behaviour—say, someone talking over them—is yet another form of domination and intimidation, this specific behaviour begins to be treated like other forms of oppression.

In political education, one crucial goal is to build a culture of activists who share equivalence relations, who see the world in similar ways and share certain common values. Discussions of multiple exemplars of common oppressive practices (multiple instances of intimidation, multiple instances of homophobic disrespect, multiple instances of structure violence, multiple instances of violations of basic human rights) can help build equivalences among those actions.[37] Statements of accurate equivalences made by respected, persuasive models are likely to strengthen those equivalences, and dialogic methods offer many opportunities for those who are conscious of injustice to bring others along. Rehearsing how to discuss lack of access to health care as a human rights violation is apt not only to have an impact on members of the population being engaged but also to strengthen the equivalence for the activist leading the discussion. Techniques like sociodrama, in which activists play out oppressive scenes in ways that clarify injustice, have a long history and function through shifts in equivalences. Many other artistic approaches can also contribute in somewhat similar ways to such shifts, including murals, other visual arts, and music and song.

Changing Rules

A related and central process in political education is deepening participants' understandings of relevant cause-and-effect relationships—that is, of what consequences particular actions are likely to produce. In some cases, oppressed populations express great hopelessness, basing their lack of action on rules like "Anything we try will fail, and we will be more severely punished for making the effort." On the one hand, hopeless people do not take strategic action, although they may strike out in frustration. On the other hand, given rules that encourage hope, "the poor have no fears," as Gandhi once noted.[38] They have little to lose.

Once established, rules can become very rigid. Once rigid rules are established, exceptions are often not noticed, so powerful challenges may be required to induce changes. One way to introduce such challenge is to offer people opportunities to test alternative rules experimentally and, as a result, to take first steps, however modest, toward resistance; this approach has proven powerful in other areas of human behaviour. Inducing participants to test alternative rules involves a process of (a) offering opportunities, in dialogue, to clarify current beliefs about what can and cannot work; (b) searching, again dialogically, for exceptions to the rules of hopelessness, which involves raising exemplars of success; (c) encouraging very modest first experiments; and (d) evaluating those experiments in terms of possible shifts in rules. This is simply the scientific process as applied to rule-governed behaviour, beautifully exemplified by Václav Havel's encouragement to "live in truth" (explored in some detail in chapter 7).[39]

A contemporary example of rule changing is the Chicago Freedom School (CFS), which emphasizes political education for a diverse group of young people from across the city—primarily young people of colour. Most participants have experienced a lifetime of disempowerment and oppression at the intersections of poverty, race, gender, sexual orientation, poor education, community violence, and adultism. The CFS program integrates education on the history and strategies of social movements, activities encouraging youth leadership and identity development, and collective nonviolent action to construct an intergenerational community of people from diverse backgrounds and neighbourhoods; this community then comes together to build a broad-based movement for social justice across issues, identities, and ideologies. Dialogic political education emphasizing shifts in equivalence relations and rules toward stances of empowerment and hopeful action, as well as active experimentation (reflection in action), are central to the CFS's model of praxis.[40]

NONVIOLENT DISCIPLINE

Nonviolent discipline refers to maintaining adherence to a minimum set of standards for behaviour as a member of a nonviolent activist group, particularly when participating in nonviolent actions and campaign activities. For Gene Sharp, nonviolent discipline includes staying with the action once one has engaged, "refus[ing] to submit to fear," committing to nonviolent behaviour regardless of provocation, and complying with collectively established plans and instructions.[41] These standards are commonly accepted in the literature on nonviolent struggle. Although the importance of eschewing "even a little" violence has been explored in previous chapters, there is more to say about this in the context of nonviolent discipline.[42] ("Refusing to submit to fear" will be considered in the following section on courage.)

A particularly well-developed example of a set of commitments to nonviolent discipline is the "CORE Rules for Action" developed and widely implemented during the US civil rights movement by the Congress of Racial Equality, or CORE. This set of principles, reproduced in table 3, goes beyond clarifying what a participant should and should not do in the heat of nonviolent action. It also provides comprehensive statements that can guide practical aspects of political education in preparation for an overall campaign. Each of the thirteen rules, ten for individual participants and three for the local group, merits careful attention, but we focus here on a few that are specifically related to nonviolent discipline in the context of behavioural systems analysis

Rule 2 is particularly relevant here in that it specifically endorses participation in "experiments"—a way of framing action that is crucial to increasing the application of behavioural systems science to nonviolent struggle. Rules 3, 4, and 6 are obviously very challenging, and not all practitioners or analysts of nonviolent action would agree that acting out of hatred or anger is always a mistake. Ultimately, this is an empirical question that requires further exploration. Recall Barbara Deming's "two hands" principle, however: one hand calms the opponent while the other makes him move. Based on what we know of human behaviour, making it clear that the opponent will not be physically harmed will make it easier for that opponent to cooperate. This discipline, therefore, may be not only morally good, by some standards, but also strategically useful. In some of the 2011 Arab Spring actions, large, angry groups of protesters chanted slogans like "Death to the dictator!" and threatened security forces. The anger is natural; many of the protesters had experienced severe and violent oppression, and people who are experiencing such powerful

TABLE 3. “CORE Rules for Action” from the Congress of Racial Equality

Guarantees of the Individual to the Group

1. A CORE member will investigate the facts carefully before determining whether or not racial injustice exists in a given situation.
2. A CORE member will seek at all times to understand both the attitude of the person responsible for a policy of racial discrimination, and the social situation which engendered the attitude. The CORE member will be flexible and creative, showing a willingness to participate in experiments which seem constructive, but being careful not to compromise CORE principles.
3. A CORE member will make a sincere effort to avoid malice and hatred toward any group or individual.
4. A CORE member will never use malicious slogans or labels to discredit any opponent.
5. A CORE member will be willing to admit mistakes.
6. He will meet the anger of any individual or group in the spirit of good will and creative reconciliation: he will submit to assault and will not retaliate in kind either by act or word.
7. A member will never engage in any action in the name of the group except when authorized by the group or one of its action units.
8. When in an action project a CORE member will obey the orders issued by the authorized leader or spokesman of the project, whether those orders please him or not. If he does not approve of such orders, he shall later refer the criticism back to the group or to the committee which was the source of the project plan.
9. No member, after once accepting the discipline of the group for a particular action project, shall have the right of withdrawing. However, should a participant feel that under further pressure he will no longer be able to adhere to the *Rules for Action*, he shall then withdraw from the project and leave the scene immediately after notifying the project leader.
10. Only a person who is a recognized member of the group or a participant accepted by the group leader in a particular project shall be permitted to take part in that group action.

Guarantees from the Local Group to the Individual

11. Each member has the right to dissent from any group decision and, if dissenting, need not participate in the specific action planned.
12. Each member shall understand that all decisions on general policy shall be arrived at only through democratic group discussion.
13. A CORE member shall receive the uncompromising support of his CORE group as he faces any difficulties resulting from his authorized activities.

aversives are likely to strike out at the perpetrator (or sadly at other available targets, including the innocent).[43] Such anger may be morally justified, but those at whom the anger is directed will typically respond to such threats with fear and even stronger punitive and coercive action, thus establishing the spiral of escalating violence discussed in chapter 3. There are, therefore, practical reasons to set standards like those in the CORE set of rules and to include anger management in activist training.[44]

NONVIOLENT BEHAVIOUR

Difficult as it may be to "submit to assault and . . . not retaliate in kind either by act or by word," as called for by the CORE rule 6, this principle is almost universally regarded as central to nonviolent struggle. According to Gene Sharp, "the requirement that volunteers maintain nonviolent discipline is rooted in the dynamics of the technique of nonviolent action. Nonviolent discipline is not an alien emphasis introduced by moralists and pacifists. Nonviolent behaviour is a requirement for the successful operation of this technique." He goes on to clarify why:

> Nonviolent behaviour is likely to contribute to achieving a variety of positive accomplishments, including (1) winning sympathy and support, (2) reducing casualties, (3) inducing disaffection and even mutiny in the opponent's troops, and (4) attracting maximum participation in the nonviolent struggle. . . .
>
> . . . Resistance violence shifts attention to the violence itself, away from the issues, the courage of the resisters and the opponents' usually much greater violence. The use of violence by the resisters or members of the broader grievance group tends to unleash disproportionately severe repression and to reverse any sympathy that may be developing inside the opponent group for the resisters. Success in nonviolent struggle requires that *only* nonviolent "weapons" be used.[45]

One major challenge to nonviolent discipline is the excitement that comes with breaking free of control and exercising dramatic countercontrol, especially when a strong emotional dynamic of humiliation and anger is present. Rioting, for example, can be thrilling. This is in part due to a social contagion phenomenon that can feed on itself as participants encourage each other to more dramatic action. Rebelling against and injuring "the system" can be highly reinforcing. Sharp emphasizes that in cases where hatred and anger are too strong and preparation for nonviolent discipline too weak to prevent the occurrence of violence, such violence must be separated from the nonviolent campaign as much as possible in terms of space, population groups, timing, and issues.[46] As discussed earlier, however, the reality remains that even apparently minor acts of violence will inevitably be costly—and possibly fatal—to the cause.

Strategic Adherence and Commitment

Rules 8 and 9 of the "CORE Rules for Action" relate to the activist's commitment to respect established plans, follow orders from those selected as leaders for this action, and remain on the field of action until released by the leadership. One-time mobilizations and spontaneous actions lack the planning and organizational structure necessary to elicit and enforce such commitments, since they preclude strategic action over time. As explored in chapter 2, when planning and action is strategic rather than spontaneous and haphazard, the likelihood of success dramatically increases. Since most effective nonviolent campaigns require coordinated action over weeks, months, or years, disciplined commitment is required.

An interesting and potentially important side note might be made regarding students and nonviolent discipline. Gandhi paid particular attention to students in his *Constructive Programme* pamphlet. He was deeply concerned that the attractions of career success and associated privilege were too difficult for most to resist and that nonviolent activism seemed to hold little attraction for most people, given the time required to achieve change. Nonetheless, he spelled out a rigorous set of requirements for those students who were willing to make the commitment to India's struggle, a program for achieving nonviolent discipline that I encourage the reader to explore further. Briefly, however, he warns them not to become involved in politics (as they are learners, not politicians) and not to resort to political strikes but rather to engage in spinning and wear homespun cloth, to cultivate friendships with persons of other faiths and with Harijans ("untouchables"), to treat women well, to do the humble work of cleaning in villages while also providing education, and in other ways to adopt much of the monastic discipline characteristic of the ashrams that Gandhi championed.

Robert Helvey contends that students are often more willing to take the risks associated with participation than most other groups, in part because they have not learned to rationalize submission to tyranny (a matter of equivalence relations), nor to accept the impossibility of change (a matter of rules). Furthermore, he maintains that "young people have an instinct, not yet diminished by experience, to know truth from falsehood and right from wrong."[47] Yet he adds a note of caution about recruiting young people: "As a group, they are risk-takers in all facets of life. Without clear guidance and discipline, their actions may become excessive, and they may, if provoked, exhibit the same thuggish characteristics of those individuals utilized by an authoritarian regime. A 'code of conduct' is important for everyone participating in a movement, but it is especially important for youth organizations, and imperative that the code of conduct be accompanied by training and strong leadership to reduce instances of damaging conduct."[48]

Promoting Nonviolent Discipline

Helvey's caution leads us to consider how to establish, encourage, and maintain the kind of nonviolent discipline called for in the CORE guidelines, often under severely challenging conditions. Many campaigns struggle with how to deal with "outsiders" who have not accepted the principles of the organizers and who may therefore sabotage the effort by breaking the rules, whether intentionally or unintentionally. For example, a potentially dramatic medal return by veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan war during the NATO protests in Chicago in May 2012 was immediately overshadowed by a tense and violent confrontation between police and a relatively small group of protesters who rejected the (already weak) "Chicago Principles" calling for "separations of time and space between divergent tactics."[49] Another example of the challenge of maintaining nonviolent discipline is the Occupy movement, within which there is considerable struggle at present about a "diversity of tactics," including physical confrontation, property damage, and sabotage. Even large movements *can* remain nonviolent, however; many examples exist of such movements largely maintaining discipline, even without a common underlying belief system.[50]

Several approaches to promoting discipline have been suggested, and several behaviour science principles, by now familiar, could again be of service in doing so. Rules 11, 12, and 13 ("Guarantees from the Local Group to the

Individual") in the "CORE Rules for Action" provide a good starting place. Rule 11 ensures that participants are not coerced into participation in actions with which they do not agree, at least at a basic level. It is much more likely that a member of the group will violate the established rules and plans if they feel coerced to participate despite a lack of shared values (equivalences) and expectations of outcomes (rules). It is also more likely that members will comply if they have had a voice in deciding on steps to be taken (rule 12), a process that involves constructing shared equivalences. Members also are more likely to persist if they are confident that they will be supported should complying prove costly, thus reducing potential aversive outcomes (rule 13).

Gene Sharp lists a number of other strategies to promote nonviolent discipline.[51] He views such discipline as primarily self-discipline (a commitment to self) but recognizes that the immediate social environment can play a powerful role. Among his potentially helpful suggestions drawn from history are instructions, appeals, leaflets, marshals, and clear organization and communication. Many of these techniques are highly consistent with behavioural systems research in that they involve shifts in motivating context and social consequences within the resistance community. Public statements of commitment (e.g., pledges and codes of conduct) have also been shown to be powerful in maintaining behaviour and should therefore be seriously considered.[52]

Sharp also suggests that plans should involve only actions that the group is currently prepared to manage; if the resistance group is not prepared to maintain discipline in the face of a physical encounter, it may be best to rely on relatively simple and less provocative actions.[53] An important principle in all behavioural practice is to ensure that the necessary repertoires are acquired before expecting them to be enacted, especially under stress. This suggests the central importance of training, including realistic *in vivo* simulations during which participants are given multiple opportunities to observe others modelling appropriate responses to very provocative conditions and to practice responding themselves to those conditions, receiving corrective feedback and progressively refining their responses. Such modelling and rehearsal are the heart of social learning approaches to skills training, which have strong empirical support and have been used extensively in training for nonviolent resistance.[54]

Certainly, solidarity and high morale also support nonviolent discipline in the face of provocation and threat. Specific instances of remaining nonviolent when provoked and of following orders in the face of serious risk should be reinforced frequently by other members of the group. Participants can be specifically trained to provide such recognition, as well as to accept recognition from others with humility. Such repertoires support the selection of behaviours consistent with solidarity and discipline. Furthermore, acts of sincere recognition should themselves be regularly recognized as contributing to maintaining high morale and supporting solidarity. Always, however, the recognition offered must be truly genuine. People engaged in nonviolent struggle carry out many exceptional acts to which those around them could pay attention: recognition should focus on such moments of discretionary action.

COURAGE

> Fearlessness may be a gift, but perhaps more precious is the courage acquired through endeavor, courage that comes with cultivating the habit of refusing to let fear dictate one's actions, courage that could be described as "grace under pressure"—grace that is renewed repeatedly in the face of harsh, unremitting pressure.
>
> — Aung San Suu Kyi, *Freedom from Fear and Other Writings*

Aung San Suu Kyi has demonstrated the courage described above for over two decades and, in doing so, has contributed enormously to the survival and recent renaissance of the liberation movement in Burma. Given that nonviolent resistance is meant to be powerful, not safe, nonviolent theorists universally recognize that extraordinary courage is required to achieve liberation nonviolently in cases of severe repression. Recall the importance of the "stand and endure" repertoire discussed in chapter 3, for example. Gandhi spoke of courage in nonviolent struggle in this way: "Let me say in all humility that nonviolence belongs to the brave. A Gujarati poet has sung: 'The way of the Lord is for the brave, not for the coward.' By the way of the Lord is meant here the way of nonviolence and truth. . . . Nonviolence calls for the strength and courage to suffer without retaliation, to receive blows without returning any. . . . We have to cultivate the courage. It is an ideal worth living for and dying for." He added a note about the true test of such courage: "The virtues of mercy, nonviolence, love and truth in any one can be truly tested only when they are pitted against ruthlessness, violence, hate, and untruth."[55]

Many of those who have studied nonviolent struggle have emphasized controlling fear more than building courage, although they have also made statements such as "nonviolence is based on bravery and discipline" and "those who engage in nonviolent struggle must be prepared to endure suffering."[56] Robert Helvey dedicates an entire chapter to fear in *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*. After a brief discussion of the physiology of fear, he considers how to overcome its effects in the practice of nonviolent resistance. His suggestions, drawn from study of the historical record, include avoiding putting participants into too many overwhelmingly fearful situations, preparing participants so they know what to expect, supplying guidelines for action (see the discussion of nonviolent discipline above), providing assurance and encouragement from respected leaders, establishing common symbols of solidarity, and giving participants specific tasks on which to focus. Helvey also includes a brief discussion of reducing the level of fear among the *opponents*—once again, reminiscent of Barbara Deming's "two hands" principle. Opponents who feel that their physical well-being and even their lives are at risk are much more likely to respond with intense violence.

Note, however, that a primary focus on fear is not constructive. From a behavioural systems perspective, focusing primarily on building courage even when experiencing powerful fear is the stronger choice and the choice for which we have the more powerful procedures. In terms of encouraging and maintaining courage, the following three principles have emerged from the experience of those involved in nonviolent struggle and are strongly supported by contemporary behavioural and behavioural systems science.

1. Accepting fear facilitates commitment.

Not only does Aung San Suu Kyi's comment about courage reflect enormous wisdom, but it is also highly consistent with some of the most current behavioural science. Work over the past two decades focusing on the psychology of acceptance and mindfulness is proving extremely robust for understanding the dynamics of behaviour change for individuals and in relationships.[57] While there is great subtlety in this work, a few straightforward principles emerge from the research that have immediate utility for our purposes. For example, it has become clear that efforts to intentionally eliminate fear and anxiety are likely to fail, often adding anxiety about anxiety to the original problem. Far more effective are approaches that accept fear as natural given one's situation and life experiences; this enables shifting from a position like "I would like to participate in the resistance movement, but I am too afraid of the dangers" to "I am afraid, that is natural; nonetheless, I will participate," thus breaking the connection between fear and inaction. One can be mindful of one's fear, while defusing ("de-fusing," separating that emotion from an action commitment grounded in one's core values).[58] While the action may fail, what is most important within an "acceptance and commitment" framework is to make the commitment and act, being mindful of but not controlled by fear. This is clearly what Suu Kyi is advocating. Both the nonviolence and the military literatures contain many other examples of approaches that incorporate principles of acceptance and commitment, which current research indicates can be a powerful antidote to immobilization.

Acceptance and commitment can be (and, albeit using other terminology, often have been) included in training and political education for nonviolent action. Nonviolent struggle often requires a willingness to suffer and an acceptance of such suffering. In an example that includes a shift in equivalence relations, Sharp notes, "The sufferings incurred in the course of nonviolent struggle are sometimes interpreted by the leaders in ways that make them seem more bearable: 'Our people suffer every day, and it is all wasted,' said a South African resistance leader, who invited people instead to suffer for the cause of justice."[59] The change here is from {suffering ≈ wasted pain} to {suffering ≈ the route to justice}. Scott Wimberley points out that for a guerrilla whose political awareness is as acute as his ability to fight, hunger, cold, fatigue, and fear come to have a different meaning psychologically.[60] Fear is not the enemy; a deep commitment to action and justice can, and often does, coexist with fear, and it is useful for participants to know this. A resistance group characterized by a culture of acceptance and commitment, a culture that offers models for and encourages courageous action in the face of fear (not just as an ideal), is much more likely to be successful than a group that unrealistically pressures participants to be fearless.

2. Participation increases fearlessness.

Gene Sharp writes that participation in nonviolent action can have multiple effects on those involved, including reducing passive submission and helping to correct "a lack of self-confidence, negative self-images, a sense of helplessness and inferiority, a dislike of responsibility, or a desire to be dominated."[61] Participation in successful actions increases self-efficacy, the recognition that one has power to shape one's life, as well as collective efficacy for the resistance community. In addition to these clear benefits, *participation increases fearlessness.*[62] Even while acknowledging that acceptance and commitment is the primary road, we need to harness any knowledge about how to increase fearlessness. The methods and psychological processes involved here are straightforward and well established. First, repeated exposure to a feared stimulus reduces the level of arousal experienced.[63] Such exposure can be achieved in several ways, but *in vivo* graduated exposure, in which a person is directly exposed to increasing levels of the feared situation, is often the most natural and can be planned to occur in the course of participation in civil resistance. Although exposure can to some extent be simulated in training, the most powerful effects will result from direct involvement in actual campaigns in a graduated and controlled manner. Second, immersion in a culture in which fear has increasingly been reduced through exposure will also progressively strengthen individual participants. Yet another fear-reducing method is flooding—intense exposure all at once, ideally with adequate preparation.[64] In the context of civil resistance, the experience of being thrown into the heart of the conflict can decrease fear if the participant persists in "standing in the fire."[65]

3. One fire kindles another.

Barbara Deming described the support received by the Catonsville Nine, a group of Vietnam War resisters, including Daniel and Philip Berrigan, who publicly destroyed military draft files in 1968. She elegantly argued:

> One thing would seem to me vital in the days ahead. This is for the Movement to take more and more seriously the responsibility of drawing round whenever men and women like this find the courage to act; of gathering around the actors, in human community, and *gathering around the act*, to give it resonance. . . .

> . . . The hundreds who came to Baltimore that week of October 7 to give to the Nine a little added heart, drew even more heart from them—and from the spontaneous community that our gathering there to be with them brought into being. *One fire kindles another.*[66]

The underlying behavioural systems principles here are straightforward. Enthusiastic action under pressure ("fire"), followed by enthusiastic recognition, reverberates and propagates through a collective as they spend increasing time together. (Downheartedness and discouragement can reverberate as well.) It is therefore important to pay close attention to courageous actions that can be genuinely and enthusiastically en-*couraged* to form a culture within the resistance group that intentionally leverages and models such enthusiasm. As one act of courage is reinforced within the group, further variations—some even more courageous—are likely to emerge and can be recognized, leading to escalating cycles of courageous action. Constructing such a culture requires effective organization and leadership, the subjects of the next chapter. Note also that the emphasis here is not primarily on the person but on the *act*. Recognizing the act encourages the actor, as well as others, to continue to take similar actions and even to intensify them.

In this chapter, we have considered three crucial repertoires for sustaining effective resistance campaigns: solidarity, nonviolent discipline, and courage. In each case, major recommendations from major theorists of nonviolent struggle have been examined and interpreted in terms of behavioural and behavioural systems theory. In many cases (although not all), these recommendations have proved consistent with the directions that behavioural systems theory would also suggest. Each of the three key repertoires is best supported by positive methods. For example, in the case of solidarity, strengthening morale and providing political education is more effective than the suppression of internal dissent. At the same time, while constructive approaches that generate and help to sustain acts of solidarity, discipline, and courage among individual participants are important, behavioural systems science places primary emphasis on the construction of cultures within the resistance movement that encourage these individual repertoires—on the development of collective, interlocking practices that provide structural support for positive actions among participants. Achieving such collective repertoires requires leadership and organization, the subjects of the next chapter.

6

ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP IN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

While a robust literature offers insights into organization and leadership for civil resistance, the intent here is not to summarize all that has been said but to highlight areas where behavioural systems science may have something of particular value to contribute. Many think immediately in terms of charismatic leadership when nonviolent campaigns are discussed, but the reality is more complex. Indeed, most nonviolent campaigns for justice and human rights have not been led by a single charismatic figure.[1] As we shall see, charismatic leaders can bring both advantages and risks to such campaigns. Constructing effective and sustainable cultures of resistance requires attention to the broader question of organization, within which leadership is a central, but not the only, important dimension.

ORGANIZATION AND NONVIOLENT CAMPAIGNS

Most nonviolent campaigns require the coordination of many individuals over a considerable period of time, which is generally only possible by building and sustaining organizational strength.[2] According to Saul Alinsky, “power and organization are one and the same,” and Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler argue that “a key task for nonviolent strategists is to create new groups or turn preexisting groups and institutions into efficient fighting organizations."[3] Richard Cloward and Frances Fox Piven, well-known theorists and practitioners of community mobilization, appear to disagree: according to David Cortright, they "argue that channeling disruptive protest into organizational development weakens poor people's movements and impedes social progress."[4] This observation is consistent with much of their writing and with my own contacts with Cloward. Piven more recently maintained, however, that the contributions of many individuals "must be coordinated for the effective mobilization of disruptive power," that participants "have to act in concert," and that achieving such coordination is the "classic problem of solidarity, of organizing for joint action."[5] At least some level of organization and coordination seems requisite to social movements that extend over time. At the same time, resistance organizations are usually not static; they evolve over the course of their organizational lives. For example, the United Farm Workers, which experienced considerable success organizing California farm workers in the 1960s and 1970s, progressively withdrew from such organizing during the 1980s and 1990s, shifting from a member-supported union to a largely contribution- and investment-supported advocacy group.[6]

Three Functional Strata

Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler offer a well-developed framework for thinking about the development of organizational strength for nonviolent struggle, the second of their twelve principles of strategic nonviolent conflict.[7] While that framework is neither all-encompassing nor extensively validated, it is a useful start grounded in the history of past campaigns for freedom and justice. Ackerman and Kruegler's framework includes three functional strata, or levels of organization: the leadership, the operational corps, and the wider civilian population.[8]

Beginning with the leadership stratum, Ackerman and Kruegler describe the role of nonviolent leadership as twofold: "to make the primary decisions that will shape the conflict, and to serve as a rallying point for inspiration, courage, and clarity of purpose."[9] Despite a widespread belief that Gandhi-style charismatic leadership is required, in their historical review, Ackerman and Kruegler found that a committee or other similar group was the most common leadership structure for resistance groups.[10] Given the vulnerability of individuals, depth of leadership is often required; with collective leadership, should some be lost or jailed, others can immediately step into their place. Organizations that fail to take leadership vulnerability into account are unlikely to survive severe repression. Ackerman and Kruegler also argue from the historical record that a network arrangement of loosely connected or semi-autonomous units can offer a particularly resilient leadership structure. Such network or cellular arrangements can be highly flexible and difficult to infiltrate or destroy and can often heal quickly after attack. Loosely knit networks may, however, find it difficult to focus power and maintain common goals and discipline.[11]

The second level of organization for Ackerman and Kruegler is the operational core. The functions here are the nonviolent equivalents of the functions of the combatants, political cadre, and auxiliaries discussed in *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual.* The roles of the operational core comprise communicating decisions and information throughout the grievance population; instructing, nurturing, and supporting the general population; serving as the intelligence arm of the organization; and performing “highly specialized and sometimes particularly dangerous operations” that most members of the grievance population would not realistically be expected to undertake.[12] In the analyses discussed later in this section, much of the focus is on supporting the practices and morale of this operational core and on designing and encouraging the scenes in which the campaign wishes those in the core to engage in over time.

The last of Ackerman and Kruegler’s three levels is the civilian or general population. As established earlier, power ultimately lies in the hands of the people; the functions of the leadership and operational core are designed to engage, focus, and leverage that power. In nonviolent struggle, ultimately, “the collective choices of masses of civilians become decisive.”[13] Therefore, the task in building a movement is to gain the active support of a large proportion of the grievance population, to recruit participation, and to maintain solidarity as long as is necessary to achieve the desired outcome.[14]

A Note on Internet Organizing

The potential value of Internet organizing has been explored recently, spurred by the contributions of social media to coordinating activities during the Arab Spring. As David Cortright observes, however, the efficient functioning of distributed information hubs and networks do not obviate the need for creating effective institutions.[15] Similarly, Malcolm Gladwell makes a persuasive argument that while social media may be useful for coordination, historically successful nonviolent struggle, in every known case, has required that people take serious physical risks, and strong personal ties among participants in the resistance movement have been needed to leverage genuine power.[16] There is much to be learned about the utility of social media in organizing, but it is clear that in recent campaigns in Tunisia, Egypt, Moldova, and Iran, all of which have been called Twitter or Facebook revolutions, social media were not the central strategic factors in success or failure. This is not surprising; so far, there is no scientific evidence that online consequences are powerful enough to change human behaviour in the ways in which extended person-to-person contact can, particularly in situations involving possible threats to life and safety, in which strong ties are essential. Such campaigns require ongoing attention to Ackerman and Kruegler's three functional strata. Social media can facilitate communication within and among those strata, but there are no known examples in which such media were able to take their place.

A NETWORK OF LEADERSHIP

Many think immediately of charismatic or moral leaders like Martin Luther King Jr., Nelson Mandela, or Aung San Suu Kyi when they think of liberation and resistance movements, and the presence of such leadership carries undeniable advantages, including bringing respect and legitimacy to the movement, attracting constituents and third-party supporters, and garnering resources. At the same time, in reality, no successful nonviolent campaign has relied upon a single leader; the work to be done is too extensive, and a one-leader movement would be too vulnerable to decapitation through imprisonment or death of the leader. A close look at resistance struggles typically reveals a densely interconnected network of leadership. There is no doubt, for example, that Nelson Mandela was pivotal to the end of apartheid and the coming of democracy in South Africa. In fact, however, multiple actors on both (in fact, multiple) sides played important parts in this outcome: for example, the white South African government appears to have realized years before that the fall of the apartheid system was inevitable and thus counterstrategized as the African National Congress mobilized for freedom.[17] Mandela played a critical symbolic and practical role in the outcome, but he was only one actor in a complex drama.[18]

At the same time, as Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler point out, the personal weaknesses of a leader may become the weaknesses of the movement.[19] Years of efforts to discredit leaders of the US civil rights movement (including Dr. King, Malcolm X, and Bayard Rustin), and thereby to invalidate a movement led by persons with "suspect morals," continue into the present. Even setting aside such intentional efforts to discredit, all humans have weaknesses, and in high-profile leaders, such weaknesses can have serious impacts on a movement—as can entirely false or distorted allegations.

In some cases, errors of leadership can damage the movement from the inside as well. Marshall Ganz provides a detailed example in Cesar Chavez, who has been called "Gandhi in the Fields."[20] (Not everyone would agree with Ganz's analysis, but most of the facts are well established.) Chavez's selflessness was legendary, his fasts-unto-death utterly genuine, and his moral integrity unquestionable. With a diverse leadership team, he built a movement that had an enormous social impact over two decades. As the growing organization became more difficult to manage in the mid-1970s, however, Chavez turned to his friend Charles Dederich, the authoritarian founder of the Synanon drug treatment movement, to help restructure organizational processes within the UFW.[21] Synanon had by that time degenerated into a cult and later proclaimed itself a religion; Dederich himself later pled no contest to charges of conspiracy to commit murder. As Ganz describes it, within just a few years of following the Synanon model, diversity within the UFW leadership had been lost, deliberative processes had been replaced by loyalty tests, and the nature of the organization had changed.

At the same time, more than personal leadership is always operative. Maintaining a commitment to resistance within an organization in a changing environment is extremely challenging, and relative success can prove a barrier to long-term survival. In her analysis of the decline of social movements (framed in terms similar to those of behavioural systems science), France Fox Piven describes this challenge: "The processes set in motion by the protest movement alter the political conditions that once encouraged defiance. The movement also changes, partly in response to these changing conditions, and partly because the internal dynamics of the movement make disruptive political action hard to sustain."[22] Gene Sharp observes that in some nonviolent struggles of the past, very little organized leadership was apparent, although some form of leadership, usually collective, is always required to plan and execute strategic action (as opposed to one-time mobilizations). Sharp goes on to describe the unique characteristics of nonviolent leadership: in addition to being changeable and often temporary, it "tends to be more democratic, does not rely on violence to maintain group cohesion, and depends on the acceptance of its moral authority, political and strategic judgment, and popular support." Furthermore, it is sometimes, out of necessity, somewhat dispersed: "Under extreme conditions with severe repression . . . efficiency requires that the resisters be able to act without reliance on a central leadership group."[23]

Robert Helvey writes that in the largest campaigns, thousands of people may need to take on leadership roles at some level.[24] In a crisis situation, decision making often needs to be pushed to the lowest level so that action can proceed in a timely way; this requires that such skills are in people's repertoires and have been encouraged in advance.[25] *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* offers a related lesson with relevance to nonviolent struggle: "Effective senior leaders establish a climate that promotes decentralized modes of command and control—what the Army calls mission command and the Marine Corps calls mission command and control. Under mission command, commanders create the conditions for subordinates' success. These leaders provide general guidelines and the commander's intent and assign small-unit leaders authority commensurate with their responsibilities." The manual also notes that "the practice of leaders sharing hardship and danger with subordinates builds confidence and esprit."[26] The history of nonviolent action contains many examples of this principle; in both the military and the nonviolence milieus, though, careful discernment is required to determine what level of risk to leaders is optimal.

Someone, or usually some group, typically needs to exercise Ackerman and Kruegler's two central leadership functions (making strategic decisions and motivating the resistance movement participants). The history of nonviolent struggle clarifies that there are many ways to do this, and contextual, human, cultural, and historical factors are likely to shape leadership structures. The key point here is that whatever the leadership arrangements, they need to facilitate the sustenance or modification of effective resistance as required by shifts in environmental context. Ultimately, effective resistance depends more on strong core leadership practices than on leadership structure.

LEADERSHIP PRACTICES

There is a substantial literature related to what are commonly referred to as key traits or characteristics for the leaders of nonviolent resistance movements. Behaviour scientists, however, think in terms of key leadership *practices or repertoires*, since these terms imply potential for learning.[27] Robert Helvey, in particular, devotes considerable attention to the question of leadership in resistance campaigns. He draws both on historical study of nonviolent struggle and on his background in strategic military leadership to suggest practices like "set the example," "know the people you expect to lead," and "give others credit for success."[28] In most of the literature on nonviolent leadership, the repertoires discussed were identified anecdotally and inductively from observations. Little, if any, explicit testing of leadership practices has occurred in resistance organizations. There is, however, considerable technical literature on leadership, particularly in organizational behavior management, that provides general guidance that may be adapted for local situations.

Clarity and Communication

In recent work in behavioural systems science, researchers have examined key leadership practices related to clarity and communication. In the context of business, the role of the leader has been defined as "to promote conditions that motivate employees to execute the mission, vision, and values of the organization. In doing so, the leader must clearly specify which behaviours and results are critical."[29] Analogous application of those principles to campaign organization is likely to be valuable. Although collective discernment and decision making have an important place in nonviolent activism, a leadership structure that provides clear direction consistent with established goals and directions is generally crucial during campaign actions, as emphasized in the CORE principles discussed in the previous chapter.

Clear communication is a central key behaviour, especially as related to organizational goals and the actions likely to achieve them. Much of this communication involves specifying rules (in the technical sense of "rule"—a description of the consequences of behaviours—rather than in the sense of telling people what to do). Such rules reduce environmental ambiguity; people have some clarity as to what to do and what the desired outcomes are. The environments in which nonviolent campaigns operate are often highly ambiguous; it is the leaders' role to elaborate rules (descriptions of contingencies) that are sufficiently explicit, only as complex as necessary, and accurate.

The available evidence suggests that in the face of ambiguous rules, followers will self-generate rules based on their own limited experiences, which may produce poor outcomes.[30] Within organizational networks, ambiguity leads to increased self-organization of networks of equivalence relations and rules—that is, people collectively shape their own interpretations. On the one hand, in cases calling for tight discipline (e.g., where adherence to something like the "CORE Rules for Action" is important), which is common in resistance campaigns, ambiguity may lead to undesirable actions. On the other hand, in situations requiring creativity, clear specification of desired goals but flexibility of methods may be the preferred arrangement.

An additional fundamental leadership function is the coordination of the interlocking practices of multiple subsystems within the resistance movement.[31] Imagine within a campaign that the communication cadre is successfully implementing public information campaigns, the strategic planning cadre is producing clear and promising plans, and the resources cadre is successfully gathering the resources it thinks are necessary. The overall campaign can only be successful, however, if the resources gathered are those required by the strategic plan, the public information campaign is consistent with the planned strategy, and the strategic plan fits the available resources—in other words, if what each subsystem produces fits what other subsystems require. The functions of the overall leadership group, therefore, include ensuring that the practices of each group interlock with those of the others, in terms of both resource flows and messaging. This requires skills of observing and shaping interactional interlocks to be consistent with overall organizational goals. (The practice and metacontingency diagrams described and illustrated in chapters 5 and 6 are valuable here.)

A high level of systems integration may not always be required: for example, as discussed above, in crises and in cases where repression has severely damaged overall leadership, relatively independent networks may need to improvise based only a small set of shared goals. Long-lived movements, however, generally require considerable integration and highly effective communication repertoires.

Structuring Recognition and Reinforcement

Consistent recognition and reinforcement processes are crucial for the effective functioning of all organized behavioural systems. A large technical literature offers guidance related to how recognition and reinforcement are best arranged.[32] For our purposes here, among the most important points from that research are that positive consequences need to occur relatively often for new participants and, although they can diminish over time, need to be provided at least somewhat regularly throughout a person's involvement. In addition, behaviour is most likely to be sustained if positive consequences are intermittent—that is, if they occur when people perform well but not so often that they lose their power, and certainly not on a mechanically regimented schedule. How rich the schedule of such recognition needs to be also varies from individual to individual, as does the kind of recognition (verbal or non-verbal, public or private).

Research by Judith Komaki and others indicates that key features of effective leadership include high levels of monitoring in the beginning, fading over time, and relatively immediate consequences that emphasize recognition of positive contributions, encouragement, and—very important for resistance communities—opportunities to describe how one or one's group achieved positive outcomes, which can then be celebrated.[33] These simple principles are extremely well established in the research, yet the available research also suggests that they are not common in most organizations. Many leaders believe that they provide much more recognition than their followers report they experience.[34] Other leaders believe that people should participate out of commitment without requiring thanks or praise.[35] Specific attention to the number of recognition events of whatever kind that are present in an organization, including by explicitly tracking and charting such recognition, has proven useful, as has asking for the perspective of those being led. The best course is to develop a culture in which participants regularly encourage each other, but leaders need to pay attention to make sure this encouragement does not fade too drastically, since there is a natural tendency among humans to reduce effort over time.

"Discretionary effort," behaviour that goes beyond the expected or beyond the norm for that individual or for the group, should be a particular focus of the leadership group.[36] Such attention tends to gradually shape stronger and stronger action and commitment. Leaders therefore need to know who they are leading in order to recognize advances over each person's former level of performance. A general message that everyone is doing great is too nonspecific in terms of behaviour and individual differences to be of real value and may come across as insincere or even manipulative. Robert Helvey notes that taking initiative should be encouraged and not stifled (within the limits of established discipline). This is related to his emphasis on maximizing and challenging the abilities of subordinates, since reinforcement for progressive advances supports the expansion of repertoires. Helvey also stresses the importance of reinforcing active participation in decision making, arguing that such encouragement leads to greater commitment to plans in which participants feel they have had a voice.[37]

Aversive Practices

Given the high level of aversive and coercive control present in contemporary society and the high level of stress that leaders may be under in a nonviolent campaign, scolding and threats may naturally tend to become parts of their repertoires. Recall, however, the clear results of research across many types of behavioural systems: aversive control almost inevitably leads to withdrawal, resentment, and overt or covert rebellion.[38] The use of aversive measures to manage the behaviour of members of the resistance movement should therefore be kept to the bare minimum; even tone of voice needs to be carefully monitored. The line between clear and assertive directions and punitive forms of correction can become blurred under pressure, but it is real. The first maintains respect, provides direction for what to do, and recognizes compliance immediately when the directed steps are taken, while the second simply strikes out at undesirable action and distances the recipient.

Should aversive or punitive practices become embedded in an organization, they will seriously damage morale and commitment. In resistance movements, the ability to resist provocations and respectful requests to speak or act differently are essential repertoires for all actors, but particularly for those in leadership. Despite the natural tendency to strike back verbally if another member of the group speaks or acts in an aggressive or passive-aggressive manner, such retaliation will only damage the process further. A respectful but clear and assertive request to speak calmly or to “work with me on this to find a solution” is an important first step; if a continuing conflict appears likely, it is often best handled with a dialogic circle process.[39] Self-aggrandizing practices are generally dealt with best through extinction by withholding smiles, agreement, and attention until more appropriate language is used, and through communal reminders of the need to work collectively. Again, circle processes can help to deal with established problems of self-aggrandizement or self-absorption.

Sources of Strategic Capacity

The second of Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler’s twelve principles of strategic nonviolent conflict is to “develop organizational strength,” and both Sharp and Helvey also call for such development.[40] In *Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in the California Farm Worker Movement*, Marshall Ganz offers a different and valuable perspective on the issue, drawing on social psychological research and personal experiences.

Ganz, a former director of organizing for the United Farm Workers (now a lecturer in public policy at Harvard University), focuses on what he calls the "strategic capacity" of the leadership team and organization within a nonviolent campaign, extracting principles inductively from comparative analyses of competing campaigns by the United Farm Workers, the AFL-CIO, and the Teamsters. This work, which has close connectons to behavioural systems analysis, is a potentially important addition to understanding the dynamics of effective nonviolent organizations.

Ganz's research suggests that strategic capacity derives from two sets of factors, what he calls "biographical" and "organizational" sources.[41] With regard to biographical sources, Ganz argues that the *combined identities* of individual members of the leadership team, the *social networks* (including both strong and weak ties) of which they are part, and a *diversity of tactical repertoires* among them are major dimensions contributing to strategic capacity. Expanding the number and range of well-prepared members of the leadership circle, for example, offers opportunities for organizational growth. Diversity of experiences among the leadership group (which tend to be associated with demographic differences, world views, and ways of thinking) can expand commitment, knowledge, and innovation. Strong connections to and within activist social networks can buttress motivation, while connections to diverse social networks can increase access to information and feedback. The advantages of a diversity of tactical repertoires is self-expanatory.

If we accept the importance of Ganz's three biographical sources of strategic capacity, we can easily identify desirable practices that should be shaped and reinforced within a resistance movement. Recruiting of new leadership needs to be ongoing, both to replace those who withdraw over time and to continuously inject new and diverse experiences, perspectives, and social connections. Bringing in new blood, however, can lead to discomfort, as current leaders may be concerned about losing power and recognition (both of which are strong reinforcers) to new members of the leadership cadre. In establishing organizational practices, therefore, leaders need to recognize this likelihood and intentionally reinforce recruiting, welcoming, and involving new members of the leadership group, as well as shifting equivalences toward {new members ≈ new power}, in part through open discussion of the challenges of accepting changing leadership dynamics.

The three organizational sources of strategic capacity that emerged from Ganz's research are *processes of deliberation and decision making*, *resources*, and *accountability structures*.[42] Effective resistance organizations rely, to a considerable extent, on processes of shared power in which all voices are respected in deliberations and on established procedures to make decisions after all voices have been heard and to maintain discipline around those decisions, once made. According to Ganz, groups tend to lose diversity of thinking, with minorities gradually taking the perspective of the majority—a tendency that should be explicitly, respectfully, and continuously challenged to maintain a creative and responsive edge. He recommends voting, after thorough discussion, as an alternative to centralizing authority or efforts to achieve consensus.[43] Under what circumstances this makes sense is an empirical question. The size and diversity of the group, the complexity of the issues and environment, and the extent to which common values have been established may mediate the optimal practices for reaching decisions. Intriguingly, Quakers' collective experiments over centuries suggest that while achieving a high level of unity may take longer, when shared decisions finally are made, they are easier to implement, since there is very little internal resistance.[44] More experimentation is clearly needed in this area, although recent research into circle processes can provide valuable guidance.[45]

In his discussion of resources, Ganz is primarily concerned with access to sources of those resources and with the entities to whom the organization must be accountable in order to access and sustain them.[46] He suggests that the more the organization relies on resources provided by the grievance population itself, the more responsive to their needs it is likely to be. This makes sense in behavioural systems terms: when the primary contingencies affecting the leadership flow from members, leaders' actions are more likely to be consistent with members' interests. The more contingencies affecting leadership are provided by outsiders, the more influence outsiders will have. As the primary financial sources of the UFW shifted, for example (at least according to Ganz's analysis), the organization gradually became less tightly focused on the needs of its members and more responsive to outside funders.[47] Here the critical variables are motivating context and, particularly, the set of consequences that shape leaders' actions.

On a related note, as more accountability to the grievance population is structured into organizational processes, it becomes more likely that the organization's established mission will remain central. What is involved here is a shift in metacontingencies. In the UFW example, as the balance of available resources shifted more and more to outside groups (which happened as it became easier to obtain financial support elsewhere, rather than directly from farm workers), practices within the organization shifted in response.[48] An important behavioural systems principle is in effect here: while to some extent, the interlocking practices within an organization shift due to internal exchanges, those interlocking practices are almost always sensitive to environmental context as well. Behavioural systems are, to some extent, self-organizing; changes within them are self-generated and self-maintaining—within limits. Those systems and the interlocking internal practices that give them structure must, to some extent, be responsive to changes in their external environment or they will become isolated and collapse. Organizations that achieve collective awareness of both levels of change are likely to be optimally resilient.

An important emphasis in Ganz's work is that the survival of a resistance organization does not necessarily depend on its stated mission or on its success in producing social change. Without adequate accountability structures, the contingencies that select organizational survival (levels of funding, for example) may have little to do with effectiveness.[49] For example, outside funders may donate funds based on the expectations of a larger constituency rather than on the activist organization's adherence to mission. Campaigns with outside funding for specific objectives distant from the organization's core mission may be very successful but may expend too many resources, alienate too many supporters, or distract the leadership in ways that ultimately damage the organization. A similar issue is present with third-party support for insurgencies; such outside support is typically structured to be consistent, at least in part, with the interests of the third party, and as the leadership becomes more responsive to that party, the needs and interests of the grievance population are less likely to shape organizational decisions.

Organizational cultures that encourage diversity of perspectives and continuous learning among the leadership group within a framework of common motivation and strong accountability processes can expand potential strategic and tactical options. Failing to attend to those sources weakens an organization, although this may not be obvious until the environment becomes more challenging. Increasing leadership homogeneity, suppression of dissent, and lack of accountability can weaken strategic capacity over time.

PRAXIS AND EXPERIMENTATION

The term *praxis*—common in the literatures of nonviolent struggle, political education, and organizing—is usually defined as reflection in action, a recursive process in which one observes, reflects, acts based on what is learned, and reflects further on what is observed in action.[50] In praxis, both understanding and action are progressively refined. (The practice of collective accountability, if carried out mindfully, can support such praxis.) Many authors have described Gandhi's approach as praxis. Gandhi himself often described such praxis as "experiments," and he gave activists for justice a perceptive and important reminder: "I claim for them [my moral experiments] nothing more than does a scientist who, though he conducts his experiments with the utmost accuracy, forethought, and minuteness, never claims any finality about his conclusions, but keeps an open mind regarding them. I have gone through deep self-introspection, searched myself through and through, and examined and analyzed every psychological situation. Yet I am far from claiming any finality or infallibility about my conclusions."[51]

The parallels between Gandhi's praxis and scientific experimentation are obvious. All personal and collective action in nonviolent struggle can and probably should be viewed as experimental in nature. One particular form of scientific research, interrupted time-series (or single-system) experimentation, potentially lends itself to recursive evaluation of scenes and campaigns in nonviolent struggle. This approach—which could be harnessed to guide campaigns over time either loosely, as Gandhi did, or very rigorously—is discussed in the concluding chapter. For now, however, as our discussion moves into examining the major strategic options for nonviolent struggle, it is useful to think of our goals in terms of experiments in strengthening patterns of interactions supporting activist organizations and movements and in shifting the interactional patterns and behavioural systems that support opponents' oppressive practices. Campaigns, and the strategic and tactical actions taken within them, can be treated as experiments—experiments that may be thoughtfully designed and evaluated, and progressively refined, even in the heat of the struggle. Experiments, as Gandhi stressed, require an open mind, one committed to testing and learning rather than to orthodoxy and received authority.

PART TWO

STRATEGIC OPTIONS

In his core writings, Gene Sharp emphasizes three major groups of strategic methods, presented roughly in order of increasing intensity: nonviolent protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention.[1] He characterizes protest and persuasion as methods for "sending a message" that are mainly symbolic.[2] Included here are such actions as declarations, skywriting and earthwriting, "haunting" officials, political mourning, teach-ins, and walkouts.[3] Most nonviolent struggles in Sharp's analysis rely on methods of noncooperation (suspension of cooperation with or assistance to the opponent). Noncooperation, for Sharp, encompasses an extraordinarily wide range of actions (and inactions), including social and consumer boycotts, student strikes, provision of sanctuary, rent strikes, noncooperation with conscription, and withholding of diplomatic recognition.[4] Sharp's third group of methods is nonviolent intervention, which involves disruption of or direct intervention into the existing situation. He includes here fasting, nonviolent invasion, guerrilla theatre, nonviolent land seizure, the overloading of administrative systems, and civil disobedience of neutral laws.[5] Some forms of "positive interventions" also fall into this group, like establishment of alternative institutions or alternative transportation systems. Sharp's classification has proven useful and robust; the alternative presented here is not a criticism but a different perspective that may support new options.

While the functional reinterpretation discussed in the remaining chapters maps, to some extent, onto Sharp's categorization, it is not identical. The six functional classes presented below more directly capture the underlying behavioural systems dynamics. In analyses drawing on this theoretical base, choices among the six classes can be made on the basis of the type of outcome desired, the persons or groups to be influenced, and the resources and environment present. Such a framework is consistent with Sharp's insistence that choice of nonviolent method should emerge from strategic analysis and planning: "Careful strategic planning is very important *before* the selection of specific methods in a given conflict. Strategic calculation and planning are required to identify what kinds of pressure the resisters need to apply against their opponents, and therefore what specific methods the resisters need to employ."[6]

In nonviolent action, a resistance group is nearly always attempting to accomplish one (or, quite commonly, more) of the objectives listed below. Behavioural systems science suggests that the strategic class of methods noted in italics for each is functionally the best fit:

- Induce someone or some group to take specific action through *persuasion* (which relies on changes in equivalence relations and rules and/or on incentives)
- Induce someone or some group to take specific action through *protest*, establishing an aversive situation that can be relieved by taking that action (a strategic method often most effective when linked to persuasion)
- Induce someone or some group to discontinue current patterns of action or inaction (and ideally to take preferred action instead) through *disruptive noncooperation*
- Induce someone or some group to stop taking some action through *retaliation*
- Make repression difficult or impossible through *disrupting essential or facilitating resources* that support that repression
- Construct a society or culture in which oppressive structures and persons become increasingly irrelevant and powerless (*constructive noncooperation*)

Each of those goals is best achieved through shifts in distinct dynamics, although it is common for multiple methods to contribute to a single campaign, and even a single campaign action. Choosing methods that are functionally inconsistent with desired outcomes is likely to be a strategic error. In addition, as will become clear in the following chapters, changes in the actions of opponents are typically achieved indirectly, by influencing the practices and actions of behavioural systems supporting those opponents (pillars of support, in Sharp's terms), those of the resistance group, those of the broader population, or often some combination.

Constructive noncooperation, the focus of the next chapter, does not map directly onto any of Sharp's categories, although some of the methods that Sharp includes under nonviolent intervention are in fact constructive. Constructive noncooperation is the strategic choice that Gandhi (using the term *constructive programme*) viewed as most powerful; it has been central to a number of very important struggles for liberation, and it is given primacy of place in the material that follows. Persuasion and protest are often linked and are presented together in chapter 8. Within a behavioural systems framework, however, some of the methods that Sharp classified in other groups (e.g., fasting and guerrilla theatre) also functionally belong in the persuasion and protest category. Many of Sharp's "methods of noncooperation" are classified here as disruptive noncooperation, which is distinct from constructive noncooperation in terms of both targets and underlying dynamics. In many cases of disruptive noncooperation, parallel persuasion or protest is present; making this connection explicit adds an important analytic element. Sharp's identification of a conceptually separate class of disruptive methods is, in part, consistent with the discussion of interruption of resources in chapter 10, although a functional classification analyzes the dynamics present in a different way. Also discussed in chapter 10 is retaliation, a relatively uncommon strategic choice but one that is included here both for completeness and because it has recently emerged in new forms.

The strategic literature on warfare commonly warns of "the fog of war," which refers to the fact that the realities of conflict are much harder to understand, predict, and control on the ground than they may seem during strategic planning. Opponents and populations respond in unexpected ways, resources and conditions change quickly and dramatically, and events overtake intentions. History demonstrates that the same is true in nonviolent struggle, so whatever analyses and plans are made are best recognized as provisional and fluid. The potential of a scientific perspective for making rapid adjustments in objectives, and therefore in strategy and tactics, seems substantial: one of the great advantages of such a perspective is its consistent reminder that all conclusions need to be held as tentative and open to change based on emerging data.

7

CONSTRUCTIVE NONCOOPERATION

> You see, it's not a change of government we want but a new kind of society—a society in which people can have a common life based on brotherhood and freedom from violence.
>
> — Joan Baez, *Playboy Interview: Joan Baez*

While many forms of nonviolent action may contribute to social change, most do not primarily support the creation of a new kind of society. This chapter focuses on one approach that does: constructive noncooperation, arguably the most universally applicable, most overlooked, and, in Gandhi's understanding, most powerful option for nonviolent struggle. I draw extensively in the early part of this chapter on Jonathan Schell's seminal analysis in *The Unconquerable World,* while interpreting historical examples through the lens of behavioural systems dynamics throughout.

GANDHI'S *CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAMME*

To understand the power—and the neglect—of constructive noncooperation, our discussion must begin with Gandhi's "constructive programme," which was not the first application of constructive noncooperation but appears to have been the first clarification of its potential strategic primacy.[1] Over the course of Gandhi's three decades of resistance in India, two threads of nonviolent strategy were consistently interwoven. Theorists and practitioners have devoted most of their attention to Gandhi's campaigns of civil disobedience (encompassing persuasion, protest, disruptive noncooperation, and resource disruption as discussed in later chapters). Those campaigns were often dramatic, involving actions like hartals (general strikes that included voluntary closure of businesses and institutions—"shutting it all down") and the Salt March to the Sea. Such strategic actions drew great attention from the population, the colonial government, Britain, and the wider world, and they played a significant part in strengthening a positive Indian identity. Yet Gandhi himself stubbornly insisted that such campaigns were only a secondary, and perhaps unnecessary, means to achieve "Poorna Swaraj" (complete independence or self-rule). By contrast, he saw the constructive programme as the fundamental strategic requirement for true self-rule. In his pamphlet *Constructive Programme*, he declares, "Readers . . . should definitely realize that the constructive programme is the truthful and non-violent way of winning Poorna Swaraj. Its wholesale fulfillment is complete Independence." He further insists, "For my handling of Civil Disobedience without the constructive programme will be like a paralyzed hand attempting to lift a spoon."[2]

Just what is Gandhi's constructive programme? Crucially, he believed that the central power of nonviolence lies in creating and constructing—rather than in obstructing. The constructive programme therefore focuses on shaping a healthy society that relies, to the greatest possible extent, on local resources and values, refusing to be dependent on resources provided by a colonial power. The heart of the constructive programme has been described as "living the social and political order" that one "wants to create."[3] From living out this order, self-rule organically emerges, and the substance of political power will thereby already be gained. The takeover of the structures of government will then be inevitable.[4]

The constructive programme, for Gandhi, was not an abstract statement of values or principles. Rather, it aims for the creation of specific, strategic improvements in the practical, social, intellectual, and spiritual dimensions of daily life. As Jonathan Schell notes, "The most important tasks, he [Gandhi] believed, were providing a decent life, including adequate food, shelter, and sanitation, for India's 'dumb millions,' establishing a system of active self-government in the country's seven hundred thousand villages, ending the Hindu system of untouchability, raising the status of women, and making and keeping peace among Hindus and Muslims. Noncooperation, taken by itself, was useless for this purpose. It could do nothing to feed the hungry, to relieve the oppressed, to make peace among India's quarreling ethnic and religious groups. For these purposes, positive action was required."[5]

Gandhi organized the final (1945) version of *Constructive Programme* into eighteen sections, each spelling out a specific program for action. He viewed all as indispensible; some of the most telling and dramatic are the following:

- Communal Unity. As discussed in chapter 5, unity has been almost universally recognized as essential to effective nonviolent struggle but is difficult to achieve in splintered and disempowered societies. Given the historical context, Gandhi's discussion focuses on the tremendous challenges of bridging religious and caste differences, and the more insidious divisions that partisan politics commonly creates. Similar cleavages continue to be serious obstacles to achieving what Gandhi called "unbreakable heart unity" in many contemporary nonviolent struggles.[6] Disunity can often be used by oppressors to maintain power, so in addition to supporting a community of mutual aid, achieving higher levels of unity draws power from the opponent.
- *Khadi*. Gandhi's controversial insistence on the creation and use of khadi—homespun cotton cloth, which would replace expensive, imported British textiles—was a step toward economic freedom, and it also functioned as a sign of solidarity and equality (by "levelling down" the rich). Beyond this, wide acceptance of khadi, which would eliminate large profits from British cloth, would disrupt one interdependency integral to maintaining colonial power.
- "New or Basic" Education. Gandhi and the closely allied Congress Party consistently emphasized the need for a new form of education for children. Existing primary education was recognized as being designed to support the colonial system; new or basic education would connect children with "all that is best and lasting in India" and teach them how to be responsible citizens.[7]
- Adult Education. Similarly, Gandhi argued that "the villagers know nothing of foreign rule and its evils."[8] He therefore advocated a form of adult education, now often called liberatory or popular education, that would heighten

critical consciousness of political realities. Expanding the community of politically aware citizens would then enhance collective motivation for the larger struggle.

- Provincial and National Languages. Gandhi believed that a return to the use of traditional regional and ethnic languages, as well as the sharing of a single national language (Hindi), would minimize reliance on the language of the oppressor (English), reduce the distance between elites and the masses, and build national pride. Given the centrality of language to culture, rejection of the colonial language also functioned as a rejection of the British system as a whole.
- Inclusion. Gandhi insisted on the need to include all people on equal footing in the construction of a new Indian society, one that would include *dalit*s ("untouchables"), women, *kisan*s (peasants), *adivasi*s (tribal and Indigenous peoples), and lepers as full members, both politically and economically. Exclusion and marginalization could be leveraged to maintain colonial and repressive structures.

The constructive programme embodied an obligation to actively pursue social betterment—a society of "truth" in the sense of Gandhi's satyagraha ("truth force"). But each of Gandhi's programs of action also illustrates a central characteristic of constructive noncooperation: *While constructive action is primarily an affirmation of self-liberation producing practical advantages, such constructive action is, in every case, simultaneously an act of resistance to the oppressive system.* At its heart, constructive noncooperation involves the construction and sustenance of a new self-reliant and self-determining culture within the shell of—and in resistance to—structural oppression. Václav Havel, who spoke of constructive noncooperation in terms of "living in truth" (as discussed below), contended, "As long as it remains what it is, the practice of living within the truth cannot fail to be a threat to the system."[9] Acts of constructive cooperation break links in the networks of interdependence that bind the population to the oppressor, while progressively building an autonomously functioning society within a society. In addition, as with all forms of nonviolent resistance, acts of constructive noncooperation in the face of threat challenge the structures of fear on which domination, oppression, and repression depend.

While Gandhi believed that near-universal participation in the constructive programme could, in theory, be all that was needed to end British occupation and the colonial system, he recognized that not everyone would join in this effort. Given that reality, he recognized that civil disobedience—particularly protest and disruptive noncooperation (to be discussed in later chapters)—would also be required. Still, he continued to the end of his life to believe that widespread adoption of the constructive programme was the primary way to avoid violence and disaster after the end of the colonial period, and events suggest that he was correct. Although parts of Gandhi's constructive programme were widely regarded as unrealistic, acts of constructive noncooperation were in fact central to successful resistance campaigns throughout the twentieth century and into the present. In many cases, constructive noncooperation may need to be linked to at least the threat if not the reality of disruptive strategies. Still, only constructive work can build a new society.[10]

OTHER STATEMENTS AND UNDERSTANDINGS OF CONSTRUCTIVE NONCOOPERATION

Other activists and theorists of nonviolent struggle have generally not given constructive noncooperation the central place that Gandhi did, and some have understood it differently. Barbara Deming, however, in stating her conviction that dissidents generally did not act radically enough, clearly asserts its importance: "They have stopped far too short not only of widespread nonviolent disruption but of that form of noncooperation which is assertive, constructive—that confronts those who are 'running everything' with independent activity, particularly independent economic activity. There is leverage for change here that has scarcely begun to be applied."[11]

Although he did not give constructive work priority in most of his books, Gene Sharp recognized its power:

> Combined with political defiance during the phase of selective resistance, the growth of autonomous social, economic, cultural, and political institutions progressively expands the "democratic space" of the society and shrinks the control of the dictatorship. As the civil institutions of the society

> become stronger vis-à-vis the dictatorship, then, whatever the dictators may wish, the population is incrementally building an independent society outside of their control. If and when the dictatorship intervenes to halt this "escalating freedom," nonviolent struggle can be applied in defense of this newly won space and the dictatorship will be faced with yet another "front" in the struggle. In time, this combination of resistance and institution building can lead to *de facto* freedom, making the collapse of the dictatorship and the formal installation of a democratic system undeniable because the power relationships within the society have been fundamentally altered.[12]

Despite his limited discussion of this topic, occupying only a page and a half in *From Dictatorship to Democracy,* this is a strong statement of the power of constructive noncooperation.

By contrast, Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler view the utility of this strategic option more narrowly. "Our use of the phrase 'constructive work' is compatible, but not precisely synonymous with, Gandhi's usage," they explain. "In his philosophy, a constructive program was a voluntary effort outside the aegis of the state, which had the dual purpose of redressing material inequalities and training the participants to be more competent and self-reliant. We refer to positive actions that can be taken primarily with a view to improving the material situation in which a conflict may be developed."[13] For Ackerman and Kruegler, then, constructive work is primarily a step toward preparing for nonviolent struggles of other kinds—a means toward an end, rather than, as it was for Gandhi, the central strategy for escaping oppression and achieving autonomy. They do little else with the concept, their focus being almost exclusively on obstructive and disruptive strategies.

Perhaps more than anyone else, Jonathan Schell, in *The Unconquerable World*, identifies the central place of constructive resistance in the history of challenging colonialism and dictatorship. According to Schell's persuasive analysis, combinations of obstructive and constructive work were largely responsible not only for India's independence but also for the success of the American Revolution and of North Vietnam in the Vietnam War, the liberation of Eastern Europe, and the fall of the Soviet Union—and these are only four of the many historic liberatory events over several centuries that Schell discusses in terms of constructive resistance. (Several detailed examples are presented later in this chapter.) Schell is clearly inspired by the "power that flows from people's freedom to act in behalf of their interests and beliefs." He eloquently describes this power: "It has, with the steady widening and deepening of the human spirit, over and over bent great powers to its will. Its point of origin is the heart and mind of each ordinary person. . . . It is generated by social work as well as political activity. . . . Its chief instrument is direct action, both noncooperative and constructive, but it is also the wellspring of the people's will in democratic nations."[14] Throughout his volume, Schell gives at least equal—and often greater—weight to the constructive alternative, stressing that "campaigns of noncooperation are empty without constructive programs."[15] Indeed, failure to engage in constructive action (as well as lack of strategic planning) can severely limit the potential success of nonviolent struggle. Several recent examples can be seen in some of the 2011–13 campaigns in the Middle East, in which mass mobilization was highly successful but democratic stabilization after initial success remains uncertain, in part because of the weakness of civil society and the lack of a collective vision and plan for the future.

Constructive action has been central to global struggles for freedom, and that centrality is clearly reflected in the historical record. Yet this option has been, at best, marginally present even in the work of theorists of nonviolent struggle, much less in overall conflict and strategic literatures. One of the reasons may be that thinking in terms of constructive responses to conflict ("There is a problem—what shall we build?") is deeply countercultural in contemporary Western societies, which characteristically respond to control with countercontrol, and to coercive pressure with countercoercion.[16] All nonviolent action is somewhat countercultural in that counterviolence is often seen as a justifiable—and as the only realistic—response to violence, whether physical, emotional, or structural. Constructive work is even more countercultural in that it does not focus on coercive action at all. It does, nonetheless, leverage real power.

VÁCLAV HAVEL: LIVING IN TRUTH

Václav Havel, playwright, long-time Czech dissident, and first president of the free Czechoslovakia (and later of the Czech Republic), offers particularly important and unique insights into the roots of constructive noncooperation. An important theorist and practitioner of nonviolent struggle, among his many works Havel wrote a series of six powerful essays published, with contributions from others, in a volume titled *Václav Havel: Living in Truth,* edited by Jan Vladislav. He is adamant that "living within the lie," by which he means living under oppressive conditions as if all is well, is destructive of self and constitutes the primary impediment to individual and collective freedom.[17] For Havel, in living within the lie, "individuals confirm the system, fulfill the system, make the system, *are* the system."[18] The behavioural dynamics here are straightforward. As noted in earlier chapters, oppressive systems require the cooperation of the oppressed to survive. Members of the population understandably participate in such oppressive systems to avoid more severe repression and disruption of their lives, living as best they can within the narrow range of options available. While such participation reduces immediate threat, it supports and reinforces the practices that structure their own and others' oppression. Acknowledging such realities, even to oneself, can be extremely difficult and is therefore likely to be avoided through denial; that denial conceals but further confirms the lie.

Havel, and many others since, also asserts that seduction by a consumer society privileging attention to personal well-being and material comfort is likely to diminish commitment to action for social change or liberation.[19] Barbara Deming recounts a conversation she had with a scientist, a man who clearly recognized the progressive damage associated with our way of life and the risks associated with nuclear war:

> We in America, he thought, were of course engaged above all in a struggle to hang on to our unequal share of the world's wealth. And it was undoubtedly a losing game. . . . If nuclear war was gravely risked by maintaining arms—as he had admitted—and if what we were defending he thought less and less worthy of defense, why not take this creative risk [the pacifist program], in which we stood at least the chance of transforming ourselves into the kind of society he might admire? He answered with surprising candor: This would involve heroism and discomfort. "I can't take that road." He looked about the comfortable room. "I've worked hard for what I have. My world is small: this house, my family. But this is what is precious to me. I can't feel that your way is bound to succeed. I have little faith in your man

> in the street. So I have to cling to what I have while I'm allowed to enjoy it. It's not an admirable position to take," he said, and smiled wryly.[20]

Havel maintains that fundamental change is threatened by a "static complex of rigid, conceptually sloppy and politically pragmatic mass political parties run by professional apparatuses and releasing the citizen from all forms of concrete and personal responsibility; and those complex focuses of capital accumulation engaged in secret manipulations and expansion; the omnipresent dictatorship of consumption, production, advertising, commerce, consumer culture."[21] Although this was written over three decades ago, it still resonates with many today, including many in the Occupy movement. In an important article titled "The Inertia of Affluence," John Nevin provides a clear explanation in behavioural systems terms for why the privileged and affluent are unlikely to take action for social and environmental change.[22] In summarizing the research on "behavioural momentum," he clarifies that "behaviour is highly resistant to change in situations with large and frequent reinforcers but weak contingencies relating reinforcers to behaviour," by which he means that those with comfortable lives have little incentive to act in different ways, including working for change. This inertia, which persists even though continuing current patterns will ultimately destroy the environments and societies on which we depend, is largely due to the behavioural phenomenon of "delay discounting": if negative consequences are far off, and especially if they are uncertain, their power to affect current behaviour is dramatically attenuated.[23] Climate change and growing income inequities are current examples. If there were today a clear imminent threat of civilization ending and its survival could only be ensured through collective action, such action would be nearly inevitable. Uncertainty (often politically manipulated) about the facts, and the reality that any action today probably will not have a major impact for a long time, make it highly probable that people will simply continue living their current comfortable lives. Sacrifice for a delayed outcome is unlikely under such conditions, as well-developed mathematical models demonstrate. Such realities make movement toward living in truth rather challenging, but anything less may not support movement toward justice. As we will see below, behavioural systems science offers some possible routes for addressing this dilemma.

As understood by Jonathan Schell, Havel's "living in truth" is a matter of "directly doing in your immediate surroundings what you think needs doing, saying what you think is true and needs saying, acting the way you think people should act."[24] Havel himself explains that living in truth begins with "elementary revolts against manipulation: you simply straighten your backbone and live in greater dignity as an individual."[25] He elaborates this further: "The point where living within the truth ceases to be a mere negation of living with a lie and becomes articulate in a particular way is the point at which something is born that might be called the 'independent spiritual, social and political life of society.' . . . Living within the truth becomes articulate and materializes in a visible way." Such actions are small examples of what would occur in a free society; how far they are taken depends on one's readiness to accept the likely consequences. A recent example is the 2011 Woman2Drive initiative in Saudi Arabia, where women, for the first time, organized to drive, a practice that has been forbidden by custom (but not by law) until now.[26] A small step, perhaps, but a meaningful step toward more extensive liberation, as demonstrated by the government's subsequent decision to allow women to vote and run for office in municipal elections.[27]

Living in truth is a form of resistance—but it is also something much more central. As Jonathan Schell notes, "Living in truth . . . is a form of protest, Havel admits, against living in the lie, and so those who try to live in truth are indeed an opposition. But that is neither all they are nor the main thing they are. Before living in truth is a protest, it is an affirmation."[28] It is in this affirmation that "something is born": the realization of autonomy and liberation. For this reason, Havel disliked being labelled a "dissident," which suggested that he was primarily against something. In reality, he was primarily interested in building something new.

Gandhi also emphasized "truth," notably in a pamphlet titled *Truth Is God* and in his consistent emphasis on satyagraha, or "truth force"—that is, keeping a firm hold on the truth even in the face of repression, risk, and the seductions of temporary safety and comfort. Holding on to the truth is at the core of constructive resistance.[29]

THE UNIQUENESS OF CONSTRUCTIVE NONCOOPERATION

Constructive noncooperation is unique among nonviolent strategic options, and not just because it is less directly coercive than many other approaches. Living in truth may begin in individual action, and individuals certainly often have a profound impact on the shaping of constructive campaigns. Ultimately, however, constructive resistance requires a collective effort emphasizing action for building a society of human rights even in the face of repression and structural violence. As Havel stresses, "The primary purpose . . . is always . . . to have an impact on society, not to affect the power structure, at least not directly and immediately."[30] Contrary to Ackerman and Kruegler's understanding, campaigns of constructive resistance by and within oppressed communities can function not only as means but—principally, in fact—as ends in themselves. At the same time, because of the interdependencies between the grievance group and the opponent, ultimately and inevitably the opponent's actions will shift in response.[31]

In terms of behavioural systems analysis, however, there is much more to be said. The essential distinction between constructive noncooperation and other forms of nonviolent resistance is that *the actions targeted for change in constructive nonviolent action are those of the resistance community itself rather than those of the opponent*. Primary strategic attention, therefore, focuses on encouraging and sustaining positive steps within the grievance group, although certainly the actions of the opponent are important contextual conditions. In campaigns of constructive noncooperation, the attention of the resistance community is directed *toward their own actions*. Focusing on these actions with full awareness enhances analytic and strategic clarity.

Drawing on behavioural systems science, the first step in any campaign of constructive noncooperation is to identify, as specifically as possible, those scenes that would be occurring in a society or community that values human dignity and then clarifying interlocking practices that could initiate and sustain the incidence of such scenes. Desirable scenes might include sharing the truth of people's lives in literature or through social media, participation in artistic endeavours that are discouraged or banned by the oppressive system, participation in labour unions or religious ceremonies, or the making and exchange of high-quality, locally made goods. All forms of resistance involve some risk; those involved need to weigh which of the available steps toward liberation involve risks that they are willing to tolerate.

In many places around the world in which collective or structural violence is present—as different from each other as are, for example, Iraq, India, and the United States—the contemporary political scene is characterized by escalating levels of aversive exchange, ranging from painful levels of incivility to suicide-bombing campaigns, often with little serious attention to social injustice. Aversive exchange cannot reliably construct a resilient and improved reality, and complaints about such exchange appear simply to contribute to it. Constructive work, however, by its nature, does construct a new reality.[32] Given the current level of frustration with politics-as-usual in many parts of the world, turning attention to constructive action could become increasingly attractive, whether in day-to-day efforts to improve human conditions or in mass movements directed toward liberation. Such a shift would require creativity, but the necessary dynamics are clear.

As an example, Havel describes the hypothetical case of a greengrocer in communist Czechoslovakia whose revolt against government might begin by refusing to place a mandated poster in his shop window or by simply not voting in false elections.[33] So far, nothing constructive has been done; at some point, however, his dissatisfaction "may . . . grow into something more."[34] He may begin taking action to organize other shopkeepers to improve their lives and advocate for their interests by building an association. (Organizing the association is constructive; further actions taken by that association may be either constructive or disruptive.) Why would he do this? Beginning to organize might be motivated by a high level of dissatisfaction with aversive conditions over which he feels powerless; organizing might offer hope of greater autonomy in at least some areas of life. The shopkeeper may have observed successful constructive action on the part of others (models), which could function as a motivating antecedent, as could guidance and encouragement by local resistance leaders.

Two crucial questions for growing a resistance movement emerge from this analysis: How could the likelihood that people will initiate organizing such activities be increased, and how could the likelihood that the resulting scenes of association will persist over time be increased? Figure 6 provides an example of how these questions might begin to be addressed, focusing on practices among four classes of relevant actors:

- The class of initiators (the shopkeeper being one)
- The class of participants in scenes of association (other shopkeepers)

- The class of activist leaders within the local resistance
- The class of government actors acting to suppress acts of freedom

How the practices of each group support or fail to support the desired scene is the key analytic question here. Note that it is the collective one-time *actions* or (most commonly) persistent cultural *practices* present that constitute the relevant behavioural systems dynamics, not the actors themselves.[35] Those practices *select each other* through the mutual consequences provided—in other words, they interlock.

The motivating context is clearly important here. If the situation is not significantly aversive, if participants do not believe that organizing will lead to change (a rule), if there are no models for how to organize, then scenes of association will be unlikely. At the same time, if creating an association leads to only limited reinforcement or severely aversive consequences, such scenes will probably not continue to occur, given what we know of selection by consequences. Note that the practices of other classes of actors not depicted in figure 6 (e.g., police and military, labour groups, merchants in other sectors, leaders of national resistance movements) also participate in structuring both antecedents and consequences for members of the groups included in the figure.

In this scenario, the power of selection is clear; while individual action may, and often does, emerge as an immediate reaction to aversive conditions (e.g., frustration and deprivation), constructive action over the longer term must produce positive results for those involved, or extinction will occur. Although some individuals can sustain long periods of autonomous action, in most cases, continued resistance in the face of threats or pain is much more likely when social, material, spiritual, or other reinforcers are present. While one might wish that every human being would independently weigh situations and consistently choose the most ethical and effective paths even in the face of danger, neither history nor the science of behaviour promises that this is likely. Sustained and widespread living in truth generally requires the support of cultures of constructive resistance. Community organizers have learned from experience that it is often best to recruit participants with "one on ones," followed by small gatherings, often in homes, in which reality can be discussed and redefined and requests for participation can be made in the context of mutual social encouragement. As Deming observes, in sustained nonviolent


Scene of Association
Action/Practice
Invites and encourages participation
Actor
Organizing shopkeeper
Motivating Context
• Frustration
• Rule: "Organizing will improve our situation"
• Activist guidance
Consequences
• Support from peers and resistance leaders
• Excitement and hope
• Experience of resistance
• Limited perceived risk
Action/Practice
Participates and encourages others
Actor
Peer shopkeeper
Motivating Context
• Signal: invitation
• Frustration
• Model of courageous, successful organizer
• Participation by peers
Consequences
• Support from organizer and peers
• Hope and experience of successful resistance
• Limited perceived risk
Action/Practice
Offers guidance and recognition
Actor
Local resistance leader
Motivating Context
• Recognition of injustice
• Other organizing Successes
• Rule: "Organizing will challenge oppression"
Consequences
• Organizing successes
• Support and recognition from other activists
• Increased reputation
Action/Practice
Threatens unishment
Actor
Government actors
Motivating Context
• Fear of losing status
• Concern for own safety
• Fear of revolution
• {association ≈ threat}
Consequences
• Threat from superiors is avoided
• Support from peers and privileged

FIGURE 6. Interlocking practices that might encourage scenes of association among oppressed shopkeepers

struggle, we, as supporters, "reach out our hands to give what extra strength we can to these who have acted; and in the process we draw more strength from them than we give."[36] Those who collectively take liberatory action by giving that "extra strength" initiate cultures of constructive resistance as self-organizing behavioural systems.

CULTURES OF CONSTRUCTIVE RESISTANCE

The history of repression and resistance in Burma has been bloody; until very recently, the situation was discouraging to many inside and outside the country. Burma has a history of colonial oppression, military dictatorship, and Maoist and Marxist-Leninist violent resistance and guerrilla action. Until 1988, Burma had little history of nonviolent struggle, and the results of nonviolent action since then may not have seemed promising. Thousands of protesters were killed by the junta during the largely nonviolent 1988 rebellion. The junta subsequently overturned the results of the 1990 elections that were to have brought reform, and the Saffron Revolution led by Buddhist monks in 2007 was ruthlessly suppressed. The country remains among the poorest in Asia.[37]

Yet the situation is changing in Burma. Since 1989, Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the National League for Democracy Party (which won the 1990 national elections but was not allowed to take office), spent a total of fifteen years in prison. Both in confinement and in her short periods of partial freedom, Suu Kyi has been a model of nonviolently living in truth. But revolutions are not one-person events. Revolutions emerge from and are strengthened by cultural movements and the development of autonomous civil society. Scaffolded by the increasingly global flow of information, an underground culture of constructive resistance has formed among mostly young Burmese artists, students, and dissidents (and increasingly also within multiple other sectors). Such activists stage secret exhibitions and performances, form parallel nongovernmental structures, and wage relentless struggles to insert their truth into art, music, and humanitarian action, evading the censors and other authorities wherever possible. Dissident gallery founder Ay Ko notes, "We [celebrate] the open mind" even as the government "is looking at us all the time."[38] The younger generation of Buddhist monks, revered in Burma, continue to quietly support liberation.

Opposition parties, although long splintered, have increasingly come together to "speak truth to power." Based on history elsewhere, although keeping in mind that every situation is different, a broad-based movement of truth will be difficult, and probably impossible, to defeat here in the long run. Since the elections in late 2010, widely seen as tainted, the government has initiated a process of progressive openness, and the rest of the world is incrementally reciprocating. Suu Kyi's release, her subsequent election to Parliament, her freedom to travel to Europe to accept her Nobel Peace Prize, and her growing presence on the world stage are just the most visible signs of a larger, and it appears historic, cultural shift.[39] While there is, naturally, continuing skepticism, and progress must be viewed with caution given Burma's history, the signs of change are evident.[40] Third-party pressure played a role in advancing change, but an emerging culture of resistance must be viewed as a critical factor in initiating current shifts and the potential for further liberation.

In "The Power of the Powerless," Václav Havel discusses Ivan Jirous's notion of the development of a "second culture," a parallel culture formed by constructive noncooperation.[41] In Czechoslovakia, he explains, the second culture first appeared in a serious way in literary and artistic circles but gradually expanded to include the humanities, social sciences, and philosophy, ultimately resulting in the development of more formal parallel structures (discussed in the next section). Constructive noncooperation progressively shapes an autonomous civil society that provides a space for expanding freedom and challenges efforts to suppress freedoms once they are gained.[42] Most importantly, for Havel, this civil society is built through the emergence of *self-organizing associations and communities*, which, by their very nature, reduce dependence on oppressive power structures. Those associations may be of many kinds—cultural, sports, gardening, religious, financial, the range is unlimited—all contributing to the development of civil society. Research on emergence in many contemporary scientific disciplines (biology, physics, and behavioural systems analysis, among others) clarifies that within such systems, self-amplifying processes often lead to cascading and irreversible changes.[43] Something of that nature appears to be occurring in Burma as I write this.

Self-organizing processes in social systems are more than metaphor.[44] They offer routes to change that might otherwise be unimaginable. As understood by behavioural systems science, culture (ways of thinking, experiencing, and acting that are mutually supported within a group) emerges from increasingly complex interdependencies that develop within a group. This understanding of culture clarifies the idea that cultures of constructive resistance can be intentionally created in small steps. Actions supporting autonomy can be selected through shifts in how members of the group respond to each other's efforts to act in truth. Three examples of emergent cultures of constructive resistance (from the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and South Asia) offer rich guidance and suggest options for structuring networks of such practices.

Tunisia and the Wider Middle East

Events in the Middle East in early 2011 (often referred to as the Arab Spring) provide examples in which cultures of constructive resistance were relatively well, and relatively poorly, established. The first months and years immediately following major mobilizations are uncertain and high-risk periods, so at the time of writing, it is too early to know the ultimate outcomes of these struggles. Still, the early results are consistent with what is known from other historical examples. Tunisia, generally seen as the first spark of the Arab Spring, flared into a full-scale nonviolent campaign almost immediately following Mohamed Bouazizi's self-immolation (discussed in chapter 2). Within two months, not only had the government resigned, but a firm plan was in place to form a national constitutional assembly that would structure a new form of democratic government. All the demands of the protesters had been met, with relatively minor casualties.[45] By contrast, a rebellion in Libya shortly thereafter turned violent almost immediately and proceeded without a clear strategic plan or established leadership. Concurrent events in other Middle Eastern countries (including Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain) fell somewhere between Tunisia and Libya in terms of strategic action and immediate outcomes. And although events in Syria began with nonviolent resistance, progressive degeneration into a full-scale civil war has placed the country and the civilian population at enormous risk.

Why was Tunisia the first of these events, and why, at least to this point in time, has it been the most successful? Until the revolution, Tunisia was a fairly repressive police state. Inside that state, however, extensive organized networks forming a relatively strong civil society were present, including the General Union of Labor and the student unions, as well as neighbourhood watch groups that had evolved into political-action committees.[46] Also present were marginalized but persistent political parties; religious groups, including the Islamist Ennahda; and a large well-established Facebook digital community, which facilitated organizing. The business community was well connected to the global economy and essential to the stability of the government. Civil society was also supported by relatively large educational and professional sectors.

Each of these groups and networks constituted potential cells of resistance, which, at the key moment, mobilized to demand change. Collectively, the population had indeed constructed a new society within the old, one that could be and was leveraged in nonviolent struggle. Widespread calls to remain peaceful were heard from the beginning, and, as has happened in many other cases of nonviolent struggle, the commanding general of the army refused to use violence to suppress peaceful protests by citizens.[47] As the campaign expanded, equivalences like "Liberation is really possible," about which many were initially skeptical, became widely shared, and those involved in the protests reported high levels of mutual support both within and between groups (including groups that had previously lacked mutual trust). Existing behavioural networks in which cooperation had been selected linked to each other, generalizing that cooperation; the repressive government simply could not stand when so many pillars of support (and so many networks of interdependency) had collapsed.

In contrast, Libya lacked both a strong civil society and a widespread understanding of the power of nonviolent struggle; even those in professional roles almost immediately embraced, and many joined, the armed rebellion. In Libya, as well as in several of the other countries involved in the Arab Spring, protesters regularly called for the death of the current rulers and their supporters. (In fact, Muammar Gaddafi was summarily executed after his capture.) Deming's "two hands" message—you will not be harmed, but we will not allow injustice to continue—was absent. Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth explain the importance of that message to successful resistance movements: "Nonviolent resistance campaigns appear to be more open to negotiation and bargaining because they do not threaten the lives or well-being of members of the target regime. Regime supporters are more likely to bargain with resistance groups that are not killing or maiming their comrades. . . . Because explicitly nonviolent methods do not physically threaten members of the security forces or a regime's civil servants, members of the regime are more likely to shift loyalties toward nonviolent movements rather than toward violent ones."[48] Violent repression of violent resistance is to be expected, especially when those in power fear for their lives. The threat of violence in ostensibly nonviolent campaigns produces a similar behavioural dynamic.

Eastern Europe

Revolutions were attempted in Poland and Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. All failed, and as the decades rolled by, the totalitarian Soviet regime appeared increasingly invincible. However, by the 1970s, as Jonathan Schell describes, an entirely different approach to resistance had emerged in all three countries, guided in each case by communities of intellectuals. Leading activists—Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia, Adam Michnik in Poland, and Gyorgy Konrád in Hungary were particularly influential—recognized that efforts to overthrow the system, especially violent efforts, were doomed to fail . . . but might also be unnecessary. Instead of that type of rebellion, these key figures advocated shifting focus to "achieving immediate changes in daily life" through strengthening autonomous civil society.[49] Schell points out, for example, that rather than revolting, "Konrád wanted society to 'absorb' the regime in a 'ripening social transformation.' He wanted the 'iceberg of power . . . melted from within.'"[50] Konrád regarded the growing middle class in Hungary as the most powerful force in the gradual transformation of a new society in which dictatorship would gradually fade away.

In 1976, Adam Michnik called for the construction of a "post-totalitarian" society in Poland, a society in which the resistance community would set up its own institutions and "give directives to the people on how to behave, not to the powers on how to reform themselves."[51] The government would thus become increasingly irrelevant. An important beginning in Poland was the Workers' Defence Committee, established in the mid-1970s by intellectuals to help establish unofficial labour organizations, provide assistance to workers ("social work"), and support independent underground press and publishing efforts, among other activities.[52] The Solidarity union, which was ultimately central to success despite continued repression, emerged from this foundation. In Havel's Czechoslovakia, the Charter 77 movement supported and sustained the actions of dissident leaders and inspired further individual and collective action, progressively weakening the Communist government. Intellectual, artistic, business, and labour communities were important sectors of civil society contributing to this movement.

Probably such constructive strategies appeared hopelessly idealistic at many points over two decades, yet by the end of the 1980s, all three countries were independent democracies, and the Soviet Union was on a steep trajectory toward total collapse.

The Khudai Khidmatgars

In the 1930s, Badshah Khan (sometimes called "the Frontier Gandhi") assembled a militantly nonviolent Pashtun army a hundred thousand strong to resist the British colonial system.[53] The Khudai Khidmatgars ("Servants of God"), as the army was known, were notable for many reasons, not least of which is that the Pashtuns are people of the tribal areas between present-day Pakistan and Afghanistan who have a reputation as exceptionally fierce warriors. The courage of the Khudai Khidmatgars, however, was directed into highly disciplined nonviolent struggle. Important to our purpose here, most of the work to which they dedicated themselves was constructive: educational, economic, and community development; initiating and supporting local youth leagues and *jirga*s (community councils); publishing a newspaper; improving village sanitation; and political education.[54] These constructive activities increasingly distanced the Pashtun population from the British, in part through changes in equivalence relations (e.g., recognizing the British as oppressors) and rules (e.g., "Independent community action will bring improved health and prosperity, whereas the colonial system will further weaken us").

While these efforts initiated the rebuilding of an autonomous society, they simultaneously prepared the Khudai Khidmatgars themselves for other forms of noncooperation (as discussed in later chapters). In close alliance with Gandhi's efforts in India, the Khudai Khidmatgars clearly contributed to the end of the British colonial era—and demonstrated that even in this conflict-torn area, nonviolent action and the construction of cultures of constructive resistance have real potential. It is worth noting that the contemporary Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan engages in similar constructive work to that of the Khudai Khidmatgars, including in the areas of health care; education (particularly but not exclusively for girls and women); artistic, dramatic, and musical performance; human rights reporting, locally and globally; political education; social services; and economic development. This constructive work is primary to the organization, although it also engages in protest, persuasion, and other forms of resistance.[55]

Behavioural Systems Science and Cultures of Constructive Resistance

All of this may sound rather magical and almost unbelievable in summary, but the facts are there for all to see. The reality, however, is that in each of these cases, tremendous labour and struggle was required to construct behavioural networks in which living in truth was mutually and richly reinforced. Recall that the matching law predicts that people will do more of what pays off more for them. All else being equal, constructing and growing behavioural systems (unions, artistic associations, legal societies, religious communities) in which independent constructive action is consistently supported leads to more of such action—like other behaviour, autonomous action can be intentionally selected by its consequences. Cultures of constructive resistance increasingly come to share and encourage common equivalence relations (e.g., {speaking truth ≈ patriotic}), rules (e.g., "Speaking truth can lead to liberation"), and supporting practices (e.g., recognizing courageous acts by others). These equivalences, rules, and practices progressively shape better lives for the participants, expand participation, and strengthen resistance to oppression. The more explicitly these principles are recognized and the more consistently they are applied, the more likely will cultures of constructive resistance be efficiently shaped and sustained. Research into these processes could potentially have enormous payoffs in furthering social justice.

Note that in each of the examples above, activists began from a vision of the behavioural scenes to be constructed rather than from a primary focus on attacking oppression, and that vision encompassed interactions among multiple actors and groups. The simple example of the shopkeeper in figure 6 demonstrates this—the vision clarifies that we want many actors like the shopkeeper to initiate organizing and that it is not just the acts of the shopkeeper that are important but also the responses of those he invites. If invitations of initiators are consistently rejected, most initiators will give up, usually fairly quickly, because of the lack of reinforcement. The desired scene is shaped by interactions not only among those present but also among other groups of actors (community resistance leaders, for example) whose practices contribute to the likelihood of similar scenes being widely repeated throughout the population. Analyses of interlocking actions like this may sharpen the focus of nonviolent struggles, thus conserving the limited energy available to campaigns for justice and human rights.

There is no mystery in such analyses: rather, they are rooted in thoughtful and creative work directed by a rigorous and parsimonious set of principles. Constructive campaigns focus tightly on constructing arrangements that make the structures of oppression increasingly irrelevant and the population progressively less dependent on those institutions and systems. Institutions with no participants dependent on them cannot survive. If there are no plaintiffs, there are no roles for judges or police; if there are no hungry families, there is no role for demeaning forms of charity. Those who are part of the system require dependent participants in order to access their own reinforcers (including resources and privileges). Acts of autonomy are, by their nature, a direct challenge to the entire system of domination and oppression. The greater the extent to which those acts become organized into parallel structures, the greater the challenge to the oppressive system.

PARALLEL STRUCTURES

History suggests that a natural outcome of the growth of cultures of resistance is the emergence of parallel structures—organized structures that begin to take over the functions of institutions established by the oppressive system.[56]

Czech activist Václav Benda first popularized the term *parallel structures* for such functional substitutes, viewing them as important components in forming a new society within the shell of the old.[57] Parallel structures may include cultural, financial, educational, labour, political, religious, legal, medical, or other associations, organizations, or institutions. Historical examples are extensive and variable; the specific forms of alternative structures emerge from unique local realities. In Eastern Europe, they included underground publications, labour unions, a "flying university," artistic associations, and proto-political parties. By their nature, parallel structures take on necessary communal responsibilities while denying the government legitimacy. As Václav Havel wrote in 1978, "These parallel structures, it may be said, represent the most articulated expressions so far of 'living within the truth.' One of the most important tasks the 'dissident movements' have set themselves is to support and develop them. . . . For what else are parallel structures than an area where a different life can be lived, a life that is in harmony with its own aims and which in turn structures itself in harmony with those aims?"[58] Havel insists that the development of a parallel culture cannot be a retreat into isolation; the people and systems in tension with the dominant system need to remain simultaneously lodged in the latter if they are to be forces for justice. This again makes sense in terms of behavioural systems; isolation from the oppressive structures precludes having a meaningful impact on them (and, consistent with contemporary systems theory, Havel believed that such isolation was impossible, at any rate).

Jonathan Schell describes the central place of parallel structures in the struggle for US independence in the eighteenth century.[59] American colonists increasingly withdrew from participation in the colonial governance system, instead forming extensive networks of local governing committees and congresses ("para-governments"), which became increasingly interconnected through Committees of Correspondence, Articles of Confederation, and, ultimately, the Continental Congress. Refusing to participate as jurors in the British justice system, the colonists formed their own systems of law enforcement and dispute resolution. Colonists supported their own parallel structures financially, while resisting British taxes. Furthermore, the coercive efforts of the British government could not bring the colonists to cooperate—those efforts were put on the path to extinction. In Schell's view, the colonies were essentially independent by the time of the Revolutionary War, which was fought not so much to achieve independence as to protect the independence already established.

Similar strategies were used during the Indian struggle for freedom, at times approaching the establishment of a parallel government: “In 1930 the law courts were picketed by the nationalists, the litigants being urged to go instead to the *Panchayats* (village-five or town-five tribunals revived by the India National Congress); government schools and colleges were picketed, and the students were urged to attend ‘national institutions’ which were independent of the British government.”[60] Alternative taxation, policing, commercial inspection, and governance structures were also established in parts of India during this period.

During the Vietnam War, Bernard Fall reported that the construction of *hiérarchies paralléles* (autonomous political, economic, and social governance structures) was the core of the ultimately successful National Liberation Front (NLF or Viet Cong) strategy.[61] These parallel structures had considerable popular support, in part because of a commitment to land reform, although they were also supported by campaigns of terror against those allied to the government (not a strategy consistent with nonviolent struggle, obviously). The population was organized into a system of interlocking associations (women’s associations, youth associations, and others) under the supervision of governing groups (the *Lien-Viet*), which gradually assumed responsibility for supporting and directing the lives of the population in territory ostensibly under government control and occupied by a large foreign army. Both Schell and Fall regard this system as largely responsible for the final outcome of the war.

Two more examples, detailed below, further illuminate the potential for parallel structures. The first is a growing movement within Indigenous communities worldwide to return to traditional methods of dealing with unacceptable behaviour, crime, and conflict through healing justice—a movement that, although countercultural, has also begun making significant inroads into the dominant society. A second example is the extensive network of interlocking parallel structures that emerged throughout the historical development of African America. The institutions of dominant society, by their very nature, were riddled with physical and structural violence, systematically marginalizing, excluding, oppressing, and lynching African Americans. (A similar, more recent history could be outlined for the LGBTQ population.) In both cases, parallel institutions opened, to use Havel's terms, "an area where a different life can be lived, a life that is in harmony with its own aims and which in turn structures itself in harmony with those aims."[62] At the same time, both must be recognized as powerful forms of political resistance.

Indigenous Justice

During the second half of the twentieth century, Indigenous groups in New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the United States began to take constructive action in resistance to justice systems that they recognized were often doing more harm than good to both individual offenders and Native communities, contributing to experiences of cultural genocide.[63] Indigenous communities believed that traditional restorative justice practices grounded in teaching and healing offered a much better alternative to the punishment-oriented practices of the dominant society, which they had long protested to no avail. Healing justice consistent with traditional values and practices leaves little place for standard criminal and civil justice arrangements, which historically participated actively in cultural genocide.

In their own ways in different places, Indigenous peoples began to implement parallel practices in the later decades of the twentieth century, in some cases integrating these into the existing justice systems and in others largely replacing those systems. In New Zealand, the Maori people instituted a process drawn from their own traditions that came to be called family group conferencing. In family group conferencing, victims and youthful offenders come together with their own supporters and representatives of the community in a structured circle process of mutual listening and teaching.[64] In the conference, offenders have the opportunity to come to understand the pain they have caused and to learn how to function as contributing members of a community. Participants in the conference then collectively develop plans to heal the damage done by criminal acts. Ultimately, conferencing came to be used with nearly all first offences by young people, both Maori and non-Maori, and as a result, half of all juvenile facilities in New Zealand were closed.[65] Family group conferencing is now widely used in New Zealand, Australia, and, increasingly, in Canada and the United States, in both the educational and justice systems, as an alternative to standard practices that have consistently failed to reform offenders or protect the public. The data supporting this alternative are increasingly strong.

A related set of traditional practices, holistic healing circles, were developed based on traditional practices and teachings in the village of Hollow Water, Manitoba, to deal with endemic struggles with sexual abuse, addictions, and domestic violence.[66] The process of constructing alternatives to the formal justice system based on traditional teachings was painful and difficult, as the damage done to the community as the result of historical trauma ran very deep. Nonetheless, the community persisted and forged a partnership with the formal system to experiment with community-led circle processes as alternatives to standard sentencing practices. The need for the involvement of the formal justice system gradually decreased as healing circle processes came, over time, to demonstrate their superiority, with almost no recidivism in cases of sexual abuse and positive outcomes for the other issues addressed in circles.[67] Additional examples involving Indigenous peoples include the Navajo Peacemaker Court and a variety of other peacemaking circle and transformative justice processes among First Nation, American Indian, and African tribal groups.[68]

It is important to stress that Native communities in the examples given regarded the existing justice systems as deeply unjust and racist; the approaches they relied on, however, were almost exclusively constructive while also functioning as forms of resistance. When traditional practices are applied, there simply remains very little place for the practices of the dominant society. In every case—even though the cultures involved are very different from those discussed earlier in this chapter in North Africa, Eastern Europe, and Asia—oppression was challenged through the construction of behavioural systems that made the institutions of domination increasingly irrelevant. Although not conceptualized in these terms, those behavioural systems were shaped and supported through the identification of desired scenes, the selection of alternative sets of cultural practices supporting those scenes, and changes in rules and equivalences that encourage experimentation and participation. At the present time, many of these practices are being introduced into Western settings with the hope of humanizing justice more broadly.

African America

Living first within the system of chattel slavery and later under Jim Crow, African Americans have, from their earliest days in the New World, constructed parallel support networks and, wherever possible, parallel structures in order to survive as people and as a people.[69] Following emancipation, and particularly since the early days of the twentieth century, independent women's associations, churches, businesses, media, and political and civic associations were central to African America, building the financial, human, and social capital on which survival, resistance, and liberation rely.[70] Until relatively recently, largely excluded from such "universal" benefits and opportunities as Social Security, pensions, lending, and social services, African Americans constructed parallel systems to meet community needs and support "racial uplift."[71]

African American women were (and continue to be) central figures in these efforts.[72] Some, like the powerful womanist Ida B. Wells-Barnett, participated with male allies like W.E.B. Dubois in organizing advocacy associations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, building antilynching campaigns, and promoting journalistic advocacy.[73] Others, often much more obscure, were building networks of alternative structures to support the basic needs of the community, improve educational and economic opportunities, and build social spaces where a life of dignity could be lived. Margaret Murray Washington (1865–1925), for example, was largely responsible for developing the Tuskegee Woman's Club, which focused on practical learning as well as women's issues, and the Town Night School, where reading, cooking, carpentry, sewing, painting, and other practical skills were taught to farm wives and their husbands.[74] At the same time, she lectured at Tuskegee Institute (which was directed by her husband) to prepare African American women for leadership in social service efforts. She was also deeply involved in African American rural settlement-house work (blacks were largely excluded from white settlements),[75] which included Sunday schools, temperance and community work, music, the supporting and arranging of medical and dental services, and a public library. In addition, Washington was a key figure in prison reform and the construction of shelters for African American youth in the South, both boys and girls, while being deeply involved in national advocacy efforts.

At about the same time, but in the much more urban setting of Richmond, Virginia, Maggie Lena Walker (1864 or 1865–1934) emerged as a force to be reckoned with.[76] The organization that she led, the Virginia Independent Order of St. Luke, was one of many African American mutual benefit societies that provided wide-ranging services like burial assistance, food to the indigent, employment referral, black insurance companies, settlement houses, and hospitals, since mainstream institutions either excluded blacks or provided utterly inadequate services. Among the services that Walker's organization instituted were a bank, a department store, a print shop, and a newspaper. Recognizing the oppression that was structured into African Americans' relationships with white institutions, the message of the Virginia Independent Order was one of black self-help and racial uplift.

Social services and community development were, in many cases, integrated into both black business and economic development and black churches.[77] (Each could be the subject of its own volume.) As African American business grew (often separate from and in parallel to white business communities), the resources available for education and advocacy for liberation expanded. The importance to civil rights and liberation campaigns of parallel outlets for African American journalism, such as the *Chicago Defender* and the *Conservator*, also cannot be overstated. Consistent with what had gone before, black nationalist and black power movements (not always nonviolent) also emphasized self-reliance and the construction of parallel structures and institutions.[78] Consistent with Ackerman and Kruegler's understanding of constructive noncooperation, all of these parallel structures also augmented the resources available to support the campaigns of protest and disruptive noncooperation advancing civil rights and economic justice that intensified in the 1950s and 1960s.

Parallel structures often offer better outcomes from the perspective of participants (two examples being more responsive justice and land reform), thus selecting participation. Furthermore, for the grievance population, parallel institutions come to participate in equivalence relations with autonomy, freedom, and resistance. At the same time, parallel institutions, by their very existence, deny important consequences that have previously selected the actions of the oppressing group, destabilizing and disrupting the interdependencies that have maintained the power of the oppressor.

As discussed in depth in chapter 3, constructive approaches, in most spheres of human life, have clear advantages, one being that those approaches rely on offering incentives (including opportunities for intrinsic rewards), whereas efforts to reduce undesirable actions often require more aversive strategies. Constructive noncooperation leverages this advantage. During the late twentieth century, campaigns of resistance became increasingly intentional and strategic. A personal commitment to satyagraha or living in truth can be an important start, but a sophisticated scientific understanding of the dynamics of individual and collective action is likely to offer substantive help in initiating and strengthening collective nonviolent struggle, including constructive noncooperation. Much more research and experimentation is required in this area, however, to realize that potential. To be most useful, much of that research must be participatory, conducted in partnership with those who are intimately involved in nonviolent struggle.

How might locally driven constructive noncooperation help in long-troubled areas like the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan (where the historical precedent of Badshah Khan and the Khudai Khidmatgars and the contemporary Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan offer powerful models), in East Africa, or in the most neglected urban areas in the United States? And what might living in truth look like for the privileged in an interdependent world in which the luxury enjoyed by some produces utter devastation for many others?[79] We do not yet have adequate answers to those questions, nor do we know the extent and limits of the power of constructive strategies on their own or in combination with other strategic nonviolent options. If scientific analysis can offer additional knowledge to guide constructive action for human rights and justice, pursuing these questions through science appears to be a moral imperative.

Although the evident potential for constructive noncooperation is exciting, it is certainly not the only strategic option, and within the current sociopolitical context it cannot carry the full load in nonviolent struggle. In the next chapter, we turn to the two most common forms of resistance, persuasion and protest; the two are very often practiced in parallel and are in some ways mirror images. Persuasion offers an opponent incentives to improve a condition that, from the perspective of the resistance movement, is unsatisfactory;

protest creates (or threatens to create) an unsatisfactory condition for the opponent, which can be escaped if the opponent does what the resistance movement wants.

8

NONVIOLENT PERSUASION AND PROTEST

Gene Sharp describes persuasion and protest as "expressions in action of a point of view, or an attempt in action to influence others to accept a point of view or to take a certain action."[1] Elsewhere, he notes that the various nonviolent methods of protest and persuasion are "symbolic actions," meant to "send a message."[2] From a behaviour science perspective, however, statements of dissent and other attempts to influence how others think or act are not merely symbolic. Expressing a point of view, for example, is not symbolic when it is intended to influence others. All forms of nonviolent resistance, by definition, are intended to evoke change directly or indirectly.

Our discussion diverges from Sharp's in other ways as well. Recall that Sharp partitions methods of nonviolent struggle into protest and persuasion, noncooperation, and nonviolent intervention. The term *persuasion* is a bit tricky. For example, some might say that when senior diplomats from the United States and Great Britain met recently with the Burmese government, their goal was to persuade the military-supported government to change policies. What they were doing, however, was not simply asking or pleading; they were clarifying the changes they wanted to see, the potential advantages of making those changes, and the potential disadvantages of failing to do so—they were leveraging the power of positive and negative incentives, although that might not be immediately evident. When the word *persuasion* is used in the literature of nonviolent action, it is meant in this sense.

A number of the methods classified as nonviolent intervention in Sharp's taxonomy rely on the same behavioural systems dynamics as do some that he classifies as persuasion and protest; such methods are therefore included in this chapter. For example, although fasting-unto-death and painting protest graffiti are certainly different topographically and in terms of intensity level, both actions rely, at base, on establishing an aversive situation that the opponent can escape by changing his or her behaviour. This is not to say that Sharp is wrong, but that a different theoretically based approach to classification is applied here.

PERSUASION AND PROTEST AS INCENTIVE-BASED STRATEGIES

Persuasion and protest involve a common underlying dynamic. Both derive much of their power from offering (or clarifying) incentives for changing behaviour in specific ways. The incentives in persuasion are often positive: an improved situation may be offered for doing as the grievance groups asks, or the advantages of doing so may simply be clarified by providing knowledge or by shifting values. In protest, an aversive condition is established that can be relieved by compliance; possible relief from that condition is the incentive.[3] Persuasion and protest are commonly viewed as the mildest of nonviolent methods. The extent to which this is the case, however, depends on the strength and intensity of the incentives involved. The positive incentives available to support persuasion are often limited; protest can sometimes harness potent aversives, so it is sometimes, but not always, the more powerful of the two. At the same time, protest can have potentially undesirable side effects.

The incentives and aversives involved in persuasion and protest may be external or internal. Because of social upbringing and personal observations of the world, for example, an opportunity to contribute to the well-being of others functions as a positive incentive for many people. The history of nonviolence is rich with examples of persons who have willingly taken on suffering for the benefit of others. The incentive in such cases is the opportunity to contribute in ways that are consistent with one's values.

The Motivating Context

While positive and negative incentives are crucial to shaping and maintaining the actions targeted by campaigns of persuasion and protest, there is nearly always more to the story. Contextual conditions and events are powerful factors in strengthening or weakening motivation to act. Deepening deprivation commonly increases the power of incentives, for example. A hungry man will work harder for food; a battered woman may work harder for liberation. Among humans and human communities, however, verbal processes often determine responses to deprivation. Recognizing aversive conditions as injustice rather than as fate (a change in equivalence relations) is more likely to result in participation in resistance struggles. Rules, whether explicit or covert, also profoundly affect motivation.[4] For example, the rule "Nothing can improve our lives" is likely to lead to demoralization rather than the action that a rule like "Now is the moment we can transform our society" might evoke. Similarly, exposure to models of confident hope who have demonstrated a history of success can dramatically increase the probability of action.

Jonathan Schell argues that nonviolent struggle emerged as the newest reflection of a "centuries-long movement of the peoples of the earth to achieve self-determination."[5] This movement was represented in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by guerrilla war; what was new in this was the sustained support of guerrillas by the civilian population as active participants. Popular nonviolent struggle was a further (and, on average, demonstrably more powerful) advance of this same movement toward liberation. Popular struggle, whether violent or nonviolent, required both organization and a shared vision of current oppression and a new reality worth suffering for. As articulated by Mao Zedong, guerrilla war must fail "if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, co-operation, and assistance cannot be gained."[6] Shaping such a shared vision requires shifts in verbal processes toward those that heighten motivation for change and challenge denial and rationalization. Deming speaks of these shifts as an awakening: "Our only real hope . . . is if we can learn . . . to so design our actions of obstruction, and to follow them through, that we waken more and more of the people . . . to the need for them, bringing even those who oppose us always a little more alive to the truth about our country."[7]

Nearly every campaign requires action that is intended to increase motivation for the struggle among the population and within the resistance group, but usually, persuasion that shifts motivation among pillars of support and third parties is also crucial. (We will return to this idea below.) Persuasion and protest directed toward the opponent is meant to increase the opponent's motivation to accommodate or convert to the positions and goals of the resistance. The specific methods employed to accomplish this nearly always involve resistance participants engaging and motivating others who can influence the opponent, guided explicitly or implicitly by such techniques as force field analysis or the diagramming of interlocking contingencies.

Persuasion

Persuasion, as the term is used here, implies leveraging power to move some person or group toward actions or decisions consistent with the goals of the activist group by offering or clarifying the payoffs for moving in that direction. In nonviolent struggle, the incentives involved are typically not concrete or financial, although occasionally they may be. Rather, opponents come to see that if they act as the activist group asks, they may contribute to some outcome that they themselves value, or they may gain or maintain votes, cooperation in areas they care about, legitimacy among important groups, or positive publicity, for example. Persuasion need not always be loud or aggressive, but to be effective, it does involve the power of incentives that are designed to change the thinking, values, or actions of specific individuals or groups in ways consistent with the goals of the activist or resistance movement. Persuasion directed toward the general population, for example, may involve the use of gentler persuasive skills, while that directed toward the opponent may be more immediately assertive, but in both cases, the goal is a specific change consistent with movement goals.

While this approach may not seem very powerful, recall earlier examples of behavioural systems dynamics. If respected religious leaders (recruited by the grievance group) advocate for changes by the opponent, they sometimes prove very persuasive. For example, as increasing numbers of mainstream religious leaders (for example, many Catholic bishops and Dr. King) joined the Vietnam antiwar movement, their impact on both those in power and the larger population (who, in turn, had substantial influence on those in power) made it increasingly easy for decision makers to express dissent and increasingly hard not to. Antiwar protesters without such highly respected allies could not have achieved the same outcome. Respected leaders can also have a profoundly persuasive impact on the attitudes and actions of the general public; the pivotal support of Jaime Cardinal Sin and the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines for the People Power revolution in 1986, described later in this chapter, is one example.[8]

In some cases, the positive incentives offered to the opponent are genuinely new (for example, support by a political constituency that has never before supported the opponent); in other cases, persuasion simply alerts opponents to possible positive supports that have been available all along but of which they have not been aware. For example, in the United States, many politicians, until recently, were not aware of how many LGBTQ voters might support them with votes and contributions—if only the politicians proved willing to support their interests, even in limited ways. The (gay) Log Cabin Republicans have gained considerable power through approaches to politicians by members of the group who have much in common with mainstream Republicans; this clarified the considerable support that is immediately available to candidates willing to support LGBTQ Republicans on one or two crucial issues. Note that this involves establishing new rules ("If you support this bill, you will access these positive consequences") Simultaneously, exposure to LGBTQ individuals who have much in common with the politicians themselves can shift the boundaries of equivalence sets, affecting the politicians' perceptions of members of sexual minorities. In some cases, persuasion may operate in part through clarifying the potential costs of continuing current oppression, again involving a new rule ("If I continue to act this way, revolt is likely"). When such an explanation is offered by the grievance group, it generally shades into protest, establishing a threat that can be avoided by conversion or accommodation to the goals of the resistance.[9]

Questions of negotiation arise in many conflicts. Where self-interests among groups converge and each has relatively equal power to leverage, negotiation is a natural choice, and various methods of conflict resolution and consensus building may be useful.[10] As Sharp emphasizes, however, where power is very uneven and fundamental issues of social justice and human rights are at stake, negotiated compromise risks becoming negotiated surrender.[11] Where serious violations of basic rights are occurring, resistance is required; oppressive power must be challenged with equivalent power. Once the grievance group has achieved the necessary power through persuasion, protest, or other strategic options, however, negotiation is often relevant for achieving the final outcome.

Protest

Protest generally functions by establishing or threatening to establish an aversive situation from which the opponent (or those who can influence the opponent) can escape by acting as the grievance group desires. Technically speaking, protest employs two related strategies: escape and avoidance. In the former, a resistance group establishes an aversive situation from which the opponent can escape by acquiescing to the group's wishes; in the latter; the resistance group threatens to establish an aversive condition, and the opponent can then avoid the threat by doing what the group desires.[12] Most of the protest methods Sharp discusses, varied as they are, rely on these underlying dynamics. An example is the series of demonstrations by Burmese monks in 2007, discussed in detail below, which embarrassed and threatened the military junta, and were designed to pressure the junta to take specific actions. As occurred in that case, nonviolent campaigns often escalate the intensity of pressure over time until a response is achieved. The Burmese example also demonstrates an important potential limitation of such pressure—the opponent often has ways to end protests other than capitulation: for example, with mass arrests. The potential for acts of countercoercion is always present when relying on negative incentives.

Another form of protest, "declarations of indictment and intention," in Sharp's terms, functions by threatening further action—including, for example, disruptive noncooperation or active disruption—which the opponent can avoid by agreeing to the demands of the grievance group. Movement toward meeting the demands of a powerful resistance movement threatening noncooperation often leads to a better outcome for the opponent than does continuing current oppressive practices.

Persuasion and protest (or the threat of protest) are often useful parts of a larger coordinated strategy. Shifts that began in Burma in 2011–12, for example, are emerging from a combination of constructive noncooperation, internal and international advocacy, the potential for additional protests, and some forms of disruptive noncooperation. It is important to recognize and not lose sight of the incentivizing dynamics involved in protest and persuasion, despite differing situations. Behaviour is selected by consequences; in both persuasion and protest, the resistance movement (and its allies, in many cases) offers improved consequences if the opponent acts as the resistance group wishes. Persuasion is sometimes preferable to protest, since positive incentives carry fewer side effects than the aversive processes associated with escape and avoidance. At the same time, the grievance group often does not have access to incentives powerful enough to make persuasion tactics effective. Escalating protest is therefore often the more realistic option. Involvement in such escalation also offers excitement for participants and may thereby help to build the resistance community.

Situations arise in which neither persuasion nor protest is powerful enough; in those cases, constructive noncooperation, disruptive noncooperation, or active disruptive strategies may offer more powerful alternatives. Protests can, in fact, shade into disruptive noncooperation (discussed in the next chapter) when the levels of participation among the population are very high, because such protests also tend to disrupt many of the sociocultural interdependencies present.

Historians of nonviolence note that challenging oppression, including through protest, often evokes repression. When that repression produces serious injury, suffering, and death, however, it frequently backfires, resulting in loss of support for the oppressor and increased support for the resistance movement; Sharp calls this process “political ju-jitsu.”[13] The suffering of members of the resistance movement (for example, in extended fasting or endurance during violent repression) can be aversive to the opponent, to pillars of support, to the general population, and to third parties. How suffering is presented probably matters greatly in terms of how these groups perceive it (a matter of relational responding); David Cortright, quoting John Lewis, who grew up in the Jim Crow South, emphasizes that “the sufferer must have a ‘graceful heart’ and hold no malice toward those who inflict suffering.”[14]

The process here is that observing suffering that results from repression evokes an aversive response in the observers, who may then bring pressure to bear on the opponent in order to relieve their own discomfort and act in accordance with their own values. Protest can become very powerful through such dynamics.

BEHAVIOURAL SYSTEMS IN PROTEST AND PERSUASION

Protest and persuasion are meant to influence the attitudes or actions of an individual, a class of individuals, or one or more behaviour systems. The first crucial question for a campaign, therefore, is, Who is to be influenced and in what way? Gene Sharp makes the important point that it may not always be the opponent who is the proximal focus of a campaign of protest or persuasion; the general public, interest groups, third parties, or the grievance group itself may be the immediate objects of concern.[15] In many cases, the opponent responds to consequences structured indirectly by influential groups, who have themselves been influenced by the resistance movement; multiple behavioural systems may be involved in incentivizing the opponent to act differently, as was apparent in Ferdinand Marcos's decision to abandon his presidency in the Philippines. In that case, the military, the Church, the business community, and outside third parties exercised tremendous leverage to accomplish what members of the resistance movement alone could not have achieved.

The most critical actors to be influenced are typically those who constitute the strongest pillars of support maintaining the opponent. For example, Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth found that nonviolent campaigns in which security forces defected to the resistance were several times more likely to succeed than campaigns without such defections—clearly, then, working to encourage such defections is a priority for many campaigns.[16] Stephan and Chenoweth's preliminary case study data also suggest the value of mass mobilization and therefore the importance of influencing the general population.[17] The underlying systems dynamics of influence through protest and persuasion are similar regardless of the target, although they may play out differently.

Influencing Specific Individuals

If a resistance group's desired outcome is that a dictator give up power, success is most likely if the costs of remaining in power are intensified, the incentives for remaining attenuated, the incentives for leaving increased, or the costs of leaving reduced—or some combination of these. The resistance campaign can sometimes directly increase the costs of remaining (through escalating protests, for example). The grievance group may also be able to reduce the costs of leaving, although this is likely to be controversial. If the dictator expects to be tried for human rights violations and perhaps subsequently executed, he is much more likely to fight on (a dynamic that has played out in some places during the Arab Spring). If he has a safe option, as in "Baby Doc" Duvalier's exit from Haiti into exile in France, leaving may be facilitated—but the grievance group is likely to frame that outcome relationally as a serious injustice.

When a force field analysis is done in such cases, however, it is immediately apparent that many of the relevant contingencies are not under the direct control of the resistance movement; this is where Sharp's pillars of support become essential. But pillars are not individual in nature; they consist either of classes of individuals or, most often, of interlocking behavioural systems. Our analyses, therefore, generally need to expand to those levels. In some cases, though, a specific individual (say, a religious leader) may be chosen as a possible lever for change. In those cases, creating incentives (positive or aversive, using persuasion or protest) is again the operative mechanism for change.

Influencing a Class of Individuals

Persuading members of a population or members of some class of actors like the business elite or government bureaucrats to, for example, join a protest, slow down their work, or participate in selective patronage (of businesses) involves changes in common contingencies—contingency arrangements that affect a large number of people in similar ways. No arrangement will influence every member of a population, of course, and not every person who is influenced will be influenced in the same way. But effective consequences may encourage many to participate in a movement, each in his or her own (sometimes unique) way. Effective antecedents establishing new expectations of success (by creating rules) and supporting new attitudes (by shifting equivalence relations or clarifying the value of potential payoffs) may evoke participation from many.

A series of successful marches that result in progressively greater shifts in government policies (the common consequence), for example, is likely to encourage those involved to continue to participate in the ways they have done and may also provide antecedents (models, a new sense of hope) that will encourage others to join. Government repression of protests may establish a common contingency that immediately discourages further protest, but typically, in the long run, it has the opposite effect, eliciting countercontrol by the population. The central point here is that the manipulation of common contingencies is oriented toward changing the behaviour of many persons through establishing and clarifying common antecedents and consequences.

Changing the Behaviour of Complex Organizations

Inducing individual members of the military to desert by offering them sanctuary in a sheltering community (thus helping them escape from the aversive experience of injuring their own people) is an example of a common contingency. The defection of entire units, often including their commanders, may, however, have a much more potent impact on the outcome of a conflict than one-by-one defections.[18] Similarly, collective, coordinated slowdowns within the civil service can dramatically weaken a regime. These are examples of metacontingencies—that is, contingencies that involve interactions between behavioural subsystems and the environment. Entire sets of interlocking behaviours within behavioural systems are the targets of change in metacontingencies. In the military defection example, this involves interactions among and within units consisting of officers at various levels, noncommissioned officers, troops, and support staff (or, in the civil service example, coordinated action among departments comprised of supervisors, inspectors, and line staff, in interaction with citizens). Such interlocking dynamics can be analyzed as discussed in chapter 4 (often using diagrams like figure 3). The coordinated behaviours within and by a behavioural system change largely through influencing the actions of key actors within that system (military commanders, corporate management, or union opinion leaders, for example), who then influence the internal behavioural dynamics of the group, which subsequently shifts patterns of interaction with the larger environment.

Complex organizations coordinate the actions of multiple classes of actors. The contingencies that have power for each class of actors are likely to be different, so the analysis needs to include accessible groups whose actions may resonate and be amplified through contacts with other groups. Overall, the interest here is in shifting the dynamics *within* the opponent's pillars of support—the police, the military, the civil service, the financial system, political parties, media, workers' organizations, churches, and others. Some of these—the military and police systems, for example—are likely to be tightly coupled to the regime. Others, like the local business culture, may be more loosely organized and perhaps less firmly tethered to the regime. As long as interlocking dynamics are present within the group, however, analysis of the interlocks may be productive. Examples of efforts to shift such dynamics are discussed later in this chapter.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

Information operations are strategic operations intended to increase the motivation of members of the general population, the opponent, the opponent's pillars of support, third parties, and the resistance group itself to act in ways that support the struggle and to refrain from acting in ways that may damage it. The basic dynamics involved in information operations are by now familiar:

- Constructing new equivalence relations—for example, {the opponent ≈ weak} or {slavery ≈ repression}—that challenge existing equivalences like {slavery ≈ God's will}.[19] Recall that constructing counterequivalences is often more effective than suppressing current ones[20]
- Constructing new rules—for example, "Mobilization *now* can produce regime change"

- Increasing awareness of deprivation, humiliation, and injustice—this relies, to a great extent, on the shifting of equivalence relations. For example, exploring so-called natural disasters as being largely human-caused catastrophes clarifies the injustices present.[21]

Considerable local knowledge, cultural awareness, creativity, and ethical clarity are required to effectively leverage these processes. At the same time, recognizing the basic dynamics involved while focusing tightly on what needs to change and how that can be done may be helpful in avoiding wasted, undirected effort.

Robert Helvey has paid particular attention to the motivating context in nonviolent struggle, drawing on his background in military strategy. He uses the classic military term *psychological operations.*[22] More recently, the US military has come to prefer the term *information operations*, which we also use here. Note that "psychological" and "information" tend to participate in different equivalences for many. While the first may suggest manipulation, the second has more neutral connotations, suggesting efforts to simply state the facts.[23] (Of course, what is communicated may or may not be accurate.)

In his discussion, Helvey emphasizes the term *propaganda*, which he defines very broadly as "efforts . . . to influence attitudes and behaviors." This is clearly too broad for our purposes, since virtually every form of nonviolent action would fit that definition. (The equivalences in which the term *propaganda* participate are also potentially problematic.) Most of Helvey's discussion of propaganda relates primarily to what we are discussing as shifts in motivating contexts. He views psychological operations, especially the use of propaganda, as "a potent weapon to weaken, divide, neutralize and disintegrate an opponent's pillars of support . . . and to assist in recruitment efforts for opposition groups."[24] Helvey briefly examines four components of propaganda (the target, the message, the messenger, and collection of ongoing feedback) as important to analyze in conducting an effective campaign. It is not necessary to repeat that discussion since Helvey's *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict* is freely available online, but several of his points are worth emphasizing here. He clarifies that the message should be tailored to each target group; doing so involves knowing current equivalences (values, beliefs) and rules common among each group so as to make the message as congruent as possible with the culture of that group. For example, the rule "The revolution will greatly improve access to world markets" may mean nothing to a rural farmer but everything to the business elite supporting a dictator. Equivalences and rules that stand in the way of active engagement in the struggle are also likely to vary among groups; such verbal processes can be challenged through efforts to associate participation with potential positive outcomes likely to be differentially valued by each group. Helvey's emphasis on feedback through both polling and more qualitative elicitation of opinions to assess the success of shifting attitudes and expectations is also very valuable.

Helvey draws attention to both "propaganda of agitation" (encouraging resistance) and "propaganda of integration" (achieving commitment to the new rulers after a successful campaign). The second is likely be neglected unless it has been integrated into the strategic plan (as reflected in the uncertain long-term outcomes of the Arab Spring as of this writing). Revolution and resistance can lead to outcomes worse than the original situation, including states of violent anarchy, as in Somalia recently, or even more repressive regimes.[25] Helvey also discusses white, grey, and black propaganda. These terms have been used in various ways by different authors, but Helvey writes about them in terms of how the source of information is presented. In white propaganda, the source is accurately reported; in grey propaganda, the source is not specified ("a source close to the government," for example); and in black propaganda, the source is purposely misidentified. The interested reader will find Helvey's discussion of these types informative; more importantly here, however, that discussion surfaces the crucial question of honesty in information operations, to which we return shortly. Helvey's call for a "code of conduct" in propaganda campaigns should be particularly noted: for example, he warns about the ease of igniting hatred and prejudice (through changes in relational responding), on which all known cases of genocide and many other cases of severe oppression have heavily relied.[26]

Recent work on information/psychological operations in military campaigns of counterinsurgency and insurgency offers additional guidance. In both, information operations has come to assume a central place. *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* suggests that information operations may be the most important of the "logical lines of operations" required for effective counterinsurgency (such lines include combat/civil security and provision of essential services, among others).[27] Similarly, Scott Wimberley notes that the "conception of guerrilla warfare as political war turns psychological operations into a decisive tool."[28]

The *Field Manual* provides a number of specific guidelines for information operations that are generally consistent with behavioural systems science and have applicability to nonviolent campaigns, including the following:[29]

- Manage the population's expectations of what the campaign can achieve and over what period of time (i.e., provide accurate rules). This may be particularly important during the reconstruction phase.
- Give the population ways to have a voice. This supports the equivalence {ourselves ≈ powerful} while also offering participation, a powerful reinforcer in itself.
- Recognize that making unsubstantiated claims can undermine long-term credibility and legitimacy (e.g., avoid equivalences like {movement statements ≈ untrustworthy}).
- Publicize violence and barbaric actions of the opponent (i.e., strengthen the equivalence {opponent ≈ repressive}).
- Respond quickly to propaganda from the other side as the opponent engages in competing motivating operations.
- Use polling and analysis of the results to determine which media give widest dissemination and to conduct ongoing perception assessments (i.e., understand the importance of data).

Scott Wimberley similarly uses the experience of guerrilla movements to provide practical guidance for information operations, emphasizing how important it is for every member of the resistance to be prepared to serve as an effective model and marketer of values and rules for the people. He also cautions activists to resist the almost universal temptation to portray the opponent as negatively as possible, noting that the perceived importance of the cause for which the resistance is working is too often viewed as justifying departures from the truth. Wimberley insists that distancing one's movement from the truth, even in small ways, risks ultimately losing all credibility.[30] This risk may be even greater in nonviolent campaigns, since the power of nonviolent struggle is strongly associated with openness and integrity. Furthermore, as basic reinforcement theory predicts, if false propaganda has immediate positive effects, it will become increasingly tempting in the future. Once the movement is branded as deceitful (an equivalence), rebuilding trust with the population may be difficult, if not impossible. Single acts of deceit do not stand alone, particularly if they are dramatic; that isn't how equivalence relations work.

Effective Use of Media

The use of media is a crucial subcategory of information operations in nonviolent struggle. "No aspect of political reality in contemporary society," argues David Cortright, "is more important than media communications."[31] Television news coverage, for example, proved decisive in the US civil rights movement; broadcasts of attacks on children by police dogs and fire hoses violated basic values among much of the larger population. In fact, according to William Gamson, for social movements, "the media have become the central battleground which challengers ignore at their peril."[32] Cortright makes a compelling argument for the central importance of strategic broadcast media campaigns for resistance movements, emphasizing the need for framing issues in terms of widely shared values. Technically, this involves constructing equivalence relations that link justice, peace, and freedom with the resistance campaign through repeated pairing (electronic media are clearly also valuable here); modelling by respected figures; and bringing the campaign into daily dialogue in positive ways. By contrast, linking oppressors with harming children or ruining the economy, for example, further damages their image among the population.

Modern marketing methods operationalize these behavioural principles very effectively, in part because of the extensive research often conducted for marketing campaigns. Experimentation is essential for marketing automobiles—and social justice. The research-based literature on social marketing and diffusion of innovation, therefore, has much to lend to resistance campaigns.[33] Effective use of media can frame entire debates, as contemporary politicians have learned—to their advantage and sometimes despair. It is essential to widely disseminate the campaign's messages, and broadcast media are an extremely effective way to do so.

Access to the media is typically much easier in democratic societies than under repressive regimes. In some cases, a sympathetic exile community or third parties may be in a position to support broadcasts from outside when the regime exercises tight control within borders. Whether broadcast media are available or not, electronic and social media have become extremely useful, although there have been several cases in which government suppression of those media was, at least temporarily, successful. Participants in resistance campaigns throughout history have proven highly creative and resilient in finding ways to get their messages out, so lack of electronic and broadcast technologies should not be regarded as fatal—many other options exist. Print media supporting justice and liberation movements, whether mainstream or underground, have a long history, including newspapers, leaflets, *samizdat* (underground Czech publications), posters, photomontage, and billboards.[34] The visual arts (as in Burma), graffiti, song and music, theatre (including street or guerrilla theatre), movies, and narrated amateur video also have extensive histories for mobilization of populations and may even help to shift values and evoke action among the opponent's pillars of support.[35]

The creativity encouraged by many such tactics can be particularly useful in attracting attention and motivating action, particularly under repressive conditions. For example, in contemporary Iran, hip-hop has become a powerful underground "voice of resistance."[36] Syrian resisters have turned to a variety of creative tactics, including puppet shows, putting messages on ping-pong balls and rolling them downhill into cities, and leaving MP3 players playing resistance messages in trash cans.[37] So-called dilemma protests, use actions "so inchoate and unorthodox that police are trapped. If they let it happen, they are encouraging it, but if they arrest people they risk looking either silly or arbitrary or unjust."[38] Such protests have been widely used in Russia, Mexico, and many other places where standard forms of protest are often immediately suppressed. Recent examples include participating in flash mobs in Moscow; "staging a theatrical pseudo-wedding for a bride that is actually a gas cylinder, and a groom revealed to be a dressed-up diesel cylinder—an excuse for a big party while dramatizing the scarcity of essential resources," in Syria; and singing songs of last goodbyes to politicians on the streets of Mexico City.[39] Many such tactics result in media attention that may otherwise be difficult to access.

The common power of media lies in supporting the establishment of a motivating context for resistance and action for liberation through (a) the construction of new equivalence relations (often by increasing awareness of oppression and deprivation, or by connecting the resistance movement to existing values), (b) the establishment of new rules that build hope and encourage participation, and (c) the presentation of inspirational models. Military strategists recognize the importance of media, and some of the principles they have identified have particular utility for liberation movements. *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,* for example, emphasizes the need to directly and continuously engage the media.[40] Strategic media engagement, the manual suggests, involves ongoing networking and the formation of close personal relationships with those in the media. Given such contacts, it becomes possible for those in the movement to help the media frame the story, ensuring accuracy about specific events while providing ongoing content and assistance for characterizing the movement. The recent trend of embedding media within field units has helped the military to transmit repetitive themes and shape perceptions while being viewed as transparent. This level of media engagement goes beyond what has been typical in resistance campaigns (although such campaigns often have been relatively media friendly) and is worth further attention.

Consequence Analysis

One additional science-based method of refining attitudes and, particularly, shifting rules is available to nonviolent campaigns, although, as far as I know, it has yet to be tried out in such a context. Consequence analysis is a procedure in which people are asked to evaluate the multiple consequences of some action, such as a change in public policy. To date, three studies of this procedure have been conducted. The first concerned the consequences of a proposed railway project. A small group of local residents was initially asked for their overall opinions regarding the project, about which they had been informed. They were then asked to evaluate how and to what extent the project would affect their community environment along several dimensions, including air quality, noise, amount and quality of open space, and residential character.

Following this, they were asked again for their overall opinions of the project. No new information was provided; respondents were simply asked to complete a six-item questionnaire before restating their opinions. After they had thought about the issue in the course of completing the questionnaire, their opinions became more nuanced and more environmentally and socially sensitive.[41]

In the second study, respondents were initially asked for their opinions about whether penalties for youthful acts of violence should be more severe. They were then asked to consider multiple consequences of a policy that would increase such penalties, including the effects of such a policy on the level of community fear, its implications for intergroup relations, and its impact on the justice system. The items selected for the participants' consideration were drawn from statements made by proponents of various views on the question. After completing a ten-item questionnaire, respondents' support for strong punitive sanctions declined.[42] In a third study, both experimental and control groups were asked about their views on harm-reduction approaches to substance abuse treatment. Those in the experimental group then completed a consequence analysis questionnaire. As a result, the experimental group became more open to these emerging forms of substance abuse treatment than they had been at pretest; the control group did not.[43] In each case, the instruments were structured not to manipulate opinion but rather to give people opportunities to explore their understanding of multiple consequences of actions taken and from that to construct their own rules. The literature on rule-governed behaviour has clearly established that most of what human beings do is guided by such rules: people are more likely to do what they tell themselves will work.

In sum, these studies, although limited in scope, all suggest that if people are not immediately asked for a global judgment (for example, in answer to the question, "Would participation in a protest campaign be useful or not?") but are instead first asked to consider the multiple possible impacts on self, family, and community, their reliance on oversimplified rules ("Protest won't do any good") may shift. Consequence analysis is a respectful, and relatively inexpensive, approach that does not rely on propaganda or manipulation, and it may very well have a place in the nonviolent campaign toolkit. In addition to being an active intervention, it has the potential to provide useful information about public opinions that could help refine campaigns and that might facilitate thoughtful personal contact between activists and members of the general population.

Examples of Persuasion and Protest

Three brief, comparative examples of the application of persuasion and protest follow. In each case, the immediate events and outcome are described, followed by notes about the context of those events and a brief analysis of the dynamics involved and how those dynamics affected outcomes. In each example, the events described were part of much larger and extended struggles. Description of those larger campaigns is not the goal here, but for interested readers, I cite sources with further in-depth information on each case.

Anna Hazare's Fast Against Corruption

On July 28, 2011, the Indian cabinet approved a draft anticorruption bill that they intended to send on to Parliament.[44] The bill did not include a number of provisions that long-time anticorruption activist Kisan Baburao ("Anna" [elder brother]) Hazare and his supporters had earlier insisted upon, including a provision that the ombudsman's office which the bill would establish have authority to examine the actions of higher-level officials—the Prime Minister and the judiciary, among others. Hazare stated that if the draft were not modified, he would begin a public hunger strike on August 16. Despite extensive efforts, including the arrests of Hazare and hundreds of others, the government failed to block the fast, which Hazare began while incarcerated. He then refused to leave the jail until he was given approval to continue his fast publicly at the Ramila Ground in New Delhi, a site often associated with large political gatherings. Tens of thousands came to the Ground to support Hazare; thousands elsewhere in the country began to participate in "I am Hazare" demonstrations. On August 28, after negotiations, Parliament unanimously passed a resolution promising the stronger anticorruption bill that Hazare and his associates were demanding.

Context

This globally publicized and highly successful outcome did not emerge spontaneously. After completing twelve years in the military, Hazare returned to his ancestral village in 1975 and began a lifetime of activism focused heavily on building healthy communities within the shell of what he viewed (and what much of the population ultimately viewed) as a corrupt and corrupting political system. This constructive work concentrated primarily on health, education, and social restructuring. By 1991, a good deal of Hazare's effort was directed toward challenging corruption through various forms of protest. His interests were wide and his organizing and protest extended to many areas: for example, he waged a four-year, only marginally successful campaign against the distilling of liquor from grains needed for food. He had used largely successful fasts-unto-death in two previous anticorruption campaigns, in 2003 and 2006. Outrage and demoralization as a result of corruption are widespread in India, providing fertile ground for such campaigns.[45] Not everyone agreed with the methods Hazare used; some *dalit* (untouchable) activists, for example, viewed the campaign as a middle-class effort to subvert electoral democracy, a possible threat to recent and hoped for affirmative action gains.

Dynamics

Hazare himself is often described as Gandhian, but he is not a saint. In trying to rid his ancestral village of alcohol use, for instance, he supported flogging, and he is not above expressing anger toward his opponents. But, as should be clear by this point, although integrity is crucial, effective nonviolent action does not depend on sanctity. The dynamics present in this case are relatively simple but instructive. The specific goal of the 2011 campaign was that the cabinet and Parliament approve a strong anticorruption bill. The request of Anna Hazare and his allies that the government pass anticorruption legislation was not adequately met, despite considerable persuasion efforts that clarified what the country, and the officials involved, had to gain. Hazare therefore shifted to a protest strategy that would create an increasingly aversive situation until the government relented. The progressively more serious threat to Hazare's health posed by the fast was unlikely to move those involved in political power as individuals or as collectives—fasts, in many places in the world, are typically dealt with by force-feeding or ignoring. Protest fasts in India, however, are a venerated tradition; for many, Hazare's fasts participated in an equivalence relation with those of Gandhi. Such fasts by respected persons have a record of success and therefore build hope for the population, who see that "this fast could dramatically improve our lives" (a rule). Support from high-profile Bollywood figures provided additional legitimacy, since Hazare came to participate in equivalence relations with them. This fast, then, had the power to move a large portion of the population—who had the power to move the government.

As larger and larger proportions of the prosperous (and therefore potentially politically powerful) population came to support and participate in the campaign, pressures on cabinet and Parliament mounted. Not to be discounted is the additional threat associated with large groups on the streets in India, which has an extensive history of riots and disorder threatening stability and security. For this reason, one strategic objective for Hazare and his associates was to bring out and motivate the broader population. These methods operated at the level of common contingencies, offering common antecedents and hope of common positive outcomes to many people. The population then established an aversive condition for the government, while adhering tightly to nonviolent discipline. Hazare is noted for strategic sophistication and leadership skills, with a notable ability to progressively escalate levels of aversive conditions and threats.

Also analytically interesting here is the ultimately unanimous vote for Hazare's version of the legislation. Clearly, not all individual members of Parliament personally favoured the legislation; in fact, it appears that most did not. The vote, however, provided relief from an increasingly intolerable and perhaps dangerous condition for both individual legislators and the political parties involved (a metacontingency establishing aversive pressure on behavioural systems as a whole, mediated through party leadership). It should be noted, however, that five months later, legislation clarifying the specifics of the new policies continued to be controversial, and Hazare initiated a new hunger strike.[46] The success of one portion of a campaign often needs to be defended and extended over time, and resistance movements may extend over decades.

Otpor: Humour as Resistance

On October 6, 2000, Slobodan Milošević, in a televised address, announced that he had just been informed that his opponent, Vogislav Koštunica, had won the presidential election of September 24 in Yugoslavia.[47] Thus ended a twelve-day nonviolent campaign challenging Milošević's manipulation of election results, a pattern throughout his eleven years as the strongman of Yugoslavia. There is widespread agreement that a loose, nonhierarchical network of students and former students called *Otpor* ("resistance") played a key—perhaps *the* key—role in bringing about Milošević's fall. This network successfully challenged a virtual dictator, later tried at The Hague for war crimes. (He died before a verdict could be rendered.)

Otpor was a unique organization. As one member later reported, "You don't support Otpor, you have to join Otpor, to live Otpor. And you have to take part in this kind of action, to do your own actions." The member then cited an early Otpor slogan: "Bite the system, live resistance."[48] Otpor was emphatically not a political party; rather, the organization deliberately functioned, in part, as a watchdog of the multiple small Yugoslav opposition parties, monitoring them to be sure that they continued to cooperate in a unified campaign against the Milošević government. The nonhierarchical nature of the organization precluded "beheading"—disempowering the group by in some way taking out a critical leader; while there was coordination among local groups, members of each group developed and implemented the actions of their group independently. All of those actions, though, were tightly focused on the specific goals of Milošević's departure and the establishment of genuine democracy.

It was not the goals of Otpor members, however, that made them almost legendary: it was their methods. While they also participated in other forms of resistance, a distinctive emphasis and source of the power leveraged by Otpor was the use of humour—humour as resistance. I am aware of no other campaign before or since that has made such extensive use of this method. In some cases, humour emerged in street theatre that emphasized the ridiculous in the oppressive system; in other cases, it was used in dramatic symbolic acts, such as the following:

> Mira Marković, the wife of Milošević and herself a politician in the Communist party, said in a statement that the Communists came to power with blood, so they would not leave power without blood. The Otpor activists then went to the hospital to donate blood and say "Here is our blood, now you can go." This is humor that is not meant to make people laugh out loud, but to smile a little and provoke thought, and it turns the regime's own words against it. This humor is not very aggressive, but [it] stuck to what Mira Marković had said. Satire twists the meaning of words, so that the person or case satirized finds her own force used against her.[49]

When Milošević attempted to have himself declared a national hero, Otpor handed out badges on the street reading "I'm a national hero." The overall strategy was to use irony, satire, parody, or ridicule to shift power dynamics in the country. (Note the similarities to the recent creative and dilemma protests described above; it is likely that Otpor served as a model for many of these.)

Through experience, Otpor also achieved exceptional expertise in certain forms of social marketing, particularly in the *Gotov Je!* (He's Finished!) and *Vreme Je!* (It's Time!) campaigns. These messages were spread all over the country in posters, labels stuck to everything from walls to the shields of police officers during demonstrations, T-shirts, television spots, and wherever else they could be inserted. Observers and scholars agree that these campaign tactics had a profound impact on attitudes (early in Milošević's tenure, he had strong support from the population, in part due to his nationalistic rhetoric) and on people's willingness to challenge the status quo. When Otpor finally announced that, on October 5, "Serbia was coming to Belgrade," thousands of people arrived from all over Serbia, which then constituted the majority of Yugoslavia. With minimal resistance and some support from elements of the police and military, they took over the streets and critical sites such as broadcast stations and Parliament.

Context

Yugoslavian history in the 1990s is complex. Until 1991, Yugoslavia included the republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia (including the semi-autonomous province of Kosovo), and Slovenia. Following a series of military and diplomatic campaigns, only Serbia and Montenegro remained in the Yugoslav federation. Within Serbia, Milošević was highly regarded in the early 1990s for his "nationalist promises of the redemption of Serbia."[50] There were Christian Serbs in several of the former members of the federation, as well as in the largely Muslim province of Kosovo, and Milošević aimed to unite them. By the time of his fall, however, the reality in Serbia was grim. Joshua Paulson describes the situation: "By the second half of the decade, much of the population was dissatisfied with international isolation, the stigma of lost wars, thousands of dead, a ruined economy, average salaries under $70 per month, staggering inflation, and high unemployment."[51] The NATO bombing in 1999 in response to Serb oppression and genocide in Kosovo resulted in a final military and diplomatic loss. By this point, the country was ripe for change.

While Otpor provided great inspiration and had a powerful impact, many others participated in efforts to remove Milošević, often in coordinated ways.[52] Protests and acts of noncooperation occurred throughout the 1990s and into the year 2000, including demonstrations, strikes, and other forms of resistance. Academics who lost their positions for participation in or support for protests established the Alternative Academic Educational Network. A grandparents' support group accompanied their grandchildren to protests to protect them. Alternative media, although suppressed, continued to re-emerge, in some cases broadcasting on the Internet. Opposition political parties, civil society organizations, and outside third parties were active participants. Strikes by miners at Kolubara and elsewhere were key to the end game. Important elements of the military and police coordinated with the protests and ultimately, as has happened in so many other nonviolent campaigns, refused to fire on the people.

Dynamics

The Otpor case was selected here both because it is unique and because it so clearly demonstrates certain central dynamics in persuasion and protest. According to Sørenson, "Humor as nonviolent resistance can be understood in three different ways: (a) 'Facilitating outreach and mobilization' concerning the relationship with people outside the movement; (b) 'Facilitating a culture of resistance' within the resistance movement—building solidarity and strengthening the individual's capacity for participating in resistance; and (c) 'Turning oppression upside down.' This function has the most powerful potential, because it changes the relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed."[53]

These three perspectives on humour as resistance are a useful start for our analysis. The first, facilitating outreach and mobilization, refers, for Sørenson, to recruiting and motivating membership. In the Otpor case, the primary groups for recruitment were students and other young people; the organization discovered that a reputation for fun and humour with an anti-establishment edge attracted that group: "Humor became part of the style and the branding which made it 'cool' to be a part of Otpor."[54] A reputation for humour drew media attention, also attractive to the Otpor demographic. Being part of Otpor became a way to be on the social cutting edge (an equivalence) and was therefore particularly engaging to youth; furthermore, once one began participating, the social reinforcement and excitement of the creative actions taken almost certainly selected continued involvement. Sørenson contends that "humor facilitates a culture of resistance both at the organizational and individual level." One of her informants suggested that the humour increased the collective cohesion in Otpor: "We were functioning much better in the organization, we had better relations inside Otpor, we felt like a family."[55]

Sørenson reports that humour supported solidarity, group identity, and connection to the larger resistance network in Yugoslavia. The use of humour became a recognized characteristic of membership in Otpor, of being part of a valued cultural network that could be clearly distinguished from most political groups in the country. In addition, the humour supported goals of the movement. Because it was enjoyable (reinforcing) and allowed great opportunities for creativity, attention to movement goals could be sustained at high levels. Actions taken by the group became part of its identity (an equivalence relation), and discussions and planning gave many opportunities for reinforcing statements consistent with the language and goals of Otpor. As we have seen, people tend to continue to participate in groups that provide multiple payoffs, which was the case with Otpor. In addition, the group offered opportunities for members to experiment with new ways of thinking and acting, and tended to differentially reinforce those whose actions and words were most in line with the culture of the group, shaping solidarity and nonviolent discipline in the process. These dynamics shape values (equivalences) and explanations about how change operates (rules). As such processes play out within behavioural systems, group-supported equivalence relations, rules, and actions typically become more frequent, more intense, and more radical over time. Humour supported the growth and creativity of a behavioural system in which these dynamics could play out continuously.

Finally, humour can "turn oppression upside down."[56] Here lies the deep power that led to Otpor's external success. Initially, persons, symbols, and demands associated with the oppressive regime participated in equivalences of coercive power and danger, evoking compliance and fear. Otpor's humour constructed competing equivalences in which the regime was made to look ridiculous, weak, inept, and damaging to the nation. As those equivalences were strengthened, acts of resistance became increasingly likely among the population and pillars of support. Acts of resistance that evoked laughter and encouragement from others, and only limited sanctions from the regime, were likely to be repeated and intensified. As the sanctions that were applied (including imprisonment) failed to disrupt a constantly mutating and elusive resistance, the regime became progressively more fragile. The resistance devised a range of strategies for disrupting the regime, while the regime failed to seriously disrupt the resistance. (See the discussion of disruptive noncooperation in the next chapter.)

The Failure (?) of the Saffron Revolution

On the surface, a narrative of what has come to be called the Saffron Revolution in Burma sounds much like that of many successful campaigns of nonviolent resistance.[57] In August 2007, the repressive and corrupt military regime discontinued fuel subsidies, placing additional burdens on a population that already faced many struggles.[58] A group of veteran activists who had been jailed after massive demonstrations in 1988 again took to the streets to demand that subsidies be restored. This demand resonated with the long-disaffected population, many of whom struggled to feed themselves and their families or get to work as a result of the price increases. When many of the leaders of the initial demonstrations were arrested, young Buddhist monks organized demonstrations—without the support of their abbots, many of whom were affiliated with the ruling military junta. The monks initially discouraged others from participating due to the risks involved, but they soon agreed to have members of the general population line their demonstration routes. The number of participants grew, and demonstrations spread across the country. Alliances with other groups were established, and on September 22, the monks, accompanied and insulated by a large number of members of the public, marched to the home of Aung San Suu Kyi (under house arrest at this time), meeting with her at the gate. As the situation appeared increasingly out of control, the military government responded brutally with riot police, the military, and militias. Monks were arrested, beaten, and disrobed; thousands of people were arrested. The resistance movement, not prepared for this level of suppression (although it echoed events in Burma nineteen years earlier), rapidly dissipated.

This example has much in common with many successful nonviolent campaigns. The role of the monks might be viewed as analogous to clergy in the Philippines and in the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s; the initial demands were clear; the population mobilized quickly and widely. Yet every nonviolent campaign is unique, and this struggle ended in apparent failure. Such negative cases have at least as much to teach as do positive ones. In this case, analysis of the historical and current context, as well as the specific situational dynamics at play, contribute to understanding.

It is important to recall, however, that research by Maria Chenoweth and Erica Stephan indicates that it is common for a more democratic society to emerge over the years following an apparently failed nonviolent campaign.[59] Something of that sort appears to be starting as this book is written, although the advances must so far be seen as fragile. The Saffron Revolution, then, may become a useful example of both initial failure and ultimate success.

Context

Burma has an ancient and complex history and includes multiple distinct ethnic populations. Colonized by the British in the 1880s and occupied by the Japanese during World War II, Burma became independent in 1948, the year after General Aung San—now a national hero and the father of Aung San Suu Kyi, a central figure in the independence movement—was assassinated in 1947. The military temporarily took over most governance functions in 1958 and, in a military coup in 1962, established its exclusive control. Following the coup, the military took control of major financial and commercial enterprises, and the military, under varying arrangements, has controlled the country ever since. After initial student protests in 1962 were brutally suppressed, many student activists left the cities to join the ethnic insurgencies in the countryside. Economically based protests during the 1970s, including labour strikes, were similarly suppressed, as were protests associated with the burial of U Thant, the former general secretary of the UN. Throughout this period, the military government was engaged in counterinsurgent warfare against multiple ethnic movements in the countryside.

In 1987, much of the population lost their life savings as a result of changes in the regime's economic policies, initiating a wave of protests extending through much of the following year. Martial law was declared, universities were closed, hundreds were shot, thousands arrested. When the universities were reopened, a similar pattern was repeated. Ultimately, a nationwide general strike was planned for August 8, 1988, marking the onset of what has come to be known as the 8888 Uprising. Leading up to and including that date, protests swelled to the hundreds of thousands. Another general strike was called for August 22. Martial law was lifted on August 24, in hopes that this would satisfy the population, but over the next three weeks the size of the protests continued to grow. The protests also grew increasingly violent, and the multiple opposition groups involved proved unable to coordinate demands or strategy. On September 18, a new military coup occurred, led by hardliners who moved to crush all dissent and opposition. The new junta promised national democratic elections in 1990, expecting that their party (the National Unity Party) would easily win, given the limits they had placed on opposition parties. As Chenoweth and Stephan report, they were "stunned" by the results: dissident Aung San Suu Kyi's party (the National League for Democracy, or NLD) won 392 (80%) of the 495 seats in Parliament, while National Unity won only 10.[60] The regime repudiated the results and arrested the major opposition leaders, claiming that a new constitution needed to be prepared before real elections could be held. That process took until 2007; the first elections under the new constitution were held in late 2010, with rampant fraud again reported. The NLD, calling for an elections boycott, did not register for those elections. A new government allied with the military took over, and the situation became less clear after the elections: some prisoners were released; a meeting between Suu Kyi and President Thein Sein resulted in a pledge of cooperation in the country's interest; the head of state censorship has called for greater freedom of the press and the dissolution of his own office; and an agreement has been reached between the United States and Burma to normalize relations and move toward the lifting of sanctions. In a by-election in 2012 (five years after the Saffron Revolution), Suu Kyi was elected to the lower house of Parliament, and her party is, at the time of writing, participating in the government.

Dynamics

Despite some variation, the dynamics of the Burmese struggles over the past fifty years have been remarkably consistent. Each cycle of protest resulted in escalation of repression, which has largely succeeded in terminating mobilizations, although uncoordinated pockets of resistance and widespread dissatisfaction have remained throughout. The severe outcomes of the 1988 movement appear to have had a profound impact on the 2007 campaign in response to the cuts in fuel subsidies. We need, though, to go deeper analytically to understand how these campaigns and their contexts differed from those of many other countries where violent repression was also characteristic. I will briefly pursue that question here in two ways, first by drawing on Chenoweth and Stephan's thoughtful analysis of how the 8-8-88 movement failed and then by tracing key behavioural systems dynamics involved in 2007.

As discussed previously, among those who have analyzed nonviolent struggle, solidarity within a liberation movement is almost universally accepted as being essential. According to Chenoweth and Stephan's analysis, few strong, cohesive networks had persisted over time in Burma prior to 1988, and the situation had changed little by 2007.[61] Given the level of repression and the limited presence of civil society, constructing such networks would have been difficult, but the fact that the dissident groups also had not prioritized unity made it even more so. The multiple political elites and grassroots groups involved lacked a coherent alternative to offer in 1988, and common vision and strategy among groups continued to be limited in 2007. Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) is widely known in the West but was at that time only one of a number of dissident groups operating independently.

Historically, there have been few autonomous institutions and networks of civil society in Burma, although, as noted in chapter 7, the situation appears to be shifting. The state-controlled Buddhist monastic council remained under the control of the military regime throughout the period from 1962 to 2007, as did financial and commercial systems and, of course, the military, police, and paramilitary militia groups. Artistic, literary, local governance, and nongovernmental service networks were weak, and what limited independent media existed were brought under the control of the junta during each period of turmoil.

Chenoweth and Stephan clearly establish that even in 1988, the time of the largest and longest-lasting protests, the opposition lacked a strategy for separating the regime from its sources of power. Essential pillars of support identified by Helvey (for example, police, military, civil servants, media, business community, and religious structures) did not join the opposition—and there was no unified strategic plan to achieve such a shift.[62] Suu Kyi in fact discouraged sowing divisions within the military.[63] The political and social distance between the opposition and the regime, with all of its supports, was large, and the generals thought of Burmese citizens as "objects of distrust and potential enemies."[64] Chenoweth and Stephan also argue that the regime's continuing support from the Chinese and other regional powers, as well as weak international support for the opposition, were important factors. Multiple armed factions were concurrently challenging the regime throughout the two decades leading up to 1988; recall that Chenoweth and Stephan's analysis suggests that such concurrence substantially reduces the likelihood of success for nonviolent campaigns.

Turning to the behavioural systems dynamics present, although a common strategy was lacking in 2007, those participating in the protests appeared to believe that if they could capture enough support, their actions would establish an aversive situation that the regime would choose to escape by agreeing to their demands (demands that escalated quickly, probably a strategic error).[65] Instead, the regime turned to a strategy that had consistently worked for them in the past—escalating repression. This is yet another example of selection by consequences. Violent suppression of dissent had serious negative consequences for the population, but because of the rigid boundaries between regime and people, those consequences did not meaningfully affect the regime or its pillars of support: the negative consequences were "externalities"—costs paid by someone else. By discontinuing the protests in response to escalating repression, the resistance strengthened the regime's repressive repertoires, making future escalations of repression more likely. An important note: no moral judgment is involved in saying that capitulation can make the future more dangerous. The weakness here was analytic. An adequate analysis would not have asked participants and participating groups to take actions likely to evoke responses against which they were not prepared to stand.

Figure 7 may help to clarify some of the dynamics present. Here, the generals and many of their supporting pillars all fall within the single boundary of "the regime." Note that most of the relevant consequences for each of the systems within the boundary of the regime flow from other systems within that boundary. While many relevant motivational and consequential variables affecting the citizenry flow from the regime and its affiliated systems, unorganized citizens have little motivational or consequential influence on the systems within the regime boundary. Although resources were consistently drained from the citizens, the citizens exercised very little control over those resource flows. To be effective, the actions of the resisters must somehow have an effect on the consequences shaping the behaviour of one or more of the behavioural systems within that boundary. Establishing an aversive condition through large demonstrations, particularly those with important symbolic dimensions like the protests of the monks, did have an impact on some of those systems, but repression was selected as less costly than capitulating to the demands of the resistance group.

Systems scientists have discovered that relatively closed systems are typically not highly resilient under changing circumstances, suggesting that the Burmese regime as constituted in 2007 was fragile. In addition, many (but not all) citizens were integrally involved in the functioning of the regime as workers, due to institutional interdependencies which might at some point have been disrupted, producing change. At the time of the demonstrations, however, little strategic attention on the part of the resistance to possible entry


The Regime
Action/Practice
Military support
Class of Actors
Officer corps
Motivating Context
Consequences
Action/Practice
Acts of repression and exploitation
Class of Actors
Generals
Motivating Context
Consequences
Action/Practice
Surveillance and police action
Class of Actors
Police
Motivating Context
Consequences
Action/Practice
Financial and material support
Class of Actors
Commercial and financial management
Motivating Context
Consequences
Action/Practice
Control of Buddhist sangha
Class of Actors
Senior abbots
Motivating Context
Consequences
Action/Practice
Control of information
Class of Actors
Media management
Motivating Context
Consequences
Action/Practice
Acts of submission
Class of Actors
Citizens
Motivating Context
Consequences

FIGURE 7. Some behavioural systems dynamics present in the 2007 uprising in Burma

points was evident. There is no evidence of specific plans to identify and shift contingencies for individual actors (for example, particularly powerful and ambitious generals), common contingencies for classes of actors (soldiers), or metacontingencies for organized behavioural systems (e.g., military units or powerful monasteries). In other words, plans for disrupting existing arrangements supporting the regime were at best loose and uncoordinated, where they existed at all.

Deeper precision refines this analysis further. The generals' actions were in large part selected by their consequences (see figure 8). Note the high probability of the positive consequences, from the generals' perspective, and the low valence and low probability of aversive consequences, at least during the time analyzed. The salience of those positive (for the generals) consequences was intensified by antecedent conditions, including rigid verbal processes supported by other groups within the closed interactions of the regime. Resource factors (structural variables in figure 8) established limits on what actions


Motivating Context
• Rules stating that junta rule is essential
• Equivalence relation {citizens ≈ threats to the state}
• Equivalence relation {democracy ≈ dangerous}
• Models of repression within the junta
• Threats of loss of control
• Threats of prosecution if power is lost
Practice:
Acts of repression
Class of Actor:
Burmese general
Structural Variables
• Available weapons
• Available personnel
• Financial resources
• Strategic expertise
Positive Consequences
• Submission of citizens
• Maximization of profits
• Maximization of personal power and influence
• Encouragement from other members of the junta and supporting systems
Aversive Consequences
• Modest international disapproval
• Small risk of ultimate prosecution

FIGURE 8. Variables influencing the practice of repression among generals in the Burmese regime

were possible. Ultimately, the resistance needed to target the generals' actions in order to have an impact; influencing those actions would require changing the consequences, the antecedents, and/or the structural variables that surrounded their actions. In other words, changing the behaviour of the generals would require a strategy that would shift at least some of the critical variables identified. The most powerful changes would be those that could be leveraged through supporting systems; this is why strategic attention to pillars of support, lacking in both 1988 and 2007, is so essential in most nonviolent struggles. If repression led to reduced financial rewards for the oppressors, for example, repression might be less likely. In this case, pursuing strategies to bring workers into alliance with the resistance might be an option. This option, however, might well require the development of workers' networks, communities of workers that ultimately might be induced to leverage their collective power—a constructive noncooperation strategy.

Overall, the development of diverse networks—including not only activist groups but also artistic, labour, religious, and other groups—increases the resilience of civil society in the face of oppression. Such resilience contributed to the fall of the Soviet Union and the successes of the civil rights movement in the United States. Given the findings of Chenoweth and Stephan, specific attention to encouraging the defection of particular military units ("available personnel" in figure 8) may have potential. Reducing the availability of weapons (a structural variable) might have some impact on repression. Attention to sources of weapons, then, might be an additional strategic possibility, but it would not be an easy one to effect given the regime's outside supports. It is important that all of the possibilities drawn from an analysis of the motivating context, consequences, and structural factors be considered in elaborating a plan with the promise of affecting individual and collective behaviour; a wider range of strategic choices may then open up. The diagram in figure 8 is a simplification of the situation for heuristic purposes; constructing an adequate strategic plan would require a detailed analysis of this type prepared by those most familiar with the situation on the ground.

Chenoweth and Stephan conclude that the nonviolent tactics used in 1988 were insufficiently disruptive, the goals inadequately shared, and the overall strategies too diffuse to produce change in the regime. While Suu Kyi, often viewed as the primary symbol of Burmese resistance, has elicited increasing international sympathy over the years, neither her presence nor decades of sporadic protest had translated into significant pressure on the regime by 2007. These analyses raise the question of whether a primary emphasis on protest was the optimal strategic choice in Burma, either in 1988 or in 2007. The brief analysis above suggests that constructive noncooperation (chapter 7) or disruptive noncooperation (this chapter) might have been better responses to the political dynamics present. Although every situation and campaign are unique, events in Burma over the next several years will probably have much more to teach us.

The analyses in this chapter clarify that persuasion is much more than asking nicely, and protest is much more than bringing a large number of people together to issue loud complaints and demand change. Because of the interlocks among social systems, changing individual actions or the practices of organized groups requires changing the environments that sustain current patterns of behaviour so as to encourage different behaviours. Efforts to bring about such changes can thus be made more effective by taking existing or potential interlocks among behavioral systems and practices into account. A core message from this chapter is that both persuasion and protest are designed to *increase* the rate of certain behaviours or practices, in accord with the wishes of the resistance group. In circumstances of oppression, however, it is also commonly crucial to *decrease* the level of acts of injustice and established oppressive and suppressive practices. In those cases, different strategic options are required. One option, previously discussed, is constructive noncooperation. Another, more direct alternative is disruptive noncooperation, which is the subject of chapter 9.

9

DISRUPTIVE NONCOOPERATION

> And so our acts of disruption should be taken in the most careful spirit. The actions through which it is easiest to communicate that spirit of carefulness are actions simply of noncooperation, actions by which we declare to the state: Not with my life!
>
> — Barbara Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*

Gene Sharp refers to his second category of strategic options for nonviolent struggle as noncooperation. Although some of the methods that he includes in this class will be analyzed somewhat differently in the material that follows, Sharp's presentation of noncooperation is generally consistent with a behavioural science approach. In this chapter, we will explore the dynamics of disruptive noncooperation (as distinct from those of constructive noncooperation, chapter 7) and analyze several historical examples in terms of their behavioural systems dynamics. Ethical issues related to coercion are an important dimension in this discussion, given that disruption typically leverages change against the will of the opponent.

In his original work in this area, Sharp states, "Overwhelmingly, the methods of nonviolent action involve noncooperation with the opponent. That is, the actionists deliberately withdraw the usual forms and degree of their cooperation with the person, activity, institution, or regime with which they have become engaged in conflict. . . . In other words, noncooperation involves the deliberate discontinuation, withholding, or defiance of certain existing relationships—social, economic or political."[1]

The methods of noncooperation (constructive and disruptive) are among the most powerful, flexible, and robust options available to campaigns of nonviolent struggle and liberation. Referring to Sharp's work and consistent with others whose work has been previously cited, Majken Jul Sørenson asserts that "even the most brutal dictator is completely dependent on the cooperation of a large number of people, and withdrawal of cooperation from people in important positions will make the dictator's power crumble."[2] This was also Gandhi's clear understanding. For example, in 1909, in issuing demands to the British government that it begin to relinquish power, he noted that it could not maintain control in India without the cooperation of the people: "You have great military resources. Your naval power is matchless. If we wanted to fight you on your own ground, we should be unable to do so, but if the above submissions be not acceptable to you, we cease to play the part of the ruled. You may, if you like, cut us to pieces. You may shatter us at the cannon's mouth. If you act contrary to our will, we shall not help you; and without our help, we know that you cannot move one step forward."[3] As Jonathan Schell notes, "Gandhi held Indians, not Englishmen, responsible for India's colonial dependency," because power lies in the granting or withholding of cooperation.[4] Similarly, Frances Fox Piven substantiates the real power of disruption using examples from US history, asserting that "the clustering of major policy initiatives coincided exactly with the clustering of episodes of mass disruption, with the mobilization of interdependent power from below."[5]

It is worth recalling here, however, that the power to block the opponent is, at best, half the battle; additional options (persuasion, protest, or constructive noncooperation) must often be introduced to create conditions of true liberation. In the simplest case, the opponent actively oppresses the grievance population in some way (perhaps, for example, by arresting anyone suspected of disloyalty), and the resistance withholds cooperation until the opponent stops the oppressive behaviour. In many cases, though, the goals of the resistance include not only that the opponent end specific acts of oppression but also that the opponent take some affirmative action (reinstating energy subsidies, for example, as in Burma in 2007 and Nigeria in 2012, or leaving the country altogether). In such cases, not only does the resistance group withhold cooperation (for example, in a general strike); it also clarifies that if and only if the oppressive acts end *and* the desired affirmative action is taken can cooperation be re-established. Two interlocking behavioural dynamics are present here: a collective analogue of extinction (reducing the incidence of active oppressive) and a reinforcement process offering to restore or expand the cooperation that the opponent needs or wants once the opponent's actions change.

SHARP'S CLASSES OF NONCOOPERATION

Gene Sharp describes a total of 198 different methods for nonviolent struggle; of these, 103 are listed as methods of noncooperation.[6] About two-thirds of those 103 methods involve some level of disruptive noncooperation, as it will be defined here; many of the others I would classify as methods of protest. Sharp divides his 103 methods of noncooperation into three subgroups, social noncooperation, economic noncooperation, and political noncooperation. Each is briefly summarized below, with examples. This background is followed by a behavioural systems analysis of the methods of disruptive noncooperation.

Social Noncooperation

Sharp's methods of social noncooperation "involve a refusal to carry on normal social relations, either particular or general, with persons or groups regarded as having perpetrated some wrong or injustice, or to comply with certain behavior patterns or social practices."[7] These methods are divided into three classes: ostracism of persons; noncooperation with social events, customs, and institutions; and withdrawal from the social system. Each class is subdivided into several specific methods (sixteen in total). The interested reader is encouraged to explore that work in detail; a few examples, all of which call attention to the extinction dimension of noncooperation, will suffice here. Recall that extinction refers to withholding consequences that have previously been associated with an action.

Social noncooperation is the most technically complex of the methods of noncooperation. In some cases, the primary dynamic is protest, with some element of extinction involved. For example, some student strikes (see the third example below) are undertaken to pressure authorities to take some action—for example, to terminate on-campus Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) programs during the Vietnam war—or, more commonly, to reverse an action previously taken. Tactics such as refusing to leave the streets despite threats and sanctions or withholding tuition rely primarily on extinction. Ordinarily, under threat of penalties, students comply with the expectations of authorities—for example, by attending classes and paying tuition. In doing so, they are reinforcing authorities' controlling practices. By sustaining a strike or withholding tuition despite threats, demands, and sanctions, students are acting to extinguish such efforts at control by authorities. In order to regain student cooperation under such circumstances, the authorities must alter their response. The Irish Constabulary example below involved both the disruption of resources (in this case, of personnel) and the withholding of social cooperation through ostracism until repression abated (an example of extinction). The dynamics in these two cases are behaviourally different. If a resistance movement wants to stop repressive acts, some form of extinction (or possibly resource disruption, where that is realistic) is needed; if goals also include evoking positive action on the part of the opponent, the corresponding offer of cooperation for such action is essential.

Ireland, 1919

In the centuries-long political and religious conflicts between the Irish and their British overlords, many forms of resistance occurred. Sharp reports a particularly effective and direct example of the use of the social boycott (a form of ostracism) in 1919. At this point in the struggle, large segments of the Irish population organized and ostracized members of the Royal Irish Constabulary and their families in various ways, including by refusing acknowledge them on the street or to sell them food. Most members of the constabulary were Irish, and both the physical and social dimensions of the boycott proved powerful. Many constabulary members resigned, and very few people subsequently applied to fill the vacancies; those who remained were less likely to act in extremely repressive ways. It was impossible to bring the full force of the constabulary to bear under these circumstances. The cooperation of the population was necessary to maintain any semblance of normal functioning.[8]

The Coming of the Haudenosaunee Great Law of Peace

Centuries ago, the five (later six) tribes of the Haudenosaunee—the People of the Longhouse, or Iroquois—agreed to end their almost continuous intertribal warfare. The most recent estimates place the origins of the still-united Iroquois Confederation sometime between 1090 and 1150 CE, much earlier than previously thought.[9] Tradition indicates that several forms of nonviolent action were involved in the origins of this historically remarkable and long-sustained union.[10] The Peacemaker (Skennenrahowi) is said to have brought the message of peace to the tribes with the help of Aiionwatha (Hiawatha), whose daughters were killed because of his involvement in the campaign.

Tribal tradition, however, also emphasizes a campaign of nonaction, in the form of a refusal to engage in sex, by Haudenosaunee women as a key factor in leading the men to end their constant warfare and lay down their arms under the Tree of Peace. The women collectively insisted that they be given the final word in decisions about war or peace.[11] Their Lysistratic noncooperation was a highly potent cultural disruption, as Stan Steiner explains: “Until the men conceded to them the power to decide upon war and peace, there would be no more warriors. Since the Iroquois men believed that women alone knew the secret of birth, the feminist rebellion was instantly successful.”[12] While the details of such distant events obviously cannot be known for certain, the story is valuable as a memorable illustration of social noncooperation. Note here that both withholding the reinforcer of sexual contact until violence stopped (extinction) and the withholding of future warriors (resource disruption) are included in the traditional story.

Student Strikes

Student strikes are also among the methods Sharp classifies under social noncooperation. This is an example, however, where precision is important for understanding the dynamics of resistance. Some cases, like the 2005 Québec student strike, are clear examples of disruptive noncooperation, while others are primarily protests.[13] In the Québec case, the Charest government suddenly made substantial changes to the student Grants and Loans Program, increasing the ratio of loans to grants, which resulted in a near doubling of debt for some students. After a year of protests, the Coalition de l'Association pour une Solidarité Syndicale Étudiante Élargie (CASSÉÉ) and other student groups called a strike for February 2005, in which students discontinued attendance and took to the streets. (Note that not all of the protests were nonviolent.) At the high point of the campaign, more than half of Québécois college and university students were on strike. The functioning of the institutions, which could not be maintained without students' presence and tuition, was severely disrupted. By April, the government reached an agreement with student federations addressing many of the concerns. Subsequent strikes had different outcomes.

By contrast, the 1970 student strike in the United States protesting the Vietnam War was primarily a protest against the federal government and the killings associated with war protests at Kent State and Jackson State. (By some accounts, the Nixon administration experienced strike-related protests as a threat of insurrection.) Tuition was not withheld, many college faculty and administrators were sympathetic with the striking students, and organizers hoped that students would instead spend their time organizing against the war, which some did. To the extent that the strike was directed toward ending Reserve Officer Training Corps programs, however, it did involve dynamics of disruptive noncooperation directed toward the institutions.

Economic Noncooperation

Sharp identifies thirteen classes and forty-nine subtypes of economic noncooperation, all of which fall into two major categories: boycotts and strikes. Boycotts involve a wide range of "organized efforts to withdraw, and to induce others to withdraw, economic cooperation in ways which restrict the buying or selling market of an individual or group," while strikes entail "a refusal to continue economic cooperation through work."[14] Most cases of economic noncooperation fall within the definition of disruptive noncooperation as the term is used in this chapter, but many also involve other behavioural systems dynamics, as the examples below clarify.

Boycotts

As defined by Sharp, boycotts may be mounted by consumers (e.g., rent withholding), by workers (e.g., refusing to work with foreign materials), by middlemen (e.g., supplier boycotts), by owners and management (e.g., lockouts), by holders of financial resources (e.g., severance of funds and credit), or by governments (e.g., blacklisting of traders).[15] All of these options involve withholding the payoffs to which the opponent has become accustomed, and therefore involve the direct exercise of disruptive power. Two examples are examined here to clarify the dynamics involved.

The Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott. On December 1, 1955, Rosa Parks, an African American seamstress and the secretary of the local branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), was arrested for refusing to give up her seat on a city bus to a white man, as required by law.[16] Considerable mythology surrounds that event; as Parks confirms, however, the local NAACP had been discussing initiating a bus boycott to challenge Jim Crow segregation for some time, and others had previously been arrested for refusing to give up their seats. She personally reached a breaking point on December 1 and simply refused to rise.[17] The NAACP determined that, given her civil rights commitment and her personal presence, this arrest offered a prime opportunity to force the issue. The African American population of Montgomery, the primary riders on the transit line owned by the (already infamous) National City Lines, boycotted bus service.[18] The boycott was initially planned as a one-day event, but it ultimately lasted for over a year. Black taxi drivers often carried African Americans during the boycott for the cost of a bus ride, and an extensive carpooling arrangement was established. (This was the campaign that first brought Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. to national and international attention.)

The costs to National City Lines and the city were substantial, and no pressure from the city or the Ku Klux Klan was able to bring the riders back: this was a clear example of the nonviolent practice of extinction and of the directly disruptive power of withholding economic cooperation. It was, however, more than this: the boycott also withheld legitimacy from the city and state government, and respect from those of the white population who tolerated Jim Crow. As expected, this campaign elicited severe repression, including arrests, violence, and the bombing of the homes of Dr. King and the president of the local NAACP, as well as of four churches. The city prosecuted taxi drivers who supported the boycott and, in the final weeks, outlawed the established carpool system. Economic losses softened resistance to integration but did not finally bring about the desired goal and end the boycott. Rather, in the context of national attention, the US Supreme Court ruled that bus segregation was unconstitutional. The final resolution, therefore, emerged from both the economic disruption and the protest functions of the campaign.

Commitments to austerity. What Sharp termed a "policy of austerity" is a particularly interesting, and often complex, example of economic boycotts. As he described it:

> The voluntary giving up of luxuries . . . contains elements of both symbolic nonviolent protest and of economic boycott. Such austerity may have one or more consequences. It may demonstrate to the opponent and to vacillating potential resisters the depth of the actionists' feelings. Austerities may also have certain psychological influences on the people practicing them, such as increasing the intensity of their commitment to the struggle. Very frequently too—and this is the reason for classifying this method among economic boycotts—giving up the use and purchase of luxuries may have a detrimental economic effect on the opponent.[19]

Sharp provides examples from the US colonial and revolutionary era: in an effort to weaken British rule, the populations of several states implemented austerity measures such as giving up expensive mourning traditions that relied on costly British imported goods, substituting simple local goods for luxury British items, giving up lamb so more mutton could be produced, and discouraging some forms of public entertainment. The refusal to use imported liquor and the substitution of local for imported cloth were, of course, also parts of Gandhi's campaigns, and the first of these was part of Anna Hazare's campaign as well. The adoption of a simple lifestyle, at least temporarily, has been characteristic of many recent nonviolent campaigns, including Vietnam War protests and the Occupy movement in the United States and elsewhere in 2011–12.

A commitment to austerity is among the most complex to classify, as Sharp's discussion illustrates. In a behavioural science approach, it is preferable, wherever possible, to identify all of the functional dynamics present in a campaign since each of those dynamics may offer additional strategic possibilities. Functionally, such a commitment is first a campaign of constructive noncooperation: note that the immediate target is the actions of the grievance population. Commitments to austerity also nearly always have a protest function, establishing an aversive condition for the opponent; they also typically have a persuasive dimension for the grievance population (increasing intensity of commitment, as Sharp notes) and sometimes for third parties; and they sometimes disrupt economic networks supporting oppression (an extinction function). Each of these functional dimensions deserves analysis in strategic planning.

The constructive functions of organized austerity, however, deserve emphasis. Much of the injustice and suffering in the contemporary world is due to structural violence that supports the privilege of the few by exploiting and denying the basic needs of many.[20] Not only does participation in lifestyles of privilege support and structure injustice, but such lifestyles are also environmentally unsustainable.[21] Living simpler lives limits the power and control exercised by corporate capitalism, and is therefore a form of resistance, even as it affirms global well-being. Therefore, commitments to austerity can realize lasting contributions to achieving justice, human rights, and sustainability, consistent with Gandhi's and Havel's analyses of constructive efforts. Behavioural systems science can offers specific direction for encouraging and generalizing such commitments, as outlined particularly in the work of Lyle Grant of Athabasca University, who argues that some forms of austerity offer richer lives than participation in consumer cultures within a capitalist society.[22]

Although somewhat beyond the scope of this book, given the importance of mutual support, encouragement, and inspiration in cultures of resistance and parallel structures, one other uncommon but not unknown form of constructive cooperation grounded in sustainable austerity deserves mention. A number of small communities have largely separated themselves from the repressive societies within which they are embedded, refusing cooperation with larger social institutions, governmental institutions, economic systems, and both security forces and insurgent groups. Examples include efforts to establish and sustain eco-villages and peace villages in Colombia (Gaviotas is the best known), the Awramba Community in the South Gondor Zone of Amhara Region in Northern Ethiopia, and Los Horcones near Hermosillo, Mexico. For three decades, Gaviotas has focused on constructing an ecologically sustainable, liveable, and apolitical community while surrounded by cocaine traffickers, paramilitaries, insurgent groups, and government forces.[23] Awramba was founded by Zumra Nuru, a man with no formal education who was deeply disturbed by gender inequality, the exploitation of labour by the elite, poor treatment of children and the elderly, and other forms of human rights violations.[24] Like Gaviotas, the Awramba Community has survived over three decades of social disruption. Los Horcones is modelled explicitly on B. F. Skinner's fictional Walden Two and, like the Awramba Community, has functioned for over thirty years largely independently from the larger society.[25]

In each of these cases, the community was constructed as an alternative to a society that was viewed as deeply flawed, not primarily as a protest but as a better way of living separate from (and refusing to participate in) that society and its institutions. At least in the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that many such communities of constructive noncooperation will be established, but a good deal could be learned from those that do exist in terms of establishing contingencies strong enough to compete with the seductive incentives built into consumer society. Certainly, the kind of alternative, sustainable lifestyles that Lyle Grant has advocated could be more easily sustained within a supporting community.

Economic Strikes

The other major category of economic noncooperation is the strike. Strikes by workers, farmers, professionals and other groups have long been a major strategy in efforts to bring about economic and related social change. History offers numerous examples of this strategic option and the resulting successes and failures.[26] Historically, strikes have often entailed some measure of violence, whether it originated with the strikers or with the use of force against them. In most cases, nonviolent economic strikes include both extinction and protest dimensions. Such strikes are paradigmatic examples of disruptive noncooperation, in which one or more segments of interconnected behavioural systems simply stop participating in established production and distribution interdependencies. Two examples provide a sense of the possible range.

La Huelga. The major campaigns of the United Farm Workers in California were not an entirely new idea. Agricultural workers' strikes occurred in France, Italy, and elsewhere in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries and have been an important recent phenomenon in Argentina. Significant farm workers' strikes took place in California during several periods in the twentieth century; those during the Depression years were embedded in the general economic disruptions of the time and were severely repressed, although they ultimately produced significant gains.[27] One of the most important and most informative strikes in recent history was the Great Delano Grape Strike of 1965–66, led by Cesar Chavez. This strike, referred to as *La Huelga* (the strike), was seminal in the emergence of the United Farm Workers as a union and as a movement, although it was only one important chapter of that larger struggle.[28]

The Delano district produced, and continues to produce, most of the table grapes grown in the United States. In 1965, skilled Filipino packing crews and Mexican and Mexican American field workers supplied most of the labour required for the industry.[29] In September of that year, the AFL-CIO-affiliated Filipino workers struck ten Delano growers, demanding better pay. The fledgling National Farm Workers Association (later the United Farm Workers, or UFW), although not initially prepared to take such action, decided that they must support the Filipinos and, ultimately, that they needed to join the strike. The basic dynamic of the strike was to disrupt the harvest, pressuring the growers to improve pay and working conditions. If the strike succeeded, the workers had the capacity to deprive the growers of their income until they relented, the primary dynamic in most strikes related to economic conditions. In this case, the goals were to challenge the grower's refusal to negotiate and cooperate with unionization, to end civil rights violations and exploitation, and to increase worker compensation by withholding reinforcement from the growers until their collective behaviour changed. By 1970, all the significant growers in California had signed contracts with what was by then the United Farm Workers of America.

This was no ordinary strike, however. The farm workers did not simply refuse to work or stand on picket lines. The AFL-CIO-affiliated Filipino union had used those traditional methods and failed to move the growers. The UFW (into which the Filipino group ultimately merged) had no history of labour organizing. Having no established repertoire—no drag of the past—they had the opportunity for experimentation and creativity. Since the UFW did not have a large enough membership to establish static picket lines that could close the fields, they invented roving picket lines, reached out to labourers in the fields using bullhorns, turned a station wagon into a "chapel" that the growers could not refuse to allow the workers to enter, and used a variety of other creative and previously unknown tactics.[30] Crucially, the UFW presented their movement not so much as union organizing but as a nonviolent struggle for Mexican American civil rights, relying on strategies like mass arrests that triggered memories of the African American civil rights struggle. Framed as a civil rights movement, the UFW was able to engage religious groups, including much of the hierarchy of the American Catholic Church, as well as students and progressives from across the United States. They made extensive use of ethnic language and traditions like theatre and songs that linked the movement to historical Mexican liberation campaigns. Later, they turned to other nonviolent strategies, including national boycotts (the table grape and iceberg lettuce boycotts are the best known) and a 280-mile march to Sacramento to meet with Governor Jerry Brown. The last was not framed as a march, however, but as a *perigrinación*, a pilgrimage, thus engaging both religious and ethnic traditions. Each of these methods was strategically targeted at changing the attitudes and actions of particular groups who could directly or indirectly affect the actions of the growers—it was, in other words, a behavioural systems approach.

The general strike. Sharp defines the general strike as a "widespread stoppage of labor by workers in an attempt to bring the economic life of a given area to a more or less complete standstill in order to achieve certain desired outcomes."[31] Those outcomes may be economic, political, or revolutionary.[32] General strikes have been widely used in radical and revolutionary movements, with examples from every inhabited continent on earth. Threats of general strikes linked to mass mobilizations clearly contributed to the fall of repressive leaders in Tunisia and Egypt during the 2011 Arab Spring, struggles that continue to play out as this is written.

Throughout much of the twentieth century, general strikes have been reputed to be likely to lead to tragic failures (except in revolutionary cases); the May 1919 general strike in Winnipeg, which more or less brought the city to a stop, is often cited as an example.[33] The government ultimately called in the Royal North West Mounted Police, who charged on the demonstrators, resulting in many injuries and two deaths. The city came under virtual military occupation, and strikers returned to work. The Winnipeg case is not as clear-cut as it may look, however; while local government and the self-appointed conservative Citizens' Committee regarded the strike as a criminal conspiracy organized by foreign agents, a Royal Commission subsequently found that it was a true labour strike and generally supported the demands of the strikers.[34] Over the long run, the strike appears to have been seminal in contributing to a militant labour movement in Winnipeg and across Canada. In South Africa, mass strikes have a history going back at least to the successful effort to remove the poll tax for Indians in 1914 (following two mass strikes by white workers), through the 1961 strike of blacks led by Nelson Mandela, to the controversial strike of 2010 related to effects of the global economic slowdown.[35] A two-hour general strike in 1989 was an important action in the long and complex campaign for the liberation of Czechoslovakia.[36]

It has often, but not always, proven difficult to maintain nonviolent discipline in general strikes because of the lack of comprehensive organization and leadership. The mixed history of the general strike appears to be the result of concurrent disruption of many interdependencies, making strategic choices and prediction of outcomes more difficult than is the case for many other types of nonviolent action. While systems analysis facilitates the understanding of multiple interlocking and concurrent interactions, the complexity involved in general strikes makes precision and prediction of outcomes particularly difficult.

Political Noncooperation

Political noncooperation is Sharp's final major category of methods of noncooperation, comprising six classes and thirty-eight relatively discrete types. Political noncooperation involves withdrawing or withholding "the usual forms of political participation under existing [or, in some cases, any] conditions."[37]

This form of noncooperation includes the rejection of authority, as well as various forms of noncooperative action by citizens, government personnel, domestic governments, and international actors or bodies. Two important examples are disruptions supporting Native sovereignty and election boycotts.

Native sovereignty and the power to say "no."

Sharp provides a number of examples of withholding or withdrawing allegiance dating back to the sixteenth century. Refusing allegiance to the Crown was central to the American Revolution, which, in John Adams's words, "was complete in the minds of the people" prior to the beginning of the war.[38] In recent decades, self-determination, Native nationalism, and tribal sovereignty have provided the primary rationales for resistance supporting the human, treaty, and collective rights of Indigenous peoples around the world. The struggles of Canadian First Nations, Alaskan Native peoples, and American Indian peoples are particularly interesting examples, as Native resistance in both Canada and the United States has a long and complex history.[39] Campaigns for Native rights have included conventional political and legal efforts, nonviolent protest, active disruption, extensive constructive noncooperation, and armed resistance (for which the results have been poor). The results of this resistance have been uneven, but nonviolent strategies have produced dramatic change in some areas.[40] Political noncooperation, usually of the form labelled by Sharp as "withholding or withdrawing of allegiance," has been particularly common. Sharp provides several examples, including the refusal of the Haudenosaunee to accept Canadian citizenship in 1921 and the repeated efforts of the Six Nations on both sides of the US-Canadian border to petition the UN for hearings on their sovereignty over the following decades.[41]

Withholding allegiance may be total, by refusing to acknowledge or submit to the claimed authority of colonial nation-states. The Haudenosaunee have been particularly resistant to such dominance, with their claim to be an independent "Nation from Time Immemorial" whose boundaries, passports, and authority should be globally respected.[42] Withholding of allegiance may also be partial, as in the decades-long struggles of Taos Pueblo in New Mexico to recover control of Blue Lake, refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of the claims of the US government to control a site of enormous spiritual importance to the people of the pueblo.[43] It was largely the continuing refusal by Native people, grounded in their own spiritual and tribal teachings, to accept the legitimacy of colonial governments that sustained the power to resist through centuries of domination and suppression.[44] The power to say a collective "No" endured despite physical and cultural genocide.

The 1990 defeat of the Meech Lake Accord, which would have dramatically changed the Canadian constitution, is a telling example. The defeat, while immediately determined by the refusal of the Province of Manitoba to agree to the Accord, drew strength from the consistent refusal of First Nation peoples to accept continued second-class status and their insistence that their "distinct society" and right to self-governance be recognized, consistent with the treatment of Québec as outlined in the Accord. In Linda Pertusati's analysis, the defeat of the Accord also "enhanced ethnic consciousness and solidarity among aboriginal peoples across Canada" and created widespread Native support for the Mohawks in a concurrent, high-profile struggle to protect their land from encroachment for a golf course by the town of Oka, Québec, an important event in the history of Canadian First Nation rights.[45]

The Aboriginal peoples of North America have been central players in the effort to have the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples approved by the UN General Assembly. When that approval finally came in September 2007, the governments of the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were the only nonsignatories (although all have since reversed their positions). The rights of individual Native *people* were generally not at issue during the decades of struggle to have this statement of Indigenous self-determination approved. The self-determination of *peoples*, however, was a different matter entirely, speaking to collective sovereignty in terms of political status and self-government; distinct political, legal, economic, social, and cultural institutions; and land, religion, and other rights, including the right to belong to an Indigenous community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the community or nation concerned.[46] The potential for further land claims and possible reparations were evident concerns among the initial nonsignatories.

Boycott of elections

Some methods of political noncooperation have demonstrated significant power. Boycotts of elections, however, which have been common over recent centuries, have a fairly mixed record. Sharp reports cases from France, Russia, Puerto Rico, Portugal, Uganda and elsewhere in Africa, El Salvador, Vietnam, and Britain; there have been many others.[47] Small groups often call for boycotts of elections without much impact, but it appears that under specific circumstances, this type of boycott can leverage considerable power.[48] In situations in which voting in corrupt elections has been framed as a statement of support for a corrupt regime, a widespread boycott can undermine legitimacy, potentially putting pressure on the regime for change.

Widespread election boycotts may also encourage the population and those who structure pillars of support to engage in additional forms of disruption. In Sharp's example of the French election of 1793, three-quarters of the voters abstained; this was a powerful statement that both threatened the regime and encouraged further resistance. Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) called for a boycott of the Burmese election in 2010; it is not clear that the boycott itself had a large impact, given the Burmese history of corrupt elections and multiple previous election boycotts. Nonetheless, given the increasing signs of political change in Burma at the time, the threat of the boycott did keep the NLD and Suu Kyi in the eyes of the world at a delicate moment. For Suu Kyi, but also for many unknown people, the individual choice to refuse cooperation in elections may have been nothing more, and nothing less, than living in truth—an action deserving of respect in its own right and perhaps ultimately contributing to liberation through its impact on systemic interdependencies.

DISRUPTIVE POWER AND THE QUESTION OF COERCION

It is important at this point to take a closer look at the issue of coercive power. In constructive noncooperation, this issue can, to some extent, be finessed, since the emphasis is on changing the behaviour of the grievance group rather than that of the opponent. Even in such a case, however, effective constructive noncooperation, because of the interdependencies present, indirectly but inevitably involves pressure for involuntary change on the part of the opponent. Persuasion and, to some extent, protest are primarily ways to encourage the opponent to make different choices without extensive coercion, although some forms of protest marshal considerable pressure. Disruptive noncooperation and resource disruption (chapter 10), however, are forceful strategic options that inevitably involve strong pressure for change.

The issue of coercion has long been controversial in resistance movements, in part because of differing definitions. Some see only physical force or physical threats as coercive, while others regard any pressure to act against one's will as coercive violence and therefore as unacceptable. Gandhi himself asserted that "in non-violence there is no coercion" and denied that his methods were coercive, stating, for instance, "On no account may they [students] use coercion against dissentients or against the authorities."[49] Mennonite activist Guy Hershberger, however, rejects Gandhi's methods: he views them as coercive because of their application of pressure on opponents. On the basis of a Mennonite reading of the Gospels, Hershberger advocates living by love and nonresistance only, exerting no pressure whatsoever.[50] David Cortright provides a thoughtful discussion of Gandhi's position, contending that given his emphasis on forcefulness, Gandhi "could not avoid coercion," even though he defined his methods as moral persuasion.[51] By contrast, as Cortright further notes, Reinhold Niebuhr (who later rejected nonviolence as a universal principle) argued, "The selfishness of human communities must be regarded as an inevitability. Where it is inordinate it can be checked only by competing assertions of interest; and these can be effective only if coercive methods are added to moral and rational persuasion."[52] Responding in part to Niebuhr's arguments, Martin Luther King Jr. called for "realistic pacifism," recognizing, as interpreted by Cortright, that, "coercive pressure may be necessary to achieve social change."[53] Barbara Deming recognized that nonviolent resistance can and must leverage power of a kind that leaves no option for continued oppression:

> I think that those of us who act must always be saying with the actions we take two things—*and always saying these two things at the same time.* We have to be saying very strongly—and not just with words of course: Things are not going to stay as they are. The machinery of things-as-they-are is a machinery of death, and we are going to so disrupt it that it will not be able to continue functioning as it has been. . . .

> But even as we give that shock . . . we must be saying: Don't be afraid of us. It is the system we are attacking that you need to fear—that all of us need to fear. For it is reckless with lives.[54]

Differing definitions of coercion produce somewhat different positions, as one would expect. The behaviourist Murray Sidman proposes an accessible definition of the term *coercion* that is widely accepted among behavioural systems analysts: "By coercion, I refer to our use of punishment and the threat of punishment to get others to act as we would like, and to the practice of rewarding people just by letting them escape from our punishments and threats."[55] This definition includes most of the methods we have discussed as protest, as well as those disruptive techniques that are directed toward changing the actions of the opponent using aversive means. Sidman's definition excludes methods that rely on offering positive incentives but includes withholding accustomed reinforcers to achieve extinction, a central dynamic in disruptive noncooperation. Sidman's work is particularly important in that it traces in detail the potential negative side effects of coercive processes and provides significant guidance regarding how to minimize those effects. If we accept Sidman's definition, most powerful strategic options in nonviolent struggle clearly exercise some measure of coercive power, and probably must to successfully challenge serious oppression. At the same time, a behavioural systems analysis can be helpful in thinking through how predictable side effects, such as increased aggression and countercontrol, can be minimized.

Such scientific understanding cannot entirely resolve a central moral question: Is coercion in the name of justice acceptable? But even here, behaviour science offers some assistance, at least in establishing the parameters of the decision. Where there are choices among strategic directions, both effectiveness and costs should be weighed; as clarified in the next section, behaviour science can help to determine which approaches are likely to be most costly to participants and others, and also clarifies that some costly options tend not to be effective. The central strategic question in most cases of serious oppression and human rights violations is which coercive options are most likely to produce the best outcomes at an acceptable human cost.

THE BEHAVIOURAL SYSTEMS DYNAMICS OF DISRUPTIVE NONCOOPERATION

Let us now get to the heart of the matter. As discussed in chapter 3, both Gandhi and the distinguished behavioural science pioneer B. F. Skinner understood the basic workings of disruptive noncooperation in similar ways. Gandhi put it this way:

> Violence always thrived on counter-violence. The aggressor had always a purpose behind his attack; he wanted something to be done, some object to be surrendered by the defenders. Now, if the defender steeled his heart and was determined not to surrender even one inch, and at the same time to resist the temptation of matching the violence of the aggressor by violence, the latter could be made to realize in a short while that it would not be paying to punish the other party and his will could not be imposed in that way. This would involve suffering. It was this unalloyed self-suffering which was the truest form of self-defence which knew no surrender.[56]

"Refusing to provide that which the attacker wants," as Gene Sharp puts it, will ultimately end the attacks; this is, of course, the well-established extinction principle.[57] The situation is more complicated than this in most cases, but the power of extinction underlies most cases of disruptive noncooperation. Boycotts and strikes deny the opponent economic benefits; refusing allegiance denies the opponent legitimacy; social noncooperation denies many benefits, both personal and collective. Many of these methods also cause the opponent public and even international embarrassment or other aversive consequences (i.e., punishment for the opponent's actions), but the central dynamic is the power to withhold or withdraw "that which the attacker wants." If sustained, such withholding is certain to be disruptive.

Extinction is not without its costs, however, which can be grave. Extinction is aversive to the opponent, who may therefore react strongly, if temporarily. For example, in 1930, during the struggle of the Khudai Khidmatgars discussed in detail in chapter 7, a large crowd gathered in Qissa Khawani Bazaar in the Frontier Province of India to nonviolently protest the detention of a delegation from the Indian National Congress. A senior police official ordered the crowd to disperse (an implicit threat); they refused (disruptive noncooperation). As a large police and military presence gathered and confusion intensified, the troops ultimately fired on the crowd, killing several people. An investigative report by the Congress Inquiry Committee describes what happened next:

> At about half past eleven, endeavors were made by one or two outsiders to persuade the crowd to disperse and the authorities to remove the troops and armored cars. The crowds were willing to disperse if they were allowed to remove the dead and the injured and if the armored cars and the troops were removed. The authorities, on the other hand, expressed their determination not to remove the armored cars and the troops. The result was that the people did not disperse and were prepared to receive the bullets and lay down their lives. The second firing then began and, off and on, lasted for more than three hours.[58]

When the Garhwal Rifles were called in as reinforcements, however, they refused to fire on their own people, as has happened often in campaigns of civil resistance. Nonetheless, at least two hundred people were killed in the bazaar that day, and the massacre produced a tremendous outcry, both locally and internationally. Such a massacre was not repeated, and the resistance movement gained enormously as a result of this action.

The refusal of the people in this example to "provide what the attacker wants"—to offer obedience and withdraw—demonstrates both the power and the risks of extinction. When a resistance movement refuses cooperation important to the opponent, both an extensive scientific literature and the history of nonviolent struggle indicate that the opponent is almost certain at first to escalate repressive measures (the extinction burst) before relenting.[59] If the resistance holds, all else being equal, repressive actions will ultimately decline because they are both costly and ineffective. Similar dynamics were repeatedly observed in the US civil rights movement, in which protesters often stood their ground against police, dogs, and firehoses, continuing their campaign for liberation in the face of lynchings and bombings. In both the Qissa Khawani Bazaar case and the US civil rights movement, disruptive noncooperation was combined with protest and persuasion for specific forms of improved treatment.

Extinction is one of two well-established approaches for decelerating behaviours (that is, reducing them over time). The other choice is retaliation (technically, punishment): delivering an aversive each time, or nearly each time, the opponent attacks or taking something desired away each time (fines and sanctions). We discuss retaliation in more detail in the next chapter, but in summary, retaliation often has even more serious side effects than does extinction, requires more resources, is typically harder to implement effectively, and, in many cases, is actually not as powerful as extinction.

One reason why extinction can be more powerful than retaliation and less aversive to the opponent (thus, in some cases, evoking less repression) is that typically it is integrally linked with the persuasion strategy of offering incentives for more acceptable behaviour. In the case of the Birmingham, Alabama, campaign against segregation in 1963, which will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter, the central strategy was a boycott against segregated downtown stores. The boycott withheld substantial economic supports from the business community; the stores depended on black dollars for survival and profits. At the same time, those economic benefits were available—if only a decision were made to end segregation in those businesses. Technically, this is referred to as "differential reinforcement of incompatible behaviour." Removing signs and enforcement of white-only rules, acts that are incompatible with segregation, would reopen the flow of dollars. In the United Farm Worker campaigns, strikes withheld economic benefits from growers as long as exploitation continued, but when growers signed the contracts (an action incompatible with the previous exploitation), their crops were picked and their businesses could survive. Signing the contracts provided an alternative route toward at least some of "what the attacker wants."

Extinction in Behavioural Systems

While the dynamics of extinction of undesirable behaviour at an individual level are straightforward, applying the extinction principle to behavioural systems is more complex. Nonetheless, the available historical evidence (including many of the examples just presented) suggests that a powerful systemic-level analogue of extinction underlies campaigns of disruptive noncooperation. Given the realities of the complex interdependencies among populations, government, institutions, and other organized groups, the first challenge is to identify junctures of interdependence that are vulnerable to extinction processes.[60] If they can be identified, such junctures can then be targeted for disruption.

A further look at metacontingencies (first introduced in chapter 4) can help to clarify important variables in such analysis. A metacontingency is a conditional relationship between interlocking practices within a behavioural system and the environment within which that system is embedded. That system may be a business or business community, the culture of an organized religious group, a national military, a political regime, or any of many others that constitute a society. The interlocking practices within the group constitute its culture, which continues and evolves over time even as membership changes.[61] Ramona Houmanfar, N. Joseph Rodrigues, and Todd Ward recently presented a relatively accessible model of the metacontingency, illustrated in figure 9.[62] This is a generalized depiction of the metacontingency processes discussed in chapter 4 (see figure 4 for specifics). Behavioural systems are open systems in continuous interaction with their environments. Within that context, a behavioural system operates through dynamically shifting sets of organized interactions within the system itself, including interlocking and coordinated actions, incentives, and motivating operations—the multitude of variables involved in establishing, maintaining, and renewing that system. In the almost universal case in which that system is in interdependent relationship with other groups or systems, the system produces outputs to which the environment responds.

Critical for our purpose here are those outputs that the population or other receiving systems desire (the right side of the figure). In the case of businesses, the output may be a product or a service directed toward consumers. In the case of the military, it may be the protection of the regime; the coordinated activities within the military system support the regime, which is interlocked with but distinct from the military in many, but not all, cases. In the case of the network of Buddhist monasteries of Burma, the output may be support, reassurance, education, and edification for the members of the population. Regardless of the specifics, if those outputs are well received, the persons or other systems receiving them provide incentives (consequences) for the



FIGURE 9. A schematic of the concept of metacontingency, as elaborated by Houmanfar, Rodrigues, and Ward

system to continue operating as it has been operating (i.e., profits to business; wages to the military; physical and spiritual support to the monasteries). If the outputs are not satisfactory, such incentives may be reduced or withheld. There is, therefore, a feedback loop between the system and its receiving environment. In disruptive noncooperation, the incentives that the focal system needs or desires are withheld. The receiving environment may also provide aversive consequences (penalties and fines, for example) to influence the focal system.

Challenges to Extinction Processes Affecting Behavioural Systems

While this model is conceptually elegant, the realities are complex, and we need to step inside these processes to explore them further. A company or an army does not, in fact, need or desire anything; what we are describing here is a systemic analogue to need or desire. The people within those systems do have individual needs and desires, but meeting those needs and desires requires the coordinated action of multiple parts of the system. A crucial addition in the Houmanfar, Rodrigues, and Ward model is an emphasis on the leadership of the focal system: these leaders (a) extract verbal rules explaining what is working, what is not, why, and how changes within the organization may change the consequences delivered by the receiving environment and (b) initiate change within the organization consistent with their analysis. If their understandings and predictions are accurate, and if the internal functioning of the system is efficient and effective, the outputs produced will be improved and refined. Both of these conditionals, however, can be problematic.

Extinction processes affecting behavioural systems can break down in numerous ways. Businesses fail, militaries lose campaigns or internal power, religious communities lose influence. Even entire nations and civilizations collapse.[63] Such collapse typically involves a lack of sensitivity to the feedback being provided by the receiving environment. The lack of sensitivity usually results from one of two issues: the failure to generate accurate statements of the connections between performance of the system and its results (rules), or internal malfunctioning. (Both are evident, for example, in the current global failure to recognize and address climate change; activism and resistance are likely to be necessary to adequate movement in that area.) It may be possible for the resistance group to influence either the generation of rules or the processes of internal functioning within target systems. At the same time, similar kinds of failure can occur within resistance movements.

One key in the generation of inaccurate understanding and predictions of results and how those results are received by the environment is the drag of the past discussed by Frances Fox Piven.[64] If interlocking practices within the focal system have historically produced positive or at least adequate results, those practices are often continued even when the environment changes. This is a partial explanation for the extinction burst: doing more of what has worked before commonly does resolve problems that arise. If the resistance community continues to deny oppressive systems what they need or want, eventually the new reality will be realized, leading to changes in practices—or the system will collapse. Extinction can be slow, however, because the well-established rules and the equivalence relations on which they frequently rely can become very rigid. Such rules and equivalences are often widely shared within the culture of a focal system and can stand in the way of effective change, even if the leadership recognizes the need to implement changes to meet the shifting responses of the receiving environment. Faulty rules and equivalence relations produced the drag of the past that prevented the AFL-CIO from succeeding in unionizing and obtaining a fair contract from growers, for example, while the new and creative United Farm Workers were not similarly constrained and could therefore be more immediately responsive to feedback while formulating novel rules.

As is the case for resistance cultures, the systems targeted by nonviolent liberation campaigns are, to a significant extent, self-organizing. This is important, because it means that many of the interactions among participants within the target system may be driven more by internal dynamics than by what produces the best outcomes for the system as a whole. Conflicts between persons or subsystems within the target system can produce countercontrol and escalating cycles of mutual coercion or punishment; competition may result in sabotage of efforts; personal relationships may provide incentives for practices that are inconsistent with organizational stability or survival. Such conflicts within the system may produce vulnerabilities on which the resistance movement can capitalize.

As an example, rules, equivalence relations, and self-organization are all active in the many cases in which units of the security forces defect from repressive regimes. Recall that Maria Stephan and Erica Chenoweth found that high levels of participation by the general population in campaigns of civil resistance dramatically increased the likelihood of such defections, and the defections in turn substantially increased the likelihood of success.[65] Defections occur when verbal processes (rules and equivalences) among the security forces shift to support solidarity with the grievance population rather than with the regime and when those shifts, rather than the instructions of the regime, begin to organize conversations and actions within the security forces (self-organization).

Historically, it appears that fraternization between resistance participants and members of the security forces promotes such changes by weakening equivalences supporting repressive acts.[66] The many examples in which security forces have refused to fire on populations suggest that such action is highly aversive to the participants and is less likely when members of security forces view themselves and members of the resistance as members of the same population (an equivalence). Interdependencies among security forces and other societal systems may further accelerate such changes; indeed, this is why many repressive regimes limit contact between those forces and the population. So long as the regime and security forces (a) share the perspective that oppressed groups are subhuman and dangerous (also equivalences), (b) share beliefs that stability can only be maintained through force (a rule), and (c) share and encourage such understandings among themselves (self-organization), responsiveness to extinction may be sluggish. The more those equivalences, rules, and internal processes can be weakened, the greater the potential sensitivity to extinction.

Interdependencies Among Behavioural Systems

Protest was certainly a major factor in the 1986 People Power revolution in the Philippines, but defection by a large portion of the military was crucial to its success. There were, in fact, many systems affecting the decisions of the military in this case, and those influences shifted over time.[67] Prior to the revolution, the military participated in a dense web of interactions with the Marcos regime and crony capitalists. Importantly, campaigns over two decades against armed insurgents (communist, Muslim, and “moderates” who had given up hope) tended to keep the military and the regime tightly interconnected both practically and in terms of verbal processes. The ultimate military defection—proximately influenced by shifts in equivalences, rules, and internal culture—was also shaped by the interactional field of groups and institutions within which the military was embedded. For example, if the Church has strong ties to the military, the grievance group might consider certain key questions: “How can we influence the Church? What do we have to offer?” (persuasion); “What elements of the Church are most amenable to our influence, and who could be influenced by those elements to in turn influence vulnerable members of the military leadership?”; or “What kind of protests or what forms of noncooperation, directed toward what elements of the Church, might lead those elements to work behind the scenes with dissidents in the military?”

In the case of the Philippines, the central dynamic options remained protest, persuasion, and noncooperation, but these now operated indirectly on the military through other systems, concurrent with direct options like fraternization. Such analyses can identify interactions that might be targeted for either strengthening or weakening. In a thorough assessment, the content of the interactions between the groups and the interlocking practices within each system would be examined and noted, drilling down to the deepest possible level of precision. While the long-time resistance movement by itself probably could not have shifted the interactions between the military and the regime, the resistance could work with and encourage other groups with which the military was interdependent. As dissatisfaction and resistance unfolded over the several years prior to the revolution, not just marginalized groups like peasants, the urban poor, and students but also centrist groups like the business community, moderate political opposition groups, human rights and other nongovernmental organizations, women's groups, and some Islamists joined the Church and other long-time opponents in demanding the end of Marcos's rule. Many of those groups were already interlocked with elements of the military or were in positions to build new interactional networks with them.

While the values of democracy no doubt had some influence on military leadership, there were clearly many other dynamics present. The increasing protests and noncooperation of large sectors of civil society progressively threatened the availability of the resources and incentives that maintained the regime and its cronies, and potentially those of the military itself, particularly after the 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino. Military leaders recognized that the consequences for themselves and those they commanded were shifting (new rules); their connections to the regime now threatened the loss of their power and standing in society. As the resistance progressively spread into most segments of the population, elements of the military in both the rank-and-file and the officer corps increasingly engaged with the resistance both through fraternization at protests and in behind-the-scenes contacts. The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) emerged, which quietly supported Corazon Aquino's candidacy in the "snap elections" called for by Marcos in 1986. At the same time, those leading the movement prepared for a military coup. Both external and internal interactions, then, shifted the practices within the military culture over a period of time; the resistance influenced both, directly and indirectly.

When enormous protests occurred as soon as Marcos claimed victory in the deeply corrupt election, it became clear to Defence Minister Juan Ponce

Enrile and Vice Chief of Staff General Fidel Ramos that the regime was unsustainable, and they initiated a military coup to support the election of Corazon Aquino. That armed coup, however, appeared to be headed for failure as Enrile and Ramos, with a small contingent of troops, were forced to take shelter in Camps Crane and Aguinaldo under threat of attack by Marcos's forces. But in what might seem a strange turnabout, the Church and many other elements of civil society came to the *nonviolent* defence of the defecting military units.

Even loyalist troops ultimately refused orders to engage the nonviolent citizenry, and after a few dramatic days, Marcos left the country under intense internal and international pressure. Until the end, however, international influence had been minimal, and Marcos continued to receive substantial military support from the United States. It was the disruptive noncooperation of the Filipino people, into which the military was now integrated, that ultimately led to liberation through shifts in the interlocking practices within behavioural systems and the operation of large-scale metacontingencies. The widespread participation of the population in disruptive noncooperation and protest at the end was key, but it was only one final step in the weakening of previously important networks of interactions and the strengthening of new ones.[68]

ADDITIONAL STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Before we leave the discussion of disruptive noncooperation, a few additional strategic examples offer important lessons about the dynamics of such disruption. Common behavioural systems dynamics across cases are clear, but so is the reminder that every campaign is unique.

Civil Rights Failure—and Success

There is considerable utility in contrasting successful and less successful cases of seemingly similar campaigns of civil resistance. David Cortright provides a succinct and valuable example in contrasting the failed civil rights campaign in Albany, Georgia, in 1961–62 and the successful campaign in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963.[69] Cortright notes that the two were similar in many ways:

under comparable conditions of oppression, they shared large boycotts and demonstrations, overall maintenance of nonviolent discipline, and common underlying issues and values. They varied, however, along several dimensions highly relevant to behavioural systems dynamics, with particular emphasis on strategic planning and flexibility under fire. The Birmingham campaign, in part learning from the failure in Albany, focused tightly on a bounded objective—the desegregation of downtown stores—for which campaigns of disruptive noncooperation were well suited. The Albany campaign, by contrast, pursued the more diffuse goal of ending segregation in general, resulting in unfocused resistance. Organizational unity and central leadership were also more tightly maintained in Birmingham than in Albany.

In addition, in Albany, the police maintained coolness under fire, a pattern worth analyzing in systems terms, which defused the power of the campaign.[70] The leaders of the Birmingham campaign (Dr. King, in particular) recognized that a more aggressive police response would garner more public attention and might leverage more power. In analyzing the local situation, the leaders believed that dramatic disruptive action, well executed, could evoke an excessive response from the local police and that such a response would be aversive to other actors, locally and nationally, who were in positions to influence decisions to end segregation—an example of Sharp's political ju-jitsu. The leaders essentially used a process similar to the force field and interdependency analyses discussed in chapter 4 to develop their strategic plan. In the event, Police Chief Bull Connor turned firehoses, dogs, and brutal police on participants in a march that included large numbers of schoolchildren—and the success of the campaign was assured.

The Limits of Boycotts

In another example, Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers (UFW) boycotts were initially highly successful, but sustaining those successes over time proved difficult.[71] The UFW strategy relied on achieving widespread national participation in the boycotts. As interactions among the UFW, individual corporations, and the Teamsters shifted, the UFW attempted to use targeted boycotts (for example, boycotting only Gallo among the companies harvesting and using wine grapes, or lettuce from only certain growers) and to stop and restart boycotts over time depending on responses from growers. A single, continuing boycott of table grapes proved very powerful, but more complex and discontinuous national boycotts turned out to be unsustainable. Confused, many people (including some of my own acquaintances) simply boycotted grapes, lettuce, and Gallo for a decade without knowing whether it was time to buy or boycott, while others simply gave up. The behavioural systems issues here are clear: without precise reinforcement and extinction contingencies, the impact on growers and distributors was blunted. The UFW could ensure neither that boycotts would occur when the opponent failed to cooperate nor that consumption could be turned back on when they did.

The Salt of the Earth Strike

The strike of the largely Mexican American Mine Mill and Smelter Workers Local 890 against Empire Zinc Mining Company in Hanover, New Mexico, from 1950 to 1952 is a much less widely known struggle, although it was immortalized in the movie *Salt of the Earth* (banned in the United States when it was released in 1953) and in a later book.[72] This was much more than a campaign for higher wages, although the Mexican workers who did the dangerous work underground were paid only about half of what surface workers (most of them white) were. The union also demanded the end of segregated facilities (washrooms, toilets, housing) as well as indoor plumbing, benefits, and, in general, treatment consistent with current mining standards in the state. The union maintained a well-organized strike for seven months, but eventually the company brought in strikebreakers supported by sheriff's officers and was able to obtain a court injunction against further picketing.

This is when the case becomes particularly interesting, given the anti-union, Red Scare times; the high levels of exploitation of the Mexican American population; and the low social position of Mexican American women within their own culture and in general. When it became clear that the men could not maintain the picket lines given the certainty of jail, the spouses of the miners insisted that they be permitted to take over picketing (over the considerable objections of their husbands). Women—and in some cases, their children—sometimes filled the jails but, given the values of the time, were not held for extended periods as their husbands would have been. Scattered violence against them did not deter the women, who stood their ground and maintained the strike for another seven months. Still, as Larry Salomon reports, the union was losing the local public relations battle, in substantial part because of the depth of racism present. The editor of the local paper, for example, wrote, "Mexico, of course, is poverty stricken because its early settlers lost their identity in a Mestizo melting pot that lowered the general level of culture to a point little above that of the swarming aborigines."[73]

Company violence escalated, and the women defended themselves, by their own statement, with knitting needles, safety pins, straight pins, chili peppers (to the eyes), and rotten eggs. Nonetheless, the woman soldiered on. As the struggle began to attract national attention, the governor took action to resolve it. While he apparently acted in support of the company, the outcome was arbitration in which the union achieved many of its goals. As Salomon describes it,

> Though they were loathe to admit it, the company gave in to many of Local 890's key demands, including substantial wage increases that made the hourly pay among the highest in the district and some very important benefits, particularly in health and accident insurance and holiday and vacation pay. The union also won the right to negotiate rates for new jobs and for workers to use grievance procedures during their probationary period. . . . The new contract . . . also allowed all strikers to return to work with full seniority rights. Even though not spelled out in the contract, the workers and their families soon discovered that the company would install modern plumbing in their homes.[74]

This case speaks to many of the principles of effective disruptive noncooperation, while reminding us of the importance of unity, nonviolent discipline, creativity, and flexibility. It also emphasizes the power of women and the importance of drawing on the strengths of all groups in the community in efforts to achieve justice and liberation. Resonant with the later UFW struggle, one Local 890 worker stated, "I moved from thinking it was a union struggle to realizing it was a struggle of the whole people."[75] Clearly, civil resistance can leverage enormous power for liberation, even under what may appear to be hopeless conditions, because final power lies in the population's participation in interdependent behavioural systems of oppression—or of liberation.

In circumstances under which extinction processes can disrupt ongoing interdependencies, the power of disruptive noncooperation is amply evident. In most cases, however, other strategic options—in particular, persuasion and protest—need to be integrated into resistance campaigns. Wherever possible, a concurrent campaign of constructive noncooperation further leverages the power of the resistance and reduces that of the opponent. In addition, both theory and history have established that two other strategic possibilities are available, which are discussed in the next chapter. The first is resource disruption. In order to continue to function, complex oppressive systems require a range of resources from their environment, and there are times when disrupting the flow of such resources can be very powerful. The second option, which is seldom the preferred choice but should be noted, is that of retaliation, which is intended to reduce the oppressive practices of the opponent—an analogue of punishment used to reduce undesirable behaviour in an individual. After considering these two remaining options, we will turn, in the final chapter, to the integration of all of the strategic options.

10

RESOURCE DISRUPTION AND RETALIATION

> In almost any serious nonviolent struggle, one has to resort to obstructive action. . . . It is quite possible to frustrate another's action without doing him injury. . . . To impose upon another man's freedom to kill, or his freedom to help to kill, to recruit to kill, is not to violate his person in a fundamental way.
>
> — Barbara Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*

Thus far, we have explored four functionally distinct strategic options for nonviolent struggle:

- *Constructive noncooperation,* in which the resistance movement builds a relatively autonomous and just society within the shell of the old
- *Protest* and *persuasion*, which attempt to induce persons or classes of actors to act by shifting equivalence relations, rules, and incentives, both positive and aversive
- *Disruptive noncooperation*, which emphasizes disrupting or ending repression primarily through withdrawing or withholding cooperation, usually paired with the offer of incentives for positive alternative actions

Although historically, those options have been the most powerful nonviolent strategies, two significant alternatives remain to be discussed. Both are active methods that fall within Sharp's classification of "nonviolent intervention." The central dynamic in the first is disruption of resources and conditions that keep the repressive system operating. Larger sociocultural and natural realities (like International Monetary Fund loans, the presence of other resistance campaigns in the region, or the weather) are examples of what I am calling "conditions"; these often cannot be significantly influenced by the resistance, but there are exceptions. In most cases, what can be manipulated is the availability of resources (for example, communication systems, personnel, or armaments). It is important to realize, however, that while the disruption of resources can be powerful, the opponent's inclination to continue oppressive actions is usually not reduced through such interference. If the disruption caused by blocking the opponent's resources is erratic or cannot be sustained over time, the return and possible retaliatory escalation of repression is likely. Nonetheless, disruptions of this kind can be valuable when integrated with other strategic options.

A second form of active intervention, retaliation*,* is much less common in organized nonviolent struggle, although contemporary societies and nation-states rely heavily on retaliation for purposes of social control. Campaigns of retaliation appear to be emerging now in more intentional ways than has been the case in the past, however. Retaliation (technically, punishment) is based in well-studied processes of reducing behaviour. There are good reasons, both empirical and theoretical, for caution in relying on this strategy. Still, our discussion will not be scientifically or historically complete unless this option is considered.

Resource disruption and retaliation are functionally distinct from other methods of nonviolent struggle that are often thought of as "active" interventions. They clearly differ from most of the options termed "direct action" in the literature.[1] Most forms of direct action would be classified functionally as protest or persuasion, since the disruption of resources, if it occurs at all in direct action, is generally very short term. Most forms of direct action are symbolic—but recall from chapter 8 that what have been called symbolic actions are often designed to change values and attitudes (equivalence relations), shift predictions about consequences of action (rules), or actively change behaviour.

While resource disruption and retaliation would both be classified as nonviolent intervention in Sharp's taxonomy, functionally, there is considerable variation within this class.[2] Most of the methods that Sharp categorizes as nonviolent intervention I would classify as methods of protest or noncooperation (disruptive or constructive). A brief look at several of Sharp's examples of nonviolent intervention may serve as a useful review and help to clarify how resource disruption, retaliation, and other functional categories differ from one another.

Sharp makes a distinction between what he terms "nonviolent interjection" and "nonviolent obstruction," while listing both as forms of nonviolent intervention. He describes interjection as "placing one's body between a person and the objective of his work or activity."[3] In such cases, the "interjection does not constitute a sufficiently large or extensive physical obstruction that it cannot be overcome, removed, or surmounted."[4] He gives the example of standing in front of a vehicle in order to persuade the operator not to continue—which establishes a threat of a potentially aversive outcome unless the operator changes his behaviour. This is a relatively powerful form of protest, but it does not physically prevent the operator from driving over the person blocking the vehicle. In obstruction, by contrast, a large number of people might collectively block an opponent from entering a government building, so many that the opponent cannot simply walk through the crowd. This type of obstruction denies opponents access to resources they need to operate as usual. It should be noted, however, that such obstruction has generally been short-lived except under exceptional circumstances; functionally, therefore, it has usually been used primarily as a form of protest.[5]

The 1969–71 occupation of Alcatraz Island by American Indians is another of Sharp's examples of nonviolent intervention, although one that did not involve direct interference with the opponent. The Alcatraz penitentiary had been closed some years earlier, and the land had been declared surplus property, which the protesters claimed on the basis of treaty obligations. Because the island was no longer in use, apart from some law enforcement costs, government operations were only minimally affected by the occupation. Functionally, the occupation was primarily an example of protest, intended to embarrass the US government, rather than of interference. At the same time, the campaign also focused on persuading Native people and the general public of the injustice involved in ignoring such obligations. In other cases, occupation has in fact denied an oppressive system the resources needed to operate, at least for a time. An example is the actions of Czech officials and legislators who occupied their accustomed space and continued their regular work, thereby obstructing a Russian takeover of the government for a time during the 1968 rebellion.[6] This latter example is a case of resource disruption in the functional framework used in this book.

Intentionally associating with African Americans was a powerful and controversial action taken by some abolitionists in the 1830s. Actions included "interdining," accompanying African Americans down the street ("walk-alongs"), worshipping together, and inviting African Americans into one's home. Sharp also makes note of similar actions in modern India. He includes these actions in the class of active interventions, but, functionally, they are examples of constructive noncooperation—an action that one believes is right regardless of its consequences and that marks a step toward constructing a different kind of society. Sharp's examples of selective patronage, including patronizing nonsegregated transportation facilities and purchasing locally made goods rather than those that support the oppressor, are also examples of constructive actions.[7] Similarly, in cases of nonviolent land seizure, oppressed populations, with the intent of a "de facto change of ownership and control," take over land that has been claimed (is "owned") by members of an oppressive elite.[8] Although multiple functions are performed here, this is also most accurately classified as an example of constructive noncooperation, as participants are acting with the intent of holding and using the land, not primarily as a protest.

The "stay-in" (sit-down) strike as described by Sharp involves several dynamics: it certainly functions, to some extent, as protest and perhaps as interruption of resources, but it is primarily a form of disruptive noncooperation. Other actions classed by Sharp as nonviolent intervention do fit functionally into the class of active disruption of resources, as noted below. The central point here, though, is that the inclusion of such functionally distinct methods under the single heading of nonviolent intervention appears to create a category that is too broad and heterogeneous to capture the specific systems dynamics involved. Note that Sharp recognized that his listing of methods of active intervention was provisional and that alternative classifications, such as those proposed here, could be valuable.[9]

DISRUPTION OF ESSENTIAL AND FACILITATING RESOURCES

The dynamics underlying the interruption of essential and facilitating resources for repression are relatively straightforward. It is often not possible for a person or collective to act in the absence of certain physical, human, environmental, or financial resources. Although the motivating context and, particularly, the balance of positive and aversive consequences are always central to the analysis of action, essential and facilitating resources are also often crucial, and their disruption can be powerful. Figure 10 illustrates the role of such resources (while the empty boxes serve to remind us that resources and conditions alone are not adequate to leverage change). Initiating an attack, for instance, requires troops, weapons, food, and other supplies; the availability of each of these resources is an essential condition for action. The weather can either ease or hamper attacks and can thus be a facilitating condition. While weather cannot be changed, activities can be scheduled at times when weather is more likely to be favourable for one's own side.

During the US Civil War, as noted by Frances Fox Piven, "hundreds of thousands of slaves refused to work and deserted the plantations, crippling the Confederacy's ability to feed itself or its army."[10] (Many of those slaves subsequently fought for the Union.) As a work stoppage, this action looked, on the surface, much like a strike. The dynamics were more complex, however, since not only were the rewards of repression being withheld but, more powerfully, the refusal also made military action impossible or much more difficult. Military action requires personnel, food, transportation, and weapons, for example—essential conditions for action. Finding ways to block the availability of those resources, if successful and sustained, can be a very powerful option. In some cases, resources may not be absolutely essential to maintaining domination and oppression but may facilitate doing so. For example, transportation is often critical for moving security forces to where they are needed; improved equipment and transportation routes facilitate doing so. Slowing the opponent down at some points may be of use, even if it does not entirely block his movements. Similarly, disruption of communications, including command-and-control systems, may make it


Motivating Context
Practice:
Initiating attack
Class of Actor:
Confederate general
Essential and Facilitating Resources and Conditions
• Troops available
• Weapons available
• Supplies available
• Transportation available
• Intelligence available
• Weather conditions
Positive Consequences
Aversive Consequences

FIGURE 10. Illustration of the importance of essential and facilitating resources and conditions to an opponent's action

more difficult for the opponent to proceed. Depriving the opponent of essential resources is more powerful, but disruption of facilitating antecedents to action can also be of use.

Sharp offers several examples of intervention involving the active disruption of such resources and conditions. For example, overloading administrative systems "by excessive compliance . . . making an excessive number of enquiries . . . or providing excessive numbers of suggestions, protests, or statements" interrupts the functions required to support an oppressive system.[11] Overwhelming telephone lines and other communications systems beyond their capacities can have a similar impact.

Sabotage is one form of active disruption. The discussion of sabotage and property damage in chapter 2 will not be repeated here except to note that where and if sabotage is justified—perhaps only in cases of damaging or destroying parts of what Deming called the death machine itself—its power lies in the direct disruption of resources and conditions required to sustain oppression. Often, the disruption of resources of whatever kind can produce only temporary results, and it is therefore unlikely on its own to end an oppressive regime or occupation. At the same time, in limiting the availability of facilitating or essential antecedents at key moments, a resistance movement, at a minimum, makes the functioning of that regime or occupation more costly and may open space to initiate other forms of resistance.

The Behavioural Systems Dynamics of the Disruption of Resources

Most behaviours require the availability of some resources (essential resources) or are easier to perform given the availability of certain resources (facilitating resources). For example, jumping rope requires a rope (technically, an operandum). Travelling from New York to Seattle is much easier given the availability of a means of transportation and a means of paying the related expenses (facilitating resources), although one could walk, given adequate health (itself a facilitating condition). Adequate resources are as important for supporting acts of resistance (as in the example of an Afghan girl attending school discussed in chapter 4) as they are to supporting oppression, so analysis of necessary and facilitating resources for civil resistance is one valuable dimension for strategic planning.

Behaviour systems that serve as pillars of support for oppressive actions typically do so through the provision of essential and facilitating resources for action. Strategic analysis of the opponent's acts of oppression (and repression), therefore, involves the examination not only of the motivating context and consequences (positive and aversive) but also of supporting resources. Consider again figure 10, in which several essential resources and conditions are noted. In this example, the Confederate general (or a cadre of senior officers) plans and orders the attack. Many of the essential or facilitating resources and conditions listed, however, are supplied by other behavioural systems. A network of recruiters is required to supply troops; the actions of these recruiters are supported by a complex set of events and conditions that constitute a motivating context, by a set of incentives (positive consequences), and by the recruiters' own set of essential and facilitating conditions. A diagram similar to figure 10 could therefore be developed to analyze the variables that support the actions of the recruiters.

Similarly, the officers who are planning and ordering the attack do not produce, supply, or provide the weapons, or the funding for the weapons required to support the attack. A number of interlocking behavioural systems are required, including mining, production, distribution, and financial systems. Most of those interlocking systems include their own interlocking subsystems. For example, a mining company (a system) includes subsystems such as management, purchasing, maintenance, production, and other divisions or departments, all of which are necessary to produce the ore needed for weapons systems. The actions of each class of actors within those subsystems can be analyzed using diagrams like the one in figure 10, and the interlocking actions of multiple classes of actors within those interlocking systems can be analyzed using an approach like that sketched in figures 3, 6, and 7. The more thorough such analyses, the more possible points may emerge for nonviolent persuasion, protest, disruption, and intervention.

Robert Helvey's work focuses attention on important resources that sustain and support repressive regimes and need to be considered in strategic planning.[12] The additional contribution of behavioural systems analysis is the explicit, functional analysis of the full range of, and interactional interlocks among, such resources with the goal of maximizing the identification of potential leverage points. Such analysis begins by identifying resources (we will call them A, B, and C) required by the opponent to sustain oppression or to make oppressive acts easier to perform. Those on the ground who know the local situation will probably find it relatively easy to prepare an initial list, although much can also be learned from the experiences of other struggles. (Consistent with a scientific approach, the list will be tentative, subject to modification as the campaign unfolds.)

Once resources have been listed, the systems that contribute to the availability of each can be explored—for example, systems X (say, farmers), Y (truckers), and Z (distributors) contribute to the availability of resource A (say, food). If the resistance movement has direct potential influence on truckers, the strategic direction is clear: act to change the practices of truckers so that food is not made available to the opponent to support security forces. If the resistance does not have direct potential influence on truckers, the next step is to identify the systems that support the practices of truckers—perhaps fuel distributors and labour union leaders—to determine whether one or more of those systems can be impacted in ways that will block the resources that truckers need to provide food or to discourage them from doing so. This kind of process has been used extensively in nonviolent struggle; the suggestion here is to be as exhaustive and explicit in the analysis as possible, guided by established theory. Two examples in which interrupting essential or facilitating conditions served as one important dimension of overall strategic plans follow.

The Iranian revolution of 1977–79

Details of the Iranian revolution that overthrew Shah Reza Pahlavi and resulted in an Islamist state under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini are not widely known in the West.[13] The Shah had come to power in 1941. He was removed in a struggle for democracy in 1953, but returned in a coup supported by the CIA and MI6 later that year. The revolution that began fourteen years later is a successful example of nonviolent struggle, although on the surface, it is an apparent anomaly in that it led to a repressive theocracy rather than the democratic outcome commonly characteristic of nonviolent struggles. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan suggest that this replacement of one repressive regime for another was in part due to the lack of a widely shared vision of the future, except among the highly organized Islamist groups.[14] Furthermore, the presence of both leftist and Islamist guerrilla movements "gave the new regime a pretext for purging the society of its secularist voices of dissent" in the face of these armed threats.[15] Recall the data reported by Chenoweth and Stephan indicating that concurrent violent campaigns tend to weaken nonviolent struggle.[16]

The revolution overall was extraordinarily well organized and orchestrated under the close supervision of Khomeini and his close supporters. Because the Shah had successfully suppressed the development of many of the usual networks of civil society, the mosques and their associated neighbourhood religious associations (many organized by the *bazaari*—merchants and workers in the bazaars) were the primary behavioural systems available to drive the revolution. Many other groups participated, however, including intellectuals and students, the middle class and professionals, unions, and leftists. Each of these groups had their own reasons for opposing the Shah and participating in what became one of the most widespread campaigns of organized civil resistance in history.[17]

Khomeini demanded that resistance activities remain nonviolent, not out of moral conviction (he later supported the use of violence in maintaining the regime) but for practical reasons: as in many other nonviolent struggles, the resistance could not muster the military resources that would be required to successfully challenge those of the Shah. Khomeini believed that nonviolent methods could be powerful under existing circumstances and had an obvious command of the dynamics of such methods. The enormous tide of popular resistance was carefully and strategically orchestrated, unlike many struggles in which populations take to the streets out of frustration without an overall strategic analysis and plan.

The revolution drew on many different nonviolent methods and strategic options, including cycling between mass protest and nearly universal disruptive noncooperation through general strikes, construction of a parallel government, initiation of targeted strikes at key moments, and organization of mass memorials for those who died in the struggle. Earlier constructive efforts in the 1960s and 1970s appear to have built a level of respect among the population for the Islamists. In a final confrontation between mutineers and the Imperial Guard, large numbers of civilians shielded the mutineers, presaging similar action in the Philippines seven years later. Throughout the revolution, violent repression by the Shah's regime hardened the resistance and increased the extent of public participation, particularly in acts of disruptive noncooperation.[18]

There is a great deal to be learned, both positive and cautionary, from careful study of this campaign. For our purposes here, however, we focus on the interruption of crucial resources required to maintain repression in Iran, foremost but not exclusively the loyalty of the Shah's security forces. As Ervand Abrahamian explains, "Some speculate that the Shah left at the urging of the White House. But a far more likely reason was that he realized that he had lost control not only of the streets but also the military. Soldiers were refusing orders, deserting, fraternizing with demonstrators, handing over weapons to them, and even firing on gung-ho officers."[19] Abrahamian also cites a report from General Abbas Qarabaghi, the Iranian minister of the interior at the time, that field commanders were afraid to issue ammunition to tank officers after the Black Friday massacre of civilians, fearing further mutiny.[20] In addition, he notes that, according to a report in the *New York Times,* "the main reason the Shah pulled troops off the streets . . . was the 'fear that young soldiers, nearly all conscripts, would not follow orders and shoot.'"[21] Chenoweth and Stephan do not see the loss of control of security forces as the central dynamic for the campaign's success, however, viewing the level of mass participation in disruption as more powerful. Nonetheless, their analysis also indicates that, as in so many other nonviolent campaigns, the lack of troops that could be relied on to follow orders was a crucial factor in the outcome.[22]

In order to maintain his regime, the Shah required reliable troops; the availability of such troops was, therefore, an essential condition for repression and survival. While security forces defect in many nonviolent campaigns, in this case, the loss of loyalty was not fortuitous or accidental. Khomeini and his supporters waged a deliberate campaign to draw individuals and units of the security forces (behavioural systems) away from the Shah through direct persuasion, advocacy, and efforts to shift equivalence relations.[23] Among the intentional efforts to bring security forces over to the resistance reported by Chenoweth and Stephan as well as by Abrahamian were the following:[24]

- Instructions to resisters to avoid antagonizing (in some cases, by marching in silence) and to remain respectful to security forces during protests
- Meetings of opposition leaders with security officials to ask for cooperation
- Calls to security forces by Khomeini himself to "renew your bonds with the beloved people and refuse to go on slaughtering your children and brothers for the sake of the whims of this family of bandits"[25]
- Extensive, intentional fraternization efforts, including distributing flowers to soldiers along with messages of solidarity
- Assistance to security force deserters
- Intentional deployment of soldiers by sympathetic officers to places where fraternization was likely
- Prevention of protesters from using inflammatory slogans like "Death to the Shah"—slogans that threaten not only the opponent but the forces supporting him

Reducing the availability of reliable troops was just one (crucially important) instance of the use of the interruption of essential resources and conditions in the Iranian revolution. In another example, reported by Chenoweth and Stephan, "workers at Iran's electrical facilities began cutting off power for two hours each night in order to disrupt the state-run evening news and to offer the cover of darkness to protestors who were violating the 8:00 p.m. curfew."[26] The news, a potentially crucial means of manipulating public opinion and hopes, could not be broadcast without the availability of electricity. In this case, while state-run media could not be directly influenced by the resistance, they could not broadcast in support of the oppressive regime without electricity (an essential resource). Electricity was controlled by collectives (behavioural systems) that could be influenced by, and ultimately joined, the resistance. Similarly, it was much more difficult for security forces to enforce the curfew without light (a facilitating condition). Note that, as in many other cases discussed here, multiple methods were strategically interwoven into an integrated overall campaign, the intentional interruption of essential and facilitating conditions among them.

The Brazilian Church-state crisis of 1980

The deportation of an Italian priest, Padre Vito Miracapillo, on November 1, 1980, pushed the long-deteriorating relationship between the Brazilian military dictatorship and the Catholic Church to a crisis point. The unfolding of the crisis contributed in crucial ways to the movement toward democratic elections four years later and the subsequent withdrawal of the military from politics. The outcome of these events was shaped by a specific set of conditions, summarized by Daniel Zirker as

> the nonviolent tactics of Liberation Theology as practiced in Brazil, based in large measure on the writings of such Brazilian theologians as Leonardo Boff and apparent in the practice of millions of members of Brazil's basic communities [small Catholic communities occasionally visited by clergy]; the socially explosive conditions of poverty in Padre Vito's parish and in the Northeast in general; the growing vulnerability of the dictatorship and its principal ideological supporters, the large landowners, to the nonviolent strategy of publicly questioning the legitimacy of the dictatorship; . . . the Brazilian Church's overwhelming dependence upon foreign clergy; the propensity of foreign clergy to embrace the tenets of Brazilian nonviolent Liberation Theology; and the churches' previous two decades of commitment to the rights and needs of the poor.[27]

Because of the domination of the Catholic Church by the imperial government and later by the military, the number of Brazilian clergy had, since the late 1880s, been limited. The rural, underdeveloped areas, in particular, relied heavily on foreign priests and other religious workers, who were motivated by the desire to do mission work. When faced with the conditions of extreme poverty that they found, many quickly embraced liberation theology, often challenging widespread human rights abuses and the unjust land tenure system. The government, at several points, attempted to expel foreign clergy, often accusing them of Marxist sympathies that threatened the country. The Church hierarchy, meanwhile, continued to rely on them to maintain the institution and, increasingly, came to support their political positions as well. Kirker notes that tensions between the government and the Church were further exacerbated by the Church's public questioning of the "internationalist" economic perspective of the regime, which supported large landowners and the economic elite while leaving many in deep poverty and hopelessness.

The full history and story of the Church-led nonviolent struggle of 1980, which prepared the ground for the successful campaign of 1984–85, has much to teach and is worth careful study.[28] Our more limited purpose here, however, is to explore the tactical utility of resource disruption. By late 1980, the crisis between the government and the Church had become very serious. For example, the National Conference of Brazilian Bishops described the land tenure system, about which the Church had previously seemed ambivalent, in the strongest possible terms: "The usury of the land tenure, exacerbated by an archaic land [ownership] structure and the Brazilian economic model—exclusive, concentrated and dependent—generates hunger and disease, forced migrations, lack of production and productivity, precariousness in housing, arbitrary imprisonment, injustices and other forms of oppression against the human person."[29]

In response, the regime portrayed the Church, particularly the foreign clergy and base communities, as having been infiltrated by Marxist ideology and agents. The situation deteriorated to the point where the primary argument the regime could muster for its legitimacy was protecting the nation against Marxist subversion. In order for this argument to be persuasive, the government required an adversary (the Church) that could reasonably be suspected of Marxist leanings. *In fact, having such an adversary available had become an essential condition for suppression and violations of human rights.* Recognizing this, the Church unexpectedly acted to disrupt this condition, moving institutionally toward the centre through strong, coordinated statements that maintained its full commitment to a preferential option for the poor and to human liberation while emphasizing in word and action that Catholic theology and Marxist ideas were entirely incompatible. This shift simultaneously strengthened the Church's support among the middle class without losing the support of the poor and significantly weakened the government's legitimacy and freedom to act. Mass nonviolent resistance grew; four years later, the military dictatorship could no longer sustain its power—the necessary resources and conditions it required to do so were no longer available.

Third-Party Disruption and Provision of Resources

The involvement of third parties such as other nations has long been viewed as a relatively weak factor in the outcome of campaigns of nonviolent struggle, and Chenoweth and Stephan's data confirm that hypothesis.[30] In most cases, sanctions by third parties appear to have made little difference on the outcome of nonviolent campaigns. Third parties can sometimes be useful or harmful, however, through the provision or withholding of structural or facilitating resources. Denying resources like weapons to repressive regimes, for example, can be helpful and should be encouraged where possible. (Arguably, denying weapons to violent insurgencies where civil resistance may prove a more promising strategy than providing them, so long as accompanied by resources that could support nonviolent resistance.)[31] At any rate, the support of third parties tends to be unreliable at times when the economic or political interests of those third parties conflict with those of the resistance movement—a common circumstance at some point in most campaigns.

Chenoweth and Stephan found that aid from outside is commonly not a major factor in the success of resistance campaigns, although modest support for communication and campaign resources may be of value. Their review indicates that large-scale international boycotts like those directed toward the South African apartheid regime can be helpful, as can diplomatic support for human rights and opposition groups.[32] They recommend the open-access *A Diplomat's Handbook for Democracy Development Support* (diplomatshandbook.org), which offers other useful suggestions. Overall, it has become clear that third parties can have some impact on the success of liberation movements and should be encouraged to do so in ways that are consistent with the available evidence; at the same time, history indicates that grievance populations ultimately must rely primarily on themselves.

STRATEGIC RETALIATION

As emphasized in chapter 9, most methods of nonviolent struggle focusing on decelerating the level of repression rely on the dynamics of extinction—usually in tandem with differential reinforcement of desired alternatives. It is theoretically possible, however, to decelerate behaviour using a different process: retaliation (technically, punishment). Retaliation would involve the grievance group systematically injuring the opponent in some way (perhaps through organizing a disruptive demonstration that embarrasses the opponent) or taking away something the opponent wants (perhaps through sabotage) when the opponent takes oppressive action. Very little such *systematic* retaliation is apparent in the history of nonviolent struggle, however. Nonsystematic retaliation (for example, property destruction out of frustration), while common, does not appear to leverage significant power. The general weakness of retaliation, whether in nonviolent or violent campaigns, is clear; the available research indicates that retaliation against terrorist acts, and retaliation in response to collective violence in general, is usually ineffective.[33] Gene Sharp notes that B. F. Skinner, from whose work behavioural systems science originated, and Gandhi agreed that retaliation (counterviolence and other forms of punishment) is a poor choice for bringing about change.[34] Sharp writes: “Speaking of ‘the threat of force’ to control behaviour, Skinner, in his novel *Walden Two* through the character T. E. Frazier, said that although retribution and revenge are natural, ‘. . . in the long run the man we strike is no less likely to repeat his act.’ He’ll still *tend* to repeat it. He’ll *want* to repeat it. We haven’t really altered his potential behavior at all.’”[35] Skinner repeated this warning about the limitations of retaliation throughout his decades of work.[36] Gandhi consistently promoted the same messages—for example, in stating, “Violence always thrived on counterviolence.”[37]

The question of retaliation is one on which established science is clear. Although the explanation may seem like common sense, retaliation (“an eye for an eye") has been so deeply institutionalized in some religious and many cultural traditions that persuasion through explanation is necessary. Retaliation is usually a weak intervention for three reasons that are clear in the behavioural science literature.[38] First, implementing punishment effectively is difficult and costly. As Skinner pointed out, punishment does not reduce the opponent's inclination to oppress and exploit, so even if it is effective in the moment, constant surveillance is required to ensure that retaliation occurs systematically and continuously after instances of oppression. If punishment occurs only intermittently, not only is it demonstrably ineffective, but perhaps counterintuitively it tends to strengthen the undesirable action since that action sometimes pays off. But retaliation to every instance of undesirable action is generally unrealistic.

Second, retaliation tends to encourage escalating cycles of retaliation on each side, often moving toward more severe violence, thus increasing risk and damage with no assurance (in fact, little likelihood) of success. This consistent finding appears to account for Chenoweth and Stephan's finding that armed insurgencies have produced poor results.[39] Finally, the side effects of punishment (a relatively intense form of coercion)—which include anger, countercoercion, suppression, rigidity, and immobilization—often defeat its ultimate purpose: to achieve positive action by the opponent.[40] Such positive action, whether conversion, accommodation, or surrender, is less likely following campaigns of retaliation.[41]

The Internet age offers new opportunities for retaliation from a distance, potentially anonymously. In a recent summary in the *Washington Post*, futurist and blogger Dominic Basulto stated that "the Internet attacks of 'hacktivist' organizations this year have shown that nonviolent retaliation gets a more immediate response than nonviolent demonstration."[42] Basulto suggests that "freezing bank accounts, flooding Web sites with denial-of-service attacks, releasing sensitive records to the public, publicizing home addresses of officials, and wreaking havoc with popular social media accounts are all nonviolent steps that appear to strike more fear into the hearts of government officials" than do traditional nonviolent techniques.[43] He presents Internet-based retaliatory techniques as tactics than can be used to punish undesirable actions by individuals, institutions, and governments. (For example, if campus police pepper-spray protesters, anonymous hacktivists attack the officer or the university electronically in retaliation.)

It is too soon to fully evaluate the impact of such tactics. It is probably broadly true that electronic retaliation can, in the short term, “strike more fear into the hearts” of opponents than can noncooperation, persuasion, or protest. Shooting back, bombing, and many other forms of retaliation also evoke fear but are generally ineffective. So far, however, there is no evidence that the basic behavioural principles of punishment will not apply to punishment of the digital kind, including the probability of the opponent escalating his attacks. Governments are presenting electronic attacks like denial-of-service as potentially serious security threats (a new equivalence relation).[44] Such retaliation may therefore escalate hostilities and alienate the support of the broader population.

Concerns raised above in reference to sabotage, especially lack of transparency, also apply here. Experience continues to suggest that standing publicly against injustice and enduring the consequences are among the central effective dynamics in nonviolent struggle because of their impact on potential allies, on the resistance community itself, and, often, on the opponent’s pillars of support. The power of living in truth is, in part, its public nature, which challenges others to respond in kind. Anonymous electronic attacks do not share this characteristic and thus may be viewed as secret and sinister or as mere pranks lacking the gravity of campaigns for justice. There is room for further research into the potential and impact of retaliation, including electronic retaliation, but at present, such action appears unpromising either as a short-term tactic or as a strategic choice in nonviolent struggle.

We have now examined the full range of functional, strategic alternatives for nonviolent resistance to oppression, repression, and systematic violations of human rights: constructive noncooperation, persuasion, protest, disruptive noncooperation, resource disruption, and retaliation. In the final chapter I summarize where we have been, what we know, and how, in the future, we can use behavioural systems science to more systematically study and effectively actualize nonviolent resistance.

11

TOWARD "UNDREAMT OF" DISCOVERIES

> We are constantly being astonished these days at the amazing discoveries in the field of violence. But I maintain that far more undreamt of and seemingly impossible discoveries will be made in the field of nonviolence.
>
> — Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Collected Works, Vol. 72*

Ours is a world of injustice, whether in the most disadvantaged parts of the world or in the most advantaged, as Chris Hedges and Joe Sacco dramatically insist in *Days of Destruction, Days of Revolt*.[1] Human-caused climate change and environmental degradation are pushing the earth toward disaster, at least as a habitat for human beings and many other organisms—a situation that political structures appear powerless to address. In his discussions of the most devastated communities in the United States, victims of corporate greed and political failure, Hedges suggests that only civil resistance, only nonviolent struggle, can shift these global directions. The history of civil resistance movements indeed appears to confirm that nonviolent action is the most hopeful available option for dealing with serious injustices and repressive regimes.[2] Yet the challenges are great: such resistance does not always work as hoped, choosing the best strategic options for particular conditions remains difficult, the power of nonviolent alternatives is commonly unknown or ignored in critical policy circles, and the very notion of such resistance is widely viewed as unrealistically romantic—a view encouraged by those who recognize the true threat of people power to existing power structures. There is much more work to be done.

The overall, and admittedly controversial, thesis of this volume is that the route to Gandhi's "undreamt of and seemingly impossible discoveries" will lie not in naïve idealism but in rigorous science.[3] This science is "yet taking shape," to use Gandhi's words; he added, "There is a wide scope for research and experiment in this field."[4] An adequate science of nonviolent resistance will not be a simple one, but the thesis here is that an ecological science grounded in the science of behaviour and behavioural systems science has both austere elegance and exceptional power. Marston Bates's classic model for an ecological science, elaborated in *The Nature of Natural History*, fits well with this approach. Bates suggests that three methodologies are required to capture the complexities of interlocking ecological phenomena: rigorous observation, the elaboration of conceptual and theoretical frameworks consistent with those observations, and experimental field testing of hypotheses suggested by those conceptual frameworks.[5] But his model is not linear: he argues that ecological sciences require that those methods be used iteratively and recursively.[6]

Most of the work that has been done in the area of nonviolent struggle has been observational; we have rich databases of historical cases available for study, considerable primary data on which to draw, and many documented personal accounts. By itself, observation produces rich anecdote but usually only limited generalizable knowledge. As a result, nonviolent struggle continues to be limited by the drag of the past: resistance movements tend to repeat what has worked in the past without a clear understanding of the quality of the fit between known tactics and strategies and the dynamics of current realities.[7] There are at least two potentially valuable directions for further observational work. First, ethnographic studies that develop testable conceptual frameworks, although uncommon, offer the potential for significant advance. The final chapter of David Graeber's methodologically interesting ethnography of the global justice movement, *Direct Action: An Ethnography*, offers an initial model for such rigorous qualitative study. The focus in that work is on equivalence relations and rule-governed behaviour (although Graeber uses different terminology). A second approach, and the one that this book generally relies upon, is to view observational and historical data through the lens of well-established theory such as the science of behaviour and behavioural systems analysis.

Rich observations, whether ethnographically unique or interpreted through strong theory, nearly always suggest new questions. Those questions can, in many cases, be explored through further observations, whether prospectively or retrospectively (by re-examining the available historical data). Such explorations can be pursued rigorously—either qualitatively, as in ethnography, or quantitatively, as in the important work of Chenoweth and Stephan, in which a large number of cases were aggregated and conclusions drawn from the results.[8] Whether principles are initially framed in terms of established theory or conceptual models are instead allowed to emerge from the data, generalized knowledge requires the development and testing of explicit frameworks. In fact, the noted behavioural researcher Fred Kerlinger insisted that "the basic aim of science is theory."[9] No single observation or experiment yields certain conclusions or unassailable conceptual advances; the scientific method does not operate that way. Rather, science is a progressive enterprise in which knowledge is increasingly refined and deepened over time.

In a recursive process of observation and development of conceptual understanding, each feeds the other. In some forms of ecological science, this is the most that can be done; in astronomy, for example, it is not possible to actually manipulate heavenly bodies. Still, it has proven possible to simulate some of the processes important to astronomy and cosmology through small experiments in physics. In the study of biological ecologies, it is somewhat easier to experiment directly in the field, but even here, there are few opportunities to experimentally modify large ecological environments—in part for political reasons, in part because major ecological shifts would be expensive and complex to initiate in a controlled manner, and in large part because changes with uncertain outcomes might be irreversible. Marston Bates therefore emphasizes modest field experiments to test hypotheses that emerge from observation and conceptual analyses.[10] Analogously, modest experiments embraced by resistance movements are likely to produce new results that could guide their own strategic efforts and those of other groups, while further informing observational and conceptual explorations. Experimental science generally produces the most rigorous knowledge and developing such a science should certainly be one goal of those committed to strengthening nonviolent struggles for justice. *A meaningful science of nonviolent struggle is therefore likely to be observational, conceptual, and experimental.*

In addition to his three-part model of scholarship, Bates notes that new sciences studying new phenomena typically also require new analytic tools and forms of measurement.[11] The rigorous study of nonviolent struggle, being relatively new, is therefore likely to require new tools for observation and analysis. While we can draw on considerable measurement knowledge from behavioural science, and some from behavioural systems science, operationalizing variables and systemic behavioural interactions in measurable and useful ways is clearly an area in which much more development is required.

Three areas deserve further emphasis in concluding this volume. The first is an integrated restatement of a functional taxonomy of methods for strategic nonviolent struggle. Second, a review of templates for organizing observational and experimental data in interactional ways may be of use for those seeking to apply the ideas presented here. Finally, both the material in this volume and the work of others suggest directions for applied and scholarly contributions strengthening nonviolent struggle in the future; a few of those directions are briefly noted.

FUNCTIONAL CLASSES OF NONVIOLENT ACTION

Perhaps the most original suggestion in this volume is the application of a science-based functional classification of the methods of nonviolent action. That classification has been incrementally developed throughout; here, it may be useful to summarize the alternatives in a holistic way. Most commonly, several classes of action are integrated within a single campaign and even in a single campaign action, but in doing so, it is important to be clear about which methods are most consistent with established strategic objectives. The order of presentation here is roughly from the most to the least constructive (and to a great extent from the least to the most aggressive, although all may be experienced by the opponent as aversive).

Constructive Noncooperation

Constructive noncooperation is the least developed strategic option in the literature of nonviolent struggle, but it may be the most powerful. Jonathan Schell’s *The Unconquerable World* makes a strong case for the enormous but largely unrecognized impact of this alternative over recent centuries: as we have seen, he credits the liberation of Eastern Europe and, to a great extent, even the success of the American Revolution to constructive nonviolent resistance. The focus of this strategic choice is on the construction and sustenance of a new self-reliant and self-determining culture within the shell of—and in resistance to—structural oppression. This option is distinct from any other class in that the actions targeted for change in constructive nonviolent action are those of the resistance community itself rather than those of the opponent. Because of extensive sociocultural interdependencies, however, constructive noncooperation is also a powerful form of political resistance that ultimately must shift the practices of the opponent.

Persuasion

Persuasion, which is enacted through potentiating or offering incentives, is one option for encouraging the opponent to take specific actions. Potentiation involves shifting the opponent’s rules by increasing his recognition of the availability of existing incentives or shifting his values (equivalence relations) to increase motivation for action. Incentives for taking the action desired by the resistance cover a broad range, from potential election support to experiencing oneself as a person of moral integrity. Although often described as symbolic, persuasion is, in fact, intended to change behaviour, whether overt or cognitive. It is often a first-choice option when there is a specific action that the resistance movement wants the opponent to take, since it has few undesirable side effects and may be the least costly to the movement.

Protest

Protest is the second primary option for encouraging the opponent to take desired action. The incentives here, however, are primarily negative: the resistance movement establishes or convincingly threatens an aversive condition that the opponent can escape by complying with the group's demands. Protest has been widely exercised by resistance movements and many other dissatisfied groups, and can be a powerful option if the aversive condition can be sustained over time. This option comes with several associated risks, however. The first is the difficulty of maintaining nonviolent discipline under pressure, when the temptation to shift to physical threats or action may be high; if discipline cannot be sustained, the risk of failure can be grave. A second issue, supported by both behavioural research and history, is that the response to protest is often repression rather than compliance. Only if the resistance movement can nonviolently stand and endure that repression is success likely. In addition, through satiation, opponents commonly become inured to protest that does not produce significant disruption to systems critical to the status quo: the power of even large demonstrations alone has often faded considerably over time.

Disruptive Noncooperation

Disruptive noncooperation, like its constructive alternative, is a powerful option that is more difficult to suppress than is protest. Gandhi argued that if the grievance population refuses to cooperate regardless of the resulting repression, the power of the opponent will crumble.[12] Frances Fox Piven explains the reason why disruptive noncooperation is so powerful: the organization of contemporary society is so tightly interdependent that disruption in one area can have profound, widely resonating effects.[13] Disruption relies, to a great extent, on the behavioural science principle of extinction—consistently withholding reinforcement for undesirable behaviour will result in the extinction of that behaviour. Note that disruptive noncooperation functionally *reduces* oppressive actions; to encourage specific positive alternatives, it is often combined with persuasion and protest. Thus, the payoffs of oppression are withdrawn while incentives for desired alternatives are concurrently offered. Disruptive noncooperation, persuasion, and protest—all built on a decades-long foundation of constructive noncooperation—was the powerful strategic amalgam employed in the US civil rights movement.

Resource Disruption

It is sometimes possible to block oppressive action directly by disrupting access to essential or facilitating resources and conditions that support that action. Most forms of oppression, to be sustained, require human, financial, and physical resources. Identifying those resources and then disrupting them through direct and indirect routes may offer at least a temporary respite. Sustaining such disruption over time can be challenging, since the opponent may find other sources, and, as is the case with disruptive noncooperation, blocking the opponent's actions does not in itself shape a desirable future—for that to occur, some form of constructive strategy must usually also be included. Anonymous forms of resource disruption sometimes border on sabotage, which has significant risks (including in terms of public perception) but may be justified if the target of sabotage is clearly integral to oppression and if the safety of human beings on all sides can be assured.

Retaliation

Established theory indicates a final possibility, retaliation, which is understood functionally as punishment intended to reduce undesirable actions. Extensive data have established that punishment is difficult to apply with the force and consistency required to be effective in most domains and that it typically has serious side effects. These concerns appear to be as valid in nonviolent struggle as elsewhere. Retaliating consistently and in a seriously aversive way to acts of repression is very difficult; perhaps in part for this reason, this option appears to be rare in strategic nonviolent action. Recently, electronic retaliation has emerged as a new method, but in addition to carrying the challenges and risks of other forms of punishment, such retaliation is often a form of sabotage, which carries its own risks in terms of public response while distancing the resistance movement from the openness characteristic of successful nonviolent action and therefore potentially reducing participation.

BEHAVIOURAL SYSTEMS SCIENCE AS A BASIS FOR STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Strategic analysis drawing on behavioural science would be simple if the goal were only to influence the behaviour of one person. The reality, however, is that the opponent is often a complex regime consisting of multiple interlocking behavioural systems, and that regime is, in turn, supported by a larger network of such systems. Even when the opponent is a single individual, the resistance seldom has adequate direct influence on that person and thus needs to expand its engagement to the networks in which the opponent is embedded. In cases where a large portion of the population supports oppression (as in racist systems like slavery, apartheid, or Jim Crow), campaigns of civil resistance need to focus their efforts simultaneously on members of populations and the interlocking networks that structure society. Attempts to shift the tactics and strategies of members of a resistance movement and their allies or to maintain nonviolent discipline at such a macro level are similarly complex. The application of behavioural systems science can clarify such complexities and guide efforts toward substantive impacts.

In the simplest of such cases, activists may want to influence the values or actions of a larger population: for example, they may aim to turn people away from oppressive attitudes and practices toward LGBTQ persons. Technically, this involves changing verbal behaviour (specifically, equivalence relations and rules) and the social consequences of biased—as well as unbiased or gay-affirmative—actions among an entire class of actors: members of the population. Changes in social consequences can encourage the challenging of homophobic statements and actions and can reinforce affirmative statements and actions. The goal in such cases is to change *common contingencies*—antecedents and consequences shared among a class of actors. There are many situations in which shifts in common contingencies are strategically important, including encouraging members of security forces to defect,


Motivating context
Aversive conditions (Deprivation, pain, humiliation)
Models
Verbal processes (equivalence relations, rules)
Practice:
Class of Actor:
Essential and Facilitating Resources and Conditions
Positive Consequences
Aversive Consequences

FIGURE 11. A contingency template for analyzing the variables that shape and support shared practices among a class of actors

emboldening members of the grievance population to step up to more active participation in the movement, or persuading voters to embrace policies supporting universal human rights. In such cases, a useful analytic tool is the common contingency (technically, macrocontingency) diagram, a template for which is shown in figure 11.[14] (Refer to figure 2 for a completed example. This template, as well as that in figure 12, may be freely copied for noncommercial use.)

Note that all of the entries made on the template in figure 11 should be variables that affect the actions of members a class of actors in a similar way. We are not looking here for what is unique, for example, to a single member of the security forces but at experiences that many individual members are likely to share.[15] For example, the humiliation that a member of the security forces may experience when he is chased from the street by armed resistance fighters may be part of the motivating context for violent responses later; this is likely true for many of his fellows as well. The resources are those that make the actions of a typical member of this group possible (e.g., weapons), and the consequences are those that such members commonly experience for acting. Positive consequences are the rewards received for violent responses; aversive consequences may include the possible risk of injury. Note that what one actor experiences as positive may be negative to others; we are looking here for typical patterns. Such patterns can, however, be explored by examining and comparing the experiences of multiple single cases. One outcome of an actor's violent response may be that an innocent party is killed. This may well be experienced by a witness as very negative but by the actor as neutral or even positive. Again, to understand and potentially change his actions, his own experience of the event and its consequences must be analyzed—so if he experiences the death as positive, it should be included in the diagram as a positive consequence. This is because it may encourage the actor to repeat his action—if so, for him, it is technically a positive reinforcer. This distinction can be hard to remember; it may help to think of positive consequences as any subjective payoff for the actor.

One goal in using such a template is to identify events and conditions that would strengthen the motivating context for a desired shared practice, essential and facilitating resources and conditions that would make it possible or easier to take that action, and positive consequences that would support the desired action. At the same time, it is important to identify aversive consequences (the costs associated with taking the action) and develop plans either to minimize those consequences or to weaken their impact (for example, through reframing the need to suffer to achieve justice—a shift in relational responding). Note that this template can be used to analyze (a) undesirable actions that the resistance movement wants to reduce (e.g., acts of violence by a member of the security forces, as discussed above) or (b) desirable actions that the movement wants to encourage (e.g., participation in campaign actions by members of the population). It is all behaviour. Typically, such an analysis will quickly surface many complexities, but it provides an initial, overall picture of the situation to be addressed.

As the analysis moves to behavioural systems, other patterns of variables need to be considered. For example, if the goal is to shift the practices of corporations whose operations involve significant environmental damage, it is important to examine the consequences that select practices that produce such externalities ("externalities" being environmental costs paid by others external to the corporation).[16] Shifting the costs is likely to shift practices. Note that this is a collective analogue of the shaping of individual behaviour. All else being equal, an individual reduces the rate of a behaviour if it becomes more costly—as, for example, has been demonstrated with increasing the costs of cigarettes, a common contingency across a population. Up to a point, but only up to a point, the same pattern holds for collectives (corporations, armies, regimes) when metacontingencies shift.

Shifting consequences to the responsible entity (organization, corporation, or government agency, for instance) need not rely only on penalties or other aversive procedures. The principles underlying the "Reward and Reminder" procedure developed by Anthony Biglan and colleagues to reduce tobacco sales to minors has potentially wide applicability to environmental and, to some extent, social issues.[17] In brief, this procedure involves regular probes to determine whether stores sell tobacco to minors; if they do not, the clerk receives a commendation and in some cases a bonus, and the store receives public recognition in the media. If they do sell to minors, the result is a reminder (and the potential for public embarrassment). The key here is at least an equal, and preferably a greater, emphasis on positive than on aversive consequences. Behavioural scientists have recently expanded the application of this principle to programs that certify corporations for behavioural safety and "green" operations.[18] The utility of this overall strategic option for challenging many kinds of serious human rights and social justice issues is currently unknown, but it appears quite promising in the areas of environmental action and structural oppression involving corporations and is worth thoughtful exploration in other struggles for liberation.

Even shifts in metacontingencies are not the whole story, however. As we saw in chapter 9, corporations, governments, and even entire societies often sustain practices that are very damaging—even fatal—to themselves, despite the associated costs.[19] There are several possible reasons for this. First, the leadership of the collective may not be sensitive to the actual consequences of their decisions, which is to say that they are not operating on the basis of accurate rules.[20] Another possibility, widely viewed as common in the corporate world, is that decisions are based on immediate rather than long-term outcomes. Perverse incentives in place may reward key sets of actors primarily for short-term profits rather than for actions that benefit the organization, much less society as a whole. Such practices can be understood initially by using the simple template shown in figure 11, but the contingencies noted will generally be provided by other behavioural systems, so the more complex template in figure 12 below may be more helpful. (Refer to figures 3 and 6 for completed examples.)

Another issue may also make shifting the practices of a large collective more challenging. A complex system typically comprises multiple behavioural subsystems, and those subsystems are, to some extent, self-organizing. What this means is that the actors in the system may respond more to reinforcement from those with whom they are in closest contact than to rules regarding what is best for the organization overall. The organizational literature is rife with examples of behavioural systems that fail due to lack of cooperation or lack of "commitment" within; the discipline of organizational behaviour management exists to address such challenges.[21] Resistance movements can, in some cases, work to maximize autonomous, disaffected processes within the opponent's networks of support; this is largely what happens in encouraging defection of bureaucracies, key sectors of civil society, or units within security forces. Resistance movements can use analysis of interlocking practices within the support networks to further understand and perhaps influence behavioural dynamics (e.g., rules, equivalences, resources, consequences) within the opponent's regime. The template in figure 12 for analysis of interlocking practices is designed to facilitate such efforts.

This template can be used (1) to pinpoint the key variables that shape and maintain the actions of the key opponent or class of opponent (or ally); (2) to identify the practices of other (secondary) classes of actors that contribute to the motivating context, resources, or consequences that shape the actions of the focal actor(s); (3) to diagram the interactions between actors using arrows; and (4) to note the key variables shaping those actions among each secondary group of actors. The identified interactions and variables offer potential leverage points for campaigns of nonviolent resistance. This kind of template is best understood by actually completing an example for oneself; what may appear to be a dry exercise often proves enlightening when applied to an actual situation that one cares about. In complex situations, it may be useful to begin by completing a diagram using the template in figure 11 to understand in detail particular practices embedded in the whole and then carrying that information into the template in figure 12. This may be particularly important when one is conducting the analysis with community members and activists who are not grounded in behavioral systems principles, in which case a step-by-step process will be clearer than beginning with a complex diagram.


Action/Practice
Class of Actor
Motivating Context
Resources and Conditions
Consequences
Action/Practice
Key Actor or Class
Motivating Context
Resources and Conditions
Consequences
Action/Practice
Class of Actor
Motivating Context
Resources and Conditions
Consequences
Action/Practice
Class of Actor
Motivating Context
Resources and Conditions
Consequences
Action/Practice
Class of Actor
Motivating Context
Resources and Conditions
Consequences
Action/Practice
Class of Actor
Motivating Context
Resources and Conditions
Consequences

FIGURE 12. Template for analyzing interlocking practices within an opponent's source network

This kind of template can be used for analyzing the dynamics happening *within* a complex organization or regime, as well as for analyzing interactions *between and among* the opponent (or other key actor) and other supporting systems. The core notion in this kind of analysis is to identify both the consequences that maintain oppressive practices and who provides those consequences, and then to make plans to disrupt those interactions in some way, whether through persuasion, protest, noncooperation, or some other strategy.

The dynamics that are sketched in this way are, of course, hypotheses. A scientific approach nearly always relies on developing hypotheses from observational data and then testing them; struggles for justice can benefit from this same process. Hypotheses emerging from a first attempt at analysis should therefore be held lightly and tested through experience. Much of what we currently know about nonviolent struggle we have learned because resistance movements, journalists, and historians have documented their experiments, and continued advances require the continuation of that process.

CONSTRUCTING A FUTURE OF JUSTICE AND LIBERATION

> We need experts to develop this into a science.
> — Mahatma Gandhi, *Mohandas Gandhi: Essential Writings*

Understanding more deeply the science of nonviolent struggle in ways that have practical utility will require substantial effort. I conclude this volume by suggesting some directions for those willing to contribute to that work.

The Study of Nonviolent Resistance

Those interested in either developing or applying the behavioural systems science of nonviolent resistance need to be well grounded in theory and practice. A number of very valuable resources are available for such study. Perhaps the most useful place to begin is with Gene Sharp's *Self-Liberation*, which offers brief summaries of and links to core material within his extensive body of work, much of which is freely available online. The website of the Albert Einstein Institution (aeinstein.org), where Sharp is based, provides a wide range of additional valuable material. A second essential work is Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan's *Why Civil Resistance Works*, which has been extensively cited here. For those drawn to constructive noncooperation, Jonathan Schell's *The Unconquerable World* is extremely useful. Nothing, of course, can compete with

Gandhi's work; his small pamphlet *The Constructive Programme* is particularly accessible and important. The list of references at the end of this book provides many additional useful titles that have been cited throughout this volume.

A number of videos and other media are useful in introducing the power of nonviolent struggle. The public television series *A Force More Powerful*, for which the noted nonviolent theorist Peter Ackerman served as series editor and content advisor, is excellent for general and educational viewing. The recent award-winning documentary featuring Gene Sharp, *How to Start a Revolution*, is also extremely useful—and hopeful. In addition, the many websites and social media pages related to nonviolence, which have increased considerably following the events of the Arab Spring, afford rich material for study. Among them is the website for Ackerman's International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (nonviolent-conflict.org), which offers an extensive list of resources.

Opportunities for formal study of nonviolent struggle, peace, and conflict are available at many major universities. Programs in the behavioural systems science of nonviolent struggle, however, are currently almost nonexistent; this is clearly an area in which extensive development is needed. Such study will probably always be interdisciplinary, however; at the moment the best preparation for involvement in nonviolent struggle would probably combine the study of behaviour analysis with a program in strategic studies, peace and conflict studies, social work, or diplomatic studies. Given the central importance of this work, opportunities for such study should be supported by universities, private funders, and government.

Research on Nonviolent Struggle

Throughout this book, I have argued that more research into the dynamics of nonviolent struggle is essential to advancing human rights, social justice, and sustainability. All three of Marston Bates's methods have substantial potential to contribute to such research. Areas ripe for attention include the following:

- Historical analyses grounded in behavioural systems science. These studies are likely to identify dynamics that would otherwise not be seen, even in well-studied cases.

- Ethnographic studies of ongoing nonviolent campaigns by individuals who are grounded in the local culture, have extensive knowledge of the dynamics of nonviolent struggle, and have behavioural systems expertise. Such studies could deepen and correct current conceptual and theoretical frameworks.
- Conceptual collaborations, including round-table conversations and learning communities, among behavioural scientists and nonviolent activists to challenge conceptual frameworks and identify areas needing deeper study
- Further development of graphic analytic methodologies for expanding both micro and macro analyses of campaigns of nonviolent struggle
- Experiments on the ground to test hypotheses that emerge from the above work. The documented results could then be used to refine research agendas going forward.

The most rigorous science draws its data from experimentation whenever possible. Some kinds of experiments in nonviolent struggle are clearly impractical, at least at present. For example, experiments that require large numbers of campaigns, randomly divided into experimental and control groups, are highly unlikely (although similar studies can sometimes be conducted retrospectively). However, another form of rigorous experimentation, interrupted time-series studies, could be realistic for activist groups wanting to test the impact of specific campaigns on particular systems dynamics through modest experiments.[22] Examples might include exploring the utility of one or more methods for building unity or maintaining nonviolent discipline within an activist community, or testing the impact of public information campaigns among the larger grievance group. This approach would be novel for the study of nonviolent struggles but appears to be a good fit.

Connection and Integration with Multiple Audiences

The most important scientific advances at present generally occur at the boundaries between disciplines.[23] An adequate science of nonviolent struggle needs to integrate knowledge and experience across multiple academic disciplines and activist communities, both to maximize what is learned and to achieve legitimacy. Close connections with those in the political, policy, and diplomacy arenas will be essential to any serious implementation of the findings of this science. Serious science will also require serious funding, so legitimacy among some of those supporting policy-level research is also crucial, but with the recognition that existing power structures may find such work to be a threat. Those interested in applying behavioural systems science to conflict, peacemaking, and nonviolent struggles for justice need to emphasize collaborations with all of the communities noted here, including academics, activists, policy-makers and funders, in pursuing their research. Such collaboration will not always be comfortable, considering the mutual discomfort among many of those groups. Still, the connections must be made.

A new science needs to attract young, emerging scientists who have not yet committed to a particular career path. Many students enter doctoral studies with tremendous enthusiasm, hoping to have a real impact—and many subsequently report considerable discouragement with their experiences.[24] Few other options carry equal potential excitement to scientific work supporting social justice and contributing to limiting needless violence. Programs that can attract and engage emerging scholars and link them to the real struggles of grievance populations may be the most promising direction for achieving serious advances in this area.

In addition, a tremendous amount of public education is required, since most people worldwide—whether those facing oppression or the general public—have little understanding of the power of nonviolence, much less of its dynamics. Chenoweth and Stephan note that "the provision of educational materials (e.g., books, films, DVDs, and videogames) that highlight lessons learned from other historical nonviolent movements has been cited by nonviolent activists as critical to their mobilization," and the expansion and refinement of such materials is a relatively low-cost, high-payoff strategy.[25] Bringing the science of nonviolent struggle into civic dialogue will be more difficult, yet it appears essential if democratic societies are to support such struggle politically and financially. Such efforts will require engaging the rapidly advancing field of social marketing; in addition, circle processes, including learning and dialogue circles, and the consequence analysis procedures discussed in chapter 8 have great potential for achieving that goal.[26]

Finally, although this may not be apparent in the behaviour of all scientists, science itself is a humble endeavour. A person may labour in a specialized area for a lifetime and even win international recognition for the advances she has led. Two decades later, however, what she learned is commonly no longer part of the core knowledge base, but only of the history of the field. Those involved in the most useful research acknowledge up front that all knowledge is tentative and partial. The material in this book is no exception. While I have attempted to integrate the best of current knowledge to the greatest extent I am able, if the need for a science of nonviolent action is accepted—as I believe it should be—"undreamt of and seemingly impossible" advances that extend and correct the material here should be expected and embraced. All of our current hypotheses must be lightly held.

Chenoweth and Stephan's research strongly suggests that those "who claim that violent resistance is necessary are probably always wrong."[27] Well-established behavioural systems theory tested in historical cases supports that assertion. Of one thing, then, I am certain: a science of nonviolent struggle is clearly possible and therefore deserves the attention of the scientific, activist, strategic, military, spiritual, and diplomatic communities, as well as that of an informed public. A commitment to pursuing that science and realizing justice is our shared obligation.

ENDNOTES

PART ONE

UNDERSTANDING NONVIOLENT POWER

1 See Robert E. Klitgaard, "Gandhi's Nonviolence as a Tactic" (1971); and Amrut Nakhre, "Meanings of Nonviolence: A Study of Satyagrahi Attitudes" (1976).

2 See Gregory L. Wiltfang and Doug McAdam, "The Costs and Risks of Social Activism: A Study of Sanctuary Movement Activism" (1991); and James Downton Jr. and Paul Wehr, "Persistent Pacifism: How Activist Commitment Is Developed and Sustained" (1998).

1

NONVIOLENT POWER

1 Mahadev Desai, *Day-to-Day with Gandhi: Secretary's Diary,* 1:260.

2 Etienne G. Krug et al., eds., *World Report on Violence and Health*, 218.

3 On structural violence, see Paul Farmer, *Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor,* chap. 1.

4 See, for example, James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*.

5 Scott Wimberley, *Special Forces Guerrilla Warfare Manual*, 1.

6 Barbara Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 267.

7 Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 93. See also Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*.

8 René Girard, *Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre*, 1.

9 For some of these examples, see Ronald M. McCarthy and Gene Sharp, *Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide*, and April Carter, Howard Clark, and Michael Randle, eds., *People Power and Protest Since 1945: A Bibliography on Nonviolent Action*.

10 David Dellinger, *Revolutionary Nonviolence*, 368.

11 David Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond: Nonviolence for a New Political Age*, 211.

12 For additional discussion of these fundamental ideas, see Gene Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth-Century Practice and Twenty-First-Century Potential*. See also Mark A. Mattaini, "Constructing Nonviolent Alternatives to Collective Violence: A Scientific Strategy."

13 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place*, 4.

14 Michael N. Nagler, *The Search for a Nonviolent Future: A Promise of Peace for Ourselves, Our Families, and Our World*, 107–8.

15 Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, 4.

16 Gandhi, *Constructive Programme,* 4.

17 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium,* 208.

18 See, for example, Gene Sharp, *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts;* and Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*. Although they sometimes carry different emphases, I generally use the terms *nonviolent resistance, nonviolent struggle* (the term preferred by Sharp), and *nonviolent action* interchangeably in this volume to refer to the exercise of nonviolent power. I usually avoid using the word *nonviolence* interchangeably with the others, however, as in some cases it has been used to refer to (or interpreted as referring to) passive acceptance. When I do use *nonviolence,* it signifies a simple refusal to engage in violence.

19 See, for example, Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 433–524; and Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* 1–19.

20 Examples include Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*; Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*; Staughton Lynd and Alice Lynd, eds., *Nonviolence in America: A Documentary History*; McCarthy and Sharp, *Nonviolent Action*; Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher, eds., *Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographic Perspective*; and Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash, eds., *Civil Resistance and Power Politics*.

21 On Mozi (Mo Tsu), see Nagler, *Search for a Nonviolent Future,* 242; on the early Christians and the Haudenosaunee, see, respectively, Lawrence S. Aspey and Karen Eppler, *Transforming Power for Peace,* chap. 3; and Akwsesasne Notes, ed., *Basic Call to Consciousness.*

22 The military junta in Burma prefers to call the country Myanmar; most human rights activists, however, continue to use the name Burma. It is possible that, if the current uneven but progressive movements toward justice are sustained, the original name will eventually be restored.

23 Margaret Hope Bacon, *The Quiet Rebels: The Story of the Quakers in America.*

24 Lynd and Lynd, *Nonviolence in America*, xi–xlvi; Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond.* 9–21.

25 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 39.

26 For a discussion, see ibid., 37–51.

27 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *The Essential Gandhi: An Anthology of His Writings on His Life, Work, and Ideas,* 280.

28 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* 213–15. See also Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," a study published three years earlier that reports additional data.

29 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond,* 230.

30 "China Cancels Project After Protests," *Aljazeera*, July 28, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2012/07/201272871518282322.html; Joyce Lau, "Thousands Protest China's Plans for Hong Kong Schools," *New York Times*, July 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/30/world/asia/thousands-protest-chinas-curriculum-plans-for-hong-kong-schools.html.

31 Mark McDonald, "Taking It to the Street in China," *International Herald Tribune,* July 29, 2012, http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/29/taking-it-to-the-street-in-china/.

32 Jonathan Schell, *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People,* 186–204.

33 Schell, *The Unconquerable World,* 352; Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation,* 4–5.

34 George Lakey, "The Black Panthers' 'Militarist Error.'"

35 Murray Sidman, *Coercion and Its Fallout,* 221–23; Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 489.

36 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle,* 379, 384; and Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy,* 4.

37 Etienne G. Krug et al., eds., *World Report on Violence and Health,* 218.

38 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium,* 207, 262–69.

39 Gordon S. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic*, 314.

40 Schell, *Unconquerable World,* 163.

41 See the discussion in ibid., 167–83
42 Leon Trotsky, quoted in ibid., 170.
43 Ibid., 129.
44 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond,* 121–22.
45 Gandhi, *Constructive Programme,* 3. See also Schell, *Unconquerable World,* 131.
46 McCarthy and Sharp, *Nonviolent Action*, 615.
47 David Dellinger, quoted in Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium,* 200.
48 Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 52–53.
49 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium,* 216.
50 Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 29–30. Translated into over thirty languages, *From Dictatorship to Democracy* continues to serve as a basic manual for nonviolent resistance around the world.
51 Frances Fox Piven, *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America*, 19–20.
52 Ibid., 21.
53 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 204 (emphasis in the original).
54 Ibid., 95.
55 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Mohandas Gandhi: Essential Writings,* 50.
56 Ibid., 114, 45–46.
57 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 2–3.
58 American Friends Service Committee, *Speak Truth to Power: A Quaker Search for an Alternative to Violence,* vi.
59 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium,* 82.
60 See, for example, Jon E. Krapfl et al., “Iterative Processes and Reciprocal Controlling Relationships in a Systemic Intervention”; see also Gene Sharp, “Skinner and Gandhi on Defeating Violence.”

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STRATEGIC NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE

1 See Gene Sharp, *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, and Gene Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice and Twenty-First Century Potential*; Robert L. Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals*; and Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century.*
2 Ronald M. McCarthy and Gene Sharp, *Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide,* 547.
3 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle,* 444–45; later refined in Gene Sharp, *Sharp's Dictionary of Power and Struggle: Language of Civil Resistance in Conflicts*, from which the quotation in the second point is taken (286–87).
4 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle,* 456.
5 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* 13.
6 Jonathan Schell, *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People*; Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 504.
7 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* 33–35.
8 Saul D. Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals*, 127–29.
9 See Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle.* For other such detailed lists, see, for example McCarthy and Sharp, *Nonviolent Action*; and Sharp, *Dynamics of Nonviolent Action.*
10 Schell, *Unconquerable World*, 128–29.

11 David Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond: Nonviolence for a New Political Age*, 193.

12 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place*, 7.

13 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 44; Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 37. For an extensive discussion of this idea, see Gene Sharp, *Self-Liberation*.

14 Schell, *Unconquerable World*, 96.

15 Fidel Ramos, quoted in Miguela G.Yap, *The Making of Cory*, 174.

16 *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,* xxv.

17 Alissa J. Rubin, "Taliban Overhaul Image to Win Allies," *New York Times*, January 21, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/world/asia/21taliban.html?ref=world.

18 Scott Wimberley, *Special Forces Guerrilla Warfare Manual,* 168.

19 John M. Collins, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives*, 168.

20 Frances Fox Piven, *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America*, 19–20.

21 Key pillars of support discussed by Helvey include police, military, civil servants, media, the business community, youth, workers, the religious community, and non-governmental organizations. See Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* chap. 2.

22 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle* 29–30, 551. See also Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 4–7, and chap. 2.

23 Sharp, *Self-Liberation*, 28.

24 Frances Fox Piven, *Challenging Authority*, 21. I should note that Piven does not exclusively advocate nonviolent action; rather, she describes the dynamics present in strategic protest and disruption movements, whether violent or nonviolent.

25 Ibid., 26.

26 Ibid., 32.

27 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond,* 22.

28 Judith M. Brown, *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope*, 121.

29 Schell, *Unconquerable World*, 136.

30 Gandhi, *Constructive Programme,* 28.

31 Brown, *Gandhi*, 135.

32 Eknath Easwaran, *Nonviolent Soldier of Islam: Badshah Khan, a Man to Match His Mountains,* 195.

33 Joseph Lelyveld, *Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle with India.*

34 Peter Ackerman and Jack Duvall, *A Force More Powerful: A Century of Nonviolent Conflict*, 109 (emphasis added).

35 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 469–90.

36 Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, 7.

37 Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 135.

38 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 46.

39 Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* 135.

40 Ibid., 135–36. For Helvey, "contaminants to nonviolent movements" include acts of violence, the incorporation of too many disparate objectives, struggles related to how power will be allocated after success, and treating the campaign as a democracy rather than as a movement requiring coordination and discipline.

41 A subsequent work, *A Force More Powerful,* written by Ackerman and Jack Duvall to accompany a documentary television series, provides detailed examples of nonviolent strategic thinking in a popular format.

42 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 6.

43 Thomas C. Schelling, "Some Questions on Civilian Defense," quoted in Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 9 (emphasis in the original). Note that Schelling's statement, in suggesting symmetry, differs from the perspective of most theorists of nonviolent struggle, who, as noted, believe that ultimate power lies in the people.

44 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 22.

45 These results suggest a new set of questions to explore. It is important to note that success and failure in these cases refers to a particular period in time. For example, the 1980–81 Solidarity campaign in Poland was viewed as a failure for this analysis, but it clearly contributed to a near total win less than a decade later.

46 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 22.

47 David Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond: Nonviolence for a New Political Age*, 112.

48 Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 136.

49 Moncef Marzouki, quoted in Steve Coll, "The Casbah Coalition: Tunisia's Second Revolution," 39 (ellipses in the original).

50 Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 4.

51 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 210.

52 Ibid., 63.

53 Michael N. Nagler, *The Search for a Nonviolent Future: A Promise of Peace for Ourselves, Our Families, and Our World*, 159.

54 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 77.

55 Ibid., 145.

56 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, 218.

57 Bryan Farrell, "Self-Immolation and the Power of Self-Sacrifice."

58 Andrew Jacobs, "Tibetan Self-Immolations Rise as China Tightens Grip," *New York Times*, March 22, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/23/world/asia/in-self-immolations-signs-of-new-turmoil-in-tibet.html?_r=2&emc=eta1.

59 Coll, "Casbah Coalition"; J. David Goodman, "Spate of Self-Immolations Reported in Tunisia," *New York Times*, January 12, 2012, http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/12/spate-of-self-immolations-reported-in-tunisia/?ref=tunisia.

60 See the comments by Nagler quoted in Farrell, "Self-Immolation."

61 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 123–26.

62 Ibid., 123.

63 Ibid., 108.

64 Ibid.

65 Sharp, *Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, 609; see also Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 390–91.

66 These points are drawn from Sharp's discussion in *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, 608–11.

67 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 123. While the word *loving* may not seem to fit in a scientific analysis, this clearly is the way Deming herself framed her thought and action.

68 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 267.

69 Ibid., 268 (emphasis in the original).

70 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 149.

71 Ibid., 153, 148.

72 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 263.

73 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 37.

74 Johan Galtung, "Principles of Nonviolence: The Great Chain of Nonviolence Hypothesis."

75 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 130–34; Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 47.

76 McCarthy and Sharp, *Nonviolent Action*, 495.

77 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 211.

78 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 223.

79 Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 114.

3

BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCE PRINCIPLES FOR NONVIOLENT STRATEGY

1 Joseph Lelyveld, *Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle with India*; Robert E. Klitgaard, "Gandhi's Nonviolence as a Tactic."

2 Gene Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth-Century Practice and Twenty-First-Century Potential*, 359; see also Gene Sharp, *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*.

3 Carl Oglesby, quoted in Barbara Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 207.

4 Ibid., 214–15.

5 Robert L. Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals*, 68. See also Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 28–38; and Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, 15–20.

6 Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 10.

7 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Gandhi: Essential Writings*, 127 (emphasis added).

8 See also B. F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, especially the later sections.

9 See Mark A. Mattaini. "Ecosystems Theory"; Michael Esfeld and Vincent Lam, "Ontic Structural Realism as a Metaphysics of Objects"; Fritjof Capra, *The Web of Life*.

10 A note on terminology: *the science of behaviour, behaviour analysis,* and *behaviour science* are currently the preferred terms for the kind of scientific work being discussed here. The broader term *behavioural science* includes a number of approaches that are not conceptually consistent with standard behaviour analysis or behavioural systems analysis because of their emphasis on hypothesized internal traits and dispositions amputated from environmental conditions.

11 See B. F. Skinner, "Selection by Consequences"; and Susan M. Schneider, *The Science of Consequences: How They Affect Genes, Change the Brain, and Impact Our World*.

12 Marvin Harris, *Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture*, 46–76.

13 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 55.

14 Frances Fox Piven, *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America*, 31.

15 Ibid., 32.

16 Ibid., 35.

17 Marshall Ganz, *Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in the California Farm Worker Movement*, 19.

18 Gandhi, *Gandhi: Essential Writings*, 127.

19 Dorothea C. Lerman and Brian A. Iwata, "Developing a Technology for the Use of Operant Extinction in Clinical Settings: An Examination of Basic and Applied Research"; J. J. McDowell, Matching Theory in Natural Human Environments."

20 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 373.

21 Ibid., 379–80.

22 Gene Sharp, "Skinner and Gandhi on Defeating Violence."

23 Piven, *Challenging Authority*, 33.

24 See Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, chap. 6; Scott Wimberley, *Special Forces Guerrilla Warfare Manual*, 140–41. Among the factors to be included in the analysis, Wimberley cites "enemy leaders, military installations and units, climate industry, transportation, potential targets, political economic and social problems and strengths, enemy strengths and weaknesses, educational institutions, religion and religious leaders, ethnic makeup, local attitudes toward enemy, communication facilities, geography, history, and local leaders."

25 Allocation of behaviour is not precisely proportionate, but variations from that principle are relatively well understood; see J. J. McDowell, "On the Classic and Modern Theories of Matching." Relevant payoffs include both desired outcomes and escape or avoidance of negative outcomes.

26 See Murray Sidman, *Coercion and Its Fallout*. 209–35.

27 Ibid., 221–35. See also Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, 321, 447.

28 Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 93.

29 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 210.

30 Ibid., 208.

31 Sidman, *Coercion and Its Fallout.*

32 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 201.

33 Sharp, "Skinner and Gandhi on Defeating Violence."

34 B. F. Skinner, "The Evolution of Behavior," 218; Albert Bandura, "Exercise of Human Agency Through Collective Efficacy."

35 Joan Baez, *Playboy Interview: Joan Baez*, 34.

36 Piven, *Challenging Authority*, 39.

37 Note that this technical definition of *rule* as the term is used in the analysis of rule-governed behaviour differs from common usage. For additional discussion, see Steven C. Hayes, ed., *Rule-Governed Behavior: Cognition, Contingencies, and Instructional Control.*

38 For examples of this research, see Hayes, *Rule-Governed Behavior*; and Steven C. Hayes, Victoria M. Follette, and Marsha M. Linehan, eds., *Mindfulness and Acceptance: Expanding the Cognitive-Behavioral Tradition.*

39 See, for example, Steven C. Hayes, Dermot Barnes-Holmes, and Bryan Roche, eds., *Relational Frame Theory: A Post-Skinnerian Account of Human Language and Cognition*; and Ramona Houmanfar, N. Joseph Rodrigues, and Gregory S. Smith, "An Interdisciplinary Account of Martyrdom as a Religious Practice."

40 For the origins of the approach, see Murray Sidman, *Equivalence Relations and Behavior: A Research Story*. A more detailed analysis can be carried out using relational frame theory. Equivalence relations can include any kind of arbitrary stimulus (object, image, or sound), but verbal equivalence relations are of primary interest in the present analysis.

41 Mark R. Dixon et al., "Terrorism and Relational Frame Theory."

42 Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 23.

43 Lorenzo Kamel and Daniela Huber, "The De-threatenization of the Other: An Israeli and a Palestinian Case of Understanding the Other's Suffering."

44 Maia Carter Hallward and Patrick Shaver, "'War by Other Means' or Nonviolent Resistance? Examining the Discourses Surrounding Berkeley's Divestment Bill."

45 For further discussion, see Dixon et al., "Terrorism and Relational Frame Theory"; and Joseph E. Spradlin, Kathryn J. Saunders, and Richard R. Saunders, "The Stability of Equivalence Classes."

46 *Constructional* is the standard technical term used in this area. See, above all, Israel Goldiamond, "Toward a Constructional Approach to Social Problems: Ethical and Constitutional Issues Raised by Applied Behavior Analysis."

47 For more on constructive noncooperation, see Mark A. Mattaini and Kristen N. Atkinson, "Constructive Noncooperation: Living in Truth."

48 Jonathan Schell, *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People.*

49 See Sidman, *Coercion and Its Fallout*, for an accessible, detailed discussion of this pattern.

50 See Myles Horton and Paulo Freire, *We Make the Road by Walking: Conversations on Education and Social Change.*

51 James Downton Jr. and Paul Wehr, "Persistent Pacifism: How Activist Commitment Is Developed and Sustained."

52 Piven, *Challenging Authority*, 144–46.

4

BEHAVIOURAL SYSTEMS SCIENCE AND NONVIOLENT STRUGGLE

1 On self-organization, see, for example, Christopher G. Hudson, "From Social Darwinism to Self-Organization: Implications for Social Change Theory"; and Noshir S. Contractor, "Self-Organizing Systems Research in the Social Sciences: Reconciling the Metaphors and the Models." On interlocking practices, see Anthony Biglan, *Changing Cultural Practices,* chap. 4; Marvin Harris, *Cultural Materialism: The Struggle for a Science of Culture,* chap. 3; and Mark A. Mattaini, "Envisioning Cultural Practices."

2 Abdulrazaq A. Imam, "The Shaping of a Saint-President: Latent Clues from Nelson Mandela's Autobiography."

3 Jonathan Schell, *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People*, 128 (emphasis in the original).

4 Marston Bates, *The Nature of Natural History,* 268–84.

5 *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 141–42 (emphasis in the original). The *Field Manual* also relies extensively on diagrammatic approaches for examining interactional connections, an approach used for the same purpose in this book. See Mark A. Mattaini, *More Than a Thousand Words,* for discussion of the utility of graphic visualization for the analysis of complexity.

6 Scott Wimberley, *Special Forces Guerrilla Warfare Manual*, 140–41.

7 Robert L. Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals,* 47–66.

8 Manfred Drack, "Ludwig von Bertalanffy's Early System Approach"; Ludwig von Bertalanffy, *General System Theory*, 86; Ludwig von Bertalanffy, "An Outline of General System Theory."

9 National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine, *Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research*, 16–25.

10 For the differences between the natural science of behaviour and the social sciences, see James M. Johnston and Henry S. Pennypacker, *Strategies and Tactics of Behavioral Research.* As Johnston and Pennypacker indicate, one of the most critical differences is that the social sciences largely rely on statistical inferences based on numerous observations or analogues of observations, whereas the natural sciences generally emphasize experimental manipulations of specific phenomena, a more precise procedure that supports strong causal inferences. Certain natural sciences like astronomy, however, must rely in part on testing hypotheses about specific phenomena that can be observed but not manipulated. The natural science of behaviour, and likewise behavioural systems analysis, rely primarily on experimentation but also on methods similar to those of astronomy for the analysis of large networks of interlocking

behavioural systems, although there are times when social scientific, ethnographic, and other methodological approaches contribute in useful ways.

11 See, for example, Maria E. Malott, *Paradox of Organizational Change: Engineering Organizations with Behavioral Systems Analysis*; *Journal of Organizational Management*, Special Issue: Behavioral Systems Analysis, 29, no. 2 (2009), and Special Issue: Behavioral Systems: Understanding Complex Contingencies in Relation to Cultural Contingencies, 29, nos. 3–4 (2009); *Behavior and Social Issues*, Special Section: Advancing Cultural Analytic Science, 15, no. 1 (2006); Mark A. Mattaini, "Ecosystems Theory"; Ingunn Sandakur, "How Should Behavior Analysis Interact Effectively with the Social Sciences?"; and Ramona Houmanfar, N. Joseph Rodrigues, and Todd A. Ward, "Emergence and Metacontingency: Points of Contact and Departure." See also Sigrid S. Glenn, "Metacontingencies, Selection and OBM: Comments on 'Emergence and Metacontingency'"; Maria E. Malott and Sigrid S. Glenn, "Targets of Intervention in Cultural and Behavioral Change"; Ramona Houmanfar and N. Joe Rodrigues, "The Metacontingency and the Behavioral Contingency: Points of Contact and Departure"; and Mark A. Mattaini, "Will Cultural Analysis Become a Science?"

12 Mattaini, "Ecosystems Theory," 304.

13 Frances Fox Piven, *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America,* 110–111.

14 Ibid., 110.

15 Central Intelligence Agency, *The World Factbook,* 2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html#People.

16 Navtej Dhillon, "The Role of the U.S. in the Middle East," *Middle East Youth Initiative*, May 22, 2008, http://www.shababinclusion.org/content/blog/detail/986/.

17 For a useful discussion, see Barry N. Checkoway and Lorraine Gutierrez, *Youth Participation and Community Change*.

18 Ivan Vejvoda, "Civil Society Versus Slobodan Milošević: Serbia, 1991–2000." See also Melvin Delgado and Lee Staples, *Youth-Led Community Organizing*; and Louise B. Jennings et al., "Toward a Critical Social Theory of Youth Empowerment."

19 See, for example, Delgado and Staples, *Youth-Led Community Organizing*; Checkoway and Gutierrez, *Youth Participation and Community Change*; and Michael Reisch, Jim Ife, and Marie Weil, "Social Justice, Human Rights, Values, and Community Practice."

20 Kristen N. Atkinson, "Education for Liberation: A Precursor to Youth Activism for Liberation," 149, 165, 207.

21 Lyle K. Grant, "Sustainability: From Excess to Aesthetics."

22 Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 3. The results of research by Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan (presented in *Why Civil Resistance Works*) provide empirical support for this assertion.

23 Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 113; Gandhi, *Constructive Programme*, 28.

24 Gene Sharp, *Self-Liberation*, 36. See also Mark A. Mattaini and Kristen N. Atkinson, "Constructive Noncooperation: Living in Truth."

25 Kurt Lewin, "Defining the 'Field at a Given Time.'" Force field analysis is widely used in community and service planning, as well as in the field of business. Examples of the former include Richard W. Moore et al., *California Integrated Service Delivery Evaluation Report. Phase 1: Executive Summary*; and Sea-Change Partners, "Local Governance, Transparency and Anti-Corruption in Community-Driven Development in Vietnam"; for the latter, see, for example, Kay Hooi (Alan) Keoy, Khalid Hafeez, and Jawed Siddiqi, "An Empirical Study of the Key Drivers and Inhibitors Towards E-Business Adoption: A Multi-Country Comparison."

26 See, for example, George Brager and Stephen Holloway, "Assessing Prospects for Organizational Change: The Uses of Force Field Analysis," and Mattaini, *More Than a Thousand Words*.

27 Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan report that such defections are key variables in the success of many nonviolent campaigns: see *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 46–50.

28 Anne E. Brodsky, *With All Our Strength: The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan*, 103–50. See also "RAWA's Social Activities," RAWA website, 1997–2013, http://www.rawa.org/s.html.

29 Sakena Yacoobi, "Building a Better Future for Afghanistan Through Female Education."

30 Masoud Popalzai, "Official: 160 Girls Poisoned at Afghan School," CNN, May 29, 2012, http://articles.cnn.com/2012-05-29/asia/world_asia_afghanistan-girls-poisoned_1_afghan-girls-taliban-school-closure?_s=PM:ASIA; Dina Fine Maron, "Home Schooling"; Paul Wiseman, "Afghan Girls Stay in School Despite Attacks," *USA Today*, May 28, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/afghanistan/2010-05-27-afghanistan-girls_N.htm.

31 There is a large literature on the power of graphic visualization methods, including diagramming, for presenting and analyzing complexity. For more on such methods, which have proven particularly useful in communicating complexity in ecological sciences, see Mattaini, *More Than a Thousand Words*.

32 The term "common contingency" is used in this book; the technical term for such contingency arrangements is macrocontingency. I am working here with the original definition of macrocontingencies in behavioural systems analysis, as developed by Jerome D. Ulman, "Toward a More Complete Science of Human Behavior: Behaviorology Plus Institutional Economics." There are other definitions in this evolving area, but I see Ulman's as the most conceptually defensible.

33 I draw here on the considerable journalistic and historical record, but also on extensive contacts with Filipino Americans over two decades bracketing the revolution and a visit to the country a few days after Marcos's fall, a time of breathtaking celebration and hope.

34 Joshua Paulson, "People Power Against the Philippine Dictator—1986"; Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict."

35 For an in-depth analysis of this era in Philippine history, see Eva-Lotta E. Hedman, *In the Name of Civil Society: From Free Election Movements to People Power in the Philippines.*

36 Ibid.

37 The diagram in figure 3 does not include all actors; details of the actions of the leadership cadre, Cardinal Sin, and international players, for example, are not shown but would be included in a fully detailed diagram. The purpose of this figure is to demonstrate the methodology in an accessible way. Those involved on the ground in a particular conflict should diagram the situation in as complete a manner as possible.

38 Alex Ragir, "Social Media Flexes Muscle in Mexican Election Protests," PBS Media Shift, July 5, 2012, http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2012/07/social-media-flexes-muscle-in-mexican-election-protests187.html; Marta Molina, "Yo Soy 132's Creativity Revives Mexican Politics."

39 Terry Messman, "Discovering the Unexpected Power of Nonviolence: Street Spirit Interview with Erica Chenoweth."

40 Quoted in Michael N. Nagler, *The Search for a Nonviolent Future: A Promise of Peace for Ourselves, Our Families, and Our World,* 87.

41 Sigrid S. Glenn, "Contingencies and Metacontingencies: Relations Among Behavioral, Cultural, and Biological Evolution."

42 Houmanfar, Rodrigues, and Ward, "Emergence and Metacontingency"; Mattaini, "Will Cultural Analysis Become a Science?"

43 Houmanfar, Rodrigues, and Ward, “Emergence and Metacontingency.”

44 Glenn, “Contingencies and Metacontingencies.”

45 The central importance of these rules has been established in the work of Ramona Houmanfar and her colleagues. See, for example, Houmanfar, Rodrigues, and Ward, “Emergence and Metacontingency,” and Ramona Houmanfar, N. Joseph Rodrigues, and Gregory S. Smith, “An Interdisciplinary Account of Martyrdom as a Religious Practice.”

5

SUSTAINING RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS: SOLIDARITY, DISCIPLINE, AND COURAGE

1 For a discussion, see Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,* 30–61.

2 See Terry Messman, “Discovering the Unexpected Power of Nonviolence: Street Spirit Interview with Erica Chenoweth.” On one-time mass mobilizations, see Frances Fox Piven, *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America,* 37.

3 Robert L. Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals,* 118–19.

4 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* 39–41.

5 Gene Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth-Century Practice and Twenty-First-Century Potential,* 387–89.

6 Ibid., 388.

7 Barbara Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 254; Saul D. Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals,* 128.

8 Majken Jul Sørenson, “Humor As a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression.”

9 Malcolm Gladwell, “Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted,” 44.

10 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place,* 4.

11 Sørenson, “Humor As a Serious Strategy,” 185.

12 See Eric L. Hirsch, “Sacrifice for the Cause: Group Processes, Recruitment, and Commitment in a Student Social Movement”; and Lisbeth B. Schorr, *Common Purpose: Strengthening Families and Neighborhoods to Rebuild America,* 3–21.

13 Dorothy Day, quoted in Robert Coles, *Dorothy Day: A Radical Devotion*, 34–35.

14 Murray Sidman, *Coercion and Its Fallout,* 101–21, 209–20.

15 *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,* 161–62; Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* 80.

16 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 388.

17 Aubrey C. Daniels, *Bringing Out the Best in People*, 150–76; and Stephen Ray Flora, *The Power of Reinforcement*, 117–23.

18 For straightforward methods easily adaptable to any small group, see Sheldon Rose, *Group Therapy: A Behavioral Approach*, and *Working with Adults in Groups*; and Mark A. Mattaini, *More Than a Thousand Words*.

19 Anthony Biglan and Dennis D. Embry, “Evidence-Based Kernels: Fundamental Units of Behavioral Influence.”

20 Joseph Lelyveld, *Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle with India,* 164–65, 331–32.

21 David Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond: Nonviolence for a New Political Age,* 91–95.

22 Aubrey C. Daniels, *Bringing Out the Best in People,* 25–33.

23 Depending on the setting, various other terms have been used to refer to political education, including *liberatory education*, *popular education* (or *pop ed*), *conscientization*, and *critical pedagogy*.

24 Gandhi, *Constructive Programme*, 3, 15.

25 Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century,* 28.

26 Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, 48.

27 Mary Phillips Manke, "Liberatory Education: Myles Horton's 'American' Model."

28 John M. Collins, *Military Strategy: Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives,* 170.

29 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 393.

30 Scott Wimberley, *Special Forces Guerrilla Warfare Manual*, 160.

31 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle,* 368–70; Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium,* 263–69.

32 *The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 160–65; Scott Wimberley, *Special Forces Guerrilla Warfare Manual*, 160

33 Mohandas Gandhi, quoted in Mahadev Desai, *Day-to-Day with Gandhi: Secretary's Diary*, 1:260.

34 Mark R. Dixon et al., "Terrorism and Relational Frame Theory"; Joseph E. Spradlin, Kathryn J. Saunders, and Richard R. Saunders, "The Stability of Equivalence Classes."

35 Neal Bruss and Donaldo P. Macedo, "Toward a Pedagogy of the Question: Conversations with Paulo Freire."

36 Ellen Pence and Michael Paymar, *Education Groups for Men Who Batter: The Duluth Model,* 1–5.

37 Those performing the actions may also be incorporated into equivalences with the actions themselves. In the context of political education, this may have both advantages and disadvantages and should therefore be carefully considered.

38 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha in South Africa*, 287.

39 See Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless."

40 Kristen N. Atkinson and Mark A. Mattaini, "Constructive Noncooperation as Political Resistance."

41 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 392.

42 For data supporting this position, see Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* 202, 218.

43 Sidman, *Coercion and Its Fallout,* 209–14.

44 Relatively simple procedures for managing anger (such as stress inoculation) can be incorporated into training simulations. See, for example, Mark A. Mattaini, *Peace Power for Adolescents: Strategies for a Culture of Nonviolence*; and Raymond W. Novaco, "Stress Inoculation: A Cognitive Therapy for Anger and Its Application to a Case Of Depression," and "Perspectives on Anger Treatment: Discussion and Commentary."

45 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 390 (emphasis added).

46 Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, 28.

47 Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 15.

48 Ibid.

49 See Ken Butigan, "NATO Protests Reveal Need for Nonviolent Discipline," and, for the Chicago Principles, http://www.chicagomassaction.org/g-cmaimages/Chicago_Principles.pdf.

50 For detailed examples, see Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle,* chaps. 5–27*.* According to Jamila Raqib, executive director of Sharp's Albert Einstein Institution, Sharp recently noted the revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia as contemporary examples, at least up through 2012.

51 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle,* 392–94.

52 Embry and Biglan, "Evidence-Based Kernels," 88.

53 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle,* 393.

54 For empirical research on social learning approaches, see Albert Bandura, “Exercise of Human Agency Through Collective Efficacy”; and Steven C. Hayes, Barbara S. Kohlenberg, and Susan M. Melancon, “Avoiding and Altering Rule-Control as a Strategy of Clinical Intervention.”

55 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Mohandas Gandhi: Essential Writings,* 125–26.

56 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 369; Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 79.

57 See, for example, Steven C. Hayes, Victoria M. Follette, and Marsha M. Linehan, eds., *Mindfulness and Acceptance: Expanding the Cognitive-Behavioral Tradition*; Steven C. Hayes, Frank W. Bond, and Dermot Barnes-Holmes, eds., *Acceptance and Mindfulness at Work: Applying Acceptance and Commitment Therapy and Relational Frame Theory to Organizational Behavior*; and Anthony Biglan, “Increasing Psychological Flexibility to Influence Cultural Evolution.”

58 The term *defusing* refers to breaking the pattern in which emotion and action are fused—that is, are treated as inseparable. See Steven C. Hayes, Kirk D. Strosahl, and Kelly G. Wilson, *Acceptance and Commitment Therapy: The Process and Practice of Mindful Change,* 243.

59 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 388.

60 Wimberley, *Special Forces Guerrilla Warfare Manual*, 160–61.

61 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 424.

62 Ibid.

63 Holly Hazlett-Stevens and Michelle G. Craske, “Live (*In Vivo*) Exposure.”

64 On the use of flooding in cognitive behaviour therapy, see Lori A. Zoellner, Jonathan S. Abramowitz, Sally A. Moore, and David M. Slagle, “Flooding.” Even virtual reality exposure can be effective: see Thomas D. Parsons and Albert A. Rizzoa, “Affective Outcomes of Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy for Anxiety and Specific Phobias: A Meta-analysis.”

65 The phrase is from the title of Larry Dressler’s *Standing in the Fire: Leading High-Heat Meetings with Clarity, Calm, and Courage* (San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 2010), but it has been used colloquially elsewhere.

66 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 253–54 (emphasis added).

6

ORGANIZATION AND LEADERSHIP IN RESISTANCE MOVEMENTS

1 Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century,* 27.

2 David Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond: Nonviolence for a New Political Age*, 193–95.

3 Saul D. Alinsky, *Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals*, 113; Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 26.

4 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond,* 194, referencing Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, *Poor People’s Movements: Why They Succeed, How They Fail*, 77, 309.

5 Frances Fox Piven, *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America*, 29.

6 Marshall Ganz, *Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in the California Farm Worker Movement,* 239–54.

7 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* 26–30.

8 Other frameworks can also be useful. For example, *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* divides participation in insurgencies into movement leaders, combatants, political cadre, auxiliaries, and mass population base, each of which has clear parallels in nonviolent struggle.

9 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 27.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 27–28; *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 31; Collins, *Military Strategy*, 170.

12 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* 28.

13 Ibid., 29. For more on the power of the civilian population, see Erica Chenoweth and. Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*.

14 See Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 30-61, for an extensive discussion of participation.

15 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond,* 195.

16 Malcolm Gladwell, "Small Change: Why the Revolution Will Not Be Tweeted."

17 Abdulrazaq A. Imam, "The Shaping of a Saint-President: Latent Clues from Nelson Mandela's Autobiography."

18 The African National Congress was not exclusively nonviolent, and a plausible case can be made that the violence that occurred may have delayed the outcome. There is no clear evidence that violence and acts of terror had a positive impact internally or externally. Mass nonviolent protests over several decades did, however, make the country increasingly ungovernable, and Mandela ultimately came to be viewed as a sort of secular saint as a result of his eventual commitment to a nonviolent but inescapable transfer of power. Third-party support contributing to the end of apartheid was aroused primarily through witnessing the injustices to and suffering of the population. Some examples are the Sharpeville and Soweto massacres; the murder of Steve Biko, memorialized in the movie *Cry Freedom*; and Mandela's refusal to compromise full democracy in order to be released from jail.

19 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 27.

20 See Ganz, *Why David Sometimes Wins*; see also Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 73.

21 Ganz, *Why David Sometimes Wins*, 243–48.

22 Piven, *Challenging Authority*, 110.

23 Gene Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth-Century Practice and Twenty-First-Century Potential*, 428.

24 Robert L. Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals,* 108.

25 Ibid., 114.

26 *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, 243.

27 In general, behavioural systems research over many years has found that framing behaviour in terms of enduring personality "traits" has been less consistent with the evidence than thinking in terms of repertoires that emerge from history, person, and environment in transaction. See, for example, Gary Novak, *Developmental Psychology: Dynamical Systems and Behavior Analysis*; Henry D. Schlinger Jr., *A Behavior Analytic View of Child Development*, 183–87; Sidney W. Bijou, *Behavior Analysis of Child Development,* 29–48; and Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda, "Toward a Unified Theory of Personality: Integrating Dispositions and Processing Dynamics Within the Cognitive-Affective Processing System," 208–41.

28 Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* 107–15.

29 Ramona Houmanfar, N. Joseph Rodrigues, and Gregory S. Smith, "Role of Communication Networks in Behavioral Systems Analysis," 260.

30 This self-generation, and the self-organization of communication networks discussed next, are the result of relational responding; people basically develop their own rules based on equivalence

relations (beliefs, values) that they have already learned. See Houmanfar, Rodrigues and Smith, "Role of Communication Networks," for details.

31 See ibid., and see M. E. Malott, *Paradox of Organizational Change: Engineering Organizations with Behavioral Systems Analysis,* 169–76.

32 See, for example, Aubrey C. Daniels, *Bringing Out the Best in People*; Steven Ray Flora, *The Power of Reinforcement*; and Susan M. Schneider, *The Science of Consequences: How They Affect Genes, Change the Brain, and Impact Our World.*

33 Judith L. Komaki, *Leadership from an Operant Perspective,* 79–130; Daniels, *Bringing Out the Best in People,* 222–27; Malott, *Paradox of Organizational Change,* 165–79.

34 Daniels, *Bringing Out the Best in People*, 163.

35 Ibid., 151.

36 Ibid., 53–62.

37 Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 114.

38 Murray Sidman, *Coercion and Its Fallout.*

39 For discussions of circle processes, see, for example, Jennifer Ball, Wayne Caldwell, and Kay Pranis, *Doing Democracy with Circles: Engaging Communities in Public Planning*; Kay Pranis, Barry Stuart, and Mark Wedge, *Peacemaking Circles: From Crime to Community*; Carolyn Boyes-Watson, *Peacemaking Circles and Urban Youth: Bringing Justice Home*; and Nancy Riestenberg, *Circle in the Square: Building Community and Repairing Harm in School.* Circle processes have their origin in Indigenous practices in many parts of the world; practices of First Nations, American Indian, and Maori peoples have been particularly influential in the developed world. Circles have been extensively used in conflict resolution, peacebuilding, alternative justice and disciplinary processes, and youth development work. Core circle processes include a physical arrangement (usually a circle) in which all have an equal voice, one or more circle keepers to guide the process, the development of shared guidelines and statements of values, and procedures such as the use of a talking piece that is handed around the circle, with only the person holding the talking piece being allowed to speak. Well-implemented circles are demonstrably useful in encouraging respectful listening and communication and, as the references cited above and others indicate, have often demonstrated more powerful effects than Western organizational practices.

40 Ackerman and Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* 26–30; Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle,* 438–40; Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* 107–15 (integrated with material on leadership)

41 Ganz, *Why David Sometimes Wins,* 14–19.

42 Ibid., 17–19.

43 Ibid., 18.

44 See, for example, Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Society of Friends, *Faith and Practice.*

45 See, for example, Ball, Caldwell, and Pranis, *Doing Democracy with Circles.*

46 Ganz, *Why David Sometimes Wins,* 18.

47 Ibid., 248–51.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., 18–19.

50 For discussions of praxis, see, for example, Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*; Ralph Summy, "Nonviolent Politics: From Praxis to Research to Classroom to Praxis to Research to Classroom"; and Karen Sihra, "Philosophical Contributions of Gandhi's Ideas on Non-violence."

51 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Mohandas Gandhi: Essential Writings,* 51.

PART TWO

STRATEGIC OPTIONS

1 Gene Sharp, *The Methods of Nonviolent Action*; Gene Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth-Century Practice and Twenty-First-Century Potential.*

2 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 51.

3 Ibid., 51–54; Sharp, *The Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 109–82.

4 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 54–61.

5 Ibid., 62–65.

6 Ibid., 50 (emphasis in the original).

7

CONSTRUCTIVE NONCOOPERATION

1 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Constructive Programme: Its Meaning and Place.*

2 Ibid., 29.

3 Björn Hettne, "The Vitality of Gandhian Tradition," 230.

4 For further discussion, see Mohandas K. Gandhi, "Backward and Untouchable Classes"; Gandhi, *Constructive Programme*; and Michael N. Nagler, *The Search for a Nonviolent Future: A Promise of Peace for Ourselves, Our Families, and Our World.*

5 Jonathan Schell, *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People*, 138.

6 Gandhi, *Constructive Programme*, 6.

7 Ibid., 14.

8 Ibid., 15.

9 Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 112.

10 Earlier discussions of the importance of constructive approaches for shaping desired and novel behaviour and behavioural systems are relevant here.

11 Barbara Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 205.

12 Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, 69.

13 Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler, *Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: The Dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century*, 53n18.

14 Schell, *Unconquerable World*, 387.

15 Ibid., 352–53.

16 See the discussion in Murray Sidman, *Coercion and Its Fallout*, 209–20.

17 Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 50. See also Schell, *Unconquerable World*, chap. 7.

18 Václav Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 45.

19 See, for example, Anthony Nevin, "The Inertia of Affluence," and Lyle K. Grant, "Sustainability: From Excess to Aesthetics."

20 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 58–59.

21 Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 116.

22 Nevin, "Inertia of Affluence."

23 See Lyle K. Grant, "Peak Oil as a Behavioral Problem"; Nevin, "Inertia of Affluence." Delay discounting can be defined as "the devaluing of future outcomes relative to present outcomes": see Andrea M. Angott. "What Causes Delay Discounting?" (PhD dissertation, University of

Michigan, 2010, 1; available at http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/78754/aangott_1.pdf?sequence=1).

24 Schell, *Unconquerable World,* 196.

25 Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 85.

26 Mohammed Jamjoom, "Driving Campaign for Saudi Women Challenges Custom," CNN.com, June 20, 2011, http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/06/17/saudi.women.drivers.

27 "Women in Saudi Arabia to Vote and Run in Elections," BBC News Middle East, September 25, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-15052030.

28 Schell, *Unconquerable World*, 196.

29 Amrut Nakhre, "Meanings of Nonviolence: A Study of Satyagrahi Attitudes."

30 Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 105.

31 On those interdependencies, see Piven, *Challenging Authority.* 26–31.

32 Israel Goldiamond, "Toward a Constructional Approach to Social Problems: Ethical and Constitutional Issues Raised by Applied Behavior Analysis."

33 Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 41.

34 Ibid., 84.

35 As we saw in 4 (in the section titled "Act, Practice or Scene?"), strategic action may centre on a single action, whether individual or collective, that may require few or no repetitions, such as the abdication of a dictator or attendance at a series of massive demonstrations over a relatively brief period of time. In most cases, however, strategic action requires attention to shaping and sustaining a set of interlocking practices within or among groups that extend over time. This is the reason why the diagrams in this book use the label "Action/Practice": either can be analyzed by means of behavioural systems analysis, although the analysis of practices is more complex.

36 Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 258.

37 See Michael A. Beer, "Violent and Nonviolent Struggle in Burma: Is a Unified Strategy Workable?"; Joshua Hammer, "Myanmar's Free Thinkers."

38 Hammer, "Myanmar's Free Thinkers," 30; "celebrate" appears in brackets in the original.

39 Richard Allen Greene, "Smiling Suu Kyi Lays Out 'Ambitious' Plan for Myanmar," CNN, June 14, 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/14/world/europe/switzerland-myanmar-suu-kyi/index.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn_latest+%28RSS%3A+Most+Recent%29.

40 Steven Lee Myers and Seth Mydans, "U.S. Restores Full Ties to Myanmar After Rapid Reforms," *New York Times*, January 13, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/world/asia/united-states-resumes-diplomatic-relations-with-myanmar.html?pagewanted=all.

41 Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 101.

42 See Gandhi, *Constructive Programme*; Havel, "The Power of the Powerless"; Schell, *Unconquerable World*.

43 See Mark A. Mattaini, "Ecosystems Theory."

44 Noshir S. Contractor, "Self-Organizing Systems Research in the Social Sciences: Reconciling the Metaphors and the Models."

45 Steve Coll, "The Casbah Coalition: Tunisia's Second Revolution."

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," 13.

49 Schell, *Unconquerable World*, 193.

50 Ibid., 198 (quoting Gyorgy Konrád).

51 Ibid., 195.

52 On assistance to workers, see ibid., 195. On the underground press, see Joshua Paulson, "Poland's Self-Liberation—1980-1989," 223–31. For a bibliography of resources on this period, see Ronald M. McCarthy and Gene Sharp, *Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide,* 448–52.

53 Mukulika Banerjee, *The Pathan Unarmed.*

54 Eknath Easwaran, *Nonviolent Soldier of Islam: Badshah Khan, a Man to Match His Mountains*; Mohammad Raqib, "The Muslim Pashtun Movement of the North-West Frontier of India—1930–34."

55 See "RAWA's Social Activities," RAWA website, 1997–2013, http://www.rawa.org/s.html.

56 Parallel structures are also commonly called "parallel institutions" (Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy*, 76) or "alternative institutions" (Peter Evans, "Is an Alternative Globalization Possible?" 276). In the case of very large structures, the military refers to "counterstates" or "shadow governments" (*The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,* 12).

57 Schell, *Unconquerable World,* 200.

58 Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 102.

59 Schell, *Unconquerable World,* 156–63.

60 Sharp, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 133.

61 Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Vietnams,* 133–38; see also Schell, *Unconquerable World,* 87.

62 Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 102.

63 See, for example, Rupert Ross, *Returning to the Teachings: Exploring Aboriginal Justice*; Berma Bushie, "Community Holistic Circle Healing"; and Jarem Sawatsky, *The Ethic of Traditional Communities and the Spirit of Healing Justice.*

64 For more on family group conferencing, see Mark S. Umbreit, *Family Group Conferencing: Implications for Crime Victims*; and Ted Wachtel, Terry O'Connell, and Ben Wachtel, *Restorative Justice Conferencing: Real Justice© and the Conferencing Handbook.*

65 Ross, *Returning to the Teachings,* 16–22.

66 Ibid., 27–51.

67 Bushie, "Community Holistic Circle Healing."

68 Many examples are presented in Ross, *Returning to the Teachings*; and in Centre for Justice and Reconciliation, *Restorative Justice Online,* http://www.restorativejustice.org/articlesdb/articles/6667 (see the sections on each continent).

69 For examples, see Thomas C. Holt, *Children of Fire: A History of African Americans*; and Linda Gordon, "Black and White Visions of Welfare: Women's Welfare Activism, 1890-1945."

70 For more detailed discussions, see Paul Finkelman, ed., *Encyclopedia of African American History, 1896 to the Present: From the Age of Segregation to the Twenty-First Century*; W. E. B. DuBois, ed., *Economic Co-operation Among Negro Americans.*

71 See Jerry Cates, "Compassion, Control, and Justice in Social Work History"; see also Jacqueline M. Moore, *Booker T. Washington, W. E. B. DuBois, and the Struggle for Racial Uplift.*

72 See, for example, Iris B. Carlton-LaNey, ed., *African American Leadership: An Empowerment Tradition in Social Welfare History*; and Gordon, "Black and White Visions of Welfare."

73 Tricia Bent-Goodley, "Ida B. Wells-Barnett: An Uncompromising Style."

74 Joyce G. Dickerson, "Margaret Murray Washington."

75 Cates, "Compassion, Control, and Justice."

76 Jerome H. Schiele, M. Sebrena Jackson, and Colita Nichols Fairfax, "Maggie Lena Walker and African American Community Development."

77 Gordon, “Black and White Visions of Welfare.”

78 George Breitman, ed., *Malcolm X Speaks: Selected Speeches and Statements*; Dean E. Robinson, *Black Nationalism in American Politics and Thought*.

79 Here I am paraphrasing Juan Segundo, as discussed in Paul Farmer, *Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor*, 41.

8

NONVIOLENT PERSUASION AND PROTEST

1 Gene Sharp, *The Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 118.

2 Gene Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice and Twenty-First Century Potential*, 54.

3 Technically, these are the positive reinforcement and negative reinforcement processes.

4 Richard W. Malott, “The Achievement of Evasive Goals: Control by Rules Describing Contingencies That are Not Direct Acting,” 269–322; Hayne W. Reese, “Rules and Rule-Governance: Cognitive and Behavioristic Views,” 34–41.

5 Jonathan Schell, *The Unconquerable World: Power, Nonviolence, and the Will of the People*, 64.

6 Mao Tse-tung, “On Guerrilla Warfare,” http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/works/1937/guerrilla-warfare/ch01.htm.

7 Barbara Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium*, 255.

8 Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,” 32–37.

9 The behavioural dynamic associated with advocacy as we use it here is the positive reinforcement process; protest is rooted in negative reinforcement. The two are procedurally distinct but not entirely technically distinct, since each involves the transition from a less desired to a more desired state.

10 See Mike Eichler, *Consensus Organizing: Building Communities of Mutual Self-Interest,* for a thorough discussion of strategic and tactical approaches appropriate to such situations.

11 Gene Sharp, *From Dictatorship to Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for Liberation*, 9–14.

12 In reality, the threat itself is an aversive condition from which a person or group wants to escape, so avoidance is a special case of escape.

13 Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle*, 397.

14 John Lewis, with Michael D’Orso, *Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement*, 73.

15 Sharp, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 118.

16 Stephan and Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works,” 20.

17 As discussed in earlier chapters, spontaneous mobilization without underlying strategic planning may produce unpredictable results. There are multiple examples of the value of mass mobilization as one part of a comprehensive strategic campaign. One example is the Stonewall riots, which energized the movement for queer rights: while spontaneous, the riots occurred in the context of a long history of quieter organizing and constructive noncooperation. Sometimes, however, the outcomes of disorganized mass mobilization may be worse than the original condition. The 1960s race riots in the United States provide one example, although some believe that the riots did bring attention to “the urban crisis.”

18 Stephan and Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works,” 18. See also the analysis in 11 of this volume.

19 Robert L. Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals,* 79.

20 Mark R. Dixon et al., "Terrorism and Relational Frame Theory"; Joseph E. Spradlin, Kathryn J. Saunders, and Richard R. Saunders, "The Stability of Equivalence Classes."

21 See, for example, Michael Grunwald, "Katrina: A Man-Made Disaster," Time, November 24, 2010, http://www.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2032304_2032746_2035982,00.html.

22 See Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* chap. 8.

23 Even more accurate from a behavioural systems perspective would be the term *motivative operations*.

24 Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, 77.

25 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,* 205–12.

26 Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict,* 15. For more on the relationship of hate propaganda and genocide, see, for example, David Yanagizawa-Drott, "Propaganda and Conflict: Theory and Evidence from the Rwandan Genocide"; and Wibke Kristin Timmermann, "The Relationship Between Hate Propaganda and Incitement to Genocide: A New Trend in International Law Towards Criminalization of Hate Propaganda?"

27 *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,* 160.

28 Scott Wimberley, *Special Forces Guerrilla Warfare Manual,* 159.

29 *The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,* 160–65.

30 Wimberley, *Special Forces Guerrilla Warfare Manual,* 160.

31 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 201.

32 William Gamson, *The Strategy of Social Protest*, 147.

33 See, for example, Alan R. Andreasen, *Social Marketing in the Twenty-First Century*.

34 On *samizdat*, see Havel, "The Power of the Powerless," 86–88. For materials related to print media and the arts, see Ronald M. McCarthy and Gene Sharp, *Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide,* 495–502.

35 In contemporary Burma, where overt statements of resistance may be too dangerous, visual arts are an important medium for protest; see Joshua Hammer, "Myanmar's Free Thinkers."

36 Ayesha Chugh, "Iranian Hip Hop: Voice of Resistance."

37 Nadine Bloch, "The Arts of Protest: 5 Ways the Syrians Resist Creatively."

38 Andrew E. Kramer and Michael Schwirtz, "Protesters in Moscow Alter Approach to Avoid Arrests," *New York Times*, May 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/10/world/europe/protesters-in-moscow-walk-softly-carry-no-sticks.html?_r=0.

39 Ibid. See also Bloch, "The Arts of Protest"; and Marta Molina, "Yo Soy 132's Creativity Revives Mexican Politics."

40 *U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual,* 163–65.

41 Fonda L. Sanford and Stephen B. Fawcett, "Consequence Analysis: Its Effects on Verbal Statements About an Environmental Project." This and the second study were relatively simply pretest and posttest experiments, whereas the third was a fully randomized experiment that involved a control group.

42 Sarah K. Moore and Mark A. Mattaini, "Consequence Analysis: An On-line Replication."

43 Sarah K. Moore, "NY Social Work Students' Attitudes Toward a Harm Reduction Approach to Substance Use Treatment."

44 These events are playing out as this book is written; history may come to see them differently. I have integrated material here from a review of related content in the *New York Times* and *The Times of India* over the course of 2011, as well as some material from the BBC, CNN, and online sources.

45 James Burke, “Corruption in India: ‘All Your Life You Pay for Things That Should Be Free,’” *The Guardian*, August 19, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/19/corruption-india-anna-hazare.

46 Jim Yardley and Vikas Bajaj, “Lower House of Indian Parliament Passes Indian Anti-corruption Measure,” *New York Times*, December 28, 2011, http://mobile.nytimes.com/article?a=885138&f=110.

47 Major sources for this section include Joshua Paulson, “Removing the Dictator in Serbia—1990–2000”; Ivan Vejvoda, “Civil Society Versus Slobodan Milošević: Serbia, 1991–2000”; and Majken Jul Sørenson, “Humor as a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression,” as well as materials from the *New York Times* over the course of the 1990s.

48 Sørenson, “Humor as a Serious Strategy,” 179.

49 Ibid., 181.

50 Vejvoda, “Civil Society Versus Slobodan Milošević,” 314.

51 Paulson, “Removing the Dictator in Serbia,” 316.

52 Vejvoda, “Civil Society Versus Slobodan Milošević.”

53 Sørenson, “Humor as a Serious Strategy,” 175.

54 Ibid., 176.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., 180.

57 Major sources for this section include Christina Fink, “The Moment of the Monks”; Christina Fink, *Living Silence: Burma Under Military Rule*; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*; and Joshua Paulson, “Burmese Defy the Military Dictators,” as well as news reports. Note that despite the appellation, most Burmese monks wear crimson rather than saffron robes.

58 The timeline in this section is drawn largely from Fink, “Moment of the Monks.”

59 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* 216.

60 Ibid., 184.

61 Fink, “Moment of the Monks.”

62 Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict*, chap. 2.

63 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* 189. Because of her father’s history, Suu Kyi had, and continues to have, a strong attachment to the military; she also believes that the military should remain separate from internal political issues.

64 Mary Callahan, *Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma*, 221.

65 There is reason to believe, from reports of the monks’ demonstrations in 2007, that at least some of the monks hoped that their calls for universal brotherhood and concern for the suffering would have a persuasive impact on some in the regime as well. Arguably, in the long run, this has proved true.

9

DISRUPTIVE NONCOOPERATION

1 Gene Sharp, *The Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 183–84.

2 Majken Jul Sørenson, “Humor as a Serious Strategy of Nonviolent Resistance to Oppression” 178.

3 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *“Hind Swaraj” and Other Writings*, 114.

4 Schell, *Unconquerable World*, 127.

5 Frances Fox Piven, *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America*, 88.

6 Gene Sharp, *The Methods of Nonviolent Action.*

7 Ibid., 184.

8 Ibid., 188; Charles Loch Mowat, *Britain Between the Wars, 1918–1940,* 64.

9 Charles C. Mann, *1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus,* 373.

10 Joanne Shenandoah, *Peacemaker's Journey*, CD liner notes (Boulder, CO: Silver Wave Records, 2000).

11 See Stan Steiner, *The New Indians*, 220. See also Akwesasne Notes, ed., *Basic Call to Consciousness*. It is worth noting that clan descent among the Haudenosaunee was matrilineal and that another specification of the Great Law was that while women could not themselves serve as *sachem*s, only women could select these leaders. Although *sachem* is often translated "chief," *sachems* were more conduits of the will of the people than the term *chief* tends to suggest in European cultures.

12 Steiner, *New Indians*, 220.

13 For more on the Québec student strike, see Benjamin Giguère and R. N. Lalonde, "Why Do Students Strike? Direct and Indirect Determinants of Collective Action Participation"; Global Nonviolent Action Database, "Quebec Students Strike Against Budget Cuts, 2004," http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/quebec-students-strike-against-budget-cuts-2004; and Peggy Curran, "A Year After Charest's Bungle, Who'll Blink First?" *Montreal Gazette*, March 30, 2005, and "Charest Government Weakened by Quebec Student Strike," *University Affairs*, May 2005, http://www.universityaffairs.ca/charest-government-weakened-by-quebec-student-strike.aspx.

14 Sharp, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 219–20, 257.

15 See the discussion in ibid., 219–55.

16 For more on the Montgomery bus boycott, see Clayborne Carson et al., *Civil Rights Chronicle: The African-American Struggle for Freedom*; and Paul Finkelman, ed., *Encyclopedia of African American History, 1896 to the Present: From the Age of Segregation to the Twenty-First Century.*

17 Although some sources suggest that Parks's refusal was planned in advance, this does not appear consistent with her own report or those of others who were personally involved. See Carson et al., *Civil Rights Chronicle,* 136–39. The question of whether her action was spontaneous or deliberate is not, however, central to our discussion here.

18 National City Lines was already infamous not only for segregation but also for participation in a conspiracy to establish a transit monopoly, limit the availability of alternative forms of mass transportation, and increase the demand for gasoline-powered vehicles. See Edwin Black, *Internal Combustion: How Corporations and Governments Addicted the World to Oil and Derailed the Alternatives*, chap. 10 ("The GM Conspiracy").

19 Sharp, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 225.

20 Chris Hedges and Joe Sacco, *Days of Destruction, Days of Revolt*; Paul Farmer, *Pathologies of Power: Health, Human Rights, and the New War on the Poor.*

21 Lyle K. Grant, "Sustainability: From Excess to Aesthetics" and "Can We Consume Our Way Out of Climate Change? A Call for Analysis."

22 Ibid.

23 Alan Weisman, *Gaviotas: A Village to Reinvent the World*.

24 For an introduction to the Awramba Community, which has not yet been extensively documented, see Eden Habtamu, "Zumra Nuru: His Awramba Community and His Quest for Utopia." Ezega, May 4, 2009, http://www.ezega.com/news/NewsDetails.aspx?Page=news&NewsID=1472.

25 Richard W. Malott, "Saving the World with Behavioral Communitarianism: Los Horcones"; B. F. Skinner, *Walden Two*.

26 See, for example, Sharp, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 257–84. Ronald M. McCarthy and Gene Sharp, *Nonviolent Action: A Research Guide,* lists numerous publications on strikes from around the world among the thousands of entries in the volume: see the subject index, 682–83.

27 Sharp, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 263.

28 See, in particular, Marshall Ganz, *Why David Sometimes Wins: Leadership, Organization, and Strategy in the California Farm Worker Movement,* 119–66; David Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond: Nonviolence for a New Political Age,* 79–81.

29 Ganz, *Why David Sometimes Wins,* 121.

30 Ibid., 129–30, 132–36.

31 Sharp, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 275.

32 See Wilfrid H. Crook, "The Revolutionary Logic of the General Strike," 656. McCarthy and Sharp, *Nonviolent Action,* contains a wealth of examples of general strikes (see the index, 665).

33 Wilfrid H. Crook, *The General Strike: A Study of Labor's Tragic Weapon in Theory and Practice*; J. M. Bumsted (1994). *The Winnipeg General Strike of 1919: An Illustrated History*; Reinhold Kramer and Tom Mitchell, *When the State Trembled: How A. J. Andrews and the Citizens' Committee Broke the Winnipeg General Strike.*

34 The Royal Commission to Inquire Into and Report Upon Industrial Relations in Canada, often referred to as the Mathers Commission (after Thomas Graham Mathers, its chair), had been convened in March of that year to investigate unsettled labour relations in the country. Its report, filed in July, concluded that the "chief causes of discontentment were: unemployment, the rising cost of living, long working hours, lack of collective bargaining rights, the housing shortage, restrictions on freedom of speech and the press, and unequal educational opportunities." See "1919: The Winnipeg General Strike," http://1919winnipeggeneralstrike.blogspot.ca/2009/07/1-july-1919-mathers-commission.html.

35 Joseph Lelyveld, *Great Soul: Mahatma Gandhi and His Struggle with India*; "The Life and Times of Nelson Mandela: Biography," Nelson Mandela Centre of Memory, 2013, http://www.nelsonmandela.org/index.php/memory/views/biography/; Celia W. Dugger, "Season of Labor Unrest Empties South African Hospitals," *New York Times,* August 27, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/28/world/africa/28safrica.html.

36 Mary Elizabeth King, "Czechoslovakia's Two-Hour General Strike."

37 Sharp, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 285.

38 Lawrence Henry Gipson, *The Triumphant Empire: Britain Sails into the Storm, 1770–1776,* 231.

39 See, for example, Linda Pertusati, *In Defense of Mohawk Land: Ethnopolitical Conflict in Native North America*; Winona LaDuke, *All Our Relations: Native Struggles for Land and Life*; and Vine Deloria Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle, *The Nations Within: The Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty.*

40 Judith Nies, *Native American History: A Chronology of a Culture's Vast Achievements and Their Links to World Events.*

41 Sharp, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 288.

42 Akwesasne Notes, ed., *Basic Call to Consciousness.*

43 R. C. Gordon-McCutchan, *The Taos Indians and the Struggle for Blue Lake.*

44 Deloria and Lytle, *The Nations Within.*

45 Pertusati, *In Defense of Mohawk Land,* 84.

46 Christine T. Lowery, "Social Justice and International Human Rights"; *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*; Vine Deloria Jr., *God Is Red: A Native View of Religion.*

47 Sharp, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 291–92.

48 For more on election boycotts with little impact, see "The Boycott Blunder," editorial, *Los Angeles Times*, September 13, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/13/opinion/la-ed-egypt-20100913; on the effectiveness of boycotts, see Ian O. Smith, "Election Boycotts and Hybrid Regime Survival" (an abstract can be viewed at http://cps.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/05/30/0010414013488548.abstract).

49 Gandhi, *Constructive Programme*, 22, 26.

50 Guy Hershberger, *War, Peace, and Nonresistance: A Classic Statement of a Mennonite Peace Position in Faith and Practice,* 58–60, 190–96.

51 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond,* 26.

52 Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, 272, quoted in Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*, 26. Note here Neibuhr's attention to "the selfishness of human communities" rather than of individuals. This specifically raises the issue of systems dynamics in understanding both oppression and resistance.

53 Martin Luther King Jr., "My Pilgrimage to Nonviolence"; Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond,* 59.

54 Barbara Deming, *Revolution and Equilibrium,* 266 (emphasis in the original).

55 Murray Sidman, *Coercion and Its Fallout*, 1.

56 Mohandas Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War,* 2: 288.

57 Gene Sharp, "Skinner and Gandhi on Defeating Violence."

58 Congress Inquiry Committee report, quoted in Easwaran, *Nonviolent Soldier of Islam: Badshah Khan, a Man to Match His Mountains,* 122. See also Mohammad Raqib, "The Muslim Pashtun Movement of the North-West Frontier of India—1930-34."

59 See Gene Sharp, *The Dynamics of Nonviolent Action*, 521.

60 Piven, *Challenging Authority,* 144–46.

61 Mattaini, "Envisioning Cultural Practices"; Sigrid S. Glenn, "Contingencies and Metacontingencies: Relations Among Behavioral, Cultural, and Biological Evolution."

62 Ramona Houmanfar, N. Joseph Rodrigues, and Todd A. Ward, "Emergence and Metacontingency: Points of Contact and Departure." See also Sigrid S. Glenn, "Metacontingencies, Selection and OBM: Comments on 'Emergence and Metacontingency'"; Maria E. Malott and Sigrid S. Glenn, "Targets of Intervention in Cultural and Behavioral Change"; Ramona Houmanfar and N. Joseph Rodrigues, "The Metacontingency and the Behavioral Contingency: Points of Contact and Departure"; Mark A. Mattaini, "Will Cultural Analysis Become a Science?"; *Journal of Organizational Management*, Special Issue: Behavioral Systems Analysis; *Journal of Organizational Management*, Special Issue: Behavioral Systems: Understanding Complex Contingencies in Relation to Cultural Contingencies; and Mark A. Mattaini, "Ecosystems Theory."

63 Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed.*

64 Piven, *Challenging Authority,* 35.

65 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, 48; Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, "Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict," 20.

66 See, for example, Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 107.

67 Sources for this section include Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*; Amado Mendoza Jr., "'People Power' in the Philippines, 1983-86"; and Joshua Paulson, "People Power Against the Philippine Dictator—1986," as well as personal contacts in Manila immediately following the revolution and extensive contacts with Filipino Americans over two decades before and following the revolution.

68 See Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 155-64.

69 Cortright, *Gandhi and Beyond*. 137–44.

70 Ibid., 139–40.

71 Ibid., 90–91; Ganz, *Why David Sometimes Wins,* 239–54.

72 Michael Wilson and Deborah Silverton, *Salt of the Earth*. See also Larry R. Salomon, *Roots of Justice: Stories of Organizing in Communities of Color*, 31–40.

73 Quoted in Salomon, *Roots of Justice,* 38.

74 Salomon, *Roots of Justice,* 39.

75 Quoted in ibid., 38.

10

RESOURCE DISRUPTION AND RETALIATION

1 See, for example, David Graeber, *Direct Action: An Ethnography*, and James Tracy, *Direct Action: Radical Pacifism from the Union Eight to the Chicago Seven.*

2 For Sharp, nonviolent intervention refers to active forms of disruption, as opposed to noncooperation, which involves refusing to act.

3 Gene Sharp et al., *Waging Nonviolent Struggle: Twentieth Century Practice and Twenty-First Century Potential,* 63.

4 Gene Sharp, *The Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 383.

5 Ibid., 387.

6 Ibid., 389–90.

7 Ibid., 391–92, 412.

8 Ibid., 405–10. The occupation of Alcatraz might be viewed as an example of nonviolent land seizure, but the primary intention of the protesters does not appear to have been to “seize” land that was actively in use by the opponent but rather to reclaim territory that was once their own. In fact, the protesters offered to buy the land back from the government, for the original purchase price of a little under fifty cents an acre—a total of less than ten dollars.

9 Ibid., 358.

10 Frances Fox Piven, *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America*, 78–79.

11 Sharp, *Methods of Nonviolent Action*, 416–17.

12 Robert L. Helvey, *On Strategic Nonviolent Conflict: Thinking About the Fundamentals*, 9–18, 52–64.

13 Key sources drawn on here include Ervand Abrahamian, “Mass Protests in the Iranian Revolution, 1977–79”; Stephen Zunes, “Unarmed Resistance in the Middle East and North Africa”; and Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran.*

14 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,* chap. 4.

15 Ibid., 117.

16 Ibid., 218.

17 Ibid., 92–95; Abrahamian, “Mass Protests in the Iranian Revolution.”

18 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* chap. 4; Abrahamian, “Mass Protests in the Iranian Revolution.”

19 Abrahamian, “Mass Protests in the Iranian Revolution,” 174.

20 Ibid., citing Abbas Qarabaghi, *Hagayeg darbareh Behran-e Iran* [Truth concerning the Iranian crisis], 87.

21 Abrahamian, "Mass Protests in the Iranian Revolution," 174, quoting R. W. Apple, "Shah's Army Showing Stresses," *New York Times,* December 18, 1978.

22 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* chap. 4.

23 Ibid.

24 Abrahamian, "Mass Protests in the Iranian Revolution," 172–73; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* 107.

25 Kurzman, *Unthinkable Revolution in Iran,* 114.

26 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 106.

27 Daniel Zirker, "The Brazilian Church-State Crisis of 1980: Effective Nonviolent Action in a Military Dictatorship," 274. For more on base (basic) communities, see Madeleine Adriance, "Base Communities and Rural Mobilization in Northern Brazil"; and Joseph A. Page, *The Brazilians*.

28 Page, *Brazilians*; Zirker, "Brazilian Church-State Crisis"; Thomas E. Skidmore, *Brazil: Five Centuries of Change*.

29 *Jornal do Brazil*, November 8, 1980, 4, quoted in Zirker, "Brazilian Church-State Crisis," 266–67.

30 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 58–59.

31 For examples of resources that support nonviolent resistance, see Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* 222–25.

32 Ibid., 223.

33 John A. Nevin, "Retaliating Against Terrorists"; Mark A. Mattaini and Joseph Strickland, "Challenging Collective Violence: A Scientific Strategy."

34 Gene Sharp, "Skinner and Gandhi on Defeating Violence," 391.

35 Ibid., 391, quoting B. F. Skinner, *Walden Two*, 260–61.

36 See, for example, B. F. Skinner, *Science and Human Behavior*, 182–93; *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, 56–77; *About Behaviorism*, 61–64; and "The Design of Cultures," 39–50.

37 Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War,* 2:288.

38 Murray Sidman, *Coercion and Its Fallout*; Nathan H. Azrin and W. C. Holz, "Punishment"; Alan E. Kazdin, Behavior Modification in Applied Settings; Mattaini and Strickland, "Challenging Collective Violence."

39 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* 9, 201–27.

40 Sidman, *Coercion and Its Fallout,* 67–77.

41 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works,* 207.

42 Dominic Basulto, "The Internet's Culture of Nonviolent Retaliation," *Washington Post*, November 23, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/innovations/post/the-internets-culture-of-nonviolent-retaliation/2010/12/20/gIQA6pYgnN_blog.html.

43 Basulto, "The Internet's Culture of Nonviolent Retaliation."

44 See, for example, Canadian Security Intelligence Service, "Information Security Threats," CSIS website, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/prrts/nfrmtn/index-eng.asp.

11

TOWARD "UNDREAMT OF" DISCOVERIES

1 For more on the suffering caused by injustice, and efforts to relieve it, in some of the poorest parts of the world, see Paul Farmer, *Partner to the Poor: A Paul Farmer Reader*.

2 Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict.*

3 Mohandas K. Gandhi, "Equal Distribution," *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Online,* 79:134, http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/vol079.pdf. Item no. 137, written August 19, 1940, and published in English in *Harijan,* August 25, 1940.

4 Mahandas K. Gandhi, "Speech at Gandhi Seva Sangh Meeting—III," *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi Online,* 77:383, http://www.gandhiserve.org/cwmg/vol077.pdf. Item no. 426, February 22, 1940.

5 Marston Bates, *The Nature of Natural History,* 268–84.

6 Ibid., 279.

7 On the drag of the past, see Frances Fox Piven, *Challenging Authority: How Ordinary People Change America*, 35.

8 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works.*

9 Fred N. Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research*, 8.

10 Marston Bates, *The Nature of Natural History.*

11 Ibid. 277–79.

12 Mohandas K. Gandhi, *"Hind Swaraj" and Other Writings*, 114.

13 Piven, *Challenging Authority,* 144–46.

14 I include the technical term *macrocontingency* for congruence with the scientific literature.

15 In other words, the goal here is a nomothetic as opposed to an idiographic analysis.

16 Anthony Biglan, "Corporate Externalities: A Challenge to the Further Success of Prevention Science."

17 Anthony Biglan et al., *Helping Adolescents at Risk: Prevention of Multiple Problem Behaviors,* 215–21; Dennis D. Embry, "Community-Based Prevention Using Simple, Low-Cost, Evidence-Based Kernels and Behavior Vaccines," 577–78.

18 Mark P. Alavosius, "Accreditation of Sustained 'Green Behavior' Programs Within the Business Community."

19 For some dramatic examples, see Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed.*

20 Ramona Houmanfar, N. Joseph Rodrigues, and Todd A. Ward, "Emergence and Metacontingency: Points of Contact and Departure," 90–98.

21 Maria E. Malott, *Paradox of Organizational Change: Engineering Organizations with Behavioral Systems Analysis.*

22 For introductory information on time-series experiments, see Anthony Biglan, Dennis Ary, and Alexander C. Wagenaar, "The Value of Interrupted Time-Series Experiments for Community Intervention Research," and Mark A. Mattaini, "Single-System Studies."

23 National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine, *Facilitating Interdisciplinary Research.*

24 Chris M. Golde and George E. Walker, eds., *Envisioning the Future of Doctoral Education: Preparing Stewards of the Discipline,* 65–96, 422.

25 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 220.

26 Jennifer Ball, Wayne Caldwell, and Kay Pranis, *Doing Democracy with Circles: Engaging Communities in Public Planning.*

27 Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*, 227.

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